fbpx

Analysis

Transcript of Briefing with Brig Gen (res.) Michael Herzog on Operation Protective Edge, Day 18

[ssba]
  • We are in the third week of Israel’s operation in Gaza and are nearing yet another decision point for Israel. The question is whether to accept a ceasefire arrangement offered by the US or whether to apply further pressure on Hamas to accept more favourable terms for a ceasefire. There are two different clocks ticking: a military and a political one.
  • On the military side, the IDF is applying immense pressure on Hamas and this is showing. Yesterday, for the first time since the ground invasion began, 150 Hamas fighters surrendered to the IDF. Shejayiya, Hamas’s centre of operations and activities, has been taken over by the IDF and Hamas’s lead battalion has been defeated there. In addition, there has been a notable decrease of rocket fire into Israel, especially central Israel. The number of rockets destroyed by the IDF, added to the number of rockets which Hamas has already fired onto Israel, means Hamas has lost about 60 per cent of its rocket stockpile. The IDF is also discovering attack tunnels leading into Israel from Gaza. It has discovered over 30 such tunnels, and is in the process of destroying them. The military operation requires more time. Israel definitely does not want to stop its operations and leave Gaza before at least destroying all tunnels leading into its territory. The IDF claims it would require a period of between one to two weeks in order to destroy these tunnels.
  • The political clock is ticking at a different pace. There is international momentum behind the attempt to reach a ceasefire arrangement as soon as possible. US Secretary of State John Kerry has presented a ceasefire proposal which suggests a five day humanitarian ceasefire, during which period talks will take place, with the aim of tackling the key issues of concern to both Israel and Hamas. Namely, Israel’s security demands and Hamas’s demands (designed to consolidate its grip on power) for the easing of pressure, opening the passages to Gaza, paying public wages there etc.  Israel cannot accept a ceasefire unless it allows for the continued  destruction of Hamas’s tunnels which lead into Israeli territory. Anything less and  would allow Hamas to effectively maintain a gun pointed to Israel’s head. As I understand it, Hamas rejects this Israeli demand and continues to stick by its list of demands which would reward it for the use of violence against Israel.
  • It is hard to synchronise these political and military clocks and also hard to synchronise Israel’s security-based demands with Hamas’s desire to improve its standing. The Egyptians are close to Israel’s position in the negotiations and have no illusions about Hamas. PA President Mahmoud Abbas has come under increasing domestic pressure in recent days for not sufficiently supporting Gaza. As a result he publicly closed ranks with Hamas’s demands and played a significant and negative role in bringing about the totally one-sided UNHRC’s decision to investigate alleged war crimes by Israel in Gaza.
  • The conclusion in Israel is that, given Hamas’s negotiating position, a sustainable ceasefire will require more military pressure on Hamas and therefore more time. This does not preclude the possibility of a brief humanitarian ceasefire in time for Eid Al-Fitr (the Muslim holiday marking the end of Ramadan, which is supposed to begin in two days).
  • If Hamas does not agree to a reasonable ceasefire that meets Israel’s basic security needs, Israel will be faced with the decision of whether to further deepen its ground operation against Hamas in Gaza. The Israeli public’s mood is currently supportive of pursuing the government’s stated objectives against Hamas – a long, stable ceasefire with a weakened Hamas; they realise that they are fighting for their home and that they must keep going in order to achieve this.
  • The unrest in the West Bank is significant and requires attention. Public opinion in the West Bank sympathises strongly with the people of Gaza, not necessarily with Hamas. This is the key reason Abbas has toughened his position on the current conflict and this could create a problem of ongoing unrest in the West Bank. This unrest could target both Israel and Abbas.
  • Nobody desires to see a repeat of this conflict soon after a ceasefire agreement. For a durable ceasefire there has to be a significant degradation of Hamas’s military capabilities, as well as in their motivation to employ violence. It should also be made difficult for Hamas to rebuild their arsenal following a ceasefire agreement. This requires more military and political pressure on them. The advantage in this case is that Egypt will be unwilling to allow Hamas to smuggle weapons into Gaza. The long term goal of the ceasefire has to be to gather international support for the idea of a demilitarised Gaza Strip, though it may be difficult in practice, the international community needs to support this demand. Only demilitarization could allow for an ambitious rehabilitation of Gaza led by the international community and regional actors.
  • The UNHRC resolution is totally one sided. It calls to investigate Israel’s actions which ‘may amount to war crimes’, effectively drawing conclusions before any investigation has even begun. Moreover, the investigation ignores completely Hamas’s very obvious war crimes, including the targeting of civilians and hiding behind civilians as human shields, and has enraged a large number of people in Israel. The outcome of the vote, with the US the only country to oppose, was to be expected. Leading support for the resolution itself came from countries with dubious human rights records such as Syria, Cuba, Sudan and Russia.