fbpx

Comment and Opinion

INSS: Possible Scenarios and Strategic Options vis-à-vis Iran, by Amos Yadlin

[ssba]

The likely agreement between Iran and the P5+1, based on the parameters announced by the US State Department on April 2, 2015 after the talks in Lausanne, is problematic but not necessarily the worst case scenario that could emerge in the context of Iran’s nuclear program. The starting point for comparing the various scenarios is not one in which Iran has zero nuclear capabilities, but one in which Iran has been – however illegitimately – a nuclear threshold state since the beginning of the current decade. Iran possesses a nuclear infrastructure it constructed over the last 10 years, i.e., the components and know-how to put together a nuclear bomb. Iran has 19,000 centrifuges, of which 9,000 enrich uranium, 10 tons of low grade enriched uranium (enough fissile material for 7-8 bombs after enrichment to a higher grade), two underground enrichment facilities, a power reactor in Bushehr also capable of producing plutonium, a heavy water plutonium reactor under construction in Arak, and an infrastructure of know-how, R&D, and covert activity dedicated to weapons development. The emerging agreement does not permit Iran to develop nuclear weapons, neither in 10-25 years, nor thereafter. An Iranian decision to develop nuclear weapons in 2025 or 2030, when most restrictions imposed by the agreement are scheduled to be lifted, would still represent a violation of the agreement and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, obligating a forceful international response.

Israel views Iran with nuclear weapons as a threat to its security of the highest order, if not an outright existential threat. Already today, before an agreement between Iran and the world powers has been signed, Iran is only 2-3 months away from the bomb, should it decide to break out to nuclear weapons. Therefore, an acceptable agreement with Iran would have to keep it at least 2-3 years away from the bomb. It thus behooves Israeli policy to focus, first and foremost, on improving the parameters of the emerging agreement. At the same time, Israel must work with the United States to promote agreements and a coordinated plan of action, and perhaps also to anchor understandings in a formal agreement that would provide solutions to the problematic scenarios and dangers inherent in an Iranian breakout, with or without a final agreement. In particular, Israel must strive to receive guarantees that there will be suitable solutions to the risks that an agreement with Iran poses to it, and to reach an agreement with the United States about strengthening Israel’s security and political standing in case the optimistic scenario envisioned by the US administration does not materialize.

Read the article in full at INSS.