A future for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding

Ned Lazarus

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The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most heavily researched in the world. Yet a shockingly small fraction of this research focuses on the millions of Israelis and Palestinians who share this land, their relations with one another, and how such relations could be improved so that a breakthrough might be possible. This report is both timely and necessary, and can hopefully provide a blueprint for greater international support of civil society efforts to foster conflict resolution.

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BICOM, the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, is an independent British think tank producing research and analysis to increase understanding of Israel and the Middle East in the UK.

Fathom: for a deeper understanding of Israel and the region is BICOM’s online research journal, publishing interviews, articles and reviews from a range of Israeli, Palestinian and international contributors.

Front Cover Photo: EcoPeace’s Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian directors and staff standing together in the Jordan River as part of their campaign to rehabilitate the river which is dwindling due to diversion of its source waters and pollution. Photograph used by permission of EcoPeace.
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It is my hope, above all, that this report justly reflects their dedicated work in relentlessly challenging conditions.
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Preface

By Jonathan Powell

The great unsung hero of the Northern Ireland peace process was not actually a person, but a fund. The International Fund for Ireland (IFI), by supporting intercommunal civil society engagement from 1986, contributed hugely to the support given by majorities of nationalists and unionists to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

The Fund promoted economic and community development; stimulated dialogue and cooperation within and between divided communities; tackled the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and fostered reconciliation.

I am in no doubt that the Fund was essential in consolidating peace.

While the Northern Ireland Peace Process can’t be used as a template to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – every conflict is different; its causes are different and its solution will be different – we know that long-term grassroots peacebuilding between the contending parties is essential in every conflict-resolution process.

However, the sums spent to date by the IFI vastly exceed what has been invested in Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding: more than 900 million Euros in more than 6,000 civil society peacebuilding programmes in Northern Ireland over 32 years. The IFI prepared the ground for peacemaking – it began its work 12 years before the Good Friday Agreements was signed. And it made peace sustainable – its work continues today, 21 years later. Long-term investment in peacebuilding brought real and durable change to relations between nationalists and unionists.

There are signs that this key lesson of Northern Ireland peace process – that peace is a long-term process of building trust between peoples through grassroots engagement as much as top-level talks – is finally being learned.

As this report makes clear, at the international level, there is already increasing recognition of the critical bridging role of civil society during the current impasse in the Middle East peace process. In July 2016 the Middle East Quartet recommended “increasing interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields – economic, professional, educational, cultural – that strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism.”

Ned Lazarus’ comprehensive study, based on his experience as both an accomplished practitioner and a leading scholar of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, is the most detailed evaluation we have to date of what works and why. It complements the Quartet’s recommendations by detailing the past and present of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, and concludes with recommendations for broadening and deepening the impact of this essential work in the future.
The report makes a persuasive case for the UK government to support efforts already underway to establish an International Fund for Israel-Palestine to “scale up” Israeli-Palestinian civil society trust building.

By following the successful precedent of the International Fund for Ireland, the proposed new Fund would provide a consistent, sustainable and transparent funding source equipped to bring to scale the successful models and the best practices discussed here by Lazarus.

It is remarkable how quickly a conflict can shift from being regarded as “insoluble” to one whose solution was “inevitable” as soon as an agreement is signed. Beforehand, and even up to a very late stage in the process, conventional wisdom states that the conflict can never be resolved; but before the ink is dry on the agreement, people are ready to conclude that it was inevitable.

Just as no conflict is insoluble, nor is it inevitable that it will be resolved at any particular moment in history. Believing that a solution is inevitable is nearly as dangerous as believing a conflict cannot be solved. If people sit around waiting for a conflict to be “ripe” for talks to start, or for the forces of history to solve it for them, then it will never be resolved.

This invaluable report helps us avoid both despair and euphoria. Instead, it suggests a practical course of action for governments and civil society organisations that want to move from vicious cycles to virtuous circles.

We need to be honest with ourselves. A quarter century after the Oslo agreements, more and more people now understand that there is no easy short-cut to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. They sense that in the real world it is as the poet wrote: “peace comes dropping slow”. This report is invaluable to those who would strain every sinew to help it drop nonetheless.

Jonathan Powell is CEO of the charity Inter-Mediate which works on armed conflicts; his book Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland is published by Vintage. He was Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff from 1995 to 2007 and was the chief British negotiator during the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In 2014, David Cameron appointed Powell to be the UK’s special envoy to Libya.
Foreword: Building constituencies of peace

By James Sorene and Professor Alan Jonhson

In 2017 the UK Parliament debated a cross-party Bill in support of the International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. The Rt Hon. Joan Ryan MP, moving the bill in the House of Commons, argued that supporting those people building strong constituencies for peace in Israel and Palestine is a practical contribution that the government can make to the peace process.

Polling by the Israeli Democracy Institute and Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research last summer underlined why Ryan was correct.

While 59 per cent of Israelis and 51 per cent of Palestinians still support a two-state solution, these already slim majorities are fragile and threatened by growing fear and distrust between the two peoples.

Eighty-nine per cent of Palestinians believe Israeli Jews are untrustworthy; a feeling reciprocated by 68 per cent of the latter. At the same time, 65 per cent of Israeli Jews fear Palestinians and 45 per cent of Palestinians fear Israeli Jews.

During the debate in the UK parliament several MPs – including the Conservative Rt Hon. Eric Pickles and the Liberal Democrat MP the Rt Hon. Alistair Carmichael – reminded the House that a seed of the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement was sown at the height of the troubles, when the International Fund for Ireland was created.

They pointed out that over the past 30 years, the Fund has promoted economic and social progress and encouraged contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland. That investment helped create the popular support which has sustained the Good Friday Agreement over nearly two decades.

An International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace – an idea designed by the Alliance for Middle East Peace, a coalition of over 100 organisations building people-to-people cooperation and coexistence – aims to increase public and private contributions worldwide, funding civil society and economic development projects that promote coexistence, peace and reconciliation.

This report, written by Ned Lazarus – who combines vast practical experience with academic expertise in peacebuilding studies – shows that peacebuilding works. More than that, his landmark study draws on a huge body of evidence from academic and governmental evaluations to show what works and why. As well as being a history of the peacebuilding field, this is a practical guide for practitioners and funders replete with informative case studies of the measurable impact that the right kind of peacebuilding projects can have, despite the considerable challenges they face.
Now is the time to increase support for peacebuilding projects.

The Middle East Quartet’s most recent report recommended a focus on civil society work for the first time since its founding.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) under the leadership of Priti Patel is considering more funding for these projects and we urge the government to expand its support.

Support for peacebuilding is strong and growing in all the UK political parties.

No, face-to-face peacebuilding can’t do it all. There is no route to a final peace that does not involve direct negotiations between the parties, excruciating compromises on both sides and a final status agreement to establish two states for two peoples. Nonetheless, as this report shows, unless we build constituencies and cultures of peace in each society, those negotiations will continue to lack the environment they need to succeed.

That’s why governments should act with what Martin Luther King Jr. once called “the fierce urgency of now”.

James Sorene
CEO, Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre

Professor Alan Johnson
Editor of Fathom
Executive Summary

This report, based on a comprehensive literature review and extensive fieldwork in Israel and the West Bank in 2016, provides a detailed portrait of the Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding field.

It begins with an overview of contemporary activity, encompassing both “cross-border” initiatives involving Israelis and Palestinians in the Palestinian territories, and “shared society” initiatives involving Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Ensuing sections chronicle the evolution of the field in historical context, illustrate the diversity of the contemporary field, and provide an empirical record for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding gleaned from academic literature and programme evaluations – highlighting models and strategies that have achieved positive outcomes and meaningful impact.

The report notes limitations of civil society peacebuilding imposed by the absence of a viable peace process, and given the inherent challenges of power asymmetry and societal legitimacy. Ultimately, the report advocates establishment of a mechanism for sustained international support for civil society peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians, to be framed within a paradigm of long-term conflict transformation rather than as an adjunct of the Track One process.

Key Points

1. The current macro-political context of the Middle East is profoundly challenging for civil society initiatives associated with “peace.” Trends at the official political level in each relevant sphere – local Israeli and Palestinian, regional/Middle Eastern, European and American - all militate against the emergence of a diplomatic horizon. This atmosphere has emboldened militant opponents of contact with “the other side,” in both Israeli and Palestinian societies.

2. The contemporary civil society peacebuilding field remains nonetheless vital, methodologically diverse and resilient. A baseline number of at least 164 civil society initiatives currently engage in peace, conflict resolution, or cross-conflict civil and human rights work in Israel and the Palestinian territories, in addition to academic programmes in Conflict Resolution, research centres and a host of less formal initiatives. These include 104 initiatives founded in the 21st century, and at least 60 veteran organisations established in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Organisational capacity and resources vary widely; funding is uneven. Published financial data was available for roughly half of the initiatives in our sample; of these, approximately one-quarter (39 NGOs) declared annual revenues exceeding one million USD.

3. Initiatives most commonly employ classic approaches such as advocacy, dialogue, education, protest and “Track Two” diplomacy – yet growing numbers of projects integrate peacebuilding into practical fields such as economic development, environmental protection, health/medicine and
technology, among others. Veteran organisations have adapted strategies in response to the volatile context, and a number have evolved into multidimensional peacebuilding “platforms” using diverse methods to address multiple issues. Youth are the most common target population, but growing numbers of projects focus on women and religiously or politically conservative constituencies not typically identified with the “peace camp.”

4. Sustained advocacy campaigns led by veteran peacebuilding civil society organisations (CSOs) have registered significant policy impacts during the term of the current Israeli government – spearheading an historic reform of its allocation of resources to Arab citizens, and vastly expanding allocation of water resources to Palestinians in the territories, among other examples.

A substantial research record now exists regarding the outcomes of peacebuilding interventions, based on two decades of empirical scholarship and evaluation reports.

5. The rise of the extreme Right in Israel has generated a degree of counter-mobilisation among some mainstream elements in Israeli society. Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin is the most prominent of a number of longtime Right-wing politicians now advocating inclusive politics toward Arab citizens, respect for human rights, the rule of law, diversity, and expressing consistent opposition to incitement and violence. These values are publicly espoused by Orthodox religious figures such as Rabbi Binyamin Lau and Adina Bar Shalom, founder of the Ultra-Orthodox Haredi College – both members of prestigious rabbinical families. There is growing interest and legitimation of integrated bi-lingual educational frameworks such as the Hand-in-Hand school network, which has doubled in size in three years and has a waiting list of hundreds of families – among other “touchpoints” of cross-cultural shared space established by CSOs, particularly in Jerusalem, Haifa, and other mixed cities.

6. International funding programmes – particularly the EU Peacebuilding Fund and USAID/CMM Annual Program Statement fund – have contributed to a professionalisation of leading organisations in terms of monitoring and evaluation. A substantial research record now exists regarding the outcomes of peacebuilding interventions, based on two decades of empirical scholarship and evaluation reports.

7. The research record validates the effectiveness of leading intervention models in terms of humanising participants’ perceptions of the other and enhancing participants’ motivation for longer-term engagement in peacebuilding activity. Notable examples include:

- Longitudinal studies of three intergroup encounter programmes found profound long-term impact for significant numbers of adult graduates, 10 to 15 years after their initial encounter experiences (Lazarus & Ross 2015). The most comprehensive study found at least 144 alumni of the Seeds of Peace programme working for more than 40 different peacebuilding initiatives as adults – representing 17.5 per cent of the first ten groups of Israeli and Palestinian participants (Lazarus 2011).

- Multiple shorter-term studies have found dialogue encounters and peace education interventions resulting in significant, positive attitudinal
change in terms of personal empowerment, critical thinking, and humanised perceptions of the other (Salomon 2004; Ross 2015). Over time, a “re-entry effect” diminishing these attitudinal changes is also clearly documented (Hammack 2006). However, follow-up activities or meetings and/or intergroup friendships are also documented as having a “restoration effect,” increasing the sustainability of positive attitudinal shifts and their subsequent expression in social action (Salomon 2009; Schroeder and Risen 2016).

- Similar effects have been documented for adult encounter programmes. For example, summative evaluation of the “History through the Human Eye” dialogue project, led by the Parents Circle Families Forum, found 80 per cent reported greater willingness to work for peace; 77 per cent reported increased belief in the possibility of reconciliation; 71 per cent improved trust and empathy for the other; and 68 per cent increased levels of acknowledgment and knowledge about the other narrative (Kahanoff & Shibly, 2014).

- Research identifies a number of “best practices” for programme design cited as enhancing the depth and sustainability of positive outcomes, including the combination of uni-national and bi-national dialogue, opportunities to build cross-conflict relationships, a “mixed” approach combining trust-building, interpersonal interaction with explicit focus on conflict content and/or social change in discussions, and substantial follow-up activity after completion of the initial encounter programme (Maddy-Weitzman 2005; CMM 2014).

- A pair of programmes designed to integrate Arab teachers in Israeli Jewish schools, led by The Abraham Fund Initiatives and the Merchavim organisation, have documented consistent positive effects in terms of prejudice reduction among students. Both programmes have been officially adopted by Israel’s Ministry of Education as part of plans to reach hundreds of schools across the country (Schneider, 2016).

- A growing number of practical interventions are designed to tangibly address areas of shared interest or common problems – especially in the “cross-border” realm involving Israeli Jews and Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The research record is less extensive in this field, but some projects have documented promising results. In one example, the Near East Foundation (NEF) Olive Oil Without Borders project has worked with 3,400 Palestinian and Israeli olive producers since 2013, facilitating the export of 4500 tonnes of olive oil from the West Bank to Israel and producing 25 million dollars in income for Palestinian farmers. The project has also documented positive results in terms of attitudinal change: 90 per cent of participants reported increased trust in “the other” and 77 per cent indicated intention to continue cross-border cooperation (Benjamin, 2016).
8. Peacebuilding efforts are inherently complicated by stark asymmetries of power and cultural differences between Israelis and Palestinians and between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and peace advocates struggle with chronic legitimacy deficits in both societies. While positive results for peacebuilding interventions are frequently documented at the individual and local/community levels, the hostile sociopolitical context limits the broader impact of most, though not all, interventions to those individuals, institutions or communities directly involved.

The IFI began its work 12 years before the Good Friday Agreements were signed – and continues today, 21 years later – long-term investment can bring lasting change to intergroup relations in a conflict environment.

9. Successful models for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding have been established through a generation of work, under extremely challenging conditions. To achieve broader, longer-term societal impact, it will be necessary to bring such efforts to scale – to significantly expand the scope of programming and make targeted efforts to reach more diverse participant populations. Given the political climate in the region, scaling effective models to achieve broader societal impact will require sustained international funding.

A promising precedent is set by the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which has:

- Invested more than 900 million Euros in more than 6,000 civil society peacebuilding programmes in Northern Ireland over 32 years (Johnston, 2017).

- Sustained long-term peacebuilding. The IFI began its work 12 years before the Good Friday Agreements were signed – and continues today, 21 years later – reflecting the type of long-term investment that can bring lasting change to intergroup relations in an intractable conflict environment.

- Promoted economic and community development, dialogue and cooperation within and between divided communities, tackle the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and build reconciliation between people and within and between communities throughout the island of Ireland.1

- Consolidated the peace. In November 2015, the Fund unveiled plans to allocate up to £45m towards a range of peace and reconciliation programmes over a five-year period through its 'Community Consolidation – Peace Consolidation 2016-2020' Strategy.2

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1. See “Celebrating 30 years of the International Fund for Ireland”, 2016. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHDGIMapqeTE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHDGIMapqeTE)

Introduction: Women Wage Peace offer hope amid hopelessness

In today’s polarised Israel-Palestine debate, there are two propositions to which all sides might agree: June 2017 marked 50 years of Israeli military rule over the West Bank and the Palestinian population, and nothing in Israeli, Palestinian, regional or international politics indicates any imminent change in the situation. The collapse of the “Kerry Process” in 2014 left negotiations stalemated – and subsequent Israeli and US elections seem to have left advocates of renewed diplomatic efforts checkmated.

Several trends militate against the emergence of a diplomatic horizon. Israel’s current government, commonly described as “the most right-wing in the country’s history”, commands a stable majority in the Knesset. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu recently declined opportunities to add the centre-left Labour Party to his coalition and begin peace talks in a regional framework led by Egypt and Jordan (Ravid, 2017). The Palestinian political arena has long been paralysed by divisions between and within rival factions Fatah and Hamas, with eyes increasingly fixed on the eventual succession of octogenarian President Mahmoud Abbas. The attention of the Arab World remains riveted on civil wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, while the West is consumed with Europe’s migration crisis and the populist backlash shaking the foundations of the post-Cold War liberal order, fueling the “Brexit” referendum and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States.

Israel’s radical Right reacted euphorically to these trends, anticipating that the spectre of American pressure would no longer be invoked to deter accelerated construction of “facts on the ground” in the West Bank, if not outright annexation. As a candidate, the new President vowed to move the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and named a prospective ambassador who has made donations to support Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories (Kershner, 2017). As President, Trump has sent mixed messages on the Middle East. On the one hand, he has refrained from the promised Embassy move and repeatedly stated his intention to achieve a peace agreement, while on the other hand expressing ambivalence regarding the two-state solution (Chandler, 2017). In short, effective renewal of the peace process seems an unlikely prospect. For advocates of a
negotiated Israeli-Palestinian peace, the immediate future has seldom looked bleaker.

