BICOM

Key Points

• The wounding of 14 Israelis, including a baby, in a car ramming attack in Jerusalem on December 14 returned the wave of Palestinian violence to the top of the Israeli public agenda. The fact that measures taken so far have failed to stop the violence, and the sense that daily attacks have become the new normal, is increasing domestic pressure on Israel’s leaders.
• Key decision makers Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yaalon, at constant risk of being outflanked by political rivals on the right, tread a fine line between being tough in response to violence, and avoiding measures which could escalate the situation.
• With Israelis attacked on a daily basis, and Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders often praising the perpetrators, there are political constraints on Israel’s ability to take constructive steps to assist the PA in the West Bank.
• If the US or European can help, it is by considering how to create political conditions conducive for constructive Israeli steps on the ground.
• The EU should strive for a balanced approach to issues which fuel the current violence and threaten the future viability of the two state solution; focussing not only on settlements, but also Palestinian incitement and governance.

 

The “limited uprising” is the new normal

The wounding of 14 Israelis, including a baby, in a car ramming attack in Jerusalem on December 14 has returned the wave of Palestinian violence to the top of the Israeli public agenda.

The wave of Palestinian assaults on Israeli civilians and security personnel has settled into a rough pattern over the past two months. November and December have typically seen one or two vehicle or stabbing attacks a day punctuated by a small number of more deadly shooting incidents. Israeli security forces expect the violence to continue with the constant risk of a wider escalation. Recent weeks have seen the majority of attacks taking place in the West Bank.

The frequency of the attacks, and the general shift of incidents to the West Bank has somewhat dulled the shock factor and sense of acute crisis for Israelis. Nonetheless, the fact that measures taken by the government and security services have failed to stop the violence, and the sense that daily attacks have become the new normal, continues to pile pressure on Israel’s leaders.

Despite John Kerry’s visit at the end of November – intended to try and kick start a modest, positive cycle of mutual confidence building measures – international attention is largely elsewhere. The US has given up trying to resume final status talks and is not backing efforts to do so via the UN Security Council.

The pressure on Israeli politicians therefore is largely to respond to the domestic demand to address the immediate security challenge. As is typically the case in Israeli national security decision making, political competition between coalition parties interferes with policy deliberations.

The immediate security challenge

Like any other population, when Israelis fear for the safety of themselves and their families their overwhelming focus is on how to address the immediate danger. The instinct of a majority of Israelis is to favour tough punitive measures to deter would be attackers. In a survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in November, 68 per cent of Israelis strongly or moderately disagreed with the claim that “the current terror wave stems from the Palestinians’ despair over the lack of progress in peace talks.” Some 69 per cent strongly or moderately agreed that “The home of the family of a Palestinian who has murdered Jews for nationalistic reasons should be destroyed.”

For politicians on the right who draw populist support from their reputation as ‘uncompromising’, this is an opportunity. The right-wing nationalist Jewish Home proudly claim credit for government measures including house demolitions, minimum sentences for rock throwers, punishing parents for their children’s acts of violence, less stringent rules of engagement for soldiers facing rock throwers, and outlawing the radical northern branch of the Islamic movement in Israel. On top of this, Jewish Home leader Naftali Bennett and his party call for major deployments of Israeli troops inside Palestinian cities, comparable to Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 in which Israel reoccupied Palestinian cities.

However, calls for such a military operation, perhaps not coincidentally, are generally restricted to those who do not have real responsibility for taking such decisions. Indeed such proposals are met with derision by many Israeli security experts who are aware that given the unorganised, ‘lone wolf’, character of the violence, such an escalation could make things worse. Recent profiling by the IDF of 123 perpetrators shows that most decide to launch their attack a very short time before doing so, often triggered by a report on television or a rumour.

Major General Yaakov Amidror, formerly Netanyahu’s national security advisor, mocked calls for soldiers to conduct house to house searches in Hebron, where many attackers have come from, asking, “What are the soldiers supposed to look for – kitchen knives?” Amidror warned the government to reject “calls for ‘massive retaliation’ that will not truly improve security and could make things worse.” The fear is that pointlessly inflaming the situation is likely to create more would be perpetrators.

By the same token the IDF opposes blanket restrictions that might motivate more Palestinians to participate in the violence. Under considerable pressure to get a hold of the situation, the IDF has substantially increased arrests and West Bank checkpoints. But security officials are opposed to large scale denial of entry visas to Palestinians wishing to enter Israel to work. Their assumption is that a Palestinian with a job in Israel is less, not more, likely to carry out an attack.

The IDF also still regard the Palestinian security forces as partners in containing organised armed groups and large scale demonstrations. Indeed, an IDF officer briefed Israeli journalists at the end of November that prior to the current upsurge in violence they had proposed a package of measures to ease the situation in the West Bank and assist the PA. These included providing the PA with more weapons and armoured vehicles, easing the process for Palestinians to acquire permits to work in Israel, and allowing Palestinian construction in Area C (those parts of the West Bank under full Israeli control). However, in the context of Palestinian violence such measures have become more problematic, since Israelis are loathe to give the impression that they are rewarding violence. The carrying out of a shooting attack by a Palestinian security officer on 3 December also raises questions for Israelis about the sustainability of the security cooperation.

The key decision makers, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yaalon – at risk of being outflanked by Naftali Bennett within the coalition, and former foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman in the opposition – are treading a fine line. Both have stressed the need to be tough on perpetrators whilst minimising harm to Palestinians not involved in violence. They understand too the importance of preventing the PA’s collapse. Netanyahu has sought to reduce friction with the Palestinians and international opinion by holding back announcements for new construction planning in settlements.

