During his visit to Washington earlier this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about possible Israeli unilateral action vis-à-vis the Palestinians, stressing that such action “would have to meet Israeli security criteria” and “would also require broader international understandings than exists.” Subsequently, the Prime Minister retracted his statement and issued explanations. Either way, however, it is important to consider whether it is possible to ensure security in the context of an independent Israeli disengagement from the West Bank without a permanent status agreement in place. The underlying condition is that any withdrawal from all or part of the West Bank and any separation from the Palestinians would not compromise the personal safety of Israel’s citizens and national security as a whole. These would have to be ensured for such a move to be possible.

Any withdrawal from the West Bank could occur in the absence of a permanent agreement and would represent an alternative to a situation in which it became patently clear that a full two-state agreement with the Palestinians is impossible to achieve is the foreseeable future. The purpose of such a withdrawal would be to implement a temporary border that would create a reality of two nation states without undermining the possibility of continuing negotiations, while also improving the daily lives of the Palestinians until an agreement is reached. An independent withdrawal, as well as a partial or an interim agreement, would in all probability involve the evacuation of some 100,000 people from the Jewish settlements located beyond the security fence or on the eastern mountain ridges, out of a total of some 380,000 Israelis living east of the Green Line, and would preserve the large settlement blocs that are home to the vast majority of this population.

Given the short distance between the West Bank and Israel’s large population centers and its strategic rear, the country is very vulnerable to fire and other attempted attacks from the West Bank. Therefore, as long as there is no bilateral security arrangement with the Palestinians, the IDF would remain responsible for security in the West Bank. Unlike the Gaza Strip, the model for maintaining security must be constructed for the most part on preventing terrorism before it happens and fighting terrorism as needed rather than on deterrence. It must prevent terrorist infrastructures from being built and prevent the development of manufacturing and/or smuggling capabilities of weapons, munitions, and/or dual-purpose materials as well as assistance from outside advisors. To that end, the IDF must continue to isolate the West Bank envelope, i.e., maintain security control of the Jordan Valley, the Jordan crossings, West Bank crossings to Israel, and the aerial space above the West Bank. In this framework, Israel maintains intelligence capabilities for foiling terrorism and freedom of movement in the West Bank needed by the IDF and the general Security Services. At the same time, the IDF would be prepared to combat terrorism and violence whenever necessary. Should the security situation deteriorate and Hamas attempts to seize control of the West Bank, Israel would be able to stop such a takeover; Israel would have to make its intentions clear ahead of time.

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