At the civil society level, the lack of political progress has exacerbated the chronic legitimacy crisis faced by initiatives working across the Israeli-Palestinian divide (CMM Field Study, 2014). “People-to-people” work has been stigmatised in Palestine and marginalised in Israel, even as it has been eulogised in the media (Kalman, 2014). Since the Second Intifada, each new round of war, with their increasingly asymmetric casualty counts, has exacted a toll in programmes postponed, relations strained and spirits broken. Reserves of hope – always a scarce resource in recent years – may have hit an all-time low.

It might seem counter-intuitive, against this grim backdrop, to organise a “March of Hope.” Yet, in October 2016, tens of thousands of women, Arab and Jewish, Israeli and Palestinian, marched together throughout the country under precisely that banner, urging the Israeli government to renew pursuit of a peace agreement. A new civil society organisation, “Women Wage Peace” (WWP), orchestrated a remarkable two-week series of marches and public rallies in dozens of towns throughout the country, culminating in approximately 4,000 Israeli and Palestinian women ascending the ancient desert road together from Jericho to Jerusalem, where they joined 20,000 protestors outside the Prime Minister’s residence. In the process, they illustrated the enduring potential of grassroots organising, and the resonance – even today – of a well-crafted campaign of peace advocacy.

Buoyed by the campaign’s success, WWP went on to maintain a vigil outside the Knesset, drawing supportive speeches from opposition lawmakers and garnering sympathetic coverage in the previously skeptical Israeli media. Social media amplified their audience within and beyond the country: a news clip featuring evocative footage of jubilant Arab and Jewish women clad in white, striding together through a barren biblical landscape, drew more than 19 million views (Negev, 2016).

While surprising in its scope, the movement did not emerge out of nowhere. The “March of Hope” manifested the value of long-term investments in civil society initiatives for peace and social change. The consciousness, the leadership, the motivation, the connections, and the strategy of WWP were all incubated over decades – through myriad campaigns, forums and projects that built networks able to leverage years of experience at a critical moment.

Many of the leaders were veterans of campaigns about peace, coexistence, equality and/or women’s rights (Langer-Gal, 2016). Orna Shimoni – known to Israelis as the leader of the late 1990s “Four Mothers” protest movement that successfully campaigned to end Israel’s 18-year occupation of a self-declared “security zone” in southern Lebanon – conspicuously stood at the front of the line. Huda Abu Arqoub, Regional Director of the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP), led the contingent of 1,000 Palestinian women from throughout the West Bank. She electrified the crowd in Jerusalem by declaring “You have a partner!”

Huda Abu Arqoub, Regional Director of the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP), led the contingent of 1,000 Palestinian women from throughout the West Bank. She electrified the crowd in Jerusalem by declaring “You have a partner!”
WWP began the series of marches in cities on Israel’s geographic and socioeconomic “periphery,” signaling their intention to expand beyond the traditional “peace camp” elite and to draw leaders from diverse communities (Negev, 2016).

WWP first assembled in 2014 as a spontaneous response to the third war in five years between Israel and Hamas – but previous peacebuilding efforts laid the groundwork and provided inspiration. Among other precursors was a two-year “Action 1325” campaign led by the Itach/Maaki organisation of Arab and Jewish feminist lawyers, which built a nationwide coalition of women’s CSOs promoting Israeli government adoption of the 2000 UN Resolution that requires equal integration of women into diplomatic and security policymaking (Perlmutter, 2014). The “March of Hope” also drew inspiration from Liberian women’s successful campaign to end fifteen years of ruinous civil war in their country, as depicted in the film Pray the Devil Back to Hell (Reticker, 2008). WWP has screened the film in homes and public venues around the country; one of the Liberian campaign’s leaders, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Lymah Gbowee, addressed the marchers at Neve Shalom/ Wahat Al-Salam outside Jerusalem (Barakat, 2016).

Indeed, international support – exemplified by the EU Peacebuilding Initiative and USAID/CMM grant programme that have funded more than 200 peacebuilding projects in the past decade, alongside other donors – has been essential to sustaining the cadre of activists who strive to keep “peace” on the public agenda in Israeli and Palestinian societies in such challenging times. It will be equally crucial in sustaining the future of civil society efforts.

Civil society matters

Any future steps toward two states will necessarily confront the test of a popular vote. Beyond the apparent need to elect governments favorably disposed toward such a solution (and on the Palestinian side, to hold elections at all), in 2014 the Knesset passed the equivalent of a constitutional amendment to require a popular referendum on any future territorial withdrawal (Basic Law: Referendum, 2014). Peace accords have a troubled track record at the ballot box; majorities of voters in Cyprus (2004) and Colombia (2016) rejected painstakingly negotiated treaties aimed at ending decades of conflict. The positive counter-example for Israelis and Palestinians to follow is Northern Ireland, where the International Fund for Ireland has been supporting intercommunal civil society engagement on a mass scale since 1986.

The positive counter-example for Israelis and Palestinians to follow is Northern Ireland, where the International Fund for Ireland has been supporting intercommunal civil society engagement on a mass scale since 1986.

3. International funding is not un-controversial; the current Israeli government recently passed an “NGO Law” requiring civil society organisations disclose the degree of their funding that comes from foreign governmental entities, in an attempt to impugn the loyalty of peace and human rights NGOs primarily supported by international donors (Beaumont, 2016). Of course, Israel’s radical Right organisations and politicians are equally indebted to international benefactors – in their cases, from the private sector (Civic Leadership, 2016).
international support, and it consulted repeatedly with Israeli and Palestinian peacebuilding NGOs in advance of the January 15th 2017 Paris Peace Conference (Bassist, 2017). The emphasis on civil society echoes the Quartet’s July 2016 recommendation of “increasing interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields – economic, professional, educational, cultural – that strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism” (Middle East Quartet, 2016).

This report seeks to complement the Quartet’s recommendation – detailing the past and present of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, and concluding with recommendations for broadening and deepening the impact of this essential work in the future.

![Combatants for Peace “Freedom March” at the “Tunnels Checkpoint” near Bethlehem, 16 July 2016. The sign reads “this is a non-violent march.” Photograph used by permission of Ned Lazarus.](image)

**Structure of the report**

Part 1 provides a *map of the contemporary field*, encompassing both “cross-border” projects concerning the Palestinian territories, and “shared society” initiatives involving Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel - noting the range of methods and strategies employed, target populations, and annual revenues of peacebuilding NGOs among other information.

Part 2 examines *the state of peacebuilding today*, highlighting four case studies of contemporary initiatives that have demonstrated growth and concrete policy impact, even in present political conditions.

Part 3 explains *the history of the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding field*, describing its evolution in relation to the volatile conflict context.

Part 4 examines *the empirical record of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding*, gleaned from academic literature and programme evaluations, highlighting models and strategies that appear worthy of sustained support.
Part 5 *identifies obstacles* exacerbated by the absence of a viable peace process, particularly financial short-termism, power asymmetry and the struggle for societal legitimacy.

The report concludes with detailed recommendations to policy-makers. In general, it argues for the vital importance of sustained support for civil society peacebuilding within a framework of long-term conflict transformation. As the research record detailed here illustrates, a consistent focus on cultivating local cross-conflict networks and capacities for peace will serve the future interests of Israelis, Palestinians and the international community – all the more so in an era of conflict irresolution.

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Part 1. Mapping the contemporary peacebuilding field

This section provides a detailed overview of the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding field, including methodology, target populations, annual revenues and other characteristics.

Despite the political impasse, militant opposition from ideological opponents, and the inertia of the “silent majority” in both societies, Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding remains a vital, diverse and resilient field. The Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP) NGO network recently added its 100th member; the present research finds a baseline number of at least 164 organisations currently engaged in peace, conflict resolution, or cross-conflict civil and human rights work in Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as at least nine degree-granting academic programmes in Conflict Resolution, multiple research centres and a host of less formal, local initiatives. Evaluation and scholarship have validated the effectiveness of numerous intervention strategies, and as noted above – particularly in the sphere of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel – models are beginning to be officially adopted and scaled, and sustained advocacy campaigns have achieved meaningful policy impact.

At the same time, peacebuilding remains controversial and far from achieving its potential reach in both societies. 164 active organisations are but a fraction of more than 20,000 active registered NGOs in Israeli civil society (Civic Leadership, 2016); the proportion is smaller yet in Palestinian civil society, in which any cooperation with Israeli civic initiatives is inevitably branded as “normalisation of the occupation”. Palestinian peacebuilding advocates commonly experience harassment from anti-normalisation activists, whose bullying tactics typically include blacklisting, threats and occasional disruption of Israeli-Palestinian meetings. In Israel, vandalism, verbal and sometimes physical attacks against “Leftists” have become a cause célèbre on the extreme Right, whose militant street activists are buoyed by the rhetoric of “friends in high places” in the current government (Eglash & Booth, 2016).

Donor fatigue, opposition and marginalisation have taken a toll; the field is prone to volatility and organisational “turnover.” In recent years a number of veteran organisations have closed doors, downscaled or reset strategy, even as new initiatives like Women Wage Peace have risen to prominence. Alongside at least 164 active organisations, the present research finds at least 77 initiatives that have either ceased to exist (41) or whose status is unclear at present (36), some closing after a decade or more of activity.

Nonetheless, the civic repertoire of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding has endured, diversified and evolved. Individual organisations have closed doors, re-branded or rebooted, but peacebuilding methodologies have steadily grown in quantity and sophistication. Strategies employed for cross-conflict engagement have grown from the classic models of advocacy, dialogue, education and protest to the eclecticism of current practice.
Mapping the contemporary peacebuilding field

re-branded or rebooted, but peacebuilding methodologies have steadily grown in quantity and sophistication. Dozens of viable organisations have been established in each of the last three decades, while the strategies employed for cross-conflict engagement have grown from the classic models of advocacy, dialogue, education and protest to the eclecticism of current practice.

The field of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, at present, is thus significantly larger than commonly assumed, yet too small to achieve the macro-political changes to which it aspires. The report now provides a detailed overview of the organisational ecology of the contemporary field.

1.1 Defining peacebuilding

The present report defines “peacebuilding” as voluntary civic engagement in organised non-violent social or political activity aimed at transforming perceptions, policies and/or structural/sociopolitical relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs with aspirations to contribute to longer-term resolution of intergroup conflict. This broad definition encompasses a wide range of social action forms, in line with the international recognition that diverse activities can contribute to conflict transformation, violence reduction, and the building of more just and peaceful societies.

The repertoire of Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding activity has evolved in step with the evolution of the international field. The United Nations (UN) officially coined the term in its 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*; a 2008 OECD/DAC guidance report affirms its rapid expansion, defining peacebuilding as “an overarching term for an entire range of actions designed to contribute to building a culture of peace ... peacebuilding covers a broad range of measures implemented in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations and which are explicitly guided and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of a lasting and sustainable peace” (OECD/DAC, 2008).

Numerous definitions of peacebuilding emphasise the goal of long-term transformation of conflict rather than the specific methods employed.
Ropers (1995) describes the aim of peacebuilding as “change in the social structures underlying the conflict, and a change in the attitudes of the parties to the conflict”; Morris explains that “[peacebuilding] involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures” (Ramsbotham et al. 2014). In international development frameworks, peacebuilding funds have allocated resources to a broad spectrum of activities in conflicts around the world – all of which are visible in the Israeli-Palestinian field.

At the same time, in taking this expansive view of the field, there are several caveats to bear in mind.

First, it is important to note that “peacebuilding” as defined here encompasses some activities beyond the traditional sphere of activity classified locally as “people-to-people” (P2P) – such that the present list includes up to 22 organisations that identify primarily as human or civil rights (8) or anti-occupation (14) as opposed to “peace” initiatives per se. The work of these other organisations nonetheless typically involves cooperation and substantial interaction of Israeli Jews and Palestinians, and substantially concerns and impacts the dynamics of Israeli/Palestinian intergroup relations. At the same time, it is critical to acknowledge the substantial differences, methodological and philosophical/political, that often prevail between initiatives classified together under the broad “peacebuilding” rubric.

Second, the civil society peacebuilding field described here encompasses two different political spheres: “Shared Society” work involving Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, and “cross-border” work involving Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with the Gaza Strip often excluded from peacebuilding frameworks.⁶ Profound differences exist, of course, between the status and struggles of the Arab minority in Israel and Palestinians in the territories – as indeed between conditions in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, international peacebuilding instruments fund organisations active in both spheres, and initiatives in both spheres employ similar methodological repertoires and share membership in the peacebuilding field’s umbrella organisations. Most important, Palestinians in the territories and Arab citizens of Israel are all part of the larger Palestinian Arab culture and people, and their relations with Israel and Israeli Jews, while distinct, are inextricably intertwined (Rabinowitz, 2004).⁷ Chart 1 details the breakdown of initiatives in the field in terms of target populations.

Finally, it is important to note the disparities of capacity and resources between peacebuilding initiatives – the spectrum ranges from globally connected organisations annually raising several million dollars and implementing dozens of projects, to informal collectives of a handful of activists leading spontaneous grassroots campaigns – and much in between.

₆. Approximately 3m Palestinians live within East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and approximately 1.8m live within the Gaza Strip. Population estimates from the Israeli and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
₇. A third “sphere,” of engagement by Jewish and Palestinian diaspora groups and international civil society, is a crucial component as well – but outside the purview of the current research. Therefore, initiatives which work exclusively or primarily with diaspora or international populations are not included in the data referenced here.
From the sample of 83 organisations for whom verifiable budget figures could be obtained through US or Israeli tax documents, annual revenues range from tens of thousands of US dollars to approximately six million. Revenues exceeded one million USD for approximately one quarter of NGOs in the field; just under 40 per cent exceeded one million Israeli shekels (approximately 271,000 USD). Shared Society and Cross-Border CSOs had relatively equal representation among the larger organisations. All human rights NGOs on the list reported annual revenues of at least 800,000 USD; 7 of 8 exceeded one million dollars of revenue, indicating fundraising success and relatively even distribution of funding within the human rights sub-field. Chart 2 provides an overview of the distribution of annual revenues.

The organisational field is likewise diverse in terms of longevity. As Chart 3 details, a new wave of several dozen NGOs has been established in each of the last three decades, complementing a cadre of veteran initiatives founded in the “formative years” of the field.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity/Citizenship of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Active Initiatives</th>
<th>Percentage of Active Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Border (Palestinians and Israeli Jews)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>41.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Society (Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem (Palestinian, Israeli Jews)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily internal Israeli/Jewish</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily internal (territories) Palestinian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Chart 1. Target populations of peacebuilding initiatives by identity/citizenship/residency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity/Citizenship of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Active Initiatives</th>
<th>Percentage of Active Initiatives</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily internal (territories) Palestinian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chart 2. Annual revenue in most recent declared budget (FY 2013-2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Revenue</th>
<th>Cross-Border/ (EJ &amp; WB)</th>
<th>Shared Society/ Israel</th>
<th>Civil/ Human Rights</th>
<th>Total Initiatives (% of 164)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$3-6 million USD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14 (8.54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1-2 million USD</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 (15.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIS 1-3 million ($300K-900K)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22 (13.41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;NIS 1 million</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22 (13.41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precise Figures n/a</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81 (49.39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. A larger number of Palestinian “internal dialogue” initiatives exist on the ground; the few that are included here also include some explicit aspect of engagement with Israelis and/or cross-conflict peacebuilding.


10. Revenues determined according to the most recent public auditing statement between FY 2013-2015 – using a United States IRS form 990 or the financial report published by Israel’s nonprofit registry (rasham ha-amutot); in some cases of international organisations with local programmes, staff were consulted and/or the organisation’s annual report was used to determine percentages of total revenue directed to Israeli-Palestinian programmes.
1.2 Diverse repertoire, limited reach

The field is equally – and increasingly – eclectic in terms of methodology. Chart 4 provides an operational categorisation of the contemporary field, detailing the methods/strategies employed by currently active initiatives. It is important to note that numerous organisations are multi-dimensional: they implement numerous projects simultaneously, employ diverse methods and address multiple issues and populations – hence the total number of strategies employed exceeds the total of 164 active initiatives.

Chart 4. Methods / strategies employed by active peacebuilding initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods Employed</th>
<th>Active Initiatives</th>
<th>Percentage of Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Advocacy</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dialogue</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Civil/Human Rights[^1]</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Education</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Arts/Culture</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Research</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Protest</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hub (Meeting/Activity Site)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Track Two Diplomacy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Music</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Economic Development</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Media</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Sport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Hi-Tech/IT</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Health/Medicine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Environment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^1]: This number includes initiatives whose work is not primarily civil/human rights but includes meaningful aspects. The overall list also includes at least eight organisations defined specifically as civil or human rights.
More organisations currently employ classic civil society peacebuilding approaches – advocacy, dialogue, education or arts and culture – than the emerging practical strategies of integrating peacebuilding content into practical fields such as economic development, environmental protection, health or technology. At the same time, practical cooperation projects – for example, projects designed to increase Palestinian IT capacity and integration of Arab citizens into Israel’s renowned technology sector – often involve greater financial investment and carry unique potential for social and economic impact. Indeed, the least common approaches – environment, health and technology – are employed by CSOs located at the higher end of the scale in terms of budget, capacity, and scope of work implemented.

