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Analysis

BICOM Focus: What Arab normalisation can do for peace

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 Key Points 

  • The issue of Arab recognition of Israel and the normalisation of relations has been a feature of the conflict since Israel’s establishment.
  • The issue has come to prominence in recent months because of attempts by President Barack Obama’s administration to elicit steps towards normalisation from Arab states in return for an Israeli settlement freeze.
  • Arab steps towards normalisation are important in three ways: to build trust with Israelis that the Arab states are serious about peace; for Arab governments to communicate to their own populations that peace is on their agenda; and to create a conducive environment within which the Palestinians can make a deal with Israel.  

Introduction 

Over the past few months, the US government has been encouraging Arab states to take steps towards normalising their relations with Israel in order to reciprocate an Israeli freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank. In the past such steps have included holding publicised meetings between officials of varying seniority, allowing Israeli officials to attend regional conferences and the establishment of Israeli ‘interest offices’ in Arab cities to promote trade. Other possible measures mentioned in recent discussions have included Arab states allowing Israeli passport holders to visit, granting access for Israeli commercial aircraft to their airspace and establishment of direct phone links. This analysis explores the roots of the normalisation issue and assesses the role of normalisation in the current context.

The roots of the issue

One of the most basic goals of the Zionist movement has been to establish a sovereign Jewish homeland which is internationally recognised, including by the Arab world. Despite the UN’s approval of a Jewish state in 1947, Arab states for the most part have been unwilling to accept Israel’s legitimacy, and have sought to undermine it through economic and diplomatic boycotts. There is a strong strain in Israeli political culture that desires recognition by the Arab world and other major Islamic countries. In addition there is a view, shared by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that it is the refusal of the Arab world to come to terms with the existence of a Jewish state in the region, rather than any territorial dispute, that is the root of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is argued that in the past, when Israel has conceded territory to the Palestinians, it has not brought peace. Therefore, it is only when the Arabs truly accept the right of Israel to exist as the legitimate home for the Jewish people that real, sustainable peace will be possible.[i]

Normalisation of relations has long been central to the peace process. UN Security Council Resolution 242 established the land for peace principle, whereby Israel would withdraw from territory it captured, and all states in the region – including Israel – would have their sovereignty recognised.

The basis of the Israel-Egypt peace accord was Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in return for the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the two states. This eventually included all the conventions of diplomatic relations such as the exchange of ambassadors. However, it was a symbolic act of Arab recognition that kick-started the process, long before any formal negotiations began. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat shocked the world by flying to Jerusalem and addressing the Knesset in 1977. This event changed the political landscape by shattering the Arab taboo on talking to Israel. This helped generate public support in Israel for withdrawing from the Sinai in return for peace with Egypt, and sent an important signal of Sadat’s intentions to his own public in Egypt.

In 1993, the PLO’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist in security made possible the signing of the Oslo Accords. This in turn made it possible for Israel’s relations with Jordan to be normalised with the signing of a peace agreement in 1994.[ii] The Oslo process between Israel and the Palestinians led to a number of other Arab states also taking interim steps towards normalisation. It was hoped by that the development of normal contacts between Israel and the Arab world would lead to a culture of peace in the region that would support the process. However, the gestures on the Arab side were limited. Morocco, Tunisia, Oman and Qatar allowed Israel to open representation trade offices in their countries. Yet, with the breakdown of the peace process, these offices were closed. The Jordanian and Egyptian ambassadors were also withdrawn after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 and only returned in 2005.

In 2002, the Saudi backed Arab Peace Initiative offered Israel normalised relations with all Arab states if Israel returned to the 1967 borders and agreed a ‘just’ resolution for Palestinian refugees. Israel, struggling at the time to cope with waves of suicide bombings at the height of the Second Intifada, viewed the proposal with some suspicion. Over time, Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, have increasingly recognised that the Arab Peace Initiative is a positive basis for talks as long as ‘these offers are not final offers’.[iii] Israel maintains that a lasting solution cannot be reached according the dictated terms of the Arab League, but only through negotiation between the parties.

The end of the Second Intifada and Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and part of the northern West Bank in 2005 allowed for another temporary boost in Israel’s diplomatic relations with the Arab and wider Islamic world. Then-Israeli foreign minister Silvan Shalom met with counterparts from Pakistan and Indonesia and made the first visit by an Israeli Minister to Tunisia. The King of Morocco wrote to then-prime minister Ariel Sharon to praise the disengagement. Still, this diplomatic warmth did not develop to substantial measures such as the reopening of the Israeli trade offices.[iv]

Through the Annapolis process, launched at the end of 2007, US President George W. Bush sought support from the wider Arab world for bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Arab states attended the Annapolis conference, but they did not make any up-front contribution to the process. Annapolis focused on high-level political talks aimed at creating a ‘political horizon’ in the form of a final status agreement that would be implemented at some point in the future. Most Israelis and Palestinians felt the talks were removed from reality, as neither then-prime minister Olmert nor Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas were able to make serious concessions and implement them on the ground. Palestinians complained that good faith in the negotiations was undermined by ongoing construction in the West Bank settlements. Israelis complained that they had to endure daily rocket attacks from Gaza over which the PA had lost control. The failure of the Annapolis process led many, including Foreign Secretary David Miliband, to conclude that a breakthrough required broader Arab engagement, both to help ensure Israeli security and to give political support to moderate Palestinians.[v]

The US focus on normalisation

Normalisation has come squarely back onto the agenda because the new US administration is trying to persuade both Israel and the Arab world to take practical steps to rejuvenate the peace process.

