fbpx

Analysis

BICOM Focus: What now for policy in Gaza?

[ssba]

Key Points

  • The Gaza flotilla incident has renewed and invigorated international calls for a change in Israel’s policies with regard to the Gaza Strip, in order to improve the situation there.
  • The security threat of Hamas, its arms build up, and refusal to renounce violence is the source of Israel’s policies on limiting access and trade to the Gaza Strip.
  • Israel’s policies come alongside international demands on Hamas to renounce violence, accept previous peace agreements, and recognise Israel, and an effort to support President Mahmoud Abbas and his engagement in the peace process.
  • Some easing of the restrictions is being considered in Israel. However, a complete lifting of the closure on Gaza would have far reaching ramifications, possibly entrenching Hamas’s rule and the separation of Gaza and the West Bank, weakening Abbas.
  • The underlying problems remain unchanged, and reflect not only Israel’s policies, but Hamas’s failure to renounce violence, and international failure to tackle smuggling, as called for in UN Security Council Resolution 1860.

What is the current policy and why is it in place?

Since Hamas violently took sole control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, ousting forces loyal to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, Israel has considered Gaza to be a hostile entity. This is because of the thousands of rockets fired by Hamas into Israel, Hamas’s ongoing refusal to renounce violence, and the ongoing captivity of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel restricts maritime and aerial access to Gaza and limits what passes through its land border, (though this has not prevented smuggling of weapons, along with other goods, under the Gaza-Egypt border). However, Israel’s judicial system recognises an underlying residual responsibility on Israel to ensure the humanitarian needs of Gaza are met. Israel therefore allows basic goods through its border.

At the same time, the Quartet seeks to bring Hamas to renounce violence, accept previous peace agreements and recognise Israel. Western leaders have largely maintained a policy of non-contact with Hamas, pending its acceptance of these principles. In addition, Egypt has until now largely kept its border with the Gaza Strip closed, and demanded Hamas sign a Palestinian national unity agreement as a condition for opening the border.

By contrast, both Israel and the international community have worked with the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad in the West Bank, to remove restrictions on access and support economic development. The hope has been that this will provide a positive model that reinforces non-violence. Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Western powers ultimately want to see the Palestinians reunited under a leadership that is committed to non-violence and a two-state solution.

Is the current policy working?

In analysing the impact of the current policy, it is firstly important to note the undoubted human cost of the situation on the residents of Gaza.  Whilst there is wide availability of food and goods, due in considerable part to smuggling from Egypt, normal economic life and opportunities for the population have been severely curtailed. UN agencies report that the majority of Gazans live in poverty and are dependent on aid. Has this helped in weakening Hamas?

The accuracy of polls is difficult to gauge, and the situation varies, but surveys consistently show that Hamas has lost support since winning parliamentary elections in 2006. In a March poll, Fatah receive 42% support and Hamas 28%. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this loss of support is due to Hamas’s inability to lift the blockade, their internal repression, or refusal to sign a Palestinian unity agreement.

It is also worth noting the difficulties faced by Hamas in governing the strip. It was reported as recently as 20 May 2010 that Hamas was unable to pay salaries. Hamas lawmaker Jamal Nassar said last month, “The government is facing a crisis… The siege on the [Hamas-run] Palestinian government has been tightened recently and because of this it has been unable to bring in funds from abroad.” Hamas’s crisis was linked to increased scrutiny by Egypt of currency transfers to Gaza. The currency situation has reportedly been eased by Egypt opening of the Rafah crossing this week in response to the flotilla incident.

Until the flotilla incident, Egypt’s policy had been getting stricter on Hamas, especially after repeated Hamas refusals to sign the Egyptian brokered unity agreement. In November 2009 it was revealed that Egypt was building an underground steel barrier to prevent tunnelling. The Palestinian Authority has also played its role in encouraging Western policy makers not to relax their position towards Hamas.

