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Analysis

Briefing on the proposed ceasefire by Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog

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BICOM Senior Visiting Fellow Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog briefed participants on a BICOM conference call on the ceasefire proposed by Egypt. The following is a summary of his assessment.

  • The ceasefire proposed by Egypt seems to be crumbling because although the Israeli cabinet has accepted it, Hamas has not, and they have continued to fire. There are supposed to be two phases to the ceasefire, with an initial period of calm followed 48 hours later with delegations from both sides travelling to Cairo to negotiate additional terms, including the opening of passages.
  • Hamas have rejected the proposal, as they say it is humiliating for them and does not meet any of their demands. These include the opening of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, the payment of salaries for their 40,000 people in the Gaza Strip, and the release of Hamas prisoners in the West Bank, especially those who were released in the Shalit deal and rearrested following the abduction of three Israeli teenagers.
  •  Israel has accepted the deal and stopped its airstrikes for several hours this morning, but with Hamas still firing, the IDF has gone back to airstrikes, initially in a limited fashion.
  • We have to wait and see but it appears the ceasefire is not holding, and that is for several reasons. First, it is very difficult for Hamas to accept a ceasefire that does not meet any of its demands. Before holding fire they want to know which of their conditions will be accepted, especially with regards to opening the passages. They do not trust the Egyptians and do not want to accept an arrangement where they stop firing now and then discuss the terms later.
  • The Egyptian proposal puts them on the horns of a dilemma. If they accept the proposal it means that they accept defeat, as none of their terms are met. If they do not accept it they further isolate themselves politically, since the deal is accepted by the Arab League and the international community, and they have a big problem especially with Egypt, which is putting on a lot of pressure. In addition, they legitimise further Israeli military pressure on them.
  •  In the last week Hamas has fired over 1000 rockets into Israel. Thanks to the Iron Dome system, about 90 percent of the rockets aimed at civilian populated areas were intercepted. Hamas tried additional offensive operations, all of which were thwarted – these included sending commandos by sea, tunnelling into Israel and sending a UAV. They did manage however to fire continuously, over 100 rockets a day on average although the pace slowed in the last couple of days, probably due to Israel’s strikes. They also managed to fire rockets the length of Israel from Haifa in the north to Eilat in the south.
  •  Hamas has been under heavy pressure due to Israeli air strikes directed at military structures and targets. Because Israel is very careful about collateral damage, their impact on Hamas rocket capabilities is not to the extent that Israel was hoping for. According to IDF estimates Hamas lost about 40 per cent of their heavier rockets capabilities. In order to inflict heavier damage, Israel would have to either lower the bar on air strikes [i.e. accept higher risks of collateral damage] or launch a ground operation.
  • If Hamas continues the firing and does not accept any proposal, sooner or later Israel will reach a decision on scaling up air operations or a ground operation. Given that the Egyptian proposal is supported by the Arab league and the international community, if Hamas rejects it, this legitimises Israel’s actions against Hamas.
  • With regard to civilian casualties in Gaza and the international media, I would say that it is better for everyone to wait until the dust settles. International (including the U.N.) reports on high percentages of civilian casualties (70-80%) base themselves on Palestinian reports from Gaza and these typically tend to be highly exaggerated. IDF sources estimate much lower rates of fatalities among uninvolved civilians, which are regrettable. But this is the result of an armed confrontation in which the other side’s leaders target Israeli civilians while hiding themselves and their military infrastructure in underground shelters and behind the Palestinian civilian population.
  • There are conflicting views regarding the situation of Hamas and how weakened it is at this point. The fact that they do not accept the ceasefire proposal and continue to fire tells you that they do not feel weakened enough to actively seek and observe a ceasefire at this stage and they want to show resistance. It is important to understand where they came from and what started this confrontation. Paradoxically they launched it out of unprecedented weakness, economic bankruptcy, political isolation, and the actions of Egypt destroying their smuggling tunnels and closing the border. The military wing was against reconciliation with Fatah because they thought Hamas did not get anything while risking Hamas’s hold on power in Gaza. Hopes that it would result in the Palestinian Authority paying 40,000 salaries of Hamas employees in Gaza were disappointed. This led them to ultimately pursue this confrontation. For now they are waiting for an improved proposal, and I do not know that they will get it.
  • As far as Israel is concerned, there is criticism from some within the government for accepting the ceasefire. Some ministers and politicians are saying they do not want a ceasefire for a few months, so why not push forward until we have more confidence that we have weakened Hamas’s capabilities. But to comprehensively dismantle the terror infrastructure would take a major extended ground operation and the majority in the government would still prefer to avoid that.