The environmental initiatives – EcoPeace and the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies (AIES) – are dynamic, multi-dimensional “peacebuilding platforms,” simultaneously engaged in diverse transboundary projects involving Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians as well as regional and international parties (Lederach, 2005).

A similar distinction between established and emerging approaches is visible in terms of the issues and populations addressed by peacebuilding initiatives. As Chart 5 details, the predominant issue categories are anti-racism and pro-two state solution advocacy – the foundational issues for the field. As detailed below, the first waves of peacebuilding activity were fueled by opposition to the rise of the racist Kahane movement in Israel, in response to the outbreak of the First Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza, and support for a two-state solution inspired by breakthroughs in the peace process.

**Chart 5. Target issues/demographics for peacebuilding initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target issues/populations</th>
<th>Active initiatives</th>
<th>Percentage of field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Youth</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Protest against Israeli rule in the West Bank</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Anti-Racism</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Two-State Advocacy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Religious/Interfaith</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Women</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Jerusalem</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Internal/Uni-National Dialogue</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nonviolence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of target populations, youth have long been the primary focus of leading approaches, e.g. dialogue, education, arts/culture and sport. Working with youth remains crucial today, given the prevalence of youth in the Palestinian population, and opinion research indicating that youth are the...
at least supportive demographic for peace efforts in both societies (Braunold & Saltan, 2016).

At the same time, there is a clear need for diversity, in terms of age, gender, and identity. The mobilising power of gendered approaches is illustrated by the WWP and Action 1325 initiatives mentioned above. The “religious/interfaith” and “internal dialogue” categories represent increasing emphasis on engaging conservative constituencies outside the secular, educated elite demographic classically synonymous with the “peace camp” (Lazarus, 2016). Interventions focused on assuring security in a potential peace framework have taken on increasing significance in the wake of the seizure of territories from which the IDF forces withdrew by Hamas and Hezbollah, and the disintegration of regional order (Koplow, 2016). Yuval Rahamim, recently appointed director of the Peace NGOs Forum in Israel, has advocated a new strategic orientation for the peacebuilding community focused on these two issues – building broad support within Israeli society and effectively addressing security concerns (Rahamim, 2016).

The above figures present a detailed snapshot of the contemporary civil society peacebuilding field. Part 2 will examine four case studies of effective peacebuilding work, even in today’s intractable conditions.
Part 2: The state of peacebuilding today: four case studies

The following four case studies – (i) projects to foster anti-racism and religious dialogue, (ii) education for shared living, (iii) policy work to secure civic equality and a “shared society” between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority in Israel, (iv) and a new approach to water politics between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan – exemplify the potential of civil society peacebuilding for growth and policy impact, even in current conditions.

2.1 Peacebuilding in 2016: eclectic, embattled, resilient

The October 2016 Women’s “March of Hope” arrived on the heels of a busy summer of civil society peacebuilding. July 2016 alone witnessed a “Freedom March” of 800 Israelis and Palestinians to an Israeli army checkpoint in the West Bank; Palestinian and Israeli youth delegations attending multiple dialogue programmes in the country and outside; a trend of interfaith iftar meals and “Ramadan Nights” in which Jews were invited to Arab cities in Israel; Israeli activists delivering water to Palestinian towns cut off by Israel’s national water company; informational tours of the Separation Barrier and Palestinian East Jerusalem for Israelis and Diaspora Jews; Knesset sessions featuring NGO advocacy on anti-discrimination and peace process issues; bi-national backgammon tournaments in East and West Jerusalem; a documentary film screening on the Separation Barrier; the Israeli Peace NGO Forum meeting in Ramallah with the PLO Committee on Interaction with Israeli Society; outdoor, public Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and negotiation sessions in Tel Aviv, among numerous other events.

These peacebuilding projects present an alternative ethos to acrimony, ethnocentrism and inertia, as illustrated by the following examples.

Case study 1: Anti-racism and religious dialogue

Episodes of racism in Israel have motivated moderate religious and centre-right figures, not associated with the “peace camp” demographic, to become outspoken advocates of dialogue, humanisation of the other and liberal democracy – commonly labeled “Leftist” values in Israel today.

The rise of the extremism within Israel has correlated with growing interest, among certain sectors of the Israeli population, in the “touchpoints” of cross-cultural shared space established over the years by civil society organisations (CSOs). Racism and violence – particularly hate crimes targeting Palestinians and Israeli peace activists – have generated many examples of counter-mobilisation:

- Israeli and international activists now organise annually to join Palestinian farmers for the West Bank olive harvest, to oppose violent harassment by militant “hilltop youth” settlers.
The state of peacebuilding today: four case studies

“The ideal framework for creating shared living between different sectors is joint schools, such as the bilingual Jewish Arab schools.”
– State Comptroller Yoseph Shapira

“Children who do not speak Hebrew and Arabic cannot talk to one another and understand each other... We must not give up on education for partnership.”
– Israeli President Reuven Rivlin

First grade students at Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand School, Jerusalem. Photograph used by permission of Hand-in-Hand Center for Jewish-Arab Education.

• The right wing Jewish “Price Tag” campaign of vandalism and violence generated the inter-religious, anti-racist “Light Tag” movement and the Coalition Against Racism in Israel.

• In Jerusalem, CSOs and grassroots groups have partnered to prevent the disruption of Christian holy sites, encourage interfaith dialogue on Mount Zion, and remove racist graffiti defacing Arabic language on public signs (Shultziner, 2016). This last example is one of 10 new initiatives of the “Jerusalem Tolerance Forum,” recently awarded NIS 200,000 to expand their work by the Jerusalem municipality (Biton, 2016).

• Sustained dialogue between faith leaders, led by Rabbi Michael Melchior’s Mosaica organisation among others, has played a role in decreasing tension with respect to Jerusalem’s holy sites (Maltz, 2016).

• Rabbinical leaders engaged in the Siakh Shalom (Talking Peace) initiative released public statements recognising the authority of the Islamic Waqf administration on the Haram A-Sharif/Temple Mount (Hirschfeld, 2016).

A prominent example of such activism in modern Orthodox religious circles is Rabbi Binyamin Lau, a nephew of Israel’s former Chief Rabbi raised in the B’nei Akiva religious Zionist youth movement and educated in the Gush Etzion yeshiva
in the West Bank. While maintaining his position as a congregational rabbi in Jerusalem, Lau has emerged in recent years as a mainstay of the “Light Tag” movement and an outspoken opponent of racism and religious extremism (Kamin, 2013). In the ultra-Orthodox sector, Adina Bar-Shalom – founder of the Haredi College and daughter of the late former Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas party – is renowned for her advocacy of higher education for women and greater integration of her community into the Israeli economy and society. Less well known, but no less remarkable, have been her integration of conflict resolution and dialogue courses into the college curriculum, and her public advocacy for peace and the humanisation of the Palestinians - in tacit contradiction of some of her late father’s remarks (Miller, 2016).

On the secular Right, a host of former Likud stalwarts have publicly denounced the tide of racism in their party. Israel’s President Reuven (“Ruvi”) Rivlin is most prominent among these territorial maximalists who champion civic equality, the rule of law, and respectful dialogue between Israel’s “tribes” – a thoroughly liberal-democratic, multi-cultural paradigm (Hecht, 2016). Rivlin’s outspoken advocacy, including his public visits to Arab victims of attacks and his social media condemnations of racism, have turned him into a target of the trolls – yet he is apparently undaunted (Lior, 2015).

Case study 2: Education for shared living

In November 2014 an arson attack took place at the Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand school, Jerusalem’s only integrated, bilingual K-12 campus. Extremists set fire to a first-grade classroom and sprayed racist slogans. Yet rather than stigmatise the school, the attack generated an unprecedented outpouring of mainstream support for integrated education, including visits from ministers, members of Knesset, US Ambassador Dan Shapiro, and President Rivlin (twice), all providing official legitimacy for a previously controversial educational model (Lazarus, 2015, B).

In the aftermath, the Hand-in-Hand (HiH) countrywide network of integrated, bilingual schools has doubled in size in the last three years, with 1,564 students now enrolled at six regional campuses, and 600 applicants on waiting lists. After uneven growth in its first fifteen years of operation, Hand-in-Hand suddenly cannot keep up with demand; the organisation has now received requests to establish programmes at eight additional locations (Bardach, 2016). All HiH campuses have now received official endorsement and requisite funding from local authorities and the Ministry of Education – after years of struggle, in certain cases (Steinberg, 2014). A recent special report by Israel’s State Comptroller Yosef Shapira on “Education for Shared Living and the Prevention of Racism,” claims that “the ideal framework for creating shared living between different sectors is joint schools, such as the bilingual Jewish Arab schools” (The State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, 2016, p. 80).

In the same period, a pair of Arab-Jewish civil society initiatives have successfully implemented a more modest strategy for educational integration by placing hundreds of Arab teachers in mainstream Jewish schools. These programmes, piloted by The Abraham Fund Initiatives and Merchavim CSOs, have been adopted by the Ministry of Education at district levels, “scaling” up their models in a manner all too rarely achieved by Arab-Jewish interventions (Maor, 2016). In a presidential address, Rivlin reiterated his support for integrated education, stating that, “We cannot continue to perpetuate the status quo, and raise our children in the darkness of mutual ignorance, with suspicion and alienation. Children who do not speak Hebrew and Arabic, and cannot talk to one another and understand each other ... We must not give up on education for partnership.”

13. There are at least four other integrated bilingual schools in the country – the Hagar K-6 school in Be’er Sheva, the Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam K-6 outside Jerusalem, the YMCA kindergarten in Jerusalem, and the Ein Bustan kindergarten in the Galilee.

This encouragement of integrated education has been accompanied by a burgeoning emphasis, in official policy and rhetoric, on the economic integration of Arab citizens as an Israeli national interest – a cardinal principle of Arab-Jewish “shared society” advocacy in Israel. President Rivlin encapsulated this idea in his seminal 2015 speech at the Herzliya Conference, asserting that:

From an economic viewpoint, the current reality is not viable. The math is simple, any child can see it. If we do not reduce current gaps in the work force participation and salary levels of the Arab and Haredi populations... Israel will not continue to be a developed economy” (Rivlin, 2015).

Multiple CSOs have long been active promoting economic development among Arab citizens in Israel. Successful models include The Abraham Fund Initiatives’ Sharikat Haya project designed to increase Arab women’s workforce participation, and a bevy of CSOs and private sector initiatives aimed at integrating Arab citizens into Israel’s globally renowned hi-tech sector (Flacks, 2015), paralleled by “cross-border” initiatives aimed at accelerating development of the Palestinian tech sector in the territories (The Marker, 2012) and combining tech training and youth dialogue (Economist, 2014). These initiatives have led to highly significant investments in diversifying the tech sector and removing barriers to opportunity for Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line. Civil society’s most powerful contemporary impacts in the economic sphere, however, may have come recently at the policy level.

“Whether you’re Israeli or Palestinian, you should have the same access to the same amount of water”.
– Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, speaking at EcoPeace’s annual conference in Jordan
2.2 Achieving policy change: Sikkuy and Eco-Peace

Case study 3: Creating a shared society: Sikkuy

The long-term impact of civil society advocacy is perhaps most visible in the Israeli government’s historic “Decision 922” – a revolutionary overhaul of the State budgeting procedure designed to equalise, year on year, resource allocation to the Arab sector, including investments of more than 15bn shekels toward infrastructure and economic development in the Arab sector (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015).

Decision 922 was adopted on December 30, 2015, against the vehement opposition of some government ministers. The breakthrough was made possible by years of civil society work – advocacy, coalition building, programme development, research, and lobbying. Among the primary trailblazers was Sikkuy: The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel – a fully integrated Arab-Jewish NGO dedicated to achieving “full equality on all levels between the Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel.” In concert with the civil society and political leaders of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, Sikkuy worked tirelessly to build the substance and the political support for Decision 922, which co-director Ron Gerlitz describes as “a significant change in the whole relationship of the government and the Arab citizens, a very big opportunity to change realities” (Inter-Agency Task Force on Israeli Arab Issues, 2016).

Sikkuy has built relationships over the long-term by convening regular roundtable meetings with key advisors in the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office, under the auspices of an internationally-funded project entitled “Seat at the Table.” Key elements of Decision 922 were taken straight from Sikkuy policy papers developed during those years. According to Gerlitz, the organisation was able to leverage the trust built over years of work, “to substantially improve the plan and to contribute to the dynamics of agreement between the Arab citizens’ political leadership and the Ministry of Finance” (Gerlitz, 2016). Their work testifies to the potential for strategic, sustained civil society campaigns to effect positive change at the highest level even in present political circumstances.
The state of peacebuilding today: four case studies

Case study 4: “Water can’t wait”: The achievements of EcoPeace

EcoPeace – a trilateral Israeli/Palestinian/Jordanian environmental NGO – led the Israeli government to show unprecedented flexibility in water diplomacy, by more than doubling Israel’s water supply to Palestinians in the territories (Edelstein, 2016). In recent years, EcoPeace has played a leading role in reshaping transboundary water policy, advancing wastewater treatment infrastructure in the West Bank, and focusing attention on the degradation of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea. In 2013 EcoPeace convinced the Israeli government to release fresh water from the Sea of Galilee into the Jordan for the first time in 50 years (Lidman, 2015). More controversially, EcoPeace has campaigned for water to be resolved independently from final status negotiations, advocating for an increase in Israel’s allocation of water to Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The latter, according to a 2016 UN report, may be “uninhabitable” by 2020 due to the lack of clean water, among other conditions (UNCTAD, 2015).

EcoPeace’s Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian directors and staff standing together in the Jordan River as part of their campaign to rehabilitate the river which is dwindling due to diversion of its source waters and pollution. Photograph used by permission of EcoPeace.

Israel will benefit materially and politically by advancing the economic capacity of its 1.8 million Arab citizens. Yet such pragmatism all too rarely prevails within the adversarial cast of Arab-Jewish and Israeli-Palestinian relations. It was years of civil society work that built sufficient support for the win-win approach to succeed.

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Israeli governments to date have adhered strictly to the water allocation regime fixed in the 1995 Oslo II agreements, which were construed at the time as temporary arrangements for a five-year interim period. In the post-Oslo era, dynamics on the Joint Water Committee, which is meant to set policy and resolve conflict, all too often deteriorated into a dysfunctional “blame game” (Brooks & Trottier, 2012). EcoPeace and the World Bank have extensively documented the inadequacy of the present system, which results in a plentiful supply to Israeli settlements in the territories while neighboring Palestinian towns face chronic water shortages in the arid summer months (Traiman, 2016). For years, Israeli governments have
refused to alter current allocation policy, arguing that water must be resolved alongside the other “final status” issues. EcoPeace, by contrast, has campaigned for years under the headline “water can’t wait” (Bromberg, 2014).

At long last, it appears that the dam has broken. In December 2016 Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz used the platform of EcoPeace’s annual conference in Jordan to declare that, “whether you’re Israeli or Palestinian, you should have the same access to the same amount of water. Palestinians should be able to buy as much water as they want [from Israel]” (EcoPeace, 2016). In policy terms, Israel is drawing on its substantially increased water reserves, enabled by advances in desalination technology, to double the quantity of water sold to the Palestinian Authority in both Gaza and the West Bank, in the context of a tripartite “water swap” agreement with Jordan – all policy changes long advocated by EcoPeace (Edelstein, 2016). In parallel, the Joint Water Committee resumed its meetings after a seven-year hiatus, allowing at least 97 stalled infrastructure projects in the West Bank to move forward (Rasgon, Lazaroff, & Udasin, 2017).

Israel will benefit materially and politically by advancing the economic capacity of its 1.8 million Arab citizens, and by selling its surplus water to Jordan and the Palestinians. Yet such pragmatism all too rarely prevails within the adversarial cast of Arab-Jewish and Israeli-Palestinian relations. It was years of civil society work that built sufficient support for the win-win approach to succeed.

In this section we have seen that jointly led Arab-Jewish advocacy campaigns can generate the policy substance and the political will for new directions to be taken, the implementation of which will have profound impacts on the lives of Israel’s Palestinian Arab citizens and the Palestinians in the territories, and contribute to creating the conditions for peace.
Part 3. The history of peacebuilding

For nearly as long as there has been Arab-Jewish conflict over sovereign rights to the Holy Land, Arabs and Jews have established civic initiatives aimed at resolving it. A 2016 study lists 500 joint Arab-Jewish non-violent activities dating back to the twilight of the Ottoman era (Katz, 2016). Civil society peacebuilding organisations remained few and far between, however, until the eruption of the First Intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israeli military rule in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, in December 1987. Eighty-nine per cent of the (at least) 164 currently active civil society peacebuilding initiatives were established in the decades following the First Intifada, with subsequent historic turning points sparking new waves of civic response, particularly the peace process of the early and mid-1990s, the Second Intifada that followed its collapse, and subsequent episodes of negotiation and escalation. Chart 6 details the evolution of the field according to historical era.

