BICOM

Key points

• The ceasefire appears to be close to that agreed by Israel on 15 July, but which Hamas at that point rejected.
• The nature of the ceasefire suggests Hamas was forced to back down, but Hamas was able to make Israel pay a significant price militarily and in international opinion.
• In Israel there is disappointment at the failure to deliver a swifter and more decisive outcome.
• Hamas boasts of victory will look thin if their more substantial demands are not met, and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas will try to position himself as the one who can deliver for the Palestinians.

Who does the ceasefire favour?

It appears that the Egyptian brokered ceasefire is close to that agreed by Israel on 15 July, a week into the conflict, but which Hamas at that point rejected. Hamas was ultimately forced to negotiate as part of a joint Palestinian delegation through Egyptian intermediaries, as opposed to Qatari or Turkish intermediaries.

In essence, the deal is a variation on the ceasefire agreed in November 2012. Israel has agreed to immediately increase the humanitarian aid and goods entering the Gaza Strip. But the borders have in fact been open to aid and imports all along, so it remains to be seen how much difference this increase will make. Israel has also agreed to expand the fishing zone back up to six miles, and eventually to 12 miles.

All Hamas’s more substantial demands are deferred for future talks. These include the opening of a sea port and airport, the release of prisoners, a more substantial normalisation of the crossings into Israel, opening the Rafah crossing with Egypt, payment of salaries to Hamas employees and the release of prisoners.

Though the redeployment of PA forces loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas on the borders is agreed in principle by all sides including Hamas, it is not clear how this will be implemented. As for the sea port and airport, Israel will link these to the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip, and it is hard to imagine substantial progress on these issues in the talks.

A full judgement of the ceasefire will also depend on the content of a UN Security Council resolution which is still under negotiation.

Who has established greater military deterrence?

In the context of an asymmetric conflict, in which the means and strategies of the two sides are very different, the true measure of the military balance is which side is more deterred from a future round. This assessment can only be made in time, but some interim judgements can be made.

Israeli officials are stressing that Hamas accepted the Egyptian ceasefire because its will to fight was broken. Israel claims Hamas’s impact on the Israeli home front was limited by Israel’s defences. Iron Dome performed with spectacular success and Israel thwarted almost all of Hamas’s special operations, including attempted infiltrations by sea, through tunnels, and the use of drones. Meanwhile, two thirds of Hamas’s rocket capability has been used or destroyed and the strategic tunnel threat, in which Hamas invested enormous financial and human resources, has been destroyed. In addition, the IDF estimated it killed 750-1000 Hamas fighters, a very significant proportion of its fighting force, including several key commanders. The damage to the Gaza Strip and civilian death toll is of course very considerable, and despite the public celebrations, Gazans will likely be directing some of the blame towards Hamas.

However, many Israelis are disappointed to see another ceasefire agreement, as opposed to something that looks more decisive. The sense of disappointment is fuelled by the length of the conflict and the extent of military casualties (64 soldiers killed), which were much higher than previous rounds. Anger is most acute in communities close to the Gaza Strip, which took the brunt of the fire, and many of whom are very sceptical about another ceasefire which appears to offer no long term solutions. Hundreds if not thousands of Israeli families in southern Israel left their homes during the conflict and five Israeli civilians and a Thai worker were killed. Hamas also managed to force Israelis into shelters in almost every city in Israel, and stopped airlines flying to Ben Gurion airport for a couple of days. An entire tourist summer has been wiped out, with the cost to the Israeli economy yet to be counted.

Ultimately, the nature of the ceasefire suggests that Hamas was fought to a standstill, but it was not a knockout blow, and Hamas was able to make Israel pay a heavy price, not only militarily, but in international opinion.

What will be the political impact in Israel?

