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Analysis

Syria: How to advance transition to a post-Assad future, by Brig. Gen. (ret.) Michael Herzog

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Download the paper in full here.

As the bloodshed continues in Syria, there are widespread calls among Western leaders for Assad to go. However, the West has been relatively passive in their support for the Syrian opposition forces trying to displace his regime. This is in contrast to international supporters of the regime – Russia, Iran and Hezbollah – who have been actively helping Assad to stay in power in order to protect their own interests.

In this paper, BICOM Senior Visiting Fellow Brig. Gen. (ret.) Michael Herzog argues that in addition to the moral imperative to act, there are also strong strategic reasons for the West to be more proactive, along with states in the region,  in bringing about the end of the Assad regime. Speeding up the process of the regime’s collapse would avert the destabilising consequences of a lengthy civil war, as well as dealing a blow to the radical, Iran-led alliance in the region. Though direct military intervention is not currently on the cards, there are other ways the West could intervene to help advance the fall of Assad. International involvement certainly comes with risks, Herzog argues, but the costs of inaction will be far higher.

For more information about this and other BICOM publications, contact Director of Research Dr. Toby Greene by emailing tobyg@bicom.org.uk.

Key Points (for the full paper click here)

  • The Syrian government is battling a growing insurgency, with the situation developing into a civil war. Neither side is currently capable of overwhelming the other.
  • Whilst external powers interested in keeping Assad in power are actively protecting their interests, Western powers calling for Assad to go are relatively passive in supporting the Syrian opposition.
  • Continued relative Western passivity could result in a very long conflict within Syria, possibly lasting years, developing along sectarian lines and leading to the deaths of many more thousands with no clear outcome.
  • With Assad unwilling to negotiate his own departure and the bulk of the opposition unwilling to negotiate any solution with him, the Annan Plan has little prospect for success and a plan B is required.
  • The Assad regime’s departure would deal a serious blow to Iran and to the Iranian-led axis and encourage those in the region standing up to repression.
  • To maximise the chances of Assad’s departure, while minimising risks, European powers along with the US should adopt a more proactive policy through:
    • significantly increased, though carefully calibrated support for the opposition;
    • further isolation of the regime;
    • continuing to seek Russia’s cooperation, whilst realising that the more inevitable the fall of the regime looks, the more likely Russia is to engage in a process to replace it;
    • support for Syria’s neighbours in managing the fallout from the conflict;
    • preparation of contingency plans to secure Syrian strategic weapons and prevent humanitarian catastrophes;
    • taking an opportunity to mend fences between Israel and Turkey.

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