BICOM

It took seven days for Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence, designed to stop constant rocket-firing from Gaza into Israel, to arrive at a ceasefire. As the ceasefire was jointly announced in Cairo by the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State, Israelis were betting that Hamas, the governing body in Gaza, was sufficiently deterred to maintain it.

There is strong sense of déjà vu. Nearly four years ago Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in Gaza when the firing of rockets became unbearable. The then-established ceasefire has eroded badly over the last two years as Jihadi groups mushrooming in Gaza provoked Israel with terrorist attacks. As Israel responded, violence escalated into daily rocket fire on its territory. From the beginning of 2012 until the launching of Israel’s operation a week ago, more than 1000 rockets were fired from Gaza. Once again, Israel felt compelled to act, as hundreds of thousands of its citizens were driven daily into shelters.

Hamas clearly miscalculated Israel’s response. Assuming (correctly) that Israel is not interested in major escalation and emboldened by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in neighbouring Egypt, Hamas played a dangerous brinkmanship role – allowing Jihadists to provoke Israel and later joining them in a bid to maintain its credentials as an anti-Israel resistance group. Some claim that Hamas was lately suggesting a practical ceasefire with Israel but serious evidence points otherwise.

The logic governing Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence is similar to that which governed Operation Cast Lead. It was neither to eradicate Hamas nor topple it but rather, as defined by Israeli leaders, to enhance deterrence and curtail the ability of armed groups in Gaza to threaten Israel and disrupt the normal daily life of its citizens. The idea was to degrade the ability and the motivation of Hamas to attack Israel and to pressure it to commit to a sustainable ceasefire and enforce it on all armed groups in Gaza.

But, there is a huge difference in the circumstances in which Israel operates. First the Arab Spring has transformed the regional landscape, especially in Egypt. In 2008, the regime of Hosni Mubarak quietly encouraged Israel to destroy Hamas; now Egyptian president Mohamad Morsi provides a safety net to the Islamist government in Gaza.

Second, both sides have drawn lessons from 2008 and developed their capabilities accordingly. Hamas and other extreme militant groups in Gaza more than doubled their arsenal of rockets, and acquired longer-range rockets capable of hitting Tel Aviv, Israel’s biggest city. Israel developed Iron Dome, an effective anti-rocket interception system. During Operation Pillar of Defence, Iron Dome intercepted most rockets targeting Israeli civilian population centres – achieving a knock-down success rate of nearly 85 per cent. This unprecedented achievement helped avert an Israeli ground operation in Gaza.

To achieve its goals in the shortest possible time, Israel set a high bar for its opening strike, targeting the head of Hamas’s military wing, Ahmad Ja’bari, and the longer-range Iranian manufactured Fajr rockets, which were almost entirely destroyed. Using precision-guided munitions its air strikes focused on military capabilities and infrastructure (launchers, launching pits, command and control capabilities, etc). The government also allowed the Israel Defence Forces to call up 75,000 reservists in preparation for a ground operation in Gaza. This was publicly amplified in order to signal to Hamas that the worst is still to come if it continues firing.

For Israel the question was whether it could achieve its goals without being dragged into a long, messy and costly ground operation. Conducting an asymmetric war with a body which is, all at once, a strong political party, a paramilitary group and a terrorist organisation nesting in civilian populated areas and targeting civilians – is indeed a serious challenge. Israel’s leadership was in no hurry to start a ground offensive, realising its negative potential in terms of human lives and political cost, undermining its fragile relations with Egypt.

On the other hand, Israel did not launch Operation Pillar of Defence only to find itself back at square one after a short period of time. Had it not been convinced of Hamas’s willingness to sign up to a solid ceasefire it may well have employed ground troops in Gaza in order to achieve this goal. Having dealt a serious blow to Hamas it opted out.

However, reaching a long-lasting ceasefire is still a challenging task. A stable ceasefire will not be secured unless Hamas enforces it on all factions in Gaza, including Jihadist groups. Hamas has been reluctant to do so for fear of tainting its Jihadi credentials, but under the Israeli military pressure and assertive Egyptian mediation backed by the US, it will have to make a choice between ideology and governmental responsibilities.

The ceasefire is made of mutual commitment to withhold fire. To sustain it beyond this very basic and shaky layer, the parties agreed to discuss, through Egypt, an additional layer of understanding of issues of importance to each. Among them, Israel wants to stop the smuggling of weapons through Sinai to Gaza, while Hamas wants a further opening of Gaza to movements of goods. Hamas seeks to claim victory for “lifting the siege” on Gaza, even though there is extensive traffic to and from Egypt through the border and hundreds of underground smuggling tunnels (a major source of income for Hamas), and about 200 truckloads of humanitarian goods enter daily from Israel to Gaza. Israel is concerned that opening Gaza to the free flow of goods will be used to further smuggle weapons.

The crisis underscored, once again, how best placed Egypt is to broker between Israel and Hamas. Much as the Islamist government in Cairo distances itself from Israel, it is careful to maintain the peace agreement with it and loath to see an escalation along its borders. Its close relationship with Hamas affords it a unique opportunity to influence the organisation.

Only time will tell. But let’s look reality in the eye; the newly reached ceasefire will probably be another lull in a long-lasting conflict. While there is no viable military solution to this conflict, a political solution seems elusive too since Hamas bans free elections, rejects recognition of Israel and shows no signs of moderation. The prospects are diminishing for peace between Hamas and its West Bank counterpart, the Palestinian Authority, and for peace with Israel.

This article first appeared in the the Australian Financial Review.