BICOM

Key Points

• Israel’s current strategic situation contains both reasons for optimism and causes for concern.
• The Middle East region is currently dominated by Iran’s drive for hegemony, and the emergence of a coalition of states attempting to counter Iranian ambitions. Israel is a de facto part of this anti-Iranian coalition. However, the Palestinian cause remains a central interest for Arab public opinion. As a result, there is a discrepancy between the sometimes fiercely-critical rhetoric of Arab states, and the reality of cooperation with Israel.
• Regarding Europe, there is a clear discrepancy between the delegitimisation of Israel emanating from parts of the public sphere, and the actual policy stances of the governments of the key European countries. Britain, France, Germany and Italy all have governments and leaders which remain deeply committed to the existence and security of the Jewish state, although there has been a significant ‘cooling’ in relations across the board between Israel and EU countries since Operation Cast Lead.
• Vis a vis the US, the events of the last year have brought home to the Obama Administration the absence of readiness to cooperate in Iran and Syria, as well as the limited flexibility of the Palestinians. This growing awareness has largely averted the possibility of a major crisis in relations between the US and Israel.

Introduction

Israel’s strategic situation at the beginning of 2010 is complex and multi-faceted, containing both reasons for optimism and causes for concern, from an Israeli point of view. Within the Middle East region, Israel finds itself part of a de facto alliance of states concerned to resist an Iranian drive for hegemony. The common interest of Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and a number of smaller regional states in containing the Iranians and their allies, has led to a situation in which Israel today has greater common strategic interests with major Arab states than at any time in the past.

Yet, paradoxically, this situation exists parallel to real concerns about the erosion of Israel’s wider public image in Europe, and to a lesser extent in the United States. This document will look into the current dynamics of Israel’s regional position, and its standing with the major Western powers.

Israel’s current regional position

The strategic situation in the Middle East is dominated by the drive of the Iranian regime for regional hegemony. This drive relates to a number of aspects. Most salient, of course, is the Iranian nuclear program. In addition, the Iranians are lending their support to a series of insurgent and radical movements across the region, as a tool of pressure on rival countries and in order to promote themselves as the ‘resistance’ power against the US and Israel.

The radical Islamist movements backed by Iran include Hamas among the Palestinians, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthi rebels fighting Saudi Arabia and the government of Yemen. In addition, Tehran has been linked to jihadi elements in Egypt, insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Shia oppositional forces in Kuwait, Bahrain and the oil-rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia.

The membership of Israel in the anti-Iranian regional camp which includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has had a tangible effect on regional responses to Israeli actions. It is notable that during Operation Cast Lead, the Arab League was unable to bring together a quorate meeting of Arab states to condemn Israel. Rather, two rival Arab summits were held by the pro and anti-Iranian camps. The pro-Iranian camp met in Doha in Qatar, where Israel was roundly condemned. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, organised a rival summit in Kuwait city, which focused on economic matters.

Perhaps most telling of the emergence of this new dynamic, however, has been the cooperation between Israel and Egypt in containing the Hamas enclave in Gaza. President Hosni Mubarak has spoken of Iran seeking to ‘devour the Arab world’. During Operation Cast Lead, in the face of furious protests from Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian elements in the region, Mubarak kept the Egyptian-controlled southern exit to Gaza closed. This decision is believed to have had a serious bearing on the tactical military defeat suffered by Hamas in the course of the operation. The ongoing Egyptian effort to act against the smuggling tunnels between northern Sinai and Gaza are testimony to the alliance in effect between Israel and Egypt, against Iran’s local allies.

The regional cold war also underlies the current optimism for the revival of the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Despite the absence of formal negotiations, on the ground cooperation between Israel and the PA on the West Bank is extensive. The PA’s efforts against Hamas over the last two years are generally held to be unprecedented in confronting the military, financial and other aspects of the Hamas organisational infrastructure. The cooperation is based on the membership of both Israel and the PA in the anti-Iranian regional camp of western clients.

However, the reality of the Iranian threat is not recognised in wider Arab public opinion. The Palestinian cause, and opposition to Israel, remain matters of real importance and focus in Arab public opinion. Iran is aware of this, and attempts to use its support for radical positions on the Palestinian issue to win favour itself among Arab publics, and subvert their governments. The Egyptian leadership is also aware of the popularity of radicalism among the Egyptian public, and is determined to shore up the foundations of the regime.

As a result, the public pronunciations of Arab regimes, including Egypt and particularly Saudi Arabia, belie the strategic reality of cooperation on the basis of the presence of a common threat.

