Operation Protective Edge is another example of an asymmetrical confrontation, not only of scope and means of force but also of the respective sides’ strategic objectives. For Israel, it has been yet another round in a series of confrontations with terrorist organizations, in which the strategic objective is attaining a long period of calm and postponement of the next round, mainly by deterring Hamas and demonstrating the heavy price Hamas must pay for attacking Israel. This strategic objective of returning to the status quo ante of “calm for calm” suggests that Israel lacks a viable political goal and losing the opportunity to develop new political options.

For its part, Hamas is fighting an existential war. Weakened, isolated, financially drained, and fearing the loss of its ability to govern the Gaza Strip – in effect, with nothing to lose, especially after the failure of the reconciliation agreement with Fatah – Hamas chose to escalate the conflict and intensify the rocket fire at Israel in order to restore its relevance and ensure its continued rule of Gaza.

It is unclear if Israel grasped the significance of this asymmetry at the outset of the campaign. Still, having learned the lesson of previous operations, the Israeli government lowered expectations and made it clear that, lacking an alternative, it would not try to topple the Hamas regime. This encouraged Hamas to continue fighting, despite its limited achievements on the battlefield. In any event, Israel has experienced an inherent problem of asymmetrical confrontations: when facing a non-state entity, it is difficult to translate battlefield achievements into political gains.

The feverish activity of the last few days to reach a ceasefire and a post-combat arrangement presents Israel with new opportunities to use the campaign to foster new political dynamics and encourage regional and international cooperation toward stability in the Gaza Strip. This involves generating a fundamental change in the situation in Gaza, namely, via economic and civilian rehabilitation and development. Israel would do well to propose a formula of “reconstruction for demilitarization,” which would involve all relevant actors – including Israel – to take part in rebuilding and developing the Gaza Strip in exchange for a commitment to demilitarize Gaza of strategic weapons: missiles, rockets, offensive and smuggling tunnels, even if the implementation of such a commitment would be limited.

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