BICOM

On Tuesday 5 August 2014, Director of BICOM’s Israel Office Richard Pater gave a briefing in which he discussed the 72-hour ceasefire, the negotiations in Cairo and prospects for the future. The following is an edited transcript of his remarks. 

The current situation on the ground

We have a ceasefire that came into effect at 8am, so far it has held but we should be cautious because we were in this situation on Friday when it lasted two and a half hours. This time it appears to be more serious. The operation to destroy tunnels has now finished, and soldiers have withdrawn to positions along the border of the Gaza Strip. People are hopeful that we have reached a cessation of fighting. As expected, there was a final flurry of rockets fired towards cities including Jerusalem this morning before the ceasefire, one of which landed in a Palestinian village.

So far Hamas has fired 3300 rockets, 590 of which were shot down, 2500 landed in open areas and 120 in Gaza. 3 Israeli civilians were killed.

Militarily Israel struck 4600 targets including 3000 homes. These targets included command + control centres, weapons depots, rocket launcher sites and so on. Some 1800 Palestinians have been killed, about half of which were Hamas or Islamic Jihad operatives. This does mean there were a significant number of civilian casualties.

At the same time, a third of Hamas’s rockets were fired, a third were hit during the operation and Hamas retains about a third of its rocket firing capability. The majority of its remaining arsenal comprises short-range mortars and several dozen longer-range rockets. Significantly, the destruction of 32 tunnels has been carried out, a third of which ran into Israeli territory.

In terms of Hamas’s achievements, they were able to continually fire throughout the period, forcing millions of Israelis into shelters, and closing the airport down briefly. Most of the Hamas leadership stayed intact underground, where Israel was unable to target them. They have very successfully put Gaza and Hamas on the international agenda.

The cost to the IDF was high, with 64 soldiers killed, including 15 deaths that occurred due to vehicles that were not sufficiently protected, 11 from attacks orchestrated using tunnels by Hamas, and another dozen by mortar fire.

Pictures of the destruction in Gaza have moved the international community, and it is quite likely the UN will declare a humanitarian crisis, and that we will have commissions of enquiry and the possible application to the International Criminal Court by the Palestinian Authority.

Where are we heading now?

Israel’s policy is being led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni. They have a moderate and restrained approach but also good relationships with the security sector. Former Prime Minister Olmert, Former Defence Minister Barak and Former Foreign Minister Livni for example, pulled in different directions during Operation Cast Lead in 2008.

That being said, policy dilemmas remain. The first option is reaching an understanding with Hamas and paying the minimal possible price. The second option focuses on deterrence and warnings, and coming to an arrangement with the international community without legitimising Hamas.

We understand that the Egyptian track is back on and we expect the government to pursue the first policy. The three negotiators in Cairo are Yoram Cohen, Head of the Shin Bet internal intelligence agency, Amos Gilad, Political Director of the Ministry of Defence  and  Yitzhak Molcho, who has been involved in the peace talks as a negotiator alongside Tzipi Livni.

Israel’s position is based on the following:

1. The Palestinian Authority to reassert control in Gaza, at least to some degree.
2. Disarmament of Hamas and other groups.
3. Reconstruction in the Gaza Strip under monitoring.
4. The opening up of crossings in coordination with the Palestinian Authority, to be linked to progress on the security.

For their part, the Palestinians demand the following:

1. Opening of the borders.
2. Full access to land up to the border fence.
3. Extended fishing zone in the sea around Gaza.
4. Payment of salaries of ‘public workers’ in Gaza.
5. The construction of an airport and seaport.
6. The release of prisoners, particularly the 500 that Israel arrested over a month ago in the West Bank operation following the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers.
7. Land access from Gaza to the West Bank

The Israeli side will find it difficult to fulfil all its aims. Disarmament will be difficult. One solution is an international force as suggested by Foreign Minister Lieberman, but we don’t expect Hamas to unilaterally disarm, and the PA can’t do it either. Another option would be reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, for which there is little appetitive on the Israeli side.

Policy is focussed on building an understanding with Egypt, bringing in the PA, and squeezing Hamas. A key aim is to prevent the replenishment of the rockets and to stop the smuggling in of new weapons. The Prime Minister definitely sees Palestinian President Abu Mazen as the solution in Gaza.

On Saturday night Netanyahu also spoke of the important relationship between Israel and its regional allies. If we take a step back and look at the broader trends, there’s an understanding of Israel’s actions in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States excluding Qatar. On the other side of these forces are ISIS, Iran and so on, and Hamas aligns itself with some of these.

Hamas wanted a foothold in the West Bank and they fancied their chances against Netanyahu as opposed to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The kidnapping of the three Israeli teenagers at the beginning of June was an opportunity for Israel to take care of Hamas in the West Bank, and Israel was then sucked into Gaza where it was able to take care of the tunnels. The broader struggle of moderate states against extremists is the bigger story than just Israel versus Hamas.

Future challenges

If talks break down there is concern that rockets will continue to be fired, especially mortar fire towards the Israeli communities of the south close to the border, and Israeli policy makers need to persuade the many thousands of Israelis that left the area that it is safe to return. Suitable technology to deal with tunnels going forward is important and the security sector has not found a full proof solution. There is concern is that lessons will be learned by Israel’s enemies on the northern border and in the West Bank. There will likely be a domestic enquiry in Israel into the use of inappropriate, outdated troop carriers and the presence of tunnels.

Israel also faces the concern of international isolation and any international enquiry and potential involvement of the ICC.

US role and Qatar

Israel was very disappointed that the Qatar Turkey track was being considered by the US. The US enjoys good relations with Qatar and this doesn’t sit particularly comfortably with Israel. For Israel, Egypt is the only game in town.

However, in terms of the role of the US administration, Israeli diplomats have said they’re impressed with how resilient Kerry is. He gets a beating by the Israeli commentators but he keeps going. Israeli officials found the Israeli media commentary on Kerry and the US quite uncomfortable because the truth is that there is still a good relationship on many levels.  Obama continues to rearm Israel, there’s more funding for the Iron Dome system and there’s a lot of support. The US is the only country that still votes for Israel at the UN.

What is the significance of the Iranian role?

Iran is part of the wider threat. A lot of the weapons in the Gaza Strip were originally from Iran. There have been intelligence reports suggesting that some of these people have been trained by Iran and the overall context of the Hamas war was that firing rockets into Israel is the Iranian doctrine passed onto Hezbollah. The resounding success of the Iron Dome would not have gone unnoticed, and this is an approach that Hezbollah has been building on. Formulation of the fear of rockets has been successfully counted on a tactical level at least.

Why did Israel stop when it did?

In the full Israeli cabinet (as opposed to the smaller decision-making security cabinet) there are calls that the operation should not have ended now. There are also commentators who are suggesting different ways that this operation could have been handled.

To give credit to the Prime Minister, he set himself limited and reachable goals primarily about the tunnels and weakening Hamas and its capacity. This has been achieved on a tactical level. We’ll have to see now whether pulling out the ground forces at this stage ­– taking into account the cost to Palestinians and Israelis had they kept going – will be justified by the outcome of the ceasefire talks.

If Hamas overplays its hand at this point, the IDF reservists are holding positions on the border so it’s not beyond the realms of possibility that the ground operation could resume, although that’s certainly not the  preference of decision makers right now.