BICOM

Key Points

• The Palestinian national movement is in a state of protracted crisis. The split between Hamas and Fatah has its roots in deep divisions between secular and Islamist visions reflected throughout the Middle East.
• With few points of agreement on how to proceed, and each party keen to strengthen its own position, there seems to be little basis for agreement between the two sides.
• The outcome of the planned Fatah-Hamas meeting on 9 November may reveal how each side plans to handle the rift in the coming year.
• The Quartet meeting planned to take place in Sharm el-Sheikh on the same day, as well as the arrival of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the region, will bring attention back to the Israeli-Palestinian talks, highlighting a key difference between the Palestinian factions.

Introduction

For several weeks, the leaders of the secular nationalist Fatah and the Islamist Hamas have been preparing to meet in Cairo on 9 November, along with representatives of smaller Palestinian factions, in an attempt to broker an agreement which would reunite the Palestinian Authority. This is taking place exactly 20 years after two documents were issued which cut to the heart of the dispute within the Palestinian national movement. On 18 August 1988, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, issued its founding covenant in which it flatly rejected any notion of compromise or negotiation with Israel.[1] Three months later, on 15 November, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), then dominated by Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement, made its ceremonial Palestinian Declaration of Independence, interpreted as tacitly accepting the existence of Israel for the first time. [2]

The divisions between these two movements reflect both challenges and failings which are specific to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the broader political and social fissures which afflict the entire Arab world. The conflict within the Islamic Middle East between secular and Islamist visions for the region – when translated within the Palestinian arena – leads to a deep disagreement on how to solve the plight of the Palestinian people, end the occupation and reshape the relationship with the State of Israel.

9 January 2009 will mark four years since the election of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas claims that at that point his term will expire, and the speaker of the parliament, Hamas affiliate Aziz Dweik, is his legitimate replacement. Given that Dweik is in an Israeli prison, the movement argues that his deputy, Ahmad Bahar, should assume the role. Abbas takes the position that according to the constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held at the same time, when the parliamentary election is due at the beginning of 2010. This looming question mark over Abbas’s legitimacy is set to be a focal point in the power struggle within the territories.

Egypt has now proposed a plan that calls for the establishment of a national consensus government which would be able to lift the international blockade of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The plan calls for the formation of committees that would address issues including the reform and unification of the Palestinian security forces, the incorporation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad into the PLO, and political reconciliation between the parties, ultimately leading to presidential and parliamentary elections.

Given these developments, this BICOM Focus aims to clarify the following issues: what are the roots of the division between the two sides, what are the central challenges each side now faces and what do they each hope to achieve?

Roots of discord

In November 1988, the PLO, dominated by Fatah, adopted a position – though somewhat vaguely – whereby the establishment of a Palestinian state should be based on UN resolutions, with specific reference to the 1947 partition plan. The Oslo process, which from 1993 brought Israel into direct negotiations with the PLO, culminated in 2000 with the then-Israeli government accepting a proposal for a two-state solution broadly based on the pre-1967 borders.[3] The two-state solution enjoys wide international support and recent bilateral negotiations as part of the Annapolis process have been formulated along similar lines.[4]

Yasser Arafat did not agree to the details of the Clinton proposals in 2000, and it is as yet unclear whether the gaps between the two sides can be bridged this time. However, it is clear that whether they can or not, Hamas and other Islamist Palestinian groups oppose in principle the very notion of an agreement with Israel. Hamas’s founding charter blends Palestinian nationalism with the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, which by definition is opposed to an agreement that would accept Israel’s right to exist within secure and recognised borders. To reverse this position would be a renouncement of faith.

Many analysts, including in Israel, recognise that Hamas is an organisation that includes more militant and more pragmatic voices.[5] Yet even its most moderate statements have only gone as far as suggesting that a long-term ceasefire might be possible if Israel withdraws from all of the occupied territories, and only then as an interim solution prior to the future removal of the State of Israel.[6]

Hamas in Gaza: control at the expense of popularity

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections was a dramatic illustration of its advances in the battle for hearts and minds in the territories. The basis for Islamist dissent in the territories has many traits seen in common with other parts of the Islamic world. An impoverished and frustrated population, disillusioned with the failures of its corrupt, western-backed, secular government, found that the only alternative capable of articulating an effective message of opposition came from the Islamists, who had created an outreach network of social services which formed the foundation for their political support. In the case of Hamas, it had the added benefit of having carried the mantle of authentic violent resistance against the Israeli occupation, as the most ‘successful’ exponent of suicide bombings and Qassam rocket attacks.