Chart 6. Origin of peacebuilding initiatives by historical turning points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical turning points</th>
<th>Active initiatives founded</th>
<th>Percentage of current field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second Intifada and after 2001-</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oslo Process (1994-2000)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Intifada (1988-1993)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt-Israel peace, Lebanon War (1977-1987)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is a common misconception that “peace organisations” disappeared due to the collapse of the Oslo process, the eruption of the Second Intifada, and more recent wars between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. It is beyond doubt that two decades of failed negotiations and violent escalations have damaged the electoral prospects of the Israeli Left, often referred to as the “peace camp.” However, as this section illustrates, periods of escalation in the conflict have often inspired the genesis of new waves of peacebuilding initiatives in response.

3.1 Beginnings

From Israel’s founding until the late 1970s, there existed no civil society peacebuilding sector, “peace movement” or “peace camp” to speak of. Two organisations espoused early versions of a cross-cultural ethos and hosted nascent forms of Arab-Jewish encounter: the Jerusalem international YMCA, founded in mandatory Palestine in 1933, and the Jewish-Arab Centre for Peace at the Givat Haviva campus in the Galilee, founded in 1963. Each remains a hub of joint activity in 2017.

Most politically conscious joint activity (excluding patronage-based politics or intelligence gathering), was confined to Israel’s radical Left. The Communist Party, in particular, advocated consistently for the rights of Arab citizens living
under military rule from 1948-66, and, post-1967, of the Palestinians living under Israeli rule. Following the Six-Day War, activists from the Marxist Matzpen movement built ties with ideological counterparts in Palestinian society. Publicist Uri Avnery’s broadsheet Ha-Olam Ha-Zeh spoke to a small Zionist far Left. Avnery advocated establishing a “Semitic Confederation” with the Palestinians in the 1950s, supported a Palestinian state as a member of Knesset beginning in 1969, and engaged in clandestine talks with PLO representatives in the early 1970s (Bar-On, 1996).

### 3.2 Begin, Sadat and the emergence of the Peace Camp

Such activities remained the province of an ideological fringe, however, until the political earthquakes of 1977 – the Israeli Right’s first electoral victory, and the first visit of an Arab head of state to Israel. In May of that year, Menachem Begin led Israel’s Likud to its first electoral victory, ending six decades of Labour Zionist hegemony dating to the institutions of the pre-State yishuv. In Hebrew, Begin’s victory is referred to as the “mahapach” – literally, turning the country upside down. Six months later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat turned the conflict on its head, stunning Israelis and the world by traveling to Israel and declaring at the Knesset in Jerusalem, “No More War! No More Bloodshed!” This unprecedented state visit broke with three decades of unified Arab refusal to recognise Israel, and inaugurated the first Arab-Israeli peace process.

The sudden juxtaposition of an unprecedented opportunity for peace with the largest Arab state, contrasted with the ascendance of Israel’s Right wing and expansion of Jewish settlement, inspired the genesis of the country’s first peace-oriented social movement organisation, Peace Now. Beginning in 1978 with a letter of protest from hundreds of IDF reserve officers to the Prime Minister, the movement campaigned successfully to encourage withdrawal from the occupied Sinai Peninsula in order reach peace with Egypt, while opposing, with less success, the expansion of settlements in the Palestinian territories.

Israel’s controversial 1982 invasion of Lebanon further galvanised Peace Now, and inspired the formation of radical Left initiatives such as Challenge and Yesh Gvul (there is a border), advocating conscientious objection to serving in occupied territories. This period saw Peace Now lead the largest demonstration in the country’s history at the time – an estimated 400,000 Israelis protested in Tel Aviv after revelations that the IDF stood by as allied Lebanese militias massacred Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1983. The groundswell on the Left mirrored the rise of violent extremism on the Right, directed first at Palestinians and then at Leftist Jews. In 1984, Peace Now activist Emil Grunzweig was murdered by a grenade hurled by right wing activist Yona Avrushmi into a protest march – a harbinger of the hatred that led to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and continues in the form of “Price Tag” attacks on Palestinians and peace and human rights activists and organisations today (Lebovitz-Dar, 2011).  

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15. In 1986, the Adam Institute for Democracy was founded in Grunzweig’s memory, beginning decades of anti-racism and dialogue work that continues today.
3.3 Arab-Jewish dialogue: the emergence of coexistence projects

The Arab-Jewish dialogue field emerged in the mid-1980s as part of a civic response to the rise of the openly racist Kach party, which earned two seats in the 1984 Knesset election before being declared illegal on grounds of racism by Israel’s High Court. Seeking to counter anti-Arab prejudice documented in surveys of Jewish youth, Israeli progressives established a series of “coexistence” programmes designed to bring together Jewish and Arab students for facilitated conversations aimed at humanising perceptions of the other and building cross-cultural awareness – with initial support from the Israeli Ministry of Education (Abu-Nimer, 1999).

Givat Haviva’s campus became a centre of dialogue meetings, as did the country’s first Arab-Jewish intentional community, the village of Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam, established in the early 1980s on a hill overlooking the Latrun plain between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This founding generation of dialogues brought to the surface the inherent challenges of asymmetrical power relations and differing motivations between Arab and Jewish participants, voiced in seminal critiques that drove the development of critical methodologies and maturation of the field in subsequent decades (Maoz, 2011).

3.4 Watershed: Intifada, human rights and action on track two

In December 1987, the First Intifada – a popular uprising of Palestinians against Israeli military rule – dramatically altered the dynamics of the conflict, shifting the front lines of confrontation and the vanguard of Palestinian politics to the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian civil society in the territories organised underground educational, economic and social institutions to support the sustained political struggle marked by strikes, civil disobedience and daily stone-throwing confrontations with IDF soldiers that became the icon of the Palestinian national movement (King, 2007). The uprising was the crucible of a Palestinian civil society operating independently of Israel and leading, rather than following, the exiled leadership of the PLO. In turn, this generated profound shifts in Israeli and regional politics. In July 1988, King Hussein of Jordan relinquished all claims to the West Bank, canceling the “Jordanian Option” that had been the preferred peace strategy of the mainstream Israeli Left. In November, the PLO issued a “declaration of independence” that implicitly recognised the pre-1967 borders, shifting their strategic goal from replacing Israel to establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

The impacts on Israeli civil society were no less profound. Influential, mainstream figures from the Labour and Likud parties became engaged in intensive “Track Two” dialogues with PLO figures. Previously the province of radical Left intellectuals, these became a mainstay of mainstream diplomacy, providing back channels for negotiation and generation of policy options, and playing key roles in the breakthroughs and breakdowns of the 1990s. Track Two forums, such as the Economic Cooperation Foundation and the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) among others, have remained a crucial “touchpoint” of Israeli-Palestinian interface up to today (Hirschfeld, 2014).

In the public eye, harsh IDF responses to the Intifada, and its highly asymmetric casualty toll, sparked increasing discontent in Israeli society. Prominent human rights NGOs – B’tselem and Rabbis for Human Rights among others – were established in the late 1980s to expose and, ideally, deter abuse of Palestinian civilians. Peace Now and other Israeli Left groups took up the call for two states
for two peoples, building ties with like-minded Palestinian leaders such as Faisal Husseini and Sari Nusseibeh, Orient House in East Jerusalem and the Rapprochement Center in the West Bank town of Beit Sahour became meeting points for Israeli and Palestinian activists.

3.5 The Oslo era: “peace process” and “people-to-people”

In the early 1990s, the Intifada faded from global headlines as the Iron Curtain fell, the Soviet Union collapsed and the US cemented its power-broker status in the Middle East with a decisive victory in the first Gulf War. The realignment of the international system enabled historic breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli peace process, as in other conflict regions: the 1991 Madrid conference initiating the first official Israeli-Syrian, Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations since 1949, and the 1992 election of Yitzhak Rabin’s Labour government in Israel, which signed the “Oslo” interim agreements with the PLO in 1993-95, and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty of 1994.

Tectonic shifts in global politics set the stage for historic changes in the Middle East – yet civil society developments of the previous years fueled the capacity and motivation in both societies to take advantage of the moment. The track two efforts of the previous decade provided negotiators with concepts, experience and basic familiarity with positions of the other side; the uprising, with its popular and largely unarmed nature, made ending the occupation an urgent objective for large constituencies in both societies.

The advent of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO inspired a surge of cross-conflict civil society activity, including the foundation of a second wave of youth encounter programmes, now promoting dialogue between Israelis, Palestinians in the territories, and in some cases the wider Arab World.

The Seeds of Peace programme came to symbolise a popular new model of internationally-based Israeli-Palestinian encounters, after its initial cohort of Arab and Israeli teen-aged participants were photographed with Yasser Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Bill Clinton at the 1993 White House signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. An innovative fusion of environmental advocacy fused with peacebuilding developed through the work of a pair of NGOs – EcoPeace Middle East, and the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies – work that has grown steadily through the tumultuous times that have followed. The 1995 “Oslo II” agreements established an official “people to people” programme, directed by the Norwegian government, aimed at generating grassroots support for the official peace process. The proliferation of civil society work was paralleled by a number of bilateral governmental initiatives at multiple levels, as well as “twinning” and
partnerships between schools and other institutions outside the peacebuilding field (Endresen, 2001) – although such cooperation declined after the election of Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996 (Hai & Herzog, 2005).

The Oslo era transformed a handful of activists and initiatives into an Israeli/Palestinian civil society peacebuilding field. It is important to note, at the same time, that many 1990s initiatives were inspired not by “euphoria” over Oslo, but by recognition of its fragility amid the virulent opposition that ensued.

Bereaved Israeli parents founded the Parents Circle Families Forum (PCFF) seeking to support the peace process and send a message of nonviolence and reconciliation after their children were killed in Hamas attacks; the group soon evolved into a joint Israeli-Palestinian movement involving hundreds of bereaved families on both sides (Barnea, 2014). New human rights and feminist peace initiatives coalesced as the peace process stagnated during Netanyahu’s first premiership.

The Oslo era is sometimes imagined, in nostalgic excess, as a golden age of funding and momentum, yet actual international funding was too little and too late. Two years of negotiations passed before civil society received official mention in an annex of the 1995 Oslo II Agreements; Yitzhak Rabin had been assassinated and Netanyahu elected before the official “people-to-people” programme ever began its work (Endresen, 2001). The EU’s parallel “people-to-people” fund was established in 1998, the same year that the US government added a small grant programme for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding to the Wye River interim agreement between Netanyahu and Arafat. Even this minor allocation fell hostage to partisan divisions in Washington and funded its first project only in 2001 – months after the Oslo process had collapsed. “Euphoria” no doubt inspired a spontaneous infusion of private funding for peace initiatives in Oslo’s early years, but systematic international support paled in comparison to the International Fund for Ireland, which began its more comprehensive work twelve years before the Good Friday Agreement was signed (International Fund for Ireland, 2009).

3.6 Crisis and perseverance: the Second Intifada and the era of separation

In 2000, the failure of final status negotiations led to the eruption of a second and starkly different Palestinian uprising, marked by the suicide attacks of Hamas and Fatah militias rather than mass demonstrations and civil resistance. It proved to be the most lethal period of Israeli-Palestinian violence since the 1948 War; five years of Palestinian attacks and Israeli military assaults led to approximately 1,000 Israeli and 3,200 Palestinian fatalities (BBC News, 2005), culminating in the Israeli government’s construction of the “Separation Barrier,” a sprawling maze of fortifications separating Palestinian population centres in the West Bank from Israel and Israeli settlements (UN/OCHA, 2007). These drastic developments dealt severe setbacks to advocates of peace – harming the electoral prospects of Israel’s political “peace camp,” undermining trust in the other and the possibility of peace among both populations, and causing a crisis for the fledgling peacebuilding field (Bar Siman Tov, 2007). According to one

The Second Intifada dealt severe setbacks to advocates of peace – harming the electoral prospects of Israel’s political “peace camp,” undermining trust in the other and the possibility of peace among both populations, and causing a crisis for the fledgling peacebuilding field.
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estimate, roughly half of the “cross-border” peacebuilding projects active in 2000 ceased in the first year of the Second Intifada – particularly governmental or municipal-based partnerships, and others dependent on any degree of official goodwill (Hai & Herzog, 2005).

Among peacebuilding NGOs, by contrast, a core group persevered, adapting programming to the chaotic Intifada environment and revising strategies for the harsh post-Oslo political realities (Gawerc, 2012); at least 66 pre-Intifada organisations remain active today. Moreover, a new wave of joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives arose in response to the changing context. Grassroots initiatives such as Ta’ayush and Machsom Watch combined aspects of nonviolent direct action, human rights monitoring and humanitarian relief in opposing the entrenchment of occupation, proliferation of checkpoints and construction of the Separation Barrier in the West Bank – the latter generating a radicalised activist milieu often critical of people-to-people activities (Hallward, 2009).

A series of innovative “Track Two” projects brought together Palestinian and Israeli policy figures to negotiate solutions to the core final status issues, and engaged in lobbying and popular advocacy campaigns to pressure governments that would not negotiate and to inform those that did. In the most prominent instance, the Geneva Initiative was widely credited with effectively pressuring Ariel Sharon to embark on his 2005 withdrawal of Israeli settlements from Gaza and the northern West Bank, and advocacy of further West Bank withdrawals – exerting political impact, albeit not without unintended consequences (Hirschfeld, 2014).

International donors – particularly USAID’s Department of Conflict Management and Mitigation and the EU Partnership for Peace (now the Peacebuilding Fund), incentivised the integration of peacebuilding content into projects aimed at enhancing societal capacity and social-structural change, in environmental protection, economic development, health, medicine, technology and other areas of interdependence and mutual interest (CMM Field Study, 2014). Additionally, these funds and the UNDP encouraged “internal” dialogue within the fragmented Israeli and Palestinian societies, and projects aimed at engaging ethnic, religious or politically conservative communities that have classically been alienated or excluded from both the official peace process and civil society peacebuilding (Lazarus, 2016).

3.7 The contemporary peacebuilding community

Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding did not disappear after the Second Intifada; the field has continued to evolve. Moreover, today’s civil society peacebuilding field is not primarily a product of the Oslo era; new initiatives originated as civic responses to breakdowns in the peace process as well as breakthroughs, and of course, there have been more of the former than the latter. The contemporary peacebuilding community is comprised of a determined, experienced – if perpetually embattled – cadre of civil society activists and NGOs who have persevered through the vicissitudes of the conflict (Kahanoff, Salem, Nasrallah, & Neumann, 2007). Organisations operate independently in parallel, with
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increasing degrees of collaboration developing in recent years through cross-sectoral forums like the Peace NGOs Forum and the Alliance for Middle East Peace (ALLMEP). Programmes continue to operate both “cross-border” and, increasingly, internally within Israeli or Palestinian society.

Today’s field is led by “learning organisations” that have become multi-dimensional and methodologically sophisticated as their operating context has grown ever more challenging. Their work reflects John Paul Lederach’s paradigm of conflict transformation – efforts to build cross-conflict touchpoints and networks and strengthen internal societal “capacities for peace,” within an assumed context of ongoing conflict. Lederach’s ideal CSO for intractable environments is a “transformative platform”:

A context-based, permanent and dynamic platform capable of nonviolently generating solutions to ongoing episodes of conflict ... an ongoing social and relational space, in other words, people in relationship who generate responsive initiatives for constructive change... A platform is responsive to day-to-day issues that arise in the ebb and flow of conflict while it sustains a clear vision of the longer-term change needed in the destructive relational patterns. The creation of such a platform is one of the fundamental building blocks for supporting constructive social change over time (Lederach, 2005, p. 47).

The Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding CSOs that have innovated and persevered through volatile conditions embody this ideal of resilience, versatility, contextually grounded responsiveness and long-term vision.

3.8 Professionalisation: the emergence of an evaluation culture

In the last decade, international donors, particularly the EU, US Institute of Peace, and USAID, have contributed to professionalisation in the field by providing modest levels of sustained funding, and especially setting standards and offering guidance in project design and evaluation (EU Peacebuilding Fund Report, 2015). At the turn of the century, practitioners commonly described evaluation as a major challenge, and experts commonly reported a severe capacity deficit in the field (d’Estree, 2001). Today’s leading organisations, by contrast, are often skilled in articulating theories of change, establishing indicators and speaking the language of impact assessment. The next section will survey the evaluative research that has been conducted on the outcomes of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding.
Part 4. Evaluating peacebuilding: the research record

This section examines the empirical record of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding, gleaned from academic literature and programme evaluations, highlighting models and strategies that appear worthy of sustained support.

4.1 Peacebuilding and the age of evaluation

There was a time when the consensus was that “people to people” projects had not been rigorously evaluated; early reports argued over whether measuring outcomes in such a field was even possible (Spurk, 2008). After the collapse of the peace process, however, evaluation became a requirement. No longer clearly on the right side of history, it was incumbent on peacebuilding proponents to empirically demonstrate

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Meta-studies of the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding field


value (Neufeldt, 2011). In 2017, we are more than a decade into the age of evaluation and outcomes are no longer shrouded in mystery. The local field has a steadily growing “paper trail” of evaluation reports, meta-evaluations (i.e. evaluations of evaluations) and scholarly studies, drawing on a variety of methodologies including experimental design, longitudinal studies and qualitative research.