Cabinet ministers were openly critical of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even whilst the war was waging, in particular Jewish Home party leader Naftali Bennet and Yisrael Beitenu party leader Avigdor Lieberman. They wasted no time in criticising the ceasefire. Meanwhile centre-left parties within and outside of the coalition are calling for a broader diplomatic initiative to address the roots of the conflict.

According to series of polls broadcast by Channel 2 News, Netanyahu’s ratings plummeted from a high point of 82 per cent when the ground troops went in on 23 July to a low of 38 per cent on August 25. The numbers should be taken with pinch of salt, but they reflect the growing public disappointment as his strategy appeared incapable of delivering a swift and decisive blow. A balanced judgement can only come with time, but Netanyahu faces a challenge to convince the Israeli public that his strategy worked.

The military is getting mixed reviews. Though there is a lot of praise for the field commanders and fighters, Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Chief of Staff Benny Gantz are being accused by some of running an unimaginative campaign which lacked initiative.

Inquiries into military and political performance often follow military campaigns in Israel, and this may be the case for Operation Protective Edge. However, the level of public disillusionment is not at the level which followed the Second Lebanon War, which shattered Ehud Olmert’s credibility and led to the resignation of then Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.

What will be the impact in the Palestinian political arena?

Hamas have a clear narrative which they are already championing, that this was a great victory in which they stood up to Israel and remained unbeaten. However, this boast will look thin if the more substantial demands they made during the conflict are not met, as seems likely, and Palestinians will be asking what was really achieved.

Mahmoud Abbas, with Western, Egyptian and to some extent Israeli support, now has a job to look relevant, and the only Palestinian leader capable of delivering for the Palestinian people. He will continue to do this by being the conduit for international aid into Gaza, and by the reintroduction of his forces being a prerequisite for a more substantial opening of the borders. He also has plans to try and leverage this position into new international pressure on Israel over withdrawing from the West Bank, and is threatening various moves in international forums. However, it remains to be seen whether the restoration of PA forces in the Gaza Strip will happen, what will be the fate of the Palestinian unity government, and whether it will pay the salaries of the Hamas employees in Gaza.

There is also a question about the impact within Hamas. Political Bureau Chief Khaled Mashaal resisted this ceasefire to the end, apparently under pressure from his Qatari hosts, but apparently had to concede when the leadership in the Gaza Strip had taken enough.

What is the diplomatic impact?

Israel has paid a price in terms of public diplomacy. Intense media coverage of the civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip gave a boost to those seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the State of Israel and to promote a campaign of Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS).

Relations with US administration and Secretary of State John Kerry were further strained, after Kerry’s attempt to bring Qatar and Turkey into the diplomatic process left Israeli officials dumbfounded.

However, till the end, key international actors, including the US, EU, and UK, maintained that Israel had the right to defend itself, refrained from condemning Israel’s military operation, and did not demand an unconditional ceasefire from Israel. Prime Minister David Cameron maintained this line despite a ministerial resignation and considerable pressure from his Liberal Democrat coalition partners and Labour opposition. The EU Council stressed that it was ready to play an active role in facilitating the opening of crossings but stressed also that, “All terrorist groups in Gaza must disarm.”

There will be legacy cost to Israel which is difficult to measure at this stage, including a UN Human Right Council inquiry already being dubbed ‘Goldstone II’, the terms of which have been dismissed by the British government as “fundamentally unbalanced”.

Hamas’s reputation has further deteriorated for their indiscriminate targeting of Israeli civilians, their use of the Gaza civilian population as cover, and their brutal public execution of “collaborators”, but they have less to lose on this score.

Impact on the peace process

There are some efforts to try and leverage the situation into a return to the US brokered final status talks that collapsed in April. Prime Minister Netanyahu said last Wednesday that he hoped for renewed negotiations with Abbas and that, “We have to think carefully how we tie in the new circumstances to the advantage of peace and against terror.” However, it seems that Abbas wants to maintain his strategy of building international pressure on Israel in diplomatic forums, and public scepticism on both sides at the possibility of progress will remain very high.