In the background to the attack in the Golan Heights near Quneitra on January 18, 2015 are last year’s air strikes in Syria on convoys of weapons sent to Hizbollah by Iran. With the most recent attack, however, which was attributed to Israel and killed Hizbollah operatives and Iranian Revolutionary Guards al-Quds Force commanders, Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria have apparently perceived a change by Israel of the rules of the game. Thus, this attack, which was actually a targeted killing of a symbolic figure, Jihad Mughniyeh, and Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi, a senior Iranian Quds Force officer, marked a new standard in the tension between Israel on the one hand, and Hizbollah and Iran on the other. The attack on Hizbollah and Iran on Syrian soil gave the recent incident a broader meaning than that attached to previous events in the conflict arena between Israel and the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis. Much attention, therefore, is now focused on predicting Hizbollah’s response, in coordination with Iran or separately, and assessing the considerations that will guide the “axis” response.

Apparently in the eyes of Iran and Hizbollah, the attack crossed a red line and thus demands a high price of Israel. From time to time Israel is perceived as violating the rules of the game formulated after the civil war broke out in Syria, implying that Hizbollah’s deterrence, widely accepted as a given since the Second Lebanon War, is eroding. Israel has attacked the organization several times, including the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh in 2008, the killing of Hassan Lakkis in Beirut in 2013, and the recent strike. These targeted strikes join numerous operations attributed to Israel against arms shipments to Hizbollah in Syrian territory and the exposure of a spy ring within Hizbollah that is suspected of collaborating with Israel.

Hizbollah’s responses to these events were relatively weak. They included one significant response, the attack in Burgas, Bulgaria in July 2012, along with failed attempts to launch further attacks abroad and pinpoint strikes in the northern Golan Heights and Shab’a Farms during 2014. Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that the organization and its Iranian patron believe that they must restore deterrence against Israel so as not to abandon the principle of attacking Israel, which in their view understands only the language of force, and act in accordance with the spirit of muqawama (resistance). To them, continued relative restraint will encourage Israel to continue the trend toward escalation and erode Hizbollah’s position as the leader of the resistance. This assessment concerning Hizbollah’s intentions is supported by explicit statements in recent months by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, as well as declarations by Hizbollah spokesmen following the latest strike, made in order to gain legitimacy for a response.

However, a dramatic response by Hizbollah and Iran would entail tangible risks of deterioration into war, a development that none of the parties involved – Hizbollah, Iran, Syria, or Israel – desire. Not only is Hizbollah mired in a long war in Syria, particularly in the struggle against the Islamic State (IS) on Syrian and Iraqi soil, which is stretching its capabilities over several arenas; it must also contend with problems at home, namely, the domestic situation in Lebanon.

Read the article in full at INSS.