The Americans believe that the Arab states have to make a tangible contribution. Over the past two decades, Arab steps towards normalisation were only offered as a result of prior progress with the Palestinians. Now the US administration is trying to reverse the order by enlisting the Arab states to help build the diplomatic environment in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be more easily addressed. In his Cairo speech in June Obama said: ‘Arab states must recognize that the Arab Peace Initiative was an important beginning, but not the end of their responsibilities. The Arab-Israeli conflict should no longer be used to distract the people of Arab nations from other problems.’ He called on Arab states to ‘recognise Israel’s legitimacy, and to choose progress over a self-defeating focus on the past.’

The Obama administration has tried to change the character of the peace process so that it is based not only on bilateral negotiations but also on practical confidence building gestures that include the Arab states.[vi] The administration has accepted the argument that ongoing settlement construction undermines confidence and has made a settlement freeze a principle demand on Israel.[vii] However, the US has also accepted that practical concessions should be reciprocal. It is in this context that the Obama administration sees the wider Arab world being able to play a positive role by reciprocating Israeli concessions to the Palestinians with steps towards normalisation. Rather than normalising relations only at the end of the peace process, as proposed in the Arab Peace Initiative, Obama is asking the Arab states to be proactive in helping the process by normalising in stages. By gaining concessions from the Arab world, Netanyahu can show to the Israeli public that he has received something in return for concessions on settlements, and Abbas has can show he has political support in the region for re-entering negotiations with Israel. This is of course not the only way the Arab states can support the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia, though reluctant to accept Obama’s request to take steps towards normalisation[viii], is reportedly prepared to offer financial support to the PA in the West Bank.

Seeking greater involvement from the Arab states is consistent with the Obama administration’s view of the problems in the region being interconnected. The primary strategic concern of many Arab states is the growing power of Iran and its nuclear programme. They privately want to see determined US action to stop Iran as well as momentum on the Palestinian issue.[ix] Flare-ups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are exploited by Iran and other anti-western elements in the region. The US hopes that concern over Iranian-led radicalism will give Arab states added incentive to invest in the success of the peace process.

The challenges to this approach

The Arab world is deeply divided, and is rarely capable of acting in unison. In addition, each individual regime has a serious legitimacy problem because of the widespread lack of freedom and democracy. There are typically considerable gaps between the positions of the elite and the view on the street. Arab regimes have for many years stirred fear and suspicion of Israel, and used opposition to Israel as a pillar of their legitimacy. As such, the willingness of individual Arab states to normalise relations with Israel is a test of their readiness to reverse decades of demonisation of Israel and prepare Arab public opinion for peace.

It is argued by some that the gestures that have been talked about, even if they are forthcoming, are of marginal benefit to Israel and therefore bring little leverage into the process. Steps that would really make a difference to Israel would be cooperation on intelligence, security and counter-terrorism and concerted efforts to weaken Hamas and other extremist groups in the region.[x] The Arab state that has most to offer in this respect, Syria, has so far resisted US pressure to make what would be for that country a dramatic strategic reversal. Even if some Arab states do contribute positively to the process, considerable gaps between Israel and the Palestinians on a final agreement will remain. Ultimately, these differences can only be overcome through a bilateral agreement.

Conclusion

The Obama administration believes that the Arab world can play a more proactive role in the peace process, if they take active steps to normalise their relations with Israel as a way of bringing momentum to the peace process. The hope is that such steps would have a positive impact on both the Israeli and Arab publics, and give political backing to the Palestinians in making a deal. The visit of Sadat in 1977 showed how a symbolic act of recognition could transform the situation. However, much of the Arab world has inculcated hostility to Israel as a way of legitimising their own regimes, and they are very nervous of diplomatic contact with Israel. Some point out that the small steps that have been discussed in the media are of limited significance because they do not address Israel’s core security concerns. The challenge for the US will be to obtain the maximum public impact from what Arab states are ready to concede, and ensure that real bilateral progress will help build further support in the Arab world for the peace process.

 


 

[i] See BICOM Focus on Betanyahu’s Bar Ilan speech here. See also Press conference of Gordon Brown and Binyamin Netanyahu, 25 August 2009

[ii] For more information about the Washington Declaration, see the special section on the BICOM website here.

[iii] Netanyahu hails spirit of Arab peace initiative Herb Keinon and Greer Fay Cashman, Jerusalem Post, July 23, 2009

[iv] Diplomacy: Israel and the Islamic world – separating spin from reality, Herb Keinon, Jerusalem Post, October 21 2005

[v] See David Miliband’s November 2008 speech to Labour Friends of Israel here.

[vi] Vice President Joe Biden’s Speech at American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 05 May 2009

[vii] BICOM resource pack which puts the settlement issue in context can be read here.

[viii] Joint Press conference of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal July 31, 2009

[ix] Washington Institute for Near East Studies, PolicyWatch #1486: Special Forum Report, Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress, March 9, 2009

[x] Washington Institute for Near East Studies, The Obama-Netanyahu Meeting: Analysis and Assessment, Robert Satloff, May 21 2009