At the level of individual projects, the leading grant programmes in the field – EU, USAID and USIP – all maintain rigorous monitoring and evaluation standards, requiring regular, in some cases quarterly, reporting on both finances and indicators/results, as well as detailed summative reports and often external evaluation. The leading organisations have developed their own internal evaluative capacities in concert with the requirements of their funders – who have, in turn, invested resources in training grantees towards that end.

Together, the EU, USIP and USAID programmes have funded more than 300 projects to date. Even allowing for the uneven quality of reporting by implementers, many intervention outcomes have now been documented. Moreover, each of these funders have commissioned meta-studies of their overall grant programmes, which have included study of many dozens of projects by external evaluation teams through extensive document review, field visits, interviews and focus groups with implementers and participants. These reports join a list of at least ten large-scale evaluative meta-studies of Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding since 2000 with two others in progress.

These reports draw, in turn, upon a wealth of academic literature. From the early years of Arab-Jewish coexistence programmes (Weiner, 1998) and clandestine Israeli-Palestinian “Problem-Solving Workshops” held at universities abroad (Kelman & Cohen, 1976), joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives have attracted considerable scholarly attention, with the lion’s share of scholarship being oriented towards impact assessment of one form or another. Certain programmes, such as Seeds of Peace and the Hand-in-Hand school network, have inspired multiple doctoral dissertations and peer-reviewed articles. Indeed, seminal debates on the psychology and methodology of intergroup contact are disproportionately, sometimes almost entirely, grounded in dozens of studies of Israeli-Palestinian encounters.

Evaluative research is not an exact science, of course; each study provides a list of caveats and limitations. There is a disproportionate focus on dialogue-based interventions, as the oldest and most common methodology in the field, despite the methodological diversification of recent years. While much work remains to be done, the breadth and depth of existing research is substantial for a field that has only existed in earnest for 25 tumultuous years. It is doubtful that similar scrutiny has been applied to civil society peacebuilding in any comparable conflict context, including the Northern Ireland precedent.

4.2 Will seeds of peace ever bloom? Evaluating the impact of a generation of Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding projects

The following section examines what a generation of evaluative research tells us about the impact of peacebuilding projects on the participants’ attitudes and long-term engagement in peacebuilding.

A generation has passed since the early 1990s; youth who were born in a more hopeful era came of age during the unprecedentedly violent Second Intifada, and established their own careers and families in the shadow of stalemated negotiations, ongoing settlement expansion and recurrent wars between the IDF, Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Participants in dialogue, whether adolescents or adults, have
long since faced the classic problem of “re-entry” from the safe space of a facilitated intergroup encounter to the stubborn realities of intractable conflict – a dissonance I have called the “Peacebuilder’s Paradox” (Abu-Nimer & Lazarus, 2008). So, as they have grown and the conflict has persisted, what has become of the children whose smiling faces adorn countless programme brochures?

Since the onset of the Second Intifada, a host of skeptics have questioned whether participation in peacebuilding projects has any impact at all (Bar-Zohar, 2012). Haaretz columnist Matthew Kalman’s 2014 column, “Will Seeds of Peace Ever Bloom?” asserts that “I am hard-pressed to find a single prominent leader ... among the graduates of the people-to-people projects, despite the fact that they are now in their twenties and thirties” (Kalman, 2014). The question was timely, following 50 days of fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas militants in Gaza that claimed the lives of more than 2000 Palestinians and 70 Israelis. Moreover, Kalman correctly highlights the theory-of-change implicit in most dialogue or education-based interventions – the aspiration that encounters will enhance the motivation and capacity of participants to become “agents of change” – advocates of peace, or a more humanised image of the other – in their communities.

At the same time, Kalman failed to see the evidence of impact all around him. To identify former dialogue participants turned peace activists, Kalman needed to look no farther than his own newspaper’s July 2014 “Conference on Peace,” which six adult graduates of Seeds of Peace (SOP) attended – three of them leading SOP’s programmes in Israel; the others working as directors of MEET (Middle East Entrepreneurs of Tomorrow), Peace Now’s Settlement Watch, and the Peace NGO Forum, respectively. In interviews, all these leaders have identified their teenage experiences in SOP as the inspiration for their adult activism.

Lior Finkel-Perl, then director of the Peace NGOs Forum and today Executive Director of “Civic Leadership,” the umbrella organisation of Israeli civil society, asserted in a 2015 speech that “my 1996 Seeds of Peace experience was ... the first time my life path became clear; I realised what is meaningful to me, what I want to achieve and what I am going to fight for... in hindsight, this is the moment that started it all” (Lazarus & Ross, 2015). Finkel-Perl’s testimony to the enduring impact of a youthful encounter experience is remarkable, coming two decades and five wars after the fact – yet it is echoed in the life story narratives articulated by dozens of peacebuilding activists I have interviewed for current and previous research.17

Huda Abu Arqoub, ALLMEP Regional Director and aforementioned leader of a contingent of 1000 Palestinian women at the October 2016 March of Hope, similarly recalls her first encounter experience as a turning point in her life. She began her path to peacebuilding in 2002, at a University of the Middle East (UMIDEAST) teacher training programme which included participants from Israel and Arab countries. Previous to the UMIDEAST programme, Abu Arqoub met Israelis solely as settlers and soldiers; the clashes and curfews of the

“I realised that one of the things that I need to work on is that the other is not a monster, and is not necessarily going after me, and I can build relationships with them that will change their lives and change my life at the same time.”  
– Huda Abu Arqoub, ALLMEP Regional Director

17. I refer here to interviews with several hundred peacebuilding activists and participants conducted throughout a decade of research – see Works Cited for sources.
First Intifada were her formative experiences of the conflict. She was surprised, therefore, by her first meeting with Israeli teachers:

One of the weird things was that I clicked instantly with the Israeli teachers. And the (non-Palestinian) Arabs in the programme were mad at us – they wanted to be for the Palestinians, with the Palestinians, and yet we were working with the Israelis and doing projects together. So I realised that one of the things that I need to work on is that the other is not a monster, and is not necessarily going after me, and I can build relationships with them that will change their lives and change my life at the same time.”

Abu Arqoub joined the UMIDEAST programme not in the halcyon days of the peace process, but in 2002, during the most violent year of the Second Intifada, when more than 1,000 Palestinians and 400 Israelis lost their lives in conflict-related violence (UN/OCHA, 2007). She describes her “re-entry” experience after her summer at UMIDEAST:

Then we were hit by a wave of violence, assassinations, suicide bombings, and every time I would run to the phone, checking on the internet after these teachers from Israel, making sure they were not on the bus, them or their children. And they were doing the same [for us]. And every time I saw the names of [Palestinian] martyrs or of Israelis killed, on the television, I felt the pain ... I didn’t want to see their names.

Yet rather than “revert” to previous attitudes or inaction, Abu Arqoub redoubled her efforts: She completed an MA in Conflict Transformation at Eastern Mennonite University and worked with Abraham’s Vision, IPCRI, and other peacebuilding CSOs before joining ALLMEP in 2014 (Abu Arqoub, 2016). Her Israeli colleague is Eldad Levy, a graduate of Seeds of Peace who went on to lead SOP’s regional programme staff and facilitate dialogue for multiple initiatives, before joining Huda at ALLMEP.

The list of alumni of youth encounters, now long-term activists, includes Gershon Baskin, founder of the Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) in 1988, now better known for his role mediating Israel’s 2011 prisoner exchange with Hamas, as well as Rabbi Arik Ascherman, a longtime leader of civil disobedience and humanitarian efforts in the territories with Rabbis for Human Rights. Both began their lengthy careers before the First Intifada with Interns for Peace, a CSO founded in 1983 that brought young Jews to live, learn and engage in community service/organising in Arab towns in Israel. Interns for Peace also inspired Sarah Kreimer, founder and former director of the Center for Jewish-Arab Economic Development, which brought millions of dollars of investment to joint economic enterprises during two decades of shared society work in Israel.

Farhat Agbaria, early participant and co-director of Interns for Peace, subsequently dedicated his life’s work to facilitating dialogue and training facilitators for Seeds of Peace and Givat Haviva. Another lifetime activist, Mohammad Darawshe, began his career at Givat Haviva in the 1980s – and today is director of Shared Society programmes there, after years of innovative
leadership at The Abraham Fund Initiatives. Beyond the dialogue field, one might note Michael Sfard, the director of the Yesh Din legal aid organisation for Palestinians in the territories, who was inspired by dialogue experiences at Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam (NSWAS) to dedicate his legal career to human rights advocacy (Eglash, 2017).

The list of prominent P2P alumni also includes three of Israel’s leading opposition parliamentarians. Stav Shaffir of the Zionist Union, the youngest member of Knesset – renowned for her role in the 2011 social protest movement – is a graduate of the Olive Tree Israeli-Palestinian scholarship programme at City University London (Shaffir, 2014). Zionist Union faction leader MK Hilik Bar, founder of the Knesset’s two-state solution caucus, was a co-founder of the Young Israeli Forum for Cooperation (YIFC), an NGO which engaged university students from around the Middle East in dialogue – including fellow Zionist Union MK Ksenia Svetlova, herself a ubiquitous presence at peace advocacy forums in recent years (Bar, 2014). Bar co-founded the YIFC with Ofer Zalzberg and Nimrod Goren, both prominent peace researchers today, with the International Crisis Group and the Mitvim foreign policy think tank, respectively (Goren, 2014). Both the YIFC and the Olive Tree programme closed recently after a decade of work – yet their impact lives on in the work of these graduates-turned-leaders and activists.
4.3 The evidence base: measuring the impact of peacebuilding programmes on attitudes

The encounter-alumni turned activists listed above are not isolated examples; multiple studies identify many graduates of dialogue programmes who have engaged in long-term peacebuilding and social change activity as adults — bucking the dominant trend of hawkish political opinion among their generational cohort. In surveys, 18-29 year-old Israelis and Palestinians are frequently found to be the demographic least supportive of peace. Encounter graduates are often, though not always, exceptions to the rule (Braunold & Saltan, 2016).

The body of longitudinal research on the impact of youth intergroup encounter and peace education programmes presents a three-stage pattern of attitudinal shift over time.

- **Initial attitudinal shift.** First, effectively facilitated encounters frequently lead to significant initial attitudinal shifts among a majority of participants, inspiring a sense of empowerment, humanising perceptions of “the other side,” and creating motivation for continued peacebuilding engagement.

- **Erosion effect.** After the conclusion of the initial encounter programme, the return to the intractable conflict context leads to a “re-entry problem” or “erosion effect,” diminishing the scope of the initial attitudinal changes. For some participants, “re-entry” is the end of the story – but it need not be.
Many of these alumni remained active in peacebuilding more than ten years after their initial encounter experiences as teenagers. Note that this figure only includes alumni **explicitly working in joint peacebuilding initiatives** – it does not include many other alumni who have gone on to engage in social change activism of other kinds.

**Potential restoration.** Crucially, substantial follow-up activities frequently provide what Salomon called a “restoration effect” for alumni, renewing positive attitudinal changes and providing motivation for long-term peacebuilding engagement (Salomon, 2010). Numerous encounter organisations have evolved programmatically from just an initial round of dialogue meetings into multi-year, long-term programmes that include thematic seminars, community action projects, engagement of participants’ friends and families, joint public speaking tours, facilitation and mediation training, and activism in response to political developments (see “impact factors” section below for more detail) (Thomas, 2017).

This pattern is clearly reflected in the largest longitudinal study of a dialogue-based encounter programme, the present author’s doctoral dissertation. The study tracks the first 10 years of Israeli and Palestinian Seeds of Peace (SOP) participants from adolescence through young adulthood, tracing percentages of 824 total alumni engaged in post-encounter peacebuilding activity, over spans of 8-15 years. Clear patterns emerged in the data – majorities of alumni engaged in peacebuilding declined to a smaller minority over the years, but a significant core group remained consistently active or returned to activity as adults.

The initial encounter experience sparked great enthusiasm, with 73 per cent of graduates engaged in SOP and other peacebuilding forums their first year post-encounter, and 44 per cent highly active. 52 per cent of alumni remained engaged through the remainder of high school, approximately 3 years post-encounter, with 29 per cent highly active. Engagement dropped to 42 per cent and high activity to 15 per cent between ages 18-21, with the enlistment of Israeli alumni for compulsory IDF service cited as the primary discouraging factor by both Israeli and Palestinian graduates. After age 21, however, at least 144 graduates went on to work for more than 40 different peacebuilding initiatives, and to study conflict resolution at multiple academic and professional programmes: 17.5 per cent of all Israeli and Palestinian SOP alumni from the programme’s first decade of operation (1993-2002) (Lazarus, 2011).
Moreover, in interviews, more than 90 per cent of active adult alumni traced their motivation directly to youthful encounter experiences. Palestinian graduate Mahmoud Jabari, active in local and international peacebuilding forums in his hometown of Hebron, described SOP as “the beginning of peace activism”; dozens of his Israeli and Palestinian counterparts emphatically echoed these sentiments in interviews (Lazarus, 2015, A).

Karen Ross has conducted parallel studies on two smaller youth encounter programmes involving Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel: Peace Child Israel, which operated from 1988-2012, and Sadaka-Reut, currently in its 33rd year of operations. Half of Ross’s 74 adult alumni interviewees were engaged in peacebuilding or social change activism; her interviewees commonly described youthful encounter experiences as enhancing senses of empowerment and self-efficacy, critical thinking in regards to dominant conflict narratives, and increased motivation and capacity for civil society engagement aimed at social change (Lazarus & Ross, 2015).

Such ideal outcomes – alumni going on to long-term peacebuilding and/or social change engagement – were far from universal in both studies, but at the same time significantly more prevalent than witnessed among the general Israeli population.
Several smaller studies echo these findings, albeit with varying conclusions. In a study of 46 teen-aged Hands of Peace and SOP graduates, Hammack emphasises the erosion of attitudinal changes – a reversion to the master narrative, as he puts it – among most of his subjects as they approach age 18 (Hammack, 2006). This finding echoes the decline in engagement previously noted among SOP graduates aged 18-21, ascribed primarily to Israeli graduates’ compulsory IDF enlistment. Hammack’s tracking stops, however, at age 18, failing to capture any subsequent evolution of graduates’ perspectives. Maddy-Weitzman, by contrast, describes sustained peacebuilding engagement of several cohorts of SOP graduates through the trials of the Second Intifada (Maddy-Weitzman, 2004). In a more recent project – the most comprehensive experimental design study of a dialogue programme to date – Risen & Schroeder find consistent positive attitudinal shifts among three full cohorts of Israeli and Palestinian SOP participants in comparison to control groups (Schroeder & Risen, 2014).

4.4 Impact factors which encouraging long-term engagement in peacebuilding

These longitudinal studies have identified a number of factors that encourage greater levels of long-term engagement in peace and social change activism among encounter alumni.

Impact factor: sustained follow-up activity

The SOP study emphasises the importance of a sustained programme of follow-up activity, as opposed to a “one-shot” or short-term encounter. Alumni who engaged in follow-up encounters in the Middle East were nearly twice as likely to remain active over the long-term. Even more strikingly, 52 per cent of the subset of alumni who returned to SOP summer camp a second time were actively engaged in peacebuilding as adults – compared to just three per cent of those who attended a single camp session. Each initiative develops its own unique variety of follow-up programming, but almost all veteran organisations in the field – particularly youth organisations – have evolved from focusing on an initial set of meetings to programmes in which participants can be engaged in different forms of joint activities for several years or more. Seeds of Peace, Sadaka-Reut, and Kids4Peace among other examples have each independently developed multi-year, phased models in which new cohorts of youth join the programme early in high school and participate in a new curriculum of activities each year through at least the remainder of high school. SOP and Kids4Peace have additionally developed family programmes in which parents, inspired by their children’s experiences, can voluntarily join parallel adult dialogue groups (Thomas, 2017).

Impact factor: conflict content

Ross emphasises the influence of curricular content and political orientation, finding that adult alumni of the explicitly politicised Sadaka-Reut programme were more engaged in peacebuilding and social change activity as adults than graduates of the self-declared “non-political” Peace Child Israel programme. Sadaka-Reut emphasises
critical analysis of power relations in Israeli society and training in the methodology of community organising, while Peace Child eschewed direct discussion of the conflict in its theater-oriented curriculum. Overall, studies endorse a sequenced approach, combining activities designed for interpersonal trust and relationship-building with substantive dialogue sessions focused on collective identity, historical narratives, asymmetric realities and perspectives on the conflict.

Impact factor: intergroup friendship

Risen & Schroeder find a strong correlation between experiences of intergroup friendship during the initial encounter, and the long-term resilience of positive attitudinal shifts over time (Schroeder & Risen, 2014).

Impact factor: skills-development and professional training

A number of adult encounter programme alumni described facilitation training courses, designed for young adults, as crucial opportunities that inspired renewed cross-conflict peacebuilding activity and added new depth to their perspectives. Maayan Poleg, an Israeli Seeds of Peace alumna, explained the profound impact of returning to dialogue settings as a facilitator in her twenties, after years of disconnection during and after her mandatory military service:

> It’s like someone was ripping the cover off my eyes. It’s the first time I really saw occupation, that I realised I am an occupier ... It started a process, that I can never again ignore the conflict ... There’s no way I can imagine myself waking up here to a normal job. Waking up, going to work out, going to my job, sitting in a coffee shop, not talking about the conflict, not dealing with it, not taking responsibility.