However, the policy does not so far appear to have led to a weakening of Hamas’s security and overall control of the Gaza Strip. One of the negative consequences of the border restrictions has been the development of a black economy, whereby goods not acquired from Israel are smuggled under the Gaza-Egypt border, over which Hamas has control. Smuggling provides Hamas with a source of income, as well as weapons. Israel’s maritime blockade has made it far more difficult for Hamas to bring in weapons. However, Head of Israeli military intelligence Amos Yadlin told the a Knesset committee in November 2009, that Hamas had test fired a rocket capable of hitting Tel Aviv, as part of its efforts to rebuild its arsenal after Operation Cast Lead.

The policy has also been damaging for Israel’s public relations. A lack of clarity about how Israel determines what enters Gaza has led Israel’s critics to brand its policy as arbitrary and cruel collective punishment, whilst paying little heed to Hamas’s responsibility for the current situation.

Where now for the Gaza policy?

The ill-fated storming of the flotilla has refocused international attention on Gaza. In reality, the strategic dynamics have not changed since the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1860 prior to the end of Operation Cast Lead. This resolution called on states to prevent arms smuggling, as well as calling for the reopening of crossing points and Palestinian reconciliation. In the absence of Palestinian reconciliation, Western powers have been promoting negotiations between Israel and PA President Mahmoud Abbas, and have left the Gaza situation, including the question of smuggling to Hamas, on the relative back-burner. However, the events of last week, their potential for repetition, and the role of Turkey in challenging the policy, is forcing Western governments and Israel to reassess the position.

There are mixed reports in Israel, but some indicate that Prime Minister Netanyahu may be ready to change the restrictions on the Israel-Gaza border to focus only on security related criteria. There is pressure from the United States  to move in this direction. There have been reports of a British proposal for Israel to ease restrictions on what enters Gaza through its border, possibly in return for international acceptance of an Israeli led inquiry into the flotilla incident. Defence Minister Ehud Barak told the Knesset on Monday that the government would examine “additional ways to achieve the same goals of the blockade, by reducing as far as possible the potential for friction.”

If Israel were to relax restrictions to focus only on security related items, this still leaves open the question of dual use materials, like concrete and steel. So far these materials have only been allowed in for specific UN projects. It may be that Israel will be more open to UN requests in the future, but is likely to remain cautious on the import of materials that can easily be used by Hamas for military purposes such as bunkers and fortifications.

Another proposal raised in a joint press conference between Foreign Secretary William Hague and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner is that Europe could play a role in checking shiploads of goods that enter Gaza, or perhaps reprise its role overseeing the Egypt-Gaza border crossing. However, no detailed proposals have yet emerged as to how the maritime proposal might work in practice. As for the Egypt-Gaza crossing at Rafah, EU monitors withdrew after the Hamas takeover in 2007 citing security reasons, and made the return of the Mahmoud Abbas’s Presidential Guard a condition for resuming the mission.

There are those arguing for a much bolder change, based on the belief that the international and Israeli policy of supporting Mahmoud Abbas and isolating Hamas has failed. The global conflict think tank, International Crisis Group has made this case, and called for “normal commercial traffic with adequate international end-use monitoring.” This would mean some international role in checking the use of materials entering Gaza to ensure they are not misused by Hamas.

However, many questions remain unanswered about this proposal. Israel has a poor experience of international monitors put in place to stop arms build ups on its borders. The UN force put in place to stop Hezbollah rearming following UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has proven to be completely ineffective. It has demonstrated the paucity of tools available to multilateral institutions in contributing to regional security.

It is not clear whether the ICG’s call for “normal commercial traffic”, or indeed President Obama’s recent call for “economic development” in Gaza, implies a mechanism for exports. Since the Hamas takeover, Israel has allowed only relatively small quantities of flowers and strawberries to leave Gaza. There may be room to expand on these kinds of exports. However, the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access which was supposed to govern exports from Gaza, was signed before Hamas came to power, and presupposes some level of working relationship and trust on security issues between the Palestinian Authority controlling the Gaza Strip and Israel. Furthermore, PA President Mahmoud Abbas has insisted that implementation of the agreement should only be with forces loyal to him reinserted into the Gaza Strip under a Palestinian unity agreement. It is hard to see, therefore, how this agreement can be fully implemented in the current circumstances.

