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Analysis

Elhanan Miller assesses rising violence and Palestinian politics

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BICOM Researcher Lorin Bell-Cross spoke with Elhanan Miller, Arab affairs correspondent at the Times of Israel, who assessed the recent outbreaks of violence in East Jerusalem and other parts of Israel, and the role played by various Palestinian factions. He also discussed the Palestinian unity government, the chances of renewed hostilities from Gaza and unilateral actions by the Palestinian Authority (PA). You can listen to the interview here. The following is an edited transcript.

We’ve seen violence and tension growing amongst the Arabs in East Jerusalem in recent months and with stabbings in Tel Aviv and Gush Etzion it appears to be spreading. Israeli leaders have pointed to incitement by both Palestinian Islamists and Fatah, led by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. What role are the respective Palestinian factions playing in the current situation?

Unfortunately it seems that the Palestinian factions are competing with each other on inflaming passions around the issue of the Temple Mount. We’ve seen inflammatory rhetoric, not only from Hamas which always wanted to have more violence in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, but also by the more moderate Fatah faction, and specifically Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. He said only a few weeks ago at a conference of Fatah leaders that people should oppose the Jewish expansion in East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount “with all means” – which is an escalation of rhetoric. Fatah has also taken responsibility for some of the terrorist actions that took place this week. Specifically surrounding the issue of Jerusalem, which is considered a cardinal issue for the Palestinians, rhetoric has been much more inflammatory than on other issues.

Turning to recent violence around Kfar Kana and other Arab-Israeli towns and villages inside Israel – which followed the shooting on 8 November by Israeli police of an Arab man who attacked their car in Kfar Kana – can these events be considered a one-off reaction, or are they influenced significantly by events in Jerusalem, the West Bank or Gaza, and by the Palestinian leadership?

They are influenced by both. There are underlying grievances that Arab-Israelis have voiced for many years, such as discrimination in the workforce, discrimination in infrastructure and in budgets etc. But there is also a sense of identification with the Palestinian people beyond the Green Line, with the Palestinians living in Jerusalem, and also with the wider Arab world with regards to Israel. They are, after all, Arabs and Muslims, by and large, so it’s a mixture of different grievances and we’ve seen this play out in the demonstrations in the last day or two.

Following the death of Khayr Hamdan in Kfar Kana we’ve seen both slogans that have to do with the civilian position of Arabs in Israel as equal citizens – a call for less police violence, a call for an investigation or for sacking the policemen who were involved in the shooting, and for more concern and consideration for the feelings of Arabs in Israel. But we’ve also seen nationalistic calls that are more to do with the Palestinian struggle. We’ve seen slogans mentioning Al-Aqsa, we’ve seen Palestinian flags being waved in some of these demonstrations. So as before, Arab-Israelis are caught between their Israeli identity and sense of citizenship in Israel and their Palestinian and Arab identities, and all of these identities are playing out right now.

Whether or not this is a one off is still hard to tell, I think it depends to a great extent on how forcefully the police act on this. They seem to have been mumbling and maybe changing their version about what happened. So a police investigation will have to take place and responsible rhetoric from our leaders is called for, both in the local Arab communities, and from our national leaders, such as the Prime Minister and President, to calm the situation.

Turning to intra-Palestinian tensions, Fatah officials have publicly pointed the finger at Hamas for several bombs targeting the homes of Fatah officials in the Gaza Strip on 7 November. This resulted in the cancellation of a planned visit by Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah to Gaza. Is the Palestinian unity government likely to survive this, and is there any chance we are going to see Palestinian Authority forces returning to the Gaza Strip?

I think the survival of Palestinian government is probably not the main issue, because the government hasn’t been doing that much anyway. What Hamas have really been complaining about since early June, is not getting their fair share in the unity deal; that even the new government’s Gaza ministers were underrepresented and given no real authority, so Gaza got the short end of the stick.

Whether the government will officially fall apart is a secondary question. The more important question has to do with the security forces. If Egypt ties the opening of the Rafah  crossing (between Egypt and the Gaza Strip) to the entry of PA security forces then I think Hamas will have no choice but to allow those forces to come in. But if it were only up to Hamas I think they would try to stall this, because security is the one element that Hamas has managed to maintain in the Gaza Strip over the summer, despite the unity deal. So the Ministry of Interior and the security forces subordinate to it have always remained in the hands of Hamas and that’s the type of power that Hamas would like to maintain. They’ve always said they have no problem introducing presidential guard or PA forces from the West Bank in the border crossings, but they’ve never done is, so I think it depends on the pressure from outside and primarily from Egypt.

With regard to the Egyptian sponsored ceasefire talks (established between Israel and Palestinian factions following Operation Protective Edge), given that the talks seem to be stalling, do you think there is a risk of resumption of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip?

The stakes are very high for Hamas if they resume rocket fire. They have no appetite for a renewal of violence in the Gaza Strip, given the huge amount of money that was pledged for the reconstruction of Gaza and given the suffering of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip over the summer. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that Hamas won’t try to redevelop or rebuild its capabilities in other ways, such as tunnel digging, such as replenishing their stockpiles of rockets and mortar shells.

But Egypt, especially given the recent attack against Egyptian soldiers in northern Sinai, blames primarily Hamas for not being able to prevent terrorist movements between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. There will certainly be a lot more pressure coming from the Egyptian side on Hamas to comply. Hamas have hurried to absolve themselves of responsibility for the attack but also to promise more forceful action on securing the border.

The situation won’t necessarily manifest itself in rocket fire in Israel, though it does seem at the moment that Hamas is back where it was before the operation, where it still has no money and there is no income from the tunnels coming from Sinai, so Hamas has its back to the wall again. It has to vent in some way, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that’s the way they’ll choose.

Mahmoud Abbas has continued to make a variety of threats against Israel, from bringing a UN Security Council resolution, stopping the security cooperation with Israel in the West Bank and joining the International Criminal Court. What are the manoeuvres that Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are likely to make next on the diplomatic front?

All the possibilities you brought up are on the table. At this point Abbas has given up on direct negotiations with Israel. The demand of the Palestinians to resume those negotiations was for Israel to deliver a map that recognises the 1967 borders and to debate the borders of a Palestinian state in the first three months of the negotiations; that’s a condition that Israel never accepted. So it seems like direct negotiations under the terms that the Palestinians have set are off the table at the moment.

The possibilities that remain for the Palestinians are unilateral possibilities, primarily the Security Council bid. They delayed till after the US mid-terms but we’re past that now, so in the next few months we can probably expect a Palestinian bid in the UN Security Council. They are still trying to lobby for the votes needed for them to get a majority, which would force the United States into an embarrassing veto. That’s one way of putting pressure on Israel and, putting pressure on the United States to pressure Israel.

I think stopping security cooperation [with Israel] is an empty threat, because the security cooperation serves the Palestinians and the interests of the Palestinian Authority no less than it serves Israel, in curtailing Hamas, which is primarily a threat to Abbas. Abbas has expressed his fears about being having a coup d’état orchestrated by Hamas; in meetings with the Qataris for example, he has expressed great fear and animosity towards Hamas. So fighting Hamas jointly is an interest for both Israel and Fatah.

Joining the International Criminal Court and other institutions is open to the Palestinians, but joining the ICC could backfire against the Palestinians because it could make them liable for suits by Israel for violating human rights by firing into Israel. So I think that’s probably also a move that they’ll be reluctant to make, or at least they would consider very seriously before making.