BICOM

Key Points

– As Israel gears up for elections in February 2009, political factions are trying to recast themselves, reach out to voters from within the country’s diverse communities, and bolster their presence in the next Knesset (parliament).

– Underlying the political change in Israel today has been the ongoing decline of traditional ideologies associated with the historical left and right blocs and the rise of personality-based politics.

– A new pragmatism gravitates around the political centre which recognises the need for Palestinian statehood but is sceptical about how peace can become reality at present.

– Ultimately, whilst Israel’s democracy is resilient, the system’s vulnerability to political flux is a source of pressure on Israeli society itself, as well as on the peace process.

Introduction

New political parties are emerging in Israel at the moment. The trend picked up pace last week with the pending formation of a new left-wing party and founding of two religious parties, all of which intend to vie for seats in the Knesset parliamentary elections on 10 February 2009.  Meanwhile, the ruling Kadima faction continues to trail Likud in the polls.  The latter’s leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been offered a boost by the recruitment of prominent public figures including Benny Begin, Dan Meridor and former IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya’alon.

As Israel gears up to go to the ballot box for the fifth time in a decade, its system of government appears to be even more volatile than usual.  Israel is a society of deep-seated tensions, emanating not only from the regional security setting and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also from the ethnic and cultural particularities of being an immigrant-based society.  These challenges are coupled with a party system that is fragmented and in flux, generating weak governments that struggle to make big decisions.  The power balance between the three largest parties in the current Knesset – Kadima, Labour and Likud – and the increasing number of smaller factions is shifting in this context.  This brief examines developments at the heart of Israeli democracy, including the decline of the traditional ideological rivalries and the shifts in the party system, and considers how they will impact the shape and attitude of a future Israeli government.

Reshaping the Knesset

The Israeli electoral system is unusual in terms of the ‘purity’ of its proportional representation, which means that its disparate communities are reflected by a complex multi-party system in the 120 seat Knesset.  Sector based parties seek to represent specific ethnic or cultural groups, whether it is the Haredim (ultra-orthodox Jews), the national religion, the Sephardi/Mizrahi Jews of Middle Eastern origin, the Israeli-Arab minority or immigrants from the former Soviet Union.  One consequence of this legislative model in such a diverse society is that small parties are afforded large sums of political power because the larger parties need their support to form a governing coalition.

In these conditions, it is somewhat remarkable that the Knesset is not in a permanent log jam.  Broadly, however, Israel’s democracy works. The democratic culture is firmly grounded and progressive, as Israel is a society buzzing with vibrant and critical public debate.  Yet such a highly representative system has its weaknesses too.  Complex multi-party coalitions are prone to large cabinets (a new cabinet table was affixed under former PM Ariel Sharon in order to accommodate new ministers) and the coalition-building process can lead to promises of ministerial portfolios out of political expediency rather than policy demands.  The multi-party makeup of the governments tends to generate instability, and as a result administrations themselves tend to be relatively short-lived.  31 governments have sat in 17 parliamentary lifecycles since Israel’s inception 60 years ago.[i]

Another drawback is the system’s vulnerability to new factions fragmenting or being recast almost as fast as they emerge.  Numerous attempts have been made to fill the void at the political centre.  Historically, the Knesset was dominated by two political blocs, led by Labour on the left and Likud on the right (or their predecessors), supplemented by smaller parties representing specific communities or political positions.  1977 was a huge turning point in which the left-wing Alignment lost power for the first time. The centrist Dash party (Democratic Movement for Change) weakened it by winning 15 Knesset seats and made way for the inaugural Likud coalition.  Dash did not last as a political entity, and whilst various centrist parties attempted to break the left right divide, in each case they achieved only moderate and short term success.

However in March 2006, Kadima, the centrist party formed by Ariel Sharon, then led by Ehud Olmert, broke the mould when it achieved electoral victory with 29 seats.[ii]  This was a unique achievement for a newly formed party. Now under the leadership of Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, its future remains uncertain, but the Kadima anomaly still testifies to the major shift which has been taking place in Israeli society.

The decline of traditional ideology

For many years the great ideological divide in Israeli politics was defined by opposition to Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 on the right, versus those supporting territorial compromise on the left.[iii]  Whilst this ideological dichotomy remains ingrained in some public discourse, its force has declined in recent years whilst a new political pragmatism has been emerging.  It entails a pull towards the centre which coalesces around the idea that for Israel to retain its Jewish and democratic character, it must relinquish control of the Palestinian territories.  This understanding is coupled with scepticism about the ability of the Palestinians to accept and enforce an agreement on the other side.

This ideological shift was boldly encapsulated by Kadima, which was founded on the back of Ariel Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza as a political instrument for continuing the process of withdrawal from the occupied territories. Kadima drew widespread support that transcended the old ideologies. The Labour veteran Shimon Peres, for example, joined Sharon and other former ‘Likudniks’ in this endeavour.[iv]

Political developments in both the left and right wing blocs further demonstrate the decline of ideological political identity in Israel.  Likud’s reduction to just 12 seats in the 2006 election (after having won in 2003 with 38 seats) illustrated the death of its ideological standard.  The ‘Greater Israel’ dream of holding on to all of the West Bank through the settlement project, was discredited for most Israelis.  Since then, Likud has swallowed a bitter pill.  Benjamin Netanyahu’s present campaign which talks up economic development for the Palestinians and talks down the expansion of settlements, reflects his own attempts to move into the centre ground, further blurring the distinction between left and right.