A radical alternative would be new routes for Gazan trade, through Egypt and via the coast, that did not involve Israel. However, the establishment of an independent trade facility for Gaza would have major implications for the status of the Gaza Strip. It would potentially remove Gaza from the Israeli customs envelope as determined by the Oslo Accords, and thereby upgrade the level of de facto international recognition of Hamas’s rule in Gaza. This would further entrench the political division between Gaza and the West Bank.

There are voices in Israel who advocate such a development. Giora Eiland, the IDF reserve General who has been put in charge of the commission to investigate the flawed interception of the Marmara, is among them. He has argued that Israel should accept that Gaza is a de facto state. He has advocated maintaining strong military deterrence against Gaza, whilst allowing the opening of the Egypt-Gaza border and the establishment of commercial shipping, as long as the ships are run by trusted organisations that Israel can check. It is argued that this change would allow Israel to effectively divest itself of its responsibility for the Gaza Strip.

However, there are few in Israel, and in the international community, who are currently ready to accept the creation of a virtual Hamas mini-state and to cement the Palestinian division. Among the most fervent objectors to any move that solidifies Hamas’s position in Gaza are Egypt and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. Egypt considers Hamas a threat to its own security. Whilst Egypt has periodically opened its border to relieve the pressure, and has not acted fully against smuggling tunnels, it is against formalising the Gaza-Egypt trade route because it is overwhelmingly concerned that Gaza not become its responsibility. Ultimately, the problem cannot be addressed without Egyptian cooperation.

Potential pitfalls of a policy change

In considering how to improve the situation inside Gaza, the challenges remain to stop smuggling, to support Mahmoud Abbas, to prevent Hamas from making political gains that make them less likely meet the Quartet conditions, and to bring about the release of Gilad Shalit. Any relaxation of the current situation will be spun by Hamas as an endorsement for their path of violent ‘resistance’. Furthermore, given the complete control Hamas enjoys over the Strip, it will be difficult for any increased reconstruction materials and aid to bypass the Hamas authorities.

More significant policy changes that move towards normal commercial trade could be interpreted as a de facto recognition of Hamas’s rule. Normalisation of Hamas’s rule in Gaza will entrench the separation between the PA-controlled West Bank and the Gaza Strip, making Palestinian reconciliation even less likely.

Any concessions that Israel makes at this stage, under international pressure, will also be difficult domestically because of the ongoing captivity of Gilad Shalit, which remains an issue of great concern in Israel.

Conclusion        

The manner in which Israel determines what enters Gaza through its borders has exposed it to widespread criticism, whilst Hamas has benefitted from the underground trade route on the Gaza-Egypt border. This is a situation that could be improved by Israel relaxing the restrictions on what it allows in to be based only on security criteria. It now seems that Israel is in the process of reconsidering its approach.

At the same time, whilst working to improve the situation in Gaza, it is important not to exacerbate the underlying problems of Hamas’s rule, its ongoing arms smuggling, and its refusal to renounce violence. Palestinian moderates will be looking with great concern on any measure that appears to be rewarding Hamas and its extremism. The international community will have to consider how to avoid harm to Palestinian moderates through its actions.

Furthermore, significant changes, such as allowing Gaza to resume normal commercial trade, either through Israel, Egypt or by sea, have major ramifications. The paramount issue is to prevent Hamas in Gaza becoming even more heavily armed. A further key concern for Israel, Western powers, and pro-Western Arab states is the entrenchment of Hamas rule in Gaza, and by extension the division between Gaza and the West Bank to the detriment of Mahmoud Abbas and the prospects of a negotiated two state solution. These are the dilemmas both Israel and the international community will have to consider in reassessing their policies with regard to the Gaza Strip.