BICOM

As Israel gears up for Independence Day celebrations, its security discussions have been dominated by three arenas: the demonstrations/riots on the border with Gaza; the question of potential Iranian retaliation over an alleged Israeli strike on its Tiyas (T-4) air base near Homs, which is thought to house an Iranian drone programme; and the content and aftermath of the American-British-French strike on Syrian chemical facilities. An additional piece of the national security jigsaw was provided Friday evening when the IDF announced that an Iranian UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) that was shot down in Israeli skies in February – and which originated in the T-4 base – was carrying explosives.

But the ins and outs of these issues shouldn’t distract from two larger, strategic questions which are more likely to shape the future of the region and Israel’s long-term security – the future of American’s presence in Syria; and Israel’s on-going relationship and coordination with Russia.

American military presence in Syria

Israeli commentators saw the trilateral strike in Syria – described by US Defence Secretary James Mattis as a “one time shot” – as more symbolic than substantial, doing little to significantly damage the regime’s military capabilities or threaten its survival. Yet more important is what the strike and recent official statements, indicate about American’s long-term intentions in Syria.

While many of US President Donald Trump’s advisors reportedly support maintaining America’s military presence in Syria – there are approximately 2000 US troops in the northeast of the country – it seems the administration is gearing up to bring them home. On 29 March, Trump said American troops would be departing “very soon,” while a 4 April call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump reportedly grew “tense” around this very issue. It chimes with the statement made by General Joseph Votel, Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM) who told the Senate Armed Services Committee in late February that the US remained in Syria to solely deal with ISIS, explaining that “countering Iran is not one of the coalition missions in Syria”. Even US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley’s statement yesterday – that the US’ goals in Syria were to ensure that chemical weapons are not used in a way that poses a risk to US interests, that ISIS is defeated, and that there is a good vantage point to watch what Iran is doing – is unlikely to bring relief in Jerusalem who feel that a “good vantage point” is a far cry from pushing back against Iranian regional hegemony.

Israeli-Russian coordination over Syria

While Netanyahu has been consistent in his praise of Trump as Israel’s closest ally, when it comes to protecting its interests in Syria, Israel has for some time put the majority of its eggs in Moscow’s basket. But this relationship may also be under threat.

Following the attack on the northwest quadrant of the T-4 Air base, Russia publically (and unusually) chided Israel. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the strike “a dangerous development,” and President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman described it as “a cause for concern for us”. Israel’s Ambassador to Russia Gary Koren was called to meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.

Because much of Russian foreign policy is smoke and mirrors, it’s unclear to what extent Russia was genuinely annoyed. The Kremlin may have simply been signalling disapproval to Israel (as it has done before) without changing its understanding of Israel’s red-lines. More likely is the Russians were expressing anger over not being informed in advance, and due to their feeling that their troops had been put in danger (a different quadrant of T-4 also hosts Russian troops). Yet more serious would be if the Russian statements represented a type of “yellow card” to Israel to restrain its strikes. The big question is whether this strike changed Russian position on Israel acting in Syria when it feels its interests are at stake.

Looking ahead, one key issue will be to what extent the Russian-Israeli military coordination mechanism remains in place. Another would be if control over the state-of-the-art S-400 anti-aircraft systems in Syria, which are currently under Russian control, were to be transferred to the regime. A move like this – although unlikely at this stage – could significantly reduce the IAF’s room to maneuverer above the skies of Syria and Lebanon.

In any event, Israel’s hopes that Western policy makers would succeed in exploiting differences between Iran and Russia seem to be fading. While both countries differ over the Syrian endgame, (and while Russia fears the instability from Israeli-Iranian conflagration), the recent trilateral summit between Iran, Russia and Turkey, reportedly provided Iran with a green light to militarily, economically and diplomatically remain in Syria and to serve as a factor that influences the Syrian regime. Ultimately, as Israeli-Iranian tensions increase – in what former head of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin calls the “collision between two strategic vectors” – Israel is faced with the absence of one superpower and complex relations with the other.

Calev Ben-Dor is Director of Research at BICOM.