BICOM

To assess the goals and tactics of Hamas and other armed groups firing rockets from Gaza, BICOM Director of Research Dr. Toby Greene interviewed Yoram Schweitzer, the head of the Programme on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict, at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University. The following is an edited transcript of the interview. You can listen to the interview in full at www.bicom.org.uk/podcasts.

It was widely assumed until recently that Hamas would not seek an escalation with Israel but something changed, what happened there?

Hamas has been in bad shape for a very long time and the chain of events following the failed kidnapping [of three Israeli teenagers who were murdered in Gaza in June] influenced Hamas because the organisaion suffered additional harm to its reputation. Israel put high pressure on its forces and people in the West Bank. Without any capability for Hamas to retaliate or react in the West Bank, it was very frustrated. There were other organisations in Gaza which started the shooting and Hamas didn’t want to control or curtail it, as it did previously, and the situation deteriorated from there. When Hamas encountered the Israeli reaction in the Gaza Strip, it decided to retaliate with its own forces and this deteriorated to the current situation.

What does Hamas want to get out of this now?

We need to pay attention to the internal equilibrium of power between the political wing, with its political calculations, and the military wing which is always more militant and frustrated by the situation. When the time arrived and the demand for retaliation arose, decision making in the spirit of the military wing took control. I think Hamas wants more than anything else to reaffirm its position and image as the prominent power of the resistance camp. From that point of view, this is the major achievement that they would like, and this is the only achievement they may get from the current events. Hamas also wants to exact a high price from Israel by targeting its citizens and major cities and to establish new rules of deterrence, which I’m not sure they will be able to do.

You’ve alluded to the presence of other groups in Gaza that led the rocket attacks before Hamas joined in and the potential threats to Hamas’s authority in the Strip. How significant a threat is there to Hamas’s position in the Gaza Strip right now?

I think this will help them to consolidate their position of power in Gaza. Hamas is the strongest power there. There is no other force which can shake this position and all these groups that had counter claims against Hamas, are losing credibility in their demands. Therefore I don’t think that there is a real threat to Hamas rule in Gaza, especially when the Israeli position seems to be not to shake the control of Hamas. This may only change if things deteriorate to such a situation when Israel has to reconquer the Gaza Strip or try to topple the regime, which I don’t think will be the case and I don’t think is in Israel’s interests.

Though the various organisations are operating independently, there are connections between them. I don’t accept the claims that Hamas does not have the ability to curtail the operations of the others either through understandings or through force.

Israel accuses Hamas and other armed groups in the Gaza Strip of deliberately basing themselves within the Palestinian civilian population. How extensively is this tactic being used?

It is used all the time. Hamas is a type of organisation which I call an ‘army of terrorilla’. The whole strategy of Hamas is based on mixing with the public and hiding their ammunition in the houses of the civilian population and even in the houses of their own civilian and military leaders – underground or in basements. They know that one of their tools is that if Israel is engaged in military combat it will cause civilian causalities and it will give them a useful advantage in international public opinion. They know that Israel has limited time to conduct the operation and as civilian causalities grow, it will help to protect them from further Israeli strikes.

We’ve seen examples of Hamas openly calling on the Palestinian public to gather at homes that Israel has warned it intends to target. What is the general public reaction within Gaza to this tactic?

I think most of them will not co-operate, though some of them will. When there are such violent acts, the public in Gaza cannot act against Hamas and people won’t criticise Hamas in a time of war. In general you cannot expect public resentment to Hamas operations, and it is not only Hamas that is fighting in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas is looking to try to secure achievements and Israel is determined to make sure Hamas doesn’t come out of this with a strengthened position, where does the conflict go from here?

As I see it, Hamas will definitely declare victory. Even if it has two fingers left, it will make a V sign. This is something we have to accept; Hezbollah did the same. Hamas wanted to re-establish its position as the fighting, resistance force in Gaza. It will take advantage of the skirmishes and the fact that it managed to reach Israeli cities even in the North as part of its ‘victory photo’.

It will hope to revive its position as a relevant player, which was badly tarnished in recent months and this it may well achieve. Hamas is looking for attrition and not victory in the true sense of the word. In this respect, Hamas may have its own achievements according to its eyes. Israel is not going to ‘defeat’ Hamas and I don’t think that is the Israeli aim. In this sense Hamas will achieve something, but I think Hamas and the population in Gaza will feel the results of this campaign for a long time. The Israeli strategic aim is to exact such a price from Hamas, an escalating price, that it will remove the urge of Hamas to get into this sort of fight for quite a long time.

Some are pointing to the specific demands of Hamas regarding a ceasefire: re-opening of the Rafah border crossing (with Egypt), release of prisoners captured by Israel in the West Bank, payments of salaries of ‘public workers’. Do you think these demands are significant?

In my mind, there is no scenario where Hamas is going to get its demands fulfilled. I think it will settle for what I just elaborated on. It will restore itself as a player in the political scenario, and we’ll see how it will be dealt with by President Abbas, whether it will be part of the unity government, whether it will be part of the political process, whether it will get assistance from others. It would also like to get some relief from the pressure it is under from the Egyptians, and we’ll have to see how it plays out.

If Israel looks like it may be about a ground operation, do you think that will be enough to force Hamas to bring this to an end?

I think we have to realise that whilst everyone is talking about a ground operation, we need to distinguish between various forms of ground operations. Ground operations are one of the tools for Israel to escalate the situation and put pressure on Hamas. It’s not a measure Israel is going to take for its own sake. I don’t think Israel it under pressure now; it still has several levels of escalation before a ground operation. Ground operations are not something Israelis are afraid of; it’s just not something that seems to serve a purpose in this campaign. Hamas will only go for a ceasefire when its own leaders or vested interests and leverage is threatened, or when it decides it’s already reached the aims I described earlier. Only then will Hamas go for a ceasefire since I don’t think Hamas wished for this escalation, it just deteriorated into this situation.