Still, Hamas cannot deliver a normal life for the people under its control. Its position is made untenable by a fundamental paradox. No Palestinian Authority can run a normal administration without Israeli cooperation, and Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel makes that cooperation impossible. Since Hamas’s violent coup to eject Fatah forces loyal to President Abbas in June 2007, Hamas has been running Gaza alone. Israel agreed to a ceasefire with Hamas in June 2008 to bring respite from the ceaseless rocket attacks on its southern towns, rather than a major military operation that could have resulted in high casualties on both sides with no guarantee of success. The ceasefire has found a way of answering Hamas and Israel’s mutual interests in a period of calm.

Yet this is an awkward position for Hamas to be in, and opinions differ among observers as to how sustainable its position is. Hamas’s achievement is hollow for the ordinary people living under its rule. Though the flow of goods into Gaza has increased since the ceasefire[7], it is still only basic good that are entering Gaza from Israel. Whilst Egypt also shares a border with Gaza, it is keen to avoid taking responsibility for the territory, and has kept its border almost permanently closed. Hamas has not created a situation whereby Gazans can export goods or enter Israel for work or to travel abroad. Hamas’s inability to work with Israel and normalise conditions inside Gaza has damaged Hamas’s popularity.[8]

However, it has also created a situation whereby Hamas, by controlling an extensive network of smuggling tunnels running under the Gaza-Egypt border, is able to extensively manage supplies of currency, weapons and other goods. With Hamas controlling access to these additional resources and having violently repressed all forces in Gaza still loyal to Abbas, it has been able to consolidate its power and influence over all aspects of life in Gaza. The fact that Hamas has essentially sustained the current ceasefire reflects the extent to which, at this stage, the movement prioritises internal control over active confrontation with Israel or the wellbeing of Gaza’s residents. Its goal appears to be to consolidate its position and to force Israel and the international community to accommodate the movement on its own terms. What remains to be seen is whether it sees some form of reconciliation with Fatah in the short term as a step to achieving that.

Fatah: a movement failing to regain credibility

Whilst Hamas’s popularity may have been compromised by a ceasefire that enables it to strengthen its own position but delivers very little for ordinary Gazans, this has been of limited benefit to the popularity of Fatah. The organisation which has dominated the PLO since the late 1960s remains divided and discredited. Palestinians in Gaza resent Fatah for acquiescing in the Israeli closure policy. In the West Bank, there is frustration that the negotiations with Israel are not bringing results more quickly. With an Abbas-appointed government under independent Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the West Bank is enjoying some improvements on the ground. These include the deployment of Palestinian security forces, bringing greater order to Palestinian population centres; some positive developments in the economy; and the beginnings of Israeli flexibility in relaxing its restrictions on movement. Nevertheless, progress is being made at a cautious pace.[9]

President Abbas retains some level of electoral support among the Palestinian people[10], and has earned the trust of his Israeli interlocutors, who believe he is genuinely committed to a peaceful resolution. Yet whilst he shows greater will than his predecessor, Yasser Arafat, in reaching an agreement[11], he lacks Arafat’s personal authority over his own political camp. He must also be viewing the Israeli political situation with considerable concern. With Israel now entering an election and a government-forming season which will last until March 2009, and the US government also in a transition period, the comprehensive peace agreement that Abbas has been seeking with Israel will at best be deferred. The actual status of the negotiations is due to be presented by the two sides to the Quartet at its meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, in the presence of Condoleezza Rice, scheduled for 9 November.

If Kadima loses the election in February, the alternative will likely be dealing with a government led by the Likud and Benjamin Netanyahu, who does not share Ehud Olmert or Tzipi Livni’s sense of urgency when it comes to diplomatic progress with the Palestinians. Netanyahu has spoken about promoting short-term economic projects in the West Bank, and putting off any long-term political discussions.

With his legitimacy in question and the future of the bilateral talks with Israel uncertain, Abbas wants an arrangement that secures an extension for his term as president. In this he is likely to have the support of the Arab League and most of the international community, who fear Hamas’s strength as a manifestation of the influence of their sponsors in Iran. If Hamas is seen to be rejecting the Egyptian reconciliation proposals backed by the Arab League, this may give Abbas the cover he needs to push on until 2010 with international support.

Fatah certainly needs more time to get its house in order. The movement has yet to bring about reforms that will help it shed its image as self-interested and corrupt. A younger generation of Fatah leaders have had their ambitions to take control of the party frustrated for many years. The organisation remains in the hands of a dwindling group of older Fatah leaders, who came to the territories with Yasser Arafat from Tunis in 1994.[12] A long overdue Fatah General Conference, which would be the sixth in its history and the first since 1989, has been promised by the end of the year. This would help to refresh the movement and empower the younger generation of leaders. However, Fatah’s complex internal politics and unwieldy constitution make the conference very difficult to arrange and a firm date is yet to be announced. [13]

Coordination or confrontation?

