BICOM

Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, author of The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2015), explains why support for Israel is so deep-rooted in the US, and why it is likely to endure despite current differences between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the US Administration over Iran’s nuclear programme. He also discusses the potential impact of Netanyahu’s controversial speech to Congress on his election prospects in Israel. Jonathan Rynhold is director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People in the Political Science department at Bar Ilan University, and a senior researcher at the Begin Sadat Institute for Strategic Studies. He was interviewed by BICOM Director of Research Dr. Toby Greene. The following is an edited transcript. Listen to the podcast here.

TG: Before we get into the specifics of the current trip, can you tell us a little about the underpinnings of US support for Israel and what really explains it?

JR: Support for Israel and Zionism in the United States precedes not only the existence of an organised pro-Israel lobby, it precedes the development of Modern Zionism among European Jewry. The American identity is made up of two things: one, America was founded by Puritans, and Puritans believed that one had to read the bible in order to understand religious faith and religious meaning, and so Hebrew was compulsory at Harvard and Yale, whereas Latin and Greek were compulsory in Oxford and Cambridge. One of the interesting things is that even secular Americans and non-Protestant Americans – Catholics, black Americans who have nothing to do with that original religious idea – are sympathetic to Israel because they are so familiar with the story that the idea of the Jewish people returning to their homeland is clearly a legitimate one for them. So even if it’s no longer religiously based, it is culturally based.

The other reason is that American identity is about democracy. And of all the countries that received their independence after the Second World War, only two have been democratic all the way through: Israel and India, and India leaned towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War. So really it’s Israel which stands out as a beacon of democracy. And Americans say: ‘We are a country of pioneers, of immigrants, who fled Europe from religious persecution and set up a democracy – so are the Israelis.’ Barack Obama said, ‘What is it that explains our close relationship with Israel? It is that we share a common story’.

TG: All that said, in the current context there is clearly tension and a difference of opinion between the Israeli government and the US administration. How significant do you think this disagreement is?

JR: A major crisis about policy is not the same as a crisis in the US-Israeli relationship. The US-Israel relationship is so deep and so multi-faceted that it will not be toppled over, even when we have such a fundamental clash of approaches to foreign policy. To give you some idea, there is no major demographic group in the United States which is more sympathetic to the Palestinians than to the Israelis; Black Protestants, Hispanics are more sympathetic to Israel. The least pro-Israel ideological demographic are liberals and they are more sympathetic on average than the most pro-Israel ideological demographic in Europe, which is conservatives.

There are multiple institutional connections. There is a very high level of strategic cooperation, whether it’s on intelligence or special forces or technological development which is related to common interests. Most Americans see Israel and the US as sharing common interests and that perception has increased since 9/11. Americans see only Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as closer allies. This was not the case before 2000. So it is very unlikely that this crisis will in some way threaten the very deep cooperation, which has deepened under Obama, including on the Iran question, despite the disagreements.

Having said that, there is an issue here. The prime minister and the president disagree on Iran and the Prime Minister is going to Congress in an attempt to convince the American administration and the American public, and indeed the world, that Israel is right. The problem is that by accepting an invitation from a Republican-led Congress, it appears that he is taking sides in American domestic politics and that has had a negative effect on the levels of support among Democrats in Congress for strengthening sanctions against Iran and for toughening up the terms of any agreement with Iran, which is what the Prime Minister seeks to do.

There is a danger here that over time, bipartisan support for Israeli policy can be eroded. It is critical to remember that if we were to put levels of Democratic party support for Israeli policies in a European context, they would be far and away the most pro-Israel element in any European polity. But relative to the Republicans, they are less supportive and the danger is that this particular act may backfire over time by encouraging Democrats to think that the Israeli Prime Minister is forcing them to choose between their loyalty to their party and their sympathy and support for Israel.

TG: Your new book does not just deal with policy makers but with public opinion. Where is US public opinion on the Iranian issue? Do they agree with their president or do they agree with those Republicans that oppose him?

JR: There is a perception sometimes that the American public is tired of conflict and tired of intervening, and there is something to that, in the wake of the Iraq war and the failure of intervention in Libya and Afghanistan. However, increasingly over the last five to ten years, the American public reached a position where a majority believe that if it’s a choice between using force to prevent Iran going nuclear and letting Iran going nuclear, one must use force. But the public also supports the president’s effort to try and use diplomacy and at the moment they extend him a certain amount of credit to see whether he can achieve that. And that means that the proof of the pudding is whether the president can convince the American public that he has indeed reached a deal that prevents Iran going nuclear. And that is why Mr. Netanyahu feels he needs to make the case that actually such a deal may not succeed in preventing Iran going nuclear.

TG: At the Begin-Sadat Institute you have also done some polling of Israeli public opinion on this issue. What do Israelis think about this trip?

JR: Over 90 per cent of Israelis believe that the relationship with the US is vital to Israeli security. Israelis view the relationship with the US as second in importance for Israeli security only to the IDF; more important than peace with Egypt, peace with Jordan, the peace process with the Palestinians and the settlements. Even more interesting is that even a majority of those who identify as right-wing think that the relationship with the US is more important than the settlements.

And this has certain impact in that a narrow majority of Israelis think that the Prime Minister should reconsider making the speech because they are concerned that it will damage relations with the US. On the policy question itself a large majority of Israelis, more than two to one, think that President Obama’s policy on this is wrong. Israelis agree with Netanyahu on the substance of the Iranian question, what they are questioning is the tactics. Israelis are pretty much divided evenly about whether they think President Obama is favourable or not to Israel. But for Israelis it’s not about the president, it’s about his policy, because whereas they are divided about him, on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, on dealing with Iran, on dealing with ISIS, large majorities of more than two to one think that the president’s policies are bad, and that is what concerns Israelis.

When one examines what all this might mean in terms of an Israeli election the picture is mixed. On the one hand Israelis tend to see this crisis as really between Obama and Netanyahu, and therefore of limited impact. However, a slim majority, as I said, think that this is not a good idea so it’s possible that opposition leader Isaac Herzog will be able to land a couple of punches. But there’s no knockout blow because on the substance people agree with Netanyahu and not with Obama. There might be a little electoral gain for Netanyahu in that he may shore up his support on the right by doing this, but his bloc – the right-religious bloc – will not be made any larger. I suspect the net effect of possibly losing a few centrists and gaining a few on the right will cancel each other out.