BICOM

On Tuesday 8 July BICOM Senior Visiting Fellow Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog briefed journalists on a BICOM conference call following the initiation of Operation Protective Edge to stop rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. The following is an edited transcript of his assessment. You can listen to the interview in full at www.bicom.org.uk/podcasts.

Introductory overview

We are in the middle of an escalating situation. On Monday more than 100 rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel. This morning [Tuesday] dozens more were fired. Israel scaled up its response yesterday night by hitting dozens of Hamas targets, all of them part of their military infrastructure such as launchers, offensive tunnels, headquarters and so on. Today, the IDF continues its response to the rocket attacks, and the Security Cabinet has approved the calling up of 40,000 reservists.

Initially the assessment in Israel was that Hamas is not interested in escalation and at a certain point would stop firing, as happened in the past. Recently the assessment has changed, based on intelligence, that at least the military wing of Hamas is interested in escalating the situation given the deep economic and political crisis of Hamas in Gaza. Hamas’s administration is economically bankrupt and unable to pay the salaries of public employees. The border crossing with Egypt is mostly closed and Hamas is politically isolated. Some people in the Hamas military leadership believe that by escalating the attacks up to a certain point, they can then extricate better terms for the movement. This could prove a costly miscalculation.

The situation on the ground is very sensitive since there are other factions who initially fired rockets and now Hamas has joined them and leads the firing. It is not clear if Hamas can control all the factions. The Egyptians are heavily involved in mediation but this seems so far to have failed. Since the overthrow of the Morsi government the leverage of Egypt on Hamas is more of a coercive leverage.

At this point the sides may find it hard to contain the current situation and we may see some further escalation. Both parties have various measures at their disposal to gradually escalate the situation. Israel could scale up its airstrikes, target military leaders and ultimately carry out a ground operation. As far as Hamas is concerned, they have initially fired in close proximity to Gaza, then up to a range of 40km, but they are already threatening to target Tel Aviv, for which they have several dozen rockets, if not several hundred.

I believe that there is no desire in Israel to escalate to the point of a ground operation. Until now the government acted with restraint but despite that, the rockets continued and the government felt little choice but to escalate the use of force. That’s why they declared a gradual scale up of operations and will not immediately send in ground troops. They hope to push Hamas towards a ceasefire.

That said, if airstrikes prove insufficient to stop the rockets then Israel may be forced to enter Gaza. The Prime Minister and senior leadership are not rushing into this and it is not their preferred option, but they are under mounting pressure. Ministers Lieberman, Bennett and the right wing are pressuring the Prime Minister to escalate the situation and crush Hamas. If hundreds of thousands of people continue to sit in shelters in Israel, then the situation could escalate further.

Where will Hamas’s escalation leave the unity deal?

Israel blamed Hamas for the kidnapping and murder of the three Israeli teenagers [whose bodies were discovered on 30 June]. We know that Abbas said to his close circle that if he is convinced Hamas is behind this, it is the end of the reconciliation deal. Notwithstanding, there are many differences between Fatah and Hamas which have surfaced since signing the deal – first and foremost the salaries of over 40,000 public employees, recruited and until now paid by Hamas. Hamas expected that the PA will pay their salaries and Abbas refuses to do so, for good reason. This put tremendous pressure on the unity deal and Hamas as a whole. With or without this escalation, there are few chances that this Palestinian unity deal will survive and produce anything. I don’t think that any of the different parties will publically announce the end of the deal, certainly not whilst the fighting is ongoing, but in practical terms it is not going anywhere.

How might the conflict escalate?

I think Israel could scale up its operations first by targeting Hamas leaders of the military and terror wing. Israel has not been doing so recently except in cases where someone was about to launch a rocket. On the Palestinian side, the rocket range can be expanded; targeting Tel Aviv and other cities in the centre of Israel. If that happens, Israel will have to consider a ground operation.

I truly believe there is no desire on the Palestinian side to face a ground operation. They paid a heavy price in 2008 [during Operation Cast Lead] and I don’t think they want to repeat it. Israel would certainly target the military infrastructure and heavy rockets before it leaves, and it could endanger Hamas’s shaky political hold on the ground. One of the reasons Israel is reluctant to rush into a ground operation is that Jihadist groups could come to the fore.

Netanyahu ordering troops to the border with Gaza means a ground invasion is being seriously considered. The government is preparing for the possibility of a ground invasion. In November 2012 during Operation Pillar of Defence, Israel called up tens of thousands of reservists and threatened to enter Gaza and this persuaded Hamas to agree to a ceasefire. It was effective then, but it is not clear if it will be effective now.

Will the situation deteriorate in the West Bank?

The situation on the ground in the West Bank is relatively calm and stable, so I don’t think an eruption or escalation will happen there right now. Politically the situation puts a lot of strain on Abbas. There’s no love lost between Abbas and Hamas despite the unity deal but while Palestinians are fighting Israelis in Gaza, it is hard for Abbas to sit idly by. He has to show some kind of empathy with the people of Gaza, which he expresses by calling on the international community to intervene, even though he knows the international community can do very little.

Though the right wing of the Israeli government is calling for crushing Hamas, with the backdrop of the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas activists in the West Bank, I do not believe vengeance is fuelling decision making at government level. However it does add to the pressure on the government to act decisively against the rockets.