The most dramatic current expression of the decline of the traditional party structure is the unravelling of the Labour party. Labour’s vision of transferring sovereignty to the Palestinians has permeated mainstream thinking but its credibility has been eroded by the failures of the peace process it created. On regaining leadership of the Labour party, Defence Minister Ehud Barak, whose attempts to reach a two state solution in 2000 precipitated the Second Intifada, sought to address this weakness by deliberately positioned himself as a sceptic of the peace talks and as a security hawk. But this left Labour without any distinctive political identity, causing its core base of conventional support to dissipate.

Barak is also now threatened by the re-branding of the Meretz faction, a grouping positioned to the left of Labour.  The new movement is attracting sections of the literary, academic and business elite, environmentalists and other smaller political parties.[v]  Labour’s 42 Knesset seats under Rabin’s leadership fell to a record low of 19 in 2003 and 2006.  Current polls predict that in February, Labour could be down to single figures.

On the other end of the spectrum, the national religious parties have entrenched their positions on core issues of the peace process through Habayit Hayehudi (‘The Jewish Home’), a merged reincarnation of parts of the National Religious Party and the National Union, and the radical splinter faction Eretz Yisrael Shelanu (‘Our Land of Israel’).[vi]  They will compete for votes with Likud, but will not damage Benjamin Netanyahu’s party as much as the new left faction might harm Labour.  The ultra-orthodox parties, the Sephardi Shas with 12 seats and the Ashkenani United Torah Judaism with six, look set to maintain their current strength.

Another element in this fractured picture is the Russian-speaking community (approximately 1 in 7 of Israel’s population), which has had a transformative impact within Israeli society in the last two decades. The Likud has just launched its Russian-language website to try to win back votes from a sizeable constituency which abandoned it in recent years for Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu (‘Israel is our home’). The Israeli Soviet immigrant votes played a major part in Rabin’s 1992 electoral success but their subsequent rightward drift helped Netanyahu become prime minister in 1996.  He is hoping it will do so again in 2009.

Overall, the decline in the strength of the major ideological blocs in Israeli society has contributed to the importance of personality politics.  Just as Labour’s decline does not indicate an abandonment of the two state solution, Likud’s resurgence does not signal a return to the ‘Greater Israel’ ideology.  Rather Netanyahu has proved better than Barak at managing his public image, having successfully drawn a line under his previous stint as prime minister in 1996 by first breaking from politics and then returning to successfully steer the Israeli economy in the Sharon government and reenergise Likud after Kadima’s founding.  In contrast, Barak’s attempt to revive his party by promoting his image as Mr. Security has failed because he himself is a deeply unpopular politician.  Netanyahu’s growing personal appeal also exists in the context of discontent with the Olmert administration which he has opposed, and concerns people hold about the peace process given the strength of Iranian backed Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel’s borders.

Conclusion

A two month election battle must still be fought and it remains far from clear how the next Knesset will look.  Still, the two front runners are Likud and Kadima, and either Netanyahu or Livni is set to become the next Israeli prime minister.  But in a parliamentary democracy in which coalitions must be formed in order to govern, and a complex society in which ethnic and religious cleavages run deep, a significant balance of power sits with the smaller factions.

Until the election dust is settled, no substantive progress on peace-making is likely.  Whether that business will become easier or more difficult afterwards will depend on what form of coalition emerges, and external political developments.  But in any scenario, the next Israeli administration will continue to face the perennial challenge of how to manage the conflict with the Palestinians and maintain Israel’s security.  The decline of old ideological rivalry is juxtaposed by the absence of unifying leaders or fresh ideas. As such, the 2009 election will largely be defined by which political personalities can convince the voters in the centre ground that they can best be trusted with Israel’s wellbeing.

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[i] Kenig Ofer, ‘Frequent Elections and Political Instability’, The Israel Democracy Institute, 16 November 2008.

[ii] Despite becoming the largest parliamentary party, pundits were divided as to whether Kadima would be a passing fad or a longer lasting phenomenon. 

[iii] Shmuel Sandler, ‘Centrism in Israeli Politics and the Olmert Government’, BESA, Perspectives No. 17, 7 June 2006.

[iv]   The Labour veteran Shimon Peres joined former ‘Likudniks’ and the secular and religious joined forces, concurring that Israel’s national security interests were at stake.  See, for instance, Jim Lederman, ‘What Israel’s election means’, Open Democracy, 4 April 2006.

[v] Roni Singer-Heruti, ‘Meretz chief looks to galvanize left wing with new political party’, Haaretz, 16 November 2008; Roni Singer-Heruti and Akiva Eldar, ‘Feted author Amos Oz says new leftist party will replace Labor’, Haaretz, 16 November 2008.

[vi] Matthew Wagner, ‘New party Habayit Hayehudi opts for cyberspace primary’, The Jerusalem Post, 23 November 2008; Matthew Wagner, ‘New right-wing party aims to promote Greater Israel’, The Jerusalem Post, 27 November 2008.