Poleg became a frequent facilitator, eventually leaving her “normal job” to co-direct SOP regional programmes full-time. While busy orchestrating encounters for a new generation of teen-aged participants, Poleg emphasises the added value of adult dialogue: “Everything changed for me in a way that didn’t happen when I was 14 – and that is the value of a long-term process. I needed experiences both as a teenager and as an adult to get to where I am today” (Poleg, 2016).

The critical factor, then, is to build frameworks for sustained cross-conflict engagement at different stages of life, rather than designing encounters as isolated meetings. Thus, dialogue should not end at age 18 – nor, conversely, does it need to begin before the onset of maturity. A number of frameworks for adult dialogue in the country convene around shared professional interests, advanced study or geographic proximity, and often allow for more substantial intellectual and civic engagement. A notable example is the “Advocates/Agents of Change” project of the School for Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salaam (NSWAS), which since 2007 has partnered with Israeli universities to lead 1-2 year courses combining facilitated dialogue, academic study and action project development for specific Israeli-Palestinian peer groups – journalists, lawyers, environmentalists, mental health professionals, urban planners and aspiring politicians among other sectors (NSWAS, 2015). The project component, in which dialogue groups serve as incubators for subsequent work “on the ground” in local communities, is emulated in numerous other contemporary initiatives, embodying a principle of “dialogue to action.”

Palestinian graduate Mahmoud Jabari, active in local and international peacebuilding forums in his hometown of Hebron, described Seeds of Peace as “the beginning of peace activism”. 20. The potential created by the initial encounter, and the crucial role of follow-up, are illustrated by a nascent civil society initiative entitled “Israeli alumni of Israeli-Palestinian encounters”. This began as a Facebook group established in 2016 by two adult alumni of small encounter programmes which were unable to provide substantial follow-up activities. The group grew rapidly to 500 members, and has since convened multiple regional meetings. According to the (volunteer) directors, a common theme is the enduring impact of the encounter experience, a desire to discuss the experience with peers, and to “do something with it.” (Ross & Pe’eri, 2016).
Impact factor: dual-narrative approaches

One innovative dialogue initiative has effectively synthesised all of these key findings: The “History through the Human Eye” (HTHE) project of the Parents Circle Families Forum (PCFF), a joint peacebuilding CSO comprised of 600 Israeli and Palestinian families who have lost members in conflict-related violence (Lazarus, 2015, A). Beginning as a pilot project for the group’s own members to confront the divergent Israeli and Palestinian historical narratives, HTHE evolved into a sui generis dialogue curriculum that PCFF members jointly facilitate for outside groups. Each group proceeds through multiple dialogue sessions, including sharing personal stories of bereavement and loss, hearing firsthand testimonies of Holocaust survivors and of Palestinian refugees, and concluding with an exercise challenging participants to “stand in the other’s shoes” and represent the other perspective empathically.

The PCFF has led 28 different groups through the process in recent years; they are currently adding a post-encounter project component at the recommendation of previous participants (Faraj, 2016).

The “History through the Human Eye” project has been accompanied by filmmakers, who produced the 2013 documentary “Two-Sided Story,” and evaluators, who have consistently recorded positive impacts among the vast majority of participants against a series of attitudinal indicators. In a 2014 evaluation, 94 per cent of participants rated the programme “very interesting”; 87 per cent rated it as “contributing to a great degree”; 80 per cent reported greater willingness to work for peace; 77 per cent reported increased belief in the possibility of reconciliation; 71 per cent improved trust and empathy for the other; 68 per cent increased levels of acknowledgment and knowledge about the other narrative (Kahanoff & Shibly, 2014) – levels consistent with two subsequent assessments (Atamneh, 2016). At least five veteran organisations in the field have, in a similar vein, developed in-house facilitation training courses for their own former participants and the wider community.

4.5 Intergroup immersion: integrated bilingual education

In most cases, intergroup dialogue is an exceptional event – demanding a special framework outside the boundaries of normal, formal education. However, as noted previously, recent years have seen the emergence of at least eight integrated, bilingual Arab-Jewish schools – an immersive framework integrating peace education into everyday education. This is a small subculture within Israeli society, encompassing an estimated 2,000 students around the country, and only one campus – the Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand K-12 in Jerusalem, with 696 students – extending beyond sixth grade.

Despite their fledgling nature, these schools have already attracted considerable research interest. Scholars have noted the candour with which the HiH schools address both Israeli and Palestinian collective memories, including the emotionally and politically charged “national remembrance days” commemorated by both groups. This open approach to identity and narrative is contrasted with integrated schools in post-conflict contexts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, where students of different ethnicities attend separate history classes, and Northern Ireland, where discussion of conflict issues or sectarian identity in school was discouraged (Donnelly & Hughes, 2006)(Ben Nun, 2013).21
Preliminary studies of HiH schools have pointed to a significant outcome of this pedagogical approach in terms of students’ views of identity, finding that HiH students are more explicitly conscious of identity/ethnicity than peers in mainstream schools, yet less likely to “essentialise” or stereotype members of other ethnic groups. A 2011 article asserts that “interethnic exposure [at HiH] alleviated children’s essentialist bias towards ethnicity and did so via making children aware of, rather than blind to, ethnic categories” (Deeb et al., 2011). Anthropologist Zvi Bekerman of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who has closely studied HiH schools, asserts that HiH students “talk about identity, their own and of the other group, in a much more articulate, nuanced way than their peers in mainstream schools... The schools show that kids can understand profoundly complexity, and have no trouble living with it” (Bekerman, 2013). Bekerman additionally asserts that teachers are perhaps the most deeply affected by HiH’s open engagement with identities in conflict. The faculty is comprised of teachers with mainstream Ministry of Education training and diverse political views; they are not a “self-selecting” group.

Teachers represent one level of an integrated bilingual school’s “ripple effect”; families, of course, are another. HiH has made a concerted effort to expand this further, by turning its campuses into bi-cultural community centres, hubs of joint Jewish-Arab activity reminiscent of the Jerusalem YMCA or Givat Haviva. HiH has solicited grants in recent years to expand its “shared communities” programme, and its campuses now commonly offer Arabic and Hebrew language courses, study groups, concerts and lectures, mixed Jewish-Arab athletic teams, shared holiday celebrations and other events for the general public. HiH Executive Director Shuli Dichter explicitly envisions the growing school network as cornerstones of a social movement:

We are building intercommunal shared spaces that will educate, inspire, and sustain the citizens and the public consciousness to support such a movement ... that will bring the voice of shared communities to the Knesset, to the media ... that will catalyse moves in the city hall and become a source of power for better sharing of resources. We are building here, bottom-up, a civic power. (Dichter, 2012)

As detailed in section two, the HiH school network has expanded steadily in recent years, while their integrated, bilingual model has garnered increasing legitimation from state authorities. Indeed, Minister of Education Naftali Bennett of the right wing Jewish Home Party recently visited HiH’s flagship campus in Jerusalem, accompanied by State Comptroller Yosef Shapira. After meeting with students and the Arab and Jewish co-principals, Nadia Kinani and Arik Saporta, the Minister was quoted as asking, “What do we have to do to defeat racism?” (Hand-in-Hand Center for Jewish-Arab Education, 2017).

4.6 Mainstreaming: Arab teachers at Jewish schools

The recent successes of Hand-in-Hand notwithstanding, fully integrated bilingual frameworks remain a bridge too far for the vast majority of Israeli families at present. A more modest proposal for mainstreaming educational integration has been effectively advanced in recent years by a pair of Arab-Jewish civil society groups – placing Arab teachers at mainstream Jewish
schools. This model, piloted in parallel by The Abraham Fund Initiatives (TAFI) and Merchavim CSOs, have been adopted into official curricula for entire school districts, “scaling” their programmes to a degree never before achieved by Arab-Jewish educational interventions.

In 2013, external evaluators found outstanding results for TAFI’s Ya Salaam programme, which at the time had trained 90 Palestinian teachers in an interactive curriculum for teaching 5th and 6th grade Arabic, and then placed them at Jewish schools. After two years of implementation, 90 per cent of participating principals reported improved student performance, parental support and successful integration of Arab teachers in Jewish-majority school, and recommended national adoption of the programme; 95 per cent of Arab teachers reported successful integration at school; 89 per cent reported that their work positively impacted students’ perceptions of Arabic language, culture and people.

Students studying with Arab teachers in the programme exhibited significantly more positive attitudes towards Arab people and culture, and significantly less anti-Arab bias than the control group (Henrietta Szold Institute, 2013). The programme was subsequently adopted by the Haifa and Northern regional branches of the Ministry of Education, and currently operates in more than 200 schools. The Merchavim programme sponsors a parallel programme for Arabic-language education, and in 2014 partnered with Israel’s Ministry of Education in a new plan to integrate 500 Arab teachers for English, Math and Science at schools around the country (Maor, 2016).

Hand in Hand students are more explicitly conscious of identity/ethnicity than peers in mainstream schools, yet less likely to “essentialise” or stereotype members of other ethnic groups.

History through the Human Eye: Israeli-Palestinian dialogue groups visit the Yad VaShem Holocaust Memorial Museum in Jerusalem as part of the Parents Circle Families Forum Narratives Project. Photograph used by permission of Parents Circle Families Forum / Yifat Yogev.
4.7 The future of evaluation

The evaluative research record is far from comprehensive. To date, most programme evaluations and scholarly studies have focused on intergroup dialogue or educational interventions, measuring impact in terms of attitudinal change among participants. Other peacebuilding strategies remain under-researched, and demand different approaches. The methods of measuring impact must evolve to keep pace with the expanding repertoire of peacebuilding practice.

Advocacy efforts are developing their own impact “indicators,” such as tracking the percentage of Arab interviewees on mainstream Israeli news programmes following the “Representation Index” campaign led by Sikkuy and other NGOs (Darom, 2016), or the number of bus routes established as a result of lobbying the Ministry of Transportation (Gerlitz, 2016). Interventions in the practical sphere come with some ready-made measures of impact – cubic

Ninety-five per cent of Arab teachers reported successful integration at school; 89 per cent reported that their work positively impacted students’ perceptions of Arabic language, culture and people.
meters of clean water increased to Gaza, successful heart surgeries performed for children, sewage treatment plants established, funds invested in infrastructure, jobs created – yet more nuance will be necessary to verify their contributions to peacebuilding.

The Near East Foundation’s (NEF) Olive Oil Without Borders project provides a model: its 2014 evaluation report combines economic data with attitudinal surveys of participating vendors (Near East Foundation, 2014). The report highlights the gradual process by which NEF brought the Palestinian and Israeli olive growers and oil vendors to negotiate a trade agreement with the IDF and relevant Israeli Ministries that opened up cross-border olive oil sales for the first time since the Second Intifada. This allowed Palestinian olive growers to sell their surplus on the Israeli market, solving a longstanding problem that had limited the potential of previous harvests. NEF Director Charles Benjamin summarised the success of the project in terms of “Two headline numbers ... 24 million dollars of increased sales for Palestinian farmers – and the [attitudinal] change: Over 90 per cent of our participants reported increased trust in the other and increased optimism about cross-border economic cooperation” (Benjamin, 2016).
Part 5. Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

Inside the encounter, they are all human beings. Outside the encounter, their freedoms, protections and status – or lack thereof – are determined not by common humanity, but by the different identity cards they are issued by the authorities. Inside the encounter, they face each other armed only with powers of communication. Outside the encounter, lethal violence is an everyday expectation, with machine guns on ubiquitous display in public places. Inside the encounter, ground rules encourage empathy, openness, and respect to foster a “safe space” for all. Outside the encounter, they are divided by barriers erected in the name of security for some. Inside the encounter, discussion leaders mandate equality between participants. Outside the encounter, power structures dictate that they live in separate, unequal societies. Inside the encounter, they may find hope in the discovery that in terms of emotion and psychology, they are mirror images of each other. Yet outside the encounter, reality does not adapt itself to their newfound understanding. (Abu-Nimer and Lazarus 2008, p.19).

This section details three inter-related obstacles faced by every endeavour to work across the conflict divide, to humanise the other or otherwise challenge the dominant “ethos of conflict” in either society, particularly in the “cross-border” sphere. Every meta-study of the Israeli-Palestinian field emphasises these inherent challenges: financial and political volatility, the asymmetry of power between Israelis and Palestinians, and the resultant lack of societal legitimacy for peacebuilding.

5.1 Obstacle: mutually reinforcing financial and political pressures

2016 saw the closure of three internationally recognised peacebuilding initiatives with notable achievements – each a poignant illustration that in present context, effective work is not enough to guarantee organisational survival.

- After 12 years, the Olive Tree scholarship programme at City University London graduated its final cohort of Israeli and Palestinian MA students; it counts the dynamic Israeli MK Stav Shaffir and Peace Now Settlement Watch director Lior Amihai among its 58 alumni (City University London, 2013; Johnson, 2014).

- The SAYA design firm, established in 2006, won accolades and international exhibitions for its pioneering work in “Resolution Planning,” bringing architecture and planning expertise to propose concrete solutions to the elaborate infrastructural challenges of implementing a two-state solution, particularly land swaps, borders, and establishing adjacent capitals in an open Jerusalem (Berg, 2014). Co-director Yehuda Greenfield-Gilat explained that the firm’s fortunes shared the fate of the Track One negotiations. After a flurry of activity accompanying the “Kerry Process” in 2014, commissions all but ceased in the wake of the 2015 Israeli elections. “The knowledge we have gained will be very relevant,” he noted, “when the political climate changes. But not now” (Greenfield-Gilat, 2016).
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• All for Peace Radio, the first joint Israeli-Palestinian, multi-lingual radio station, won international prizes including the United Nations Intercultural Innovation award, for broadcasting peace-oriented news and talk shows to tens of thousands of Israeli and Palestinian listeners (United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, 2011). Established in 2004, the station broadcasted to growing audiences on Arabic and Hebrew FM frequencies – until the Israeli Communications Ministry revoked its Hebrew broadcast rights in 2011 (Anmuth, 2012). Suddenly unable to air Hebrew advertisements, All for Peace lost its primary source of revenue and was soon forced to release its paid staff; volunteers continued to broadcast online until 2015 (Baransi, 2016).

In these cases among numerous others, directors of embattled initiatives cite a cycle of mutually reinforcing financial and political pressures as rendering unviable the continuation of previously successful work.

The funding environment for Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding is uneven, unstable, and vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the conflict and the short-term nature of the grant cycle (Hai & Herzog, 2005) (Kahanoff, Salem, Nasrallah, & Neumann, 2007) (CMM Field Study, 2014). Private sector sources can be a case of feast or famine, shifting abruptly with political winds, as illustrated by the case of SAYA among others.

USAID and EU grant programmes operate on short-term project cycles. Grants extend over one-to-three years, and renewal, even for successful projects, is the exception rather than the rule.

In the post-Oslo era, a pair of governmental grant programmes – USAID/CMM’s Annual Program Statement Fund (APS) and the EU Peacebuilding Initiative – have been the most consistent sources of funding for peacebuilding projects. Since 2004, the APS has provided approximately $10 million per cycle to 10-12 projects; the EU Peacebuilding Initiative, established in 1998, currently divides a total of 5 million Euros between a similar number of annual grantees.

USAID/CMM’s guidebook for “people-to-people peacebuilding” explains the rationale behind sustained funding:

Peacebuilding requires sustained and long-term efforts ... programming is based on a theory of change which depends on the community and key actors realising attitudinal change, mutual understanding, and positive interaction. This organic process of change occurs over time through recurring constructive engagement, which can be both expensive and lengthy (USAID/CMM, 2011, p. 25).

Yet the USAID and EU grant programmes, nonetheless, operate on short-term project cycles. Grants extend over 1-3 years, and renewal, even for successful projects, is the exception rather than the rule. Evaluations of both funds have noted that while a handful of initiatives have expanded steadily with renewed support, other promising projects have been thrust into uncertainty, or curtailed, after initial funds expired. As one Palestinian grantee explained, “It takes time to build the staff, the discourse... two years is not enough ... an educational process demands time, as well as money.” An Israeli grantee echoed the same sentiment: “This is the gap between the theory of change that they are using ... and the reality of social change. Social change takes a long time – a long investment. And the period of the contract is maximum three years – if they don’t renew it, it can do damage ... You will cut in the middle, and then you will disappoint even the target groups that you are working with” (CMM Field Study, 2014, p. 52).
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CMM’s own guidebook acknowledges the effects of the financial short-termism imposed by the project cycle, explicitly stating that it is unrealistic to “produce long-term results with short-term resources … let alone on a timeframe nicely aligned with fiscal cycles” (USAID/CMM, 2011, p. 25).

Financial short-termism prevents peacebuilding NGOs from engaging in long-term planning and undermines sustainability. Unlike the issues of asymmetry and legitimacy discussed below, financial short-termism is an obstacle created by donor policies – not the only one, but perhaps the most consequential (Gawerc & Lazarus, 2015) (2016). It is, therefore, an issue that donors are fully empowered to address.

