BICOM

Key points

• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for a Palestinian state to be demilitarised is nothing new. It is documented in all major agreements between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, including the Oslo Accords, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Camp David negotiations and the unofficial Geneva Accords.
• Previous peace treaties and other agreements signed between Israel and its neighbours all include clauses of demilitarisation to ensure long-term stability. Prominent examples include agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
• The lessons of recent years in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon illustrate the need for international guarantees and regional cooperation in preventing offensive weapons and arms from reaching terror organisations and posing a threat to the stability of the region as a whole.

 

Not a new idea: demilitarisation of a Palestinian state in previous agreements

Documented evidence from previous negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership shows that there is broad agreement that strict limitations will be placed on the military capacity of a future Palestinian state. Restrictions of this sort commonly refer to limitations on weaponry possession, control over airspace, the monitoring of borders and limits on military treaties that may pose a threat to the security of Israel.

In all substantive negotiations on the two-state model, the demilitarisation of a Palestinian state has been taken as a given and has been clearly stipulated. When PM Netanyahu noted this demand in his recent policy speech at Bar Ilan University, he was pointing to the fact that without the diffusion of potential threats of massive Palestinian military build-up, the Israel public will reject any future territorial concessions. It is for this reason, as well as for strategic considerations, that all former negotiations included clear references to the issue of demilitarisation.

Oslo Accords (1993)

The notion of demilitarisation dates back to the first substantial agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leadership – the Oslo Accords, signed by then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat in 1993. The agreement stipulated that “In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats” (Article 8).

Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994)

Similar prerequisites were made in the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement, which enabled the transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho region. The agreement between the sides clearly noted that “Except for the Palestinian Police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established” (Article IX 2).

Camp David negotiations (2000)

The negotiations conducted by then-prime minister Ehud Barak with PA chairman Arafat led to the Clinton proposals in December 2000. The Israeli position was that Palestine should be defined as a “demilitarised state”, while the Palestinian side proposed “a state with limited arms.” As a compromise, President Bill Clinton suggested the term “non-militarised state.” In essence, the differences of terminology do not dispute the fundamental agreement that necessary limitations will be placed on the military capacity of a future Palestinian state.

Geneva Accords (2003)

The unofficial Geneva Accords, signed between Palestinian and Israeli politicians outside of government in 2003, included the clause that “Palestine shall be a non-militarised state, with a strong security force” (Article 5, Section 3 ii). Furthermore, it was agreed that both sides would “refrain from joining, assisting, promoting or cooperating with any coalition, organisation or alliance of a military or security character, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of hostility against the other” (Article 5, Section ii 3). In this sense, the accords contained exactly the same demands presented by PM Netanyahu in his policy speech.

Demilitarisation: lessons from Gaza and southern Lebanon

The demand for the demilitarisation of a future Palestinian state also derives from the deterioration in the Gaza Strip since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2005. As the Gaza experience has shown, the accumulation of offensive weaponry in an uncertain political climate, and the threat that this may fall into the hands of terror groups, is not an unrealistic scenario.

Since Hamas’s takeover in June 2007, the EU inspectors force in charge of monitoring the border crossings between Gaza and Egypt was forced to flee; without sufficient control, the crossings were shut. Attempts by Hamas and other terror groups to continue building their arsenals of rockets, explosives and other arms have resulted in deteriorating conditions for Gaza’s residents and a general instability in the region. Limiting the amount of weapons held by Palestinian forces, as well as restricting them to defensive and policing arms, is crucial to minimise the dangers of future destabilisation.

Demilitarisation also requires close monitoring and inspection mechanisms, to control both border crossings and the situation on the ground. In his speech, PM Netanyahu specifically addressed the issue of international assurances as a condition for Israeli territorial concessions. This is understandable in light of the recurring failure to prevent the smuggling of offensive weapons into Gaza and the heavy rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon following the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Despite the establishment of a large UN force to ensure the demilitarisation of southern Lebanon under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, these forces have not been able to prevent the rapid build-up of Hezbollah’s arsenal. Ensuring that demilitarisation is observed thus requires close cooperation and strict limitations that are implemented by all sides.

Israel‘s minimum strategic requirements

Israel is an extremely small and particularly narrow country. Excluding the West Bank, Israel at its narrowest point is eight miles wide. If Israel’s borders were to be penetrated by an invading force in a time of war, it would be extremely vulnerable. This is not a theoretical fear for Israelis. It was a reality in Israel’s War of Independence in 1948, and in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

In terms of previous negotiations, Israel has always premised any agreement on there being a demilitarised territorial buffer, to provide Israel with a cushion in case one of its neighbours seeks to attack it. This was a feature of the 1949 armistice agreements that followed the establishment of the State of Israel; the agreement that led to Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula after the 1956 Suez-Sinai War; the disengagement agreements that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur War; and ultimately the Egypt-Israel peace accords. The Sinai Desert is now a demilitarised zone with a monitoring force that observes the limitations on military presence. The Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty signed in 1994 designated a narrow zone of demilitarisation on the Israeli side of the international border. Although Syria and Israel do not have a formal peace treaty, the agreement that has kept their border quiet for 36 years is a demilitarised zone agreed by both sides.

The Palestinian territories are for Israel the most strategically sensitive of all, particularly for topographical reasons. A tank thrust from the highland of the central region of the West Bank into the Israeli coastal plain – the most densely populated part of Israel – could cut the country in two. Additionally, Israel’s Ben-Gurion International Airport is located only six miles from the West Bank foothills overlooking it. Under these unique conditions of vulnerability, the demand for demilitarisation of the future Palestinian state is a matter of existential importance and a condition that will assure the Israeli public that territorial concessions will not be used to further destabilise the region and threaten Israeli population centres.

Conclusion

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s demand for the demilitarisation of a future Palestinian state is in line with previous agreements made between Israel, the Palestinian leadership and Arab states. The territorial vulnerability of Israel and the experience of recent years in Lebanon and Gaza have proven that this demand is not only of the utmost importance for the security of Israel, but also an important component for ensuring the stability of the Palestinian state itself and the viability of future treaties.

Polls conducted shortly after PM Netanyahu’s speech showed that the notion of a demilitarised Palestinian state receives the support of a clear majority of Israelis: over 60% support Netanyahu’s proposal for a demilitarised state. Contrary to some claims, the demands posed by the Israeli prime minister do not pose an obstacle for the resumption of bilateral negotiations, but simply outline Israel’s requirements for substantial progress to be made. Once talks resume, this issue, along with other core aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, will become part of the negotiation process and will be for the sides to discuss and resolve. If a long-term solution is the goal, demilitarisation will be one of the key factors for its achievement.