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Comment and Opinion

INSS: The JCPOA, Three Years On, by Emily B. Landau, Ephraim Asculai

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Three years after Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in mid-January 2016, the question “how has the deal held up” is highly warranted. Supporters of the JCPOA insist that “the deal is working” – but what does this mean? If the intention is that Iran is prevented from becoming a nuclear weapons state, clearly this is not the case; not least because the deal has an expiration date in the form of its sunset provisions, and thus at best only delays the time whereby Iran is able, technically, to continue developing a nuclear weapon. If, however, the intention is the limited sense that Iran has upheld its end of the nuclear bargain, the question depends on one’s assessment of the deal. If the deal is deemed to be a solid, comprehensive agreement, then Iran’s compliance would surely be good news. But if the deal is dangerously flawed, compliance with its terms would not confirm that it has prevented Iran from carrying on its nuclear development program or that there is room for complacency regarding the prospects of Iran going nuclear in the future.

What does the future hold regarding the Iranian nuclear project, according to the JCPOA? Until 2024, Iran will be permitted to operate 5060 IR-1-type centrifuges. Later, it will be permitted, in stages, to manufacture and operate more advanced centrifuge types. At present, Iran’s potential “breakout time” is somewhat less than a year, but this span will shrink as time goes by. Iran’s continued threats to enrich uranium to higher levels than the permitted 3.67%, thereby shortening the breakout time considerably, undermine trust and cast a favorable post-deal period in doubt. Providing that the JCPOA does not dissolve before then, October 18, 2025 marks “Termination Day”, at which point UNSC Resolution 2231 – which grants authority to the JCPOA – will be terminated.

Read the full article here.