As mentioned above, in Northern Ireland, the IFI began funding peacebuilding fully 12 years in advance of the Good Friday Accords, and the sums vastly exceed what has been invested in Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding to date. Two leading Northern Ireland funders – the IFI and the EU’s Northern Ireland PEACE programmes, have invested approximately three billion Euros in peacebuilding projects in the territory to date – at least 15 times more than the combined investments of the EU Peacebuilding Fund and the USAID/CMM programme in the Israeli/Palestinian context – while the population of Northern Ireland constitutes less than 15 per cent of the aggregate population of Israel and the Palestinian territories (Hamber, 2017).

For the current fiscal year, UK government funding for coexistence work through the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund was £400,000 (Stewart, 2016). Spending on peace and coexistence amounts to just 0.2 per cent of the £72 million DFID spends in the Palestinian Territories, principally in support of the PA and in humanitarian and development aid (Braunold & Lyndon, 2016). The Israeli government and the PA do not play meaningful financial roles in the cross-border peacebuilding sphere at this time – and this is likely for the better. Direct governmental financial support for a cross-border project, from either party, would inevitably come at the expense of the same project’s legitimacy among the other population.

Israeli state and local governments are, by contrast, meaningful funders in the “shared society” sphere, given that the target populations are Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens. As detailed in section two of this report, securing state and local government funding for shared society NGOs can be a sign of success for peacebuilding NGOs in Israel – whether in terms of advocacy campaigns to equalise resource allocation and infrastructure to the Arab sector, or official adoption and “scaling up” of successful pilot programmes in dialogue, education or sport. At the same time, international and private funding sources remain absolutely crucial to preserving the operational independence of civil society organisations from the state.

5.2 Obstacle: asymmetries of power, status and resource

While Israelis and Palestinians inhabit the same geographical territory, they conduct their everyday lives in “parallel realities,” in distinct cultural and social frameworks and starkly disparate material and political conditions. To be clear, both Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations live with chronic threats of violence from the conflict (Waxman, 2011) and the collective memories and lived experiences of both peoples are characterised by existential fear and victimisation (Bar-Tal, 2007). Yet beyond this mutual vulnerability, a separate and unequal status quo prevails between the economically prosperous, technologically advanced, democratically governed and militarily powerful State...
Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

of Israel and the Palestinians living in semi-autonomous enclaves of territory surrounded by Israeli security barriers, military camps and settlements, and lacking control of their borders, movement or natural resources (CMM Field Study, 2014).

Inequality also prevails within Israel between the Jewish majority and Arab minority, a legacy of decades of discriminatory resource allocation and exclusion of Arab citizens from the social and political mainstream (Peleg & Waxman, 2011). This asymmetry is hardly unique; it is a common feature of intractable conflict situations (Bar-Tal and Schnell 2014). It is, nonetheless, pervasive and consequential. All aspects of Israeli-Palestinian interaction, including peacebuilding initiatives, are refracted through the prisms of cultural difference and the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians (Rouhana & Korper, 1997).

Beginning with the first generation of Arab-Jewish encounters in Israel, scholars and evaluators of the peacebuilding field have noted the impact of this inherent asymmetry on the motivations and experiences of participants and the dynamics of Palestinian-Israeli organisational partnerships (Gawerc, 2012). Motivations for engagement in peacebuilding are often described in terms of Palestinian participants emphasising structural change or political mobilisation, in contrast to Israeli participants seeking to “humanise” perceptions, to build relationships, reduce intergroup hostility, and to enhance their senses of acceptance and security (Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004). Each side seeks validation from the other, albeit in different forms: Israelis in terms of Palestinian acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy and opposition to anti-Israeli violence; Palestinians in terms of Israeli acknowledgment of the imbalance of power and Palestinian rights (Maoz, 2000).

In terms of visceral responses to dialogue, an MIT study found that a dialogical, or two-way interaction enhanced empathy between Israelis and Palestinians, but through divergent mechanisms. For a majority of Israeli subjects, listening to Palestinians tell personal stories of suffering inspired them to feel increased empathy toward Palestinians in general. The majority of Palestinian subjects, by contrast, experienced empathy for Israelis after telling their own stories to an Israeli listener and eliciting an empathetic response (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012). Daniel Bar-Tal and the late Gavriel Salomon, after years of research on conflict psychology and peace education, conclude that Israeli and Palestinian dialogue participants are equally able to “humanise the other,” but exhibit asymmetrical responses in terms of narrative legitimation: “Accepting the humanity of Israelis is clearly a far easier task for Palestinians than legitimising the basic tenets of the Zionist narrative” (2006, p. 36).

At the organisational level, multiple studies cited asymmetry as affecting dynamics between staff, with Israelis taking on dominant roles and greater responsibility. This often occurs by default, due to structurally-derived gaps in English fluency, international experience, and training, culturally-derived gaps in assertiveness and confidence, and politically-derived gaps in freedom of movement and access to resources. As an Israeli peacebuilder explained, “Work with [our] Palestinian partner, it wasn’t equal. We don’t live under occupation, their movements are limited, they don’t have educational opportunities” (CMM Field Study, 2014,

23. These trends do not apply to all individual Israelis and Palestinians, but have been described by scholars of intergroup contact as collective tendencies. At the same time, Israelis of particular sociopolitical backgrounds may exhibit responses more akin to Palestinians in terms of seeking acknowledgment from the other side as a prerequisite to exhibiting empathy.
Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

Asymmetry is thus a genuine and profound challenge, inherent to any cross-conflict endeavor – joint peacebuilding initiatives cannot miraculously “transcend” the social contexts in which they are embedded.

Directors of veteran initiatives typically articulate keen awareness of asymmetry, and have designed approaches to mitigate its effects on staff relations – strategies that scholars have highlighted as contributing to resilience and sustainability (Gawerc, 2012). The Parents Circle Families Forum (PCFF), for example, has reformed organisational structure and practice to enhance equality. In 2006, the Forum officially established parallel Israeli and Palestinian offices and internal governing bodies – “two signatures on every check” (Lazarus, 2015, B, p. 23). Co-Director Mazen Faraj illustrated the subsequent evolution of the meaning of partnership in terms of organisational practice:

All the reports were [previously] written in the Israeli office ... In 2013, for the first time, that the Palestinian office wrote the mid-year report for the donors on six months of activities. When I said we will do the report, some people laughed – but in two weeks, it was done by the Palestinians, in English ... Since that time, we are in full partnership in writing the reports, in management, in proposals, in budgeting, and in the joint board. There is respect, and most important, understanding what does it mean to live under the occupation. I don’t want to be a victim – but the needs are totally different. We made steps forward, from each side, in the Parents Circle (Faraj, 2016).

In response to constituent feedback and evaluation reports, international donors have likewise taken steps to address asymmetry. The EU has repeatedly revised its grant-making criteria to allow an expanding role for internal/uni-national initiatives, and recently re-branded its funding instrument as the “EU Peacebuilding Initiative,” emphasising parallel civil society and development work rather than the previous “partnership for peace” – while continuing to...
Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

“Different starting points led people to a similar place... They might have had different issues, but there was value for everyone.”
– Charles Benjamin, Director of the Near East Foundation (NEF)

In the practical sphere, the concrete, shared benefits of cooperation can ultimately outweigh different underlying motivations for participation. Near East Foundation (NEF) Director Charles Benjamin describes the asymmetric points of entry for participants in the Olive Oil Without Borders project:

Palestinians, their starting point is economic – creating a business, starting a job. For the Israelis, you know, you can go about your life without even thinking about Palestinians. So the Israelis who participate, they’ve got a conviction and a motivation about building these relationships. The motivations are different – on the one hand, it’s economic realities, and the other side, it’s a moral preoccupation that’s driving them (Benjamin, 2016).

Nonetheless, the project – which generated a trade agreement, increased production capacity and opened up new markets for sale of surplus harvest – received enthusiastic evaluations from all sides (Near East Foundation, 2014). As Benjamin explained, “Different starting points led people to a similar place ... They might have had different issues, but there was value for everyone.”

The challenge of asymmetry is often illuminated through variations on the classic “bridge” metaphor of peacebuilding, explaining that a stable bridge must be established on solid foundations, or that a level bridge cannot be established between pillars of drastically unequal height. The empirical record of recent years illustrates that in current circumstances, asymmetry remains a formidable, but surmountable, obstacle; a narrow bridge that can – and must – be crossed.

5.3 Obstacle: “legitimacy deficit disorder”

Literature on “intergroup encounters” classically identified the degree of societal legitimacy accorded to peacebuilding projects as one of a number of necessary conditions for productive cross-conflict contact (Allport, 1954). And yet such support is often elusive in the very situations of identity-based conflict which necessitate intergroup interventions.

In the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian context, robust support is elusive at both official and communal levels, on both sides.

Militant elements escalate campaigns of de-legitimisation against peacebuilding activists and initiatives, exploiting the apathy of “silent majorities” that have lost hope for peace (Yaar & Hermann, 2016). Among Palestinians, an emboldened “anti-normalisation” campaign caricatures most or all cooperative engagement with Israeli Jews as acquiescence to
Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

Israel. Among Israelis, Right wing elements harass “Leftists,” while some ministers of the current government use their bully pulpits and legislative prerogatives to incite against human rights organisations and classic P2P work is portrayed as outside the mainstream. In the face of these pressures, societal support has been uneven and unreliable.

This challenge is new in degree rather than kind – a perennial problem has been exacerbated by the deterioration of official relations and conditions on the ground (Mi’ari 1999; AWRAD 2014). All meta-studies of the field describe “legitimacy deficit disorder” as a condition endemic to the field (Hai and Herzog 2005). Herbert Kelman explained the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic as a situation of “negative identity interdependence” – a zero-sum equation in which the validation of one side’s identity or humanity is perceived as inherently de-legitimising the other side (1999). In such a situation, initiatives seeking to “humanise” the other or to treat the “enemy” as a legitimate interlocutor, are especially vulnerable to stigmatisation. The mutually exclusive framing of legitimacy generates a catch-22 situation, a “seesaw” effect in which building legitimacy on one side of the conflict undermines legitimacy on the other side. In practice, any steps that peacebuilding initiatives take to strengthen their reputation among Palestinians are exploited by critics to undermine their legitimacy among Israelis, and vice versa.

Palestinian peacebuilders routinely face the charge of “normalisation” with Israel, an epithet located somewhere on a spectrum between disloyalty and treason, which can have social and economic repercussions for individuals and organisations (Nerenberg, 2016). For years the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) organisation has published a blacklist of groups it accuses of “normalising relations” with Israelis (PACBI, 2010). Mirroring its international branch – the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement – the anti-normalisation campaign officially purports to use subtle criteria to distinguish its targets: institutions rather than individuals, and only those initiatives that fail to acknowledge the asymmetry of power or oppose the occupation. In practice, anti-normalisation advocates have attacked the most resolute critics of Israeli policy – Israeli individuals such as Haaretz journalist Amira Hass, and joint initiatives such as the Parents Circle or Combatants for Peace – stigmatising any and all associations with Israelis or Jews on the basis of identity (Hass, 2014). On numerous occasions, anti-normalisation activists have physically disrupted meetings in public venues between Israelis and Palestinians.

Cross-border projects endure due to the courage and determination displayed by Palestinian peacebuilders. The impact of the anti-normalisation campaign is palpable.

Many Palestinian peacebuilding advocates remain equally resolute, not to say courageous, in continuing to stand for cross-conflict engagement in the face of these threats. The reflections of a Palestinian director of one encounter programme echo the testimonies of many Palestinian peace activists:

I got the occasional phone call threat, things won’t be good for you if you [continue]... but after a couple of encounters with people who threatened me
personally, I realised that most of this is intimidation; fear is what they play on. The main thing that kept me going is, if I don’t work with [my organisation], I don’t feel like I’m doing anything to move the Palestinian situation forward – when I work, I am doing something better than some [anti-normalisation advocate] sitting at home, who is doing nothing but criticising me.

We try to be smart about where we meet ... We’re careful about what we announce on Facebook – we are sensitive, but we are not hiding what we do or who we are from people ... Two years ago, one of our meetings was leaked to the Hamas news agency in Gaza, and they wrote the headline, ‘Palestinian normalisers meet with Jewish Zionists in Jerusalem,’ and this spread on social media ... some of the kids got death threats ... We had an emergency meeting with the kids, and we said, they are just trying to intimidate you – and [the kids] got stronger from that. Every kid and every parent deals with it differently, and we always tell them we are there to support them ... I do understand people opposing us, or debating us [on principle] – but I don’t accept harming people.

Cross-border projects endure due to the courage and determination displayed by Palestinian peacebuilders. The impact of the anti-normalisation campaign is palpable, nonetheless, in the low public profiles maintained by many Palestinians active in joint peacebuilding (with notable exceptions such as Huda Abu Arqoub of ALLMEP). It is equally evident in the much higher number of Israeli or Israeli-led organisations currently active in the peacebuilding field. While criticising asymmetry in rhetoric, the anti-normalisation campaign has entrenched it in practice.

A 2015 survey of Palestinian activism asserts that while the BDS movement has had scant success in motivating Palestinians to boycott Israeli products, its impact “has been somewhat pronounced in pressure against grassroots peace activists who work on joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives – a tactic that appears counterproductive, as it has mainly harmed activists who advocate against the occupation” (Jaraba & Ben Shitrit, 2016, p. 36).

Above all, it is political realities on the ground that have led Palestinians to question the value of anything associated with “peace.” As Elias Zananiri of the PLO’s Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society explains, “What can you say to the average Palestinian when the [number of] settlers grew exponentially under the umbrella of peace?” (Zananiri, 2016)

The issue of Palestinian public legitimacy is illustrated by Chart 8, displaying the findings of a 2014 public opinion poll, in which Palestinian respondents were asked whether they approved of six different types of joint Israeli-Palestinian activity. Between four possible responses expressing partial or complete approval or disapproval, “unacceptable” won a plurality of respondents in every category. No form of joint interaction achieved majority support, but 43-49 per cent of respondents did express partial or complete approval of all but one category (culture and sport) (AWRAD, 2014). This constitutes a sufficient critical mass to continue cross-conflict engagement, as has been the case – but never unopposed.

“I got the occasional phone call threat, things won’t be good for you if you [continue]... but after a couple of encounters with people who threatened me personally, I realised that most of this is intimidation; fear is what they play on.”

- Palestinian director of an encounter peacebuilding programme
## Chart 8. Palestinian public opinion regarding joint activities with Israelis (AWRAD, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“How acceptable is it for Palestinians to engage in the following joint activities?”</th>
<th>West Bank (approve/disapprove)</th>
<th>Gaza Strip (approve/disapprove)</th>
<th>Overall territories (approve/disapprove)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogue</strong></td>
<td>50%/48% 24% Approve 26% Somewhat approve 19% Somewhat disapprove 29% Unacceptable</td>
<td>40%/59% 23% Approve 17% Somewhat approve 12% Somewhat disapprove 47% Unacceptable</td>
<td>47%/52% 24% Approve 23% Somewhat approve 16% Somewhat disapprove 36% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informational tour</strong></td>
<td>45%/52% 19% Approve 26% Somewhat approve 20% Somewhat disapprove 32% Unacceptable</td>
<td>37%/63% 20% Approve 17% Somewhat approve 11% Somewhat disapprove 52% Unacceptable</td>
<td>43%/57% 20% Approve 23% Somewhat approve 17% Somewhat disapprove 40% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td>46%/51% 23% Approve 23% Somewhat approve 19% Somewhat disapprove 32% Unacceptable</td>
<td>52%/48% 33% Approve 19% Somewhat approve 9% Somewhat disapprove 39% Unacceptable</td>
<td>49%/51% 27% Approve 22% Somewhat approve 16% Somewhat disapprove 35% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
<td>45%/53% 20% Approve 25% Somewhat approve 18% Somewhat disapprove 35% Unacceptable</td>
<td>43%/56% 27% Approve 16% Somewhat approve 14% Somewhat disapprove 42% Unacceptable</td>
<td>43%/55% 22% Approve 21% Somewhat approve 17% Somewhat disapprove 38% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade</strong></td>
<td>44%/53% 19% Approve 25% Somewhat approve 17% Somewhat disapprove 36% Unacceptable</td>
<td>47%/52% 31% Approve 16% Somewhat approve 12% Somewhat disapprove 40% Unacceptable</td>
<td>46%/53% 24% Approve 22% Somewhat approve 15% Somewhat disapprove 38% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture/sport</strong></td>
<td>32%/66% 13% Approve 19% Somewhat approve 18% Somewhat disapprove 48% Unacceptable</td>
<td>23%/77% 13% Approve 10% Somewhat approve 16% Somewhat disapprove 61% Unacceptable</td>
<td>28%/70% 13% Approve 15% Somewhat approve 17% Somewhat disapprove 53% Unacceptable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Poll of 1,200 Palestinian respondents, conducted March 9-11, 2014; margin of error is ± 3 per cent.
Navigating the obstacles to peacebuilding

It is clear that certain types of projects (political dialogue, media coverage, development) enjoy wider legitimacy in Palestinian society than others. The relative lack of legitimacy in the culture and sport category has taken a toll in recent years. While “shared society” Arab-Jewish culture and sport programmes are thriving in Israel and steadily growing in Jerusalem, “cross border” sports and culture initiatives are struggling and operating “under the radar” in the West Bank (Stone, 2016).

