BICOM

Key points

• Israel and other opponents of the deal, including US legislators and Sunni Arab states, fear the Obama administration is overinvested in securing an agreement and therefore willing to accept a bad deal which will legitimise Iran as a threshold nuclear power.
• The prospective deal, should it be agreed, appears set to leave Iran with substantial enrichment capability and insufficiently deterred from gradually eroding the agreement.
• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the case in a speech to Congress at the beginning of March that the US should try to drive a harder bargain.
• Though Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the immediate aftermath of an agreement is highly unlikely, Israel will reserve the option to use force to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

What are Israel’s concerns with the deal?

• Israel and other opponents of the deal, including many US legislators and Sunni Arab states, feel that the Obama administration is overinvested in securing an agreement and therefore willing to accept a bad deal. They fear that rather that blocking Iran’s path to a bomb, this agreement paves the path to a bomb, by legitimising Iran as a nuclear threshold state, able to acquire nuclear weapons within a short time frame. Aside from the threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, this threatens to spur efforts of other states in the region to develop nuclear capabilities.
• The prospective deal would leave Iran with substantial enrichment capability and insufficiently deterred from gradually eroding the agreement to shorten their breakout time (‘creep out’) or from developing additional capabilities in secret as in the past (‘sneak out’).
• The restrictions that would be placed on Iran’s nuclear programme appear reversible, whereas the sanctions regime would take much longer to restore.
• The specific details of what is being negotiated are not known, but there are many concerns about elements which are believed to be included:
  • the ‘one year breakout time’ the US declares as its goal may not give sufficient time to stop Iran should it renege;
  • the number of centrifuges Iran will keep (reportedly 6,500) and stockpiles of enriched uranium will according to some experts give Iran a breakout time of significantly less than one year;
  • according to President Obama many restrictions could be lifted after as little as ten to 15 years, in a proposed ‘sunset clause’;
  • sanctions may be lifted too quickly, before Iran has taken substantial steps to scale back its programme;
  • the Fordow enrichment facility, built in secret and fortified from aerial attack could remain active as a site for enrichment (albeit not for uranium enrichment);
  • the agreement may not prevent Iran developing more advanced and efficient centrifuges that would greatly shorten breakout time should they renege;
  • Iran has been unwilling to address IAEA concerns on ‘possible military dimensions’ of Iran’s nuclear programme and these demands could be deferred;
  • though the Arak reactor will be modified to produce much less plutonium, this could be reversed in time;
  • safeguards to ensure compliance, including intrusive inspections may not be sufficiently rigorous, given Iran’s long history of deception;
  • there is a lack of demands placed on Iran relating to its regional policies, including support for terrorism.

What would Israel like to see?

• Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made the case in a speech to Congress at the beginning of March that the US should try to drive a harder bargain, using the considerable leverage afforded by the threat of more sanctions.
• Rather that calling for no deal or a complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear programme, he made the case that “Iran’s nuclear program can be rolled back well-beyond the current proposal by insisting on a better deal and keeping up the pressure on a very vulnerable regime.”

What is likely to happen next?

• It remains to be seen what if anything will be agreed by the 31 March deadline set by the US. The US administration is under heavy domestic political pressure to provide details of the agreement in April, though the existing interim agreement does not actually expire until the end of June, potentially giving more time for talks.
• Israel is sharply criticising the negotiations in public whilst seeking to persuade the P5+1 powers to seek tougher terms. It is likely to maintain that stance if an outline agreement is reached, in attempt to shape the terms of the comprehensive agreement to be agreed by the end of the June.
• Netanyahu has also worked with opponents to the deal in the US Congress, especially Republicans, to oppose the deal and pass new sanctions legislation. Though new sanctions may not have sufficient Congressional support, Congress may pass legislation to give itself the power to review the deal and keep existing sanctions in place.
• Though Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the immediate aftermath of an agreement is highly unlikely, Israel will reserve the option to use force to stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.
• In the long run, should the deal come to pass, Israel will have to develop strategic plans and intelligence to monitor, deter and contain a threshold nuclear power committed to Israel’s destruction.
• Israel will also have to adapt to a scenario in which other states in the region seek nuclear arms to match or deter Iran, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Why is Israel so concerned about Iran and its nuclear programme?

• Iran is the leader of a regional alliance opposed to Israel’s existence, Palestinian moderates, and the two-state solution. It extensively arms and funds armed extremists on Israel’s borders and directly attacks Israeli and Jewish targets around the world.
• If Iran acquired nuclear weapons, Israel would be in the shadow of a power which openly and regularly calls for its destruction and had the capacity to carry it out.
• Even assuming Iran did not intend to use nuclear weapons against Israel, being within reach of a nuclear weapon would likely further embolden them in their violent actions against Israel.
• Iran’s strategic alliances with radical groups and rouge states in the region create the possibility that Iran might proliferate nuclear materials or technology to non-state actors, allowing Iran the potential to deploy a nuclear weapon against Israel deniably.
• The hostility between Iran and Israel, and the lack of direct communication channels, increase the chances of nuclear crises born out of miscalculation, and would create permanent uncertainty.
• If Iran establishes itself as a threshold nuclear state, it would lead to a Middle East arms race, as neighbouring states would seek to obtain weapons to deter Tehran.