Underpinned by deep differences over their visions for the future of the Palestinian people, July and August saw considerable escalation in the levels of violence between Fatah and Hamas. A bomb attack that killed five Hamas operatives and a young girl in a Gaza beachside café on 26 July was blamed on Fatah affiliates in the West Bank and led Hamas to take action to further monopolise power in Gaza.[14] For their part, Fatah forces in the West Bank have conducted a round of arrests as part of an effort to suppress Hamas affiliates in the West Bank[15], and recently extended the clampdown, with Israeli support, to Hamas’s network of welfare institutions.[16]

It is not easy to see how the two sides can resolve their differences. The last attempt at a unity government, in which Hamas and Fatah ministers sat together in the same cabinet, was brokered by the Saudis in February 2007 and was an abject failure. Whilst Hamas showed some limited flexibility, by agreeing that Abbas could negotiate with Israel, the joint position still fell well short of the Quartet demands of recognising Israel, accepting existing commitments and renouncing violence. As a result, the unity government did not succeed in gaining widespread international acceptance, and Israel was not willing to negotiate with it. However, its implosion, just five months after its founding, was ultimately triggered by escalating internal violence, resulting in a decisive military assault by Hamas forces on their Fatah partners in Gaza.

With a new agreement for reconciliation now put on the table by the Egyptians, what the next few days may clarify is whether either side really wants such a deal, or simply does not want to be blamed by the Palestinian people and the broader Arab world for failing to succeed. The problems which prevented the first unity government from surviving still exist and are now compounded further by the divided rule in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas is unlikely to take any step that will slacken its grip on Gaza. Abbas will be reluctant to agree to a joint platform with Hamas which could jeopardise his constructive relationship with Israel and the United States – the only means he has of delivering tangible benefits in the West Bank and strengthening the PA’s security services. It is not clear whether either side has any interest in risking its position through elections if it can be avoided, and if elections were to be held, whether Hamas would voluntarily cede power to Fatah in Gaza if it lost, or vice versa in the West Bank.

Conclusion

Since the publication of the Hamas Charter and the PLO Declaration of Independence 20 years ago, the Palestinian national movement has been divided over whether it wants a secular nationalist or Islamist future, and whether negotiations or resistance is the way to achieve its goals.  Today, with this difference concretised by the existence of two different authorities, Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank, the Palestinian national movement is in a state of protracted crisis that the current round of negotiations appears unlikely to resolve. In this complex picture, the Cairo meeting may cast some light on how the two main Palestinian factions plan to advance their interests in the coming period of political uncertainty, and whether there is any shared agenda around which they can unite.

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[1] The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 18 August 1988.

[2] Palestinian Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1988.

[3] Dennis Ross. ‘The Missing Peace’, 2004.

[4] In an interview with Yediot Ahronot on 29 September 2008, Prime Minister Olmert expressed his view that Israel must withdraw from most of the occupied territories to make peace with the Palestinians.

[5] See for example Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad. ‘Israel’s Current Strategic Environment’, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, Jerusalem Issues Brief, Vol. 8, No. 14, 28 October 2008.

[6] BICOM Analysis. ‘Hamas’s Diplomatic Offensive’, 22 April 2008.

[7] UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OPT. Humanitarian Monitor, No. 29, September 2008.

[8]  International Crisis Group Report: ‘Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas’, March 2008.

[9] Israel has taken a series of concrete steps to aid Palestinian development and has removed a number of the key checkpoints as requested by Quartet Envoy Tony Blair. See the Annex to the Government Response to the House of Commons International Development Committee Report on The Humanitarian and Development Situation in the Occupied Territories, 7 October 2008.

[10] Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (29). Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), 9 September 2008.

[11] Akiva Eldar and Avi Issacharoff. ‘Abbas to Haaretz: We will compromise on refugees’, Haaretz, 14 September 2008.

[12] Khaled Abu Toameh. ‘Fatah veterans fear “young guard” coup’, Jerusalem Post, 6 April 2008.

[13] Mouin Rabbani. Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2008.

[14] International Crisis Group Report: ‘Round Two in Gaza’, 11 September 2008.

[15] International Crisis Group Report: ‘Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model’, July 2008.

[16] Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel. ‘Israeli security officials laud PA crackdown on Hamas’, Haaretz, 7 September 2008.