17/09/2007
For those reasons, there is broad consensus between the US and the European Union that Tehran's nuclear ambitions must be frustrated, but there is little agreement on how to achieve that. The US will this week launch a diplomatic offensive at the United Nations. Washington wants to negotiate a new Security Council resolution condemning Iran for failing to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and tightening sanctions as punishment.
There is little chance of the Americans getting their way at the Security Council. Russia wants to wait and see what effect two previous resolutions and existing sanctions will have. Tehran, meanwhile, is happy with a 'work plan' already agreed with the International Atomic Energy Association, under which it agrees to answer questions about its nuclear programme, but not to suspend uranium enrichment. Britain, France and Germany - the so-called EU3 - are sceptical about that plan. The US is downright scornful, believing it to be a stalling tactic.
The Iranians also have reason to be sceptical. They hear some of the rhetoric coming out of Washington and conclude that, whatever they do, they will be attacked. So they may conclude that the only course of action is full acceleration towards a nuclear deterrent.
It is true that the US is increasingly bellicose. The balance of power in the Bush administration is shifting away from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who favours cautious engagement with Tehran, and towards Vice-President Dick Cheney, who urges confrontation.
That shift means Britain's diplomatic leverage in Washington is also waning. Dr Rice is much more inclined to listen to US allies than Mr Cheney. But London also has some diplomatic leverage in Iran. While deciphering Iran's internal power struggles is difficult, Britain has sufficient contact to transmit a clear but discreet message to the regime. That message should be simple: war can still be averted, but for that to happen, the US hawks must be deprived of the obvious pretext to attack and the doves sufficiently rewarded for their diplomatic efforts. That means abandoning the pretence of the IAEA 'work plan' and committing to an immediate halt in uranium enrichment."
Haaretz (17/9): "U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority tomorrow will give an important boost to the talks between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Beyond the symbolic importance of emphasizing American leadership in the peace process prior to the international summit scheduled for Washington in November, Rice's visit is expected to advance the wording of a joint declaration to be released at the summit and, as always, push Israel into making more "relief" gestures toward the Palestinians.
But no less importantly, Rice must encourage the premier not to diverge from the path he has taken in the past few weeks. Olmert's declarations and deeds indicate that he is interested in promoting a political arrangement with the "partner" Abbas, but is concerned about the internal political price attached to measures that are considered concessions to the Palestinians. Olmert prefers that the Washington summit end in a joint declaration that he will submit only for cabinet approval, and not in a signed agreement that he will have to submit to a Knesset vote. This is how he will try to avoid a coalition crisis and the need to rely on Meretz and Arab lawmakers to get Knesset approval - at the price of weakening Israel's commitment to the continuation of the process.
There are some impediments also concerning implementation of confidence-building steps for the Palestinians, which are aimed at sustaining the peace process on the way to a settlement and strengthening Abbas internally. Tomorrow Defense Minister Ehud Barak will finally present a military plan to improve Palestinian freedom of movement in the West Bank. The drafting of the plan has already dragged out for three months, during which there has been no actual improvement; the delay indicates the defense establishment's reservations about removing roadblocks and checkpoints between Palestinian cities and villages. There also has been a delay in Olmert's promise to release Palestinian prisoners for Ramadan, a promise that already encountered opposition from Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu cabinet members.
Olmert is more seasoned than his predecessors at coalition politics and is correct in his assessment that political support is an essential condition for any peace process and agreement. The challenges he faces are not simple: Yisrael Beiteinu is under pressure from the right to leave the government, and has already presented lines in the sand - the background to a possible exit. Shas will face similar pressure, particularly if Avigdor Lieberman indeed resigns. The Labor Party - the apparent leader of the peace camp - is headed by Ehud Barak, who is not enthusiastic about the Olmert-Abbas talks and has reservations about a further withdrawal from the West Bank before there is an adequate response to the Qassams. These problems complicate Olmert's work, but they must not divert him from his political path.
Olmert's leadership will be judged on his success in advancing the two-state solution, and ending the prolonged occupation of the territories - not on his success in staying in office a few months longer. His political experience should support the creation of a political agreement, and not be an obstacle to it."