In recent years, the organised Palestinian peacebuilding community has taken significant steps to shore up legitimacy. The PLO established an official Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society, under the leadership of Executive Committee member Mohammed Madani, to highlight the view of the Palestinian leadership that substantive engagement with Israeli society is a Palestinian national interest (Zananiri, 2016). In turn, the Palestinian NGOs withdrew from the former bi-national umbrella organisation for the field. As Mazen Faraj explains, “To gather with a lot of people, we need to do it in a separate way. The Palestinian (NGOs) they have to do it alone, also the Israelis, to go back to their communities, to understand the needs, the culture ... Without to going back to our community, it will never happen” (Faraj 2016).

5.4 Obstacle: broadening legitimacy in Israeli society

Asymmetry notwithstanding, echoes of the sentiments voiced by Palestinian peacebuilders have emerged among leaders in Israeli civil society. As longtime activist Yuval Rahamim explains: “In the Israeli peace movement, for many years we focused on our partnerships with the Palestinian organisations, but neglected to develop partnerships in Israeli society. The Peace Camp gave up on leadership ... we’re [now] so small and weak, we don’t even believe in our ability to lead” (Rahamim, 2016). A longtime activist in the Parents Circle-Families Forum, Rahamim is today spearheading a transformation of the Peace NGOs Forum, which has undergone significant changes in the wake of founding Director Ron Pundak’s death from cancer in 2014.

The Peace NGOs Forum worked for years as a joint umbrella for nearly 100 Palestinian and Israeli member organisations, until the 2015 withdrawal of Palestinian CSOs (Salem, 2016). Rahamim, in parallel, sought to lead a uni-national Israeli Forum with a vision of building coalitions and broadening legitimacy in Israeli society, while meeting regularly with the Palestinians through the Madani Committee.

Rahamim is cognisant of insufficient diversity within the Israeli “peace camp,” and critical of what he sees as a culture of protest for its own sake on the Left:

“Protest against the occupation speaks to a small and shrinking group of Israelis, who read Haaretz, secular, Tel Aviv ... This is not a strategy for change. I will not compromise my values, but I have to check my strategy.”
– Peacemaking activist Yuval Rahamim
“Protest against the occupation speaks to a small and shrinking group of Israelis, who read *Haaretz*, secular, Tel Aviv ... This is not a strategy for change. I will not compromise my values, but I have to check my strategy.”

The new Peace NGOs Forum’s flagship initiative has been a seminar series on engagement with diverse sectors of Israeli society, the first of which included a group of young, female advocates of peace from the Haredi community. “The Haredi activists were the attraction,” Rahamim recounts, “because no one had seen anything like that before. They said hard things – but something new started – and we hadn’t even known they existed” (Rahamim, 2016). One of those Haredi activists, Pnina Pfeuffer, is co-founder of a new initiative entitled *Haredim La-Shalom* (Haredim for Peace). As she explains, “If you’re trying to create a more pro-peace orientation in Israel, the parties are not what’s important – as a Haredi, I want to try and influence the Haredi sector, which is going to be 20 per cent of the population” (Pfeuffer, 2016).

**A moderate majority: Darkeinu**

Pfeuffer is simultaneously working with another veteran two-state advocacy CSO that has placed a new emphasis on broadening engagement with Israeli society. The 2015 elections led the OneVoice movement, which traversed the country over a decade building parallel Palestinian and Israeli grassroots networks advocating two states, to focus their efforts on consolidating a demographically diverse “moderate” majority rather than playing into the Left/Right binary. Director Polly Bronstein explains the rationale of the new initiative, called *Darkeinu* – “Our Way”:

> Israelis on the sensible, moderate right-wing have much more in common with the centre-left than they do with people on the radical right wing fringes, and the equation also works the other way around. There is an Israeli moderate majority [and] if its members can unite as a ‘civil society bloc’ they can profoundly affect the direction the country takes at this critical moment.

Darkeinu is continuing OneVoice’s traditional work of grassroots organising, but in diverse communities, especially on the front-line communities of the Gaza border. As Bronstein writes, “We are going to knock on doors, hundreds of thousands of them, across the whole country ... in the places where people may have traditionally voted for the Right, or been sceptical of the ‘peace camp’ but who now recognise that something is going wrong in Israel” (Bronstein, 2016).

27. In parallel, OneVoice supports a Palestinian grassroots organising initiative, Zimam.

Opinion researcher Dahlia Scheindlin of the Mitvim institute notes the fallout of what she calls an “international turn” on Israel’s radical Left in recent years. As she explains, “There was an evolving decision on the part of [some in] civil society to go international, to speak internationally, to write in English ... and advocate for international pressure in the belief that change would not come from within.” This occurred not in a vacuum, of course, but amid a rising chorus of sometimes hyperbolic international condemnation of Israel, embodied by the Durban
To mobilize the “silent majority” in Israel, peace must not be the trademark of a demographically identifiable “peace camp,” but a cross-cutting agenda championed by a coalition of “peace camps,” rooted in multiple constituencies.

Promising work is already happening along these lines, as evidenced by the socioeconomically diverse group of Arab and Jewish Israeli women leading the WWP “Marches of Hope” and the “Track Two” work involving rabbinic and political leaders in the Ultra-Orthodox and religious Zionist communities, who have engaged in sustained dialogue processes with secular left leaders and Palestinian citizens of Israel (Citizens Accord Forum, 2017). These efforts are still nascent, but they embody the types of engagement that can motivate a broader cross-section of Israelis to take responsibility for a democratic future.

To mobilize the “silent majority” in Israel, peace must not be the trademark of a demographically identifiable “peace camp,” but a cross-cutting agenda championed by a coalition of “peace camps,” rooted in multiple constituencies.

to convention, the BDS movement, the Goldstone Report, the 2011 Flotilla incident among other controversies. According to Scheindlin, this has eroded legitimacy among mainstream Israelis, who she describes as “allergic to moralising from the international community”. This has eroded peace advocates’ effectiveness in communicating with Israeli society, precisely when the integrity of their advocacy is under relentless attack: “There’s been a conscious reticence regarding the Israeli public. There hasn’t been khugei bayit [grassroots meetings], they’re not in dialogue conceptually with the Israeli public, the Israeli discourse. You have to acknowledge and take seriously security, and the Israeli critiques” (Scheindlin, 2016).

28. A June 2016 “Peace Index” poll illustrates this: While 43 per cent of Israeli Jewish respondents support Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in the context of a peace agreement, only 12 per cent prefer that “the international community forces Israel to withdraw” (Peace Index 2016).

29. Such sentiments are not, of course, unanimously shared in the (broadly defined) peacebuilding community. Hagai El-Ad, Director of the prominent Human Rights NGO B’tselem, made headlines recently with a highly publicised speech to the UN Human Rights Committee. The controversial Breaking the Silence IDF whistleblowers organisation has expanded its international work in recent years; and the Israeli government has now passed a law banning the organisation from Israeli schools. As Yuval Rahamim explains, dialogue is necessary within civil society: “One of the things that must happen within the peace camp is tolerance of other organisations – that we aren’t in possession of the sole truth ... We need and to sit together and find out how we can work together to create social change, strategically.”
Recommendations

The following recommendations should guide practitioners and funders who wish to support peacebuilding projects in order to build the conditions for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Recommendations for practitioners

1. Enhance the legitimacy and broaden the appeal of peacebuilding

There is growing recognition among veteran leaders in the Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding community, exemplified by the Peace NGOs Forum, that building broader societal legitimacy is an urgent strategic priority.

To do so will demand leveraging energy, resources and strategic thinking towards building “peace camps,” i.e. effective advocacy networks, among influential constituencies in Israeli society – particularly those politically and religiously conservative constituencies opposed to the “two-state” agenda.

As detailed in this report, effective models of peacebuilding exist – yet they have not been implemented in any significant scope in much of society. In designing campaigns, activists and organisations should have the primary strategic objective of reaching audiences, influencing discourse, raising awareness and building advocacy networks beyond the classic “peace camp” demographic. Where promising leaders models and/or networks exist, they must be amplified; where not, efforts must be directed toward identifying leaders, and building models and networks.

2. Address the security dimension

Within Israeli society, advocacy campaigns should effectively address the security risks of withdrawing from the West Bank. Peacebuilding advocates must answer the genuine and legitimate security concerns triggered by the Lebanon and Gaza precedents, in which territories became strongholds of Hezbollah and Hamas, leading to increased insecurity and multiple wars. To that effect, peace advocates should become familiar with recently published “two-state security” blueprints. The goal of ending Israeli military rule and establishing a Palestinian state should be explained within a framework of realistic policy steps appropriate to the current regional environment. Where possible, it will be crucial to establish or continue dialogue with religious-Zionist and pro-settlement constituencies, to mitigate the dynamics of demonisation and polarisation in both directions. In Israeli political forums, there must be continued emphasis that the Palestinian issue is the key to securing “regional” alliances with the Sunni states and the larger Muslim world.

3. Deliver practical benefits

In both societies, but particularly in Palestinian society, advocates should emphasise the growing body of peacebuilding work that is producing concrete practical benefits on issues of shared interest or common concern – economic development, environment, health, medicine, technology – including advocacy for practical policy changes. These modes of peacebuilding are a complement to (and do not come at the expense of) the crucial work of dialogue, education, and advocacy for human rights.
Recommendations

4. Use the research record, share successful strategies and best practices

Civil society and governmental forums relevant to the field, e.g. ALLMEP, the Peace NGOs Forum, the Palestinian Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society, SHATIL and others, should study the existing empirical research record and disseminate key findings regarding successful strategies, best practices and approaches to the inherent dilemmas of “intergroup encounters” and joint Arab-Jewish or Israeli-Palestinian initiatives.

Knowledge about the following should be applied across the peacebuilding community

- the profound long-term influence of intergroup encounters documented among significant numbers of adult alumni of youth programmes
- best practices for enhancing the impact of dialogue, education and encounter programmes, including:
  - Combination of meaningful uni-national and bi-national elements;
  - Opportunities for meaningful follow-up activity and sustained engagement, including through longer-term frameworks available in the wider field;
  - “Mixed” approaches combining interpersonal trust-building with focus on collective identities and conflict content;
  - Embedding dialogue within larger action/social change strategies; offering project or action options stemming from dialogue;
  - Acknowledgement of asymmetry, and designing programmes to meet needs of all participants and/or to address issues of shared interest or common concern.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS**

- **Enhance legitimacy**
  - Practitioners must build “peace camps,” particularly in politically and religiously conservative camps opposed to the two-state solution.

- **Security dimension**
  - Peacebuilding advocates must answer the genuine and legitimate security concerns triggered by the Lebanon and Gaza precedents.

- **Practical benefits**
  - Emphasise the practical benefits of peacebuilding work on economic development, environment, health, medicine and technology.

- **Share success**
  - Study the existing empirical research record and disseminate key findings regarding successful strategies, best practices and approaches.

**Recommendations for funders**

The most recent Middle East Quartet report, acknowledging the intractability of the present political context, recommended “increasing [Israeli-Palestinian] interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields ... that strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism.” The following recommendations are offered to funders seeking to operationalise the spirit of that injunction:
1. Support peacebuilding projects that (i) further aims that are already broadly supported (ii) meet clear needs, and (iii) enjoy some degree of official support by the Israeli and/or Palestinian governments.

These projects can include:

- “Education for partnership” projects within Israel. At present, demand significantly exceeds capacity. Examples include:
  1. establishing bilingual schools in all mixed regions where there is unmet demand for such frameworks
  2. expansion of existing bilingual facilities to allow greater enrollment where there is unmet demand
  3. study of potential adaptation of “shared education” frameworks for contact between students in single-identity schools as in Northern Ireland
  4. supporting effective Arabic language teaching for Israeli Jews and Hebrew for Arab citizens and Palestinian Jerusalemites across the school system – and with the potential inclusion of schools in the territories;

- Civil society and governmental initiatives aimed at expansion of tolerance, multi-culturalism, acceptance of “the other” and countering incitement in Israeli society;

- Projects focused on practical cooperation in environmental protection, water, health, and information technology, which can produce concrete benefits in areas of shared interest or common concern for both Israelis and Palestinians;

- Economic development projects in areas understood to be a shared interest – i.e. integration of Arab citizens into the Israeli workforce, particularly the technology sector, and expansion of Palestinian economic opportunities and trade;

2. Expand peacebuilding constituencies

Allocate significant resources to the diversification of civil society peacebuilding networks and programmes among potentially influential constituencies that are traditionally at the margins of the peacebuilding sectors in either society, including:

- Politically and religiously conservative sectors, including frameworks for both “internal” or uni-national and cross-conflict/bi-national engagement;

- Residents of Jerusalem, mixed cities in Israel and “seam” areas of Israeli-Palestinian interface;

- Women in positions of communal, local and national leadership;

- Young adults (20-35) through providing educational and training opportunities in cross-conflict settings, that enhance professional qualifications and career prospects and integrate dialogical or interactive components;

3. Support effective “umbrella” peacebuilding forums

“Umbrella” forums enhance the capacity and impact of peacebuilding by:

- fostering field-wide dialogue

- allowing for collective responses to changing context
Recommendations

- encouraging recognition of diverse approaches as complementary rather than competitive
- expanding advocacy networks on issues of common concern
- disseminating best practices
- engaging with shared dilemmas
- representing the interests of the peacebuilding community to local government and international actors.

4. Support the establishment of an international fund to “scale up” Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding

Following the successful precedent of the International Fund for Ireland, this new Fund would:

- provide a consistent, sustainable and transparent funding source equipped to bring to scale successful models and best practices, and achieve broader impact and influence in Israeli and Palestinian societies.

- improve conditions for peacebuilding over the medium and long-term through economic development, societal capacity-building and civil society peacebuilding.

The need for such a fund can be raised in all major international frameworks related to the peace process, i.e. the Middle East Quartet, the French Initiative, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) and others.

Funds designated by developed nations should count towards their development targets as part of the Sustainable Development Goals.

The Fund should act with a coordinating function alongside other multilateral entities, such as the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and the Office of the Quartet Representative to provide a complementary civil society strategy to go alongside large-scale humanitarian and economic development projects.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUNDERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choose projects carefully</th>
<th>Expand peacebuilding constituencies</th>
<th>Support &quot;umbrella&quot; peacebuilding</th>
<th>Support an International fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support peacebuilding projects that further broadly supported aims, meet clear needs, and enjoy some degree of governmental support.</td>
<td>Diversify peacebuilding networks and programmes among constituencies that are traditionally at the margins of the peacebuilding sector.</td>
<td>Aim to foster a field-wide dialogue and encourage diverse approaches as complementary rather than competitive.</td>
<td>Support the establishment of an international fund to “scale up” Israeli-Palestinian civil society peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex: Methodology

Data was gathered for the report primarily between June and December 2016, through interviews and conversations with scholars, practitioners and participants in civil society initiatives, document review, and participation in peacebuilding events and forums. This included six weeks of field work in Israel and East Jerusalem/West Bank in June-July and October-November, as well as numerous interviews conducted via Skype and informal correspondence. Chart I details the gender and national identities of 74 informants consulted through semi-structured interviews (40) or direct correspondence and conversation, recorded in field notes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct consultation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian citizens of Israel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The author participated in 15 expert discussion forums on peacebuilding, civil society, human rights, social movements and Track One negotiations in the Israeli/Palestinian context, including academic conference sessions and roundtable discussions convened by research centres connected to the field, as well as relevant remarks from at least 60 additional informants. The author additionally conducted participant observation of public peacebuilding actions including protest marches, two Knesset sessions sponsored by peacebuilding initiatives and two Israeli-Palestinian youth programmes in session.

For document review, the author relied on dozens of sources, including previous meta-studies of the field noted above, relevant scholarship, programme evaluations, public opinion indexes, annual reports published online by CSOs, financial reports submitted by CSOs to US (Form 990) and Israeli authorities (Registrar of Non-Profit Organisations/rasham ha-amutot) and available online through the Guidestar portal. The author additionally drew upon data gathered through four previous evaluative research assignments in the region: Lazarus, Kadayifci-Orellana, Kahanoff, & Halloun, 2014; Lazarus, 2015; Dammers, Atamneh, Lazarus, & Said, 2015; Lazarus, 2016.

Caveats and Limitations

There is an inadvertent asymmetry in terms of sources – my interviewees are more often Israeli Jews (50 per cent) than Palestinians (35 per cent), which reflects a disparity in terms of organisational leadership in the field. It should be emphasised, nonetheless, that substantial input was incorporated from all perspectives.

A significant and regrettable lacuna is the absence of direct information – whether through site visits or primary sources – from the Gaza Strip. The report therefore cannot be assumed to reflect contemporary living or political conditions in Gaza or the perspectives of Gaza’s Palestinian population – an omission that must be addressed in future research.


Hecht, R. (2016, June 21). President Rivlin is Israel's Only Opposition to Extremism. *Haaretz*.


Works cited


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