10/10/2008
"An examination of the words uttered and written by the leaders of Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas, and even Syria, easily reveals their aspirations. The Muqauma (resistance) strategy has a clear and defined long-term objective - bring about Israel's end as a sovereign Jewish entity - as well as two intermediate objectives.
The first midterm goal is to make Israeli society crumble on the inside, in a bid to prompt Jews to emigrate and undermine their motivation to defend themselves, to the point where one military blow (either nuclear or conventional) would suffice to achieve the final objective. The second midterm goal is to gradually minimize Israel's territory, in a manner that would turn our population into a convenient and concentrated target for mortar shells, rockets, missiles, and terror attack, while making it difficult for the IDF to offer protection. This territorial objective also has a religious aspect: Liberating every centimeter of Palestinian land, which in their view belongs to Muslims.
In the face of this well-formulated and clear strategy, which is prompting the buildup of appropriate military capabilities, the State of Israel is in a fundamentally inferior position. Why? Because we do not have an agreed upon national strategy that would enable us to derive diplomatic and military midterm goals as well as IDF buildup and operational methods. Therefore, the operations and wars we embark on because we're forced to, or on our own initiative, just like peace negotiations, are to a large extent being managed in line with the preferences, qualifications, and caprices of the politicians and top army officials who happen to lead the country at the time (as well as with those of top US Administration officials.)
There are quite a few examples of this: The Six-Day War, whose objectives and results were determined by IDF major generals as well as brigade and regiment commanders on the ground; the first Lebanon War, which was a war of choice that facilitated Hizbullah's establishment; the settlement boom in the territories and in the Gaza Strip in the 1970s and 1980s, which prompted a demographic threat and social schism in the State of Israel; and the hasty unilateral withdrawal from the South Lebanon Security Zone and the Gaza Strip, which gave the Muqauma a boost and motivation, because they were perceived as a surrender to the pressures exerted by guerilla and terror. Not to mention the Second Lebanon War, which only featured tactical objectives - and they too were unfeasible.
In some respects, the situation toady is even worse, because the government and its diplomatic and security conduct are zigzagging among three different strategic doctrines. This wastes precious resources and time and produces an image of confusion and befuddlement, which encourages the enemy and despairs our friends and potential friends in the Arab world."