Israel and the European Union

In Europe, the public debate regarding Israel has undoubtedly undergone a serious deterioration over the last year. Operation Cast Lead and the subsequent Goldstone Report have played a major role in this. In parts of civil society in western Europe, and in particular in Britain and Scandinavia, the denial of Israel’s right to exist, and advocacy for its nullification have shown worrying signs of migrating from the extreme fringes to the mainstream debate.

The recent issuing of a warrant for the arrest of former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is testimony to the existence of an ongoing and energetic public campaign committed to the delegitimisation of Israel. In Britain, hostility to Israel has increased in recent years among some sections of the intellectual and political elite, including on the backbenches of parliament and among other opinion formers.

Yet there is a clear discrepancy between the delegitimisation of Israel emanating from sections of the public sphere in some European countries and the actual policy stances of the governments of the key European countries. The delegitimisation campaign against Israel has now been underway for some time and has not succeeded in undermining the broad consensus among European governments on Israel’s legitimacy and right to defend itself. Britain, France, Germany and Italy all have governments and leaders which remain deeply committed to the existence and security of the Jewish state. The core factors which define the European power’s relations with Israel still mitigate in Israel’s favour. As an illustration of this, six EU prime ministers met prime minister Ehud Olmert in Jerusalem on the last day of Operation Cast Lead. However, there has been a significant ‘cooling’ in diplomatic relations across the board between Israel and EU countries since Operation Cast Lead, and in the willingness of some European leaders to expend political capital on Israel’s behalf.

Israel and the United States

Voices for the delegitimisation of Israel also exist in the United States, but are far less influential than in Western Europe. Public support and sympathy for Israel in the US also remains very high.

Following the revelation of the secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, and Iran’s determined rejection of US offers of engagement, there is an increasing convergence of opinion between Israel and the US regarding the dangers of Iran’s nuclear program.

US efforts at outreach to other members of the Iranian regional alliance have also failed to bear significant fruit, and the administration is aware of this. Efforts to engage Syria have failed to produce significant changes in the behaviour of the regime In Damascus. Consequently, the Syria Accountability Act, which imposes US sanctions on Damascus, remains in effect.

Similarly, with regard to the Palestinian track, a potential clash between Israel and the Administration appears to have been averted by Israeli willingness to declare a moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank. The unwillingness of the Palestinian Authority to begin negotiations following this declaration, and the continued division of the Palestinians into rival nationalist and Islamist camps, has undermined any claim that Israel was uniquely responsible for the failure to make progress.

The latest reports suggest an imminent revival of negotiations between Israel and the PA, which will be seen as a significant achievement for the Administration, and a test for the intentions of the Palestinian Authority and Israel. But the events of the last year have brought home to the Obama Administration the absence of readiness to cooperate in Iran and Syria, as well as the limited flexibility of the Palestinians. This growing awareness has largely averted the possibility of a major crisis in Israel’s relations with the US in the emerging period.

Opportunities and dangers in the period ahead

The main substantive threat to Israel and to the region as a whole is the onward attempt of the Islamist regime in Tehran to achieve regional hegemony. In addition to its nuclear program, Iran today maintains the two ‘active’ fronts of the Israeli-Arab conflict, through its sponsorship of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

Although the situation is uncertain, Israeli planners do not predict the re-eruption of conflict on either of these fronts in the immediate period ahead. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are engaged in a process of rearming and consolidation. A measure of deterrence has been achieved against them in the recent rounds of conflict. Nevertheless, it is generally expected that at a certain stage, renewed conflict is likely because of the implacable nature of these movements and their ideology.

The use and misuse of international forums in order to pressure Israel, and the campaign in Europe to delegitimise the country, remain matters of concern. In future rounds of conflict, Israel is likely to again be faced with the dilemmas of how to achieve military victory over enemies deliberately exploiting humanitarian principles by targeting civilians, and sheltering within civilian populations. Israel’s future military actions are likely once again to be used by the country’s opponents to focus disproportionate attention and opprobrium on the country.

Conclusion

Overall, Israel’s strategic situation going into 2010 is positive. Cooperation with the major states of the Arab world is taking place to offset the common Iranian threat. The alliance with the United States remains solid. Understanding for Israel’s position at high government level with the main European countries remains generally good, though the tone of anti-Israel rhetoric in sections of the public discourse is a cause for concern in Israel. Talks with the Palestinian Authority, designed to move toward the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, which Benjamin Netanyahu has been consistently calling for, now look more likely to commence than in the past year.The resumption of these talks is likely to have a generally positive effect on Israel’s relations with the rest of the world.