But in order to offer more progressive steps on the ground Netanyahu would need to be able to show he is getting something in return. When John Kerry encouraged Netanyahu to take steps to assist the PA during their meeting on 24 November, he failed to secure a parallel commitment from Abbas to condemn the violence. Netanyahu also reportedly sought international approval for building in settlement blocs, in return for allowing Palestinian building in Area C.

Overall Kerry’s visit served to highlight the reduced relevance of diplomatic tools to gain control over the situation. Whilst the PA is still relevant in supressing organised Hamas activity, Abbas’s influence over radicalised individual attackers of the social media generation is negligible. A survey conducted by the leading Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki in mid-December indicated that 67 per cent of Palestinians support knife attacks against Israelis and 65 per cent believe Abbas should resign. Abbas’s waning legitimacy therefore leaves him and the PA chasing, rather than shaping, the Palestinian public mood. Far from condemning the recent violence, in a speech on 14 December he described the violence as “justified popular unrest.”

The long term strategic challenge

For the Israeli public, the focus on the immediate threat of violence pushes off discussions about the strategic dimensions of the Palestinian issue. Opposition leaders and think tanks on the centre-left continue to raise the concern that without a change to the status quo, Israel is drifting in the direction of a binational state. However, the default claim of the left – that Israel should seek an agreement with moderate Palestinians – is badly undermined by Abbas’s incendiary rhetoric: such as his statements that Jews “have no right to desecrate them [Jerusalem holy sites] with their filthy feet”; his rhetorical renunciation of the Oslo Agreements; and his accusation that Israelis had killed a 13-year-old Palestinian assailant in cold blood, when the youth was alive and being treated in an Israeli hospital. It is further undermined by surveys suggesting waning Palestinian public support for a two state solution. Cognisant of Abbas’s weakness, opposition leaders Isaac Herzog and Yair Lapid have called for an Israeli policy to initiate a regional diplomatic process involving moderate Sunni Arabs states.

Meanwhile, the respected Institute for National Security Studies think tank continues to be the leading advocate of an Israeli ‘Plan B’ to advance towards separation and Palestinian sovereignty by unilaterally evacuating isolated West Bank settlements, whilst maintaining Israeli security control. However, in the context of the current violence, such an approach is out of step with the Israeli public mood. Unilateralism was brought only briefly onto Israeli front pages by comments made by Netanyahu at a progressive Washington think tank on 10 November, in which he acknowledged that if Israel could maintain security control – and a repetition of the Gaza experience of Hamas’s rockets and tunnels be avoided – a unilateral move might be a possibility. However, Netanyahu’s comments triggered an immediate confrontation with Bennett, and hasty backtracking.

Certainly any decisive move to change the status quo to expand Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank would require a new coalition with centre-left parties, representing an enormous political risk that Netanyahu would be unlikely to undertake unless he felt compelled to do so. Today the diplomatic and even strategic case for a proactive approach is challenged by the chaotic regional picture. When Ariel Sharon set unilateralism in motion in late 2003, and when Yitzhak Rabin entered the Oslo process in 1993, the US military dominated the Gulf, and Syria and Egypt were stable states. Now parts of Iraq and much of Syria are controlled by Islamic state with the rest dominated by Iran, which also has its armed proxies operating in a Hamas-run Gaza, and its leading proxy Hezbollah dominating Lebanon. To Israel’s south, Islamic State affiliates roam the Sinai Peninsula. Jordan to the east remains Israel’s only stable border, but it is hosting vast numbers of refugees, is vulnerable to Islamic State infiltration, and is potentially threatened by a future in which the West Bank falls into the hands of extremists.

Improving the situation: Considerations for third parties

Any hope for significant diplomatic progress between Israel and the PA is unrealistic in the foreseeable future, as reflected by the difficulty faced by Kerry even with his modest focus on de-escalation and confidence building. In light of this, third parties who would like to see Israel take progressive steps to assist the PA should be realistic in their expectations, and cognisant of the political realities and constraints on both sides.

Netanyahu, backed by the weight of opinion in the Israeli security establishment, recognises the importance of the political viability and economic prosperity of the Palestinian Authority. Israel should act responsibly to reduce not only the immediate threat of violence but underlying sources of tension which add fuel to the fire. As President Rivlin argued in recent article in the Washington Post, steps which improve life for Palestinians both in East Jerusalem and the West Bank “serve simultaneously Israel’s moral and practical interests.”

However, the domestic political constraints on Netanyahu when Israelis are being stabbed, shot and run over on a daily basis, and the PA is praising rather than condemning the perpetrators, must also be recognised. If the US or Europe can help in this situation, it is by considering how to create political conditions conducive for Israeli leaders to take constructive steps on the ground.

In this context the EU’s labelling announcement is unfortunate. To the extent that it registers with the Israeli public, it will generally reinforce the view that the Europeans are biased against Israel, out of touch with what is happening, and myopic in their view of the problems. Challenges on the PA side should not be ignored, such as extremism, glorification of terrorism and incitement; problems relating to corruption and governance; and the inherent instability woven into the fact that Abbas, now aged 80, keeps threatening to resign without a clear successor or credible plan for transition.

Overall the UK, EU and other third parties should strive for a balanced and holistic approach to reducing tension and violence, and addressing threats to the future viability of the two state solution.