BICOM

Executive summary

• Two factors explain Cairo’s current thinking on Hamas and Gaza: one is Egypt’s interest in reducing the immediate pressure on Gaza, by establishing a workable ceasefire which will halt the rocket attacks on Israeli towns and cities and military strikes on Gaza in response.  The other, perhaps more significant, factor is the recognition that Hamas represents a threat to Egyptian political and security interests, which is especially acute in light of an expected leadership struggle in the next few years.
• Overlapping and contingent interests of the key actors in the Gaza-Egypt-Israel triangle have meant that Cairo continues to play a greater role in Gaza affairs than at any time since 1967. Whilst Egypt is equally as keen as Israel not to be dragged into the Gaza quagmire, pressure has mounted on President Mubarak to recalibrate Cairo’s policy towards the Strip.^[i]  His handling of the border breach demonstrates how in touch he is with the Arab street.
• For Israel, if the Gaza lull does not hold and the deployment of ground troops becomes the only solution to rocket attacks, the implications for Egypt would be integral to any exit strategy.
• The repercussions of an unstable Egypt – one bereft of Mubarak or certainly of his political outlook – would have a transformational impact on the balance of regional interests, enabling Iran to challenge the less powerful conservative Arab regimes for regional hegemony.

Introduction

The effects of Hamas’s breach of the Gaza-Egypt border in January 2008 are still being felt. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch, Egypt is now “more willing than ever before to find a joint solution to their problem [in Rafah] with Israel.”[i]  Although President Hosni Mubarak quickly restored relative calm following the crisis, Cairo saw that Hamas holds potential to destabilise relations between the two states.[ii] In the weeks since the breach, there has been a noticeable intensification of contacts between Israeli and Egyptian security officials. Amos Gilead, Head of the Political-Security Bureau of the Israeli Defence Ministry, and Omar Suleiman, Head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, have held several meetings in Cairo.[iii] The Egyptian intelligence chief may visit Israel soon.

This briefing focuses on the two factors which explain Cairo’s current thinking.  One is Egypt’s interest in reducing the immediate pressure on Gaza by establishing a workable ceasefire which will halt the rocket attacks on Israeli towns and cities and military strikes on Gaza in response. The other, perhaps more significant, factor is the recognition that Hamas represents a threat to Egyptian political and security interests, which is especially acute in light of an expected leadership struggle in the next few years.

Whilst President Mubarak is seeking to preserve Cairo’s political stability, Israeli interests focus on the need to provide security to its own citizens.  Yet uncertainty surrounding Egypt’s domestic political trajectory also troubles Israeli policymakers because Egypt, home to approximately one third of the Arab world’s population[iv], is a crucial regional counterweight to destabilising forces across the Middle East, most notably Iran.  As such, whatever happens in Egypt will have consequences for the entire region.

Egyptian engagement in Gaza following the border breach

The massive movement of up to three quarters of a million people after Hamas destroyed sections of the Sinai border on 22-23 January caught both Israel and Egypt by surprise.[v]  The “tactical ingenuity” it demonstrated posed a serious problem for Egypt, balancing humanitarian and security considerations.[vi] Analysts were initially sceptical about how quickly and effectively Cairo would restore order.[vii]  By ordering his troops not to open fire and enabling Palestinians to stock up on food and fuel (expenditure at local markets totalled around $130 million, until supplies dried up)[viii], Mubarak was perceived across the Arab world as providing oxygen to a Gaza population suffocating under siege.  Under watchful, but firm, Egyptian guidance, the border was resealed on 3 February with Hamas’s consent.[ix]

Overlapping and contingent interests of the key actors in the Gaza-Egypt-Israel triangle have mean that Cairo continues to play a greater role in Gaza affairs than at any time since 1967.  First, Hamas has preconditioned any hudna (ceasefire) with Israel on reopening the Rafah commercial crossing with Egypt.  Hamas requires this Egyptian concession in order to open an alternative supply route, and it appears likely that the Egyptians will agree.  The PA would prefer to revert to the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access under which European monitors were stationed at Rafah, but with Hamas keen to display its unchallenged control of Gaza, this is unlikely.[x] Last week’s deal by which Egypt would effectively become the sole electricity provider to Gaza will ensure long-term Egyptian engagement.[xi]

Israel also makes demands on Egypt, notably to prevent the flow of arms across – and often under – the Philadelphi route border into Gaza, to control Hamas attacks on Israel.[xii]  Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s criticism in December 2007 that Egypt was doing a “terrible”[xiii] job of policing the border was reassessed by defence officials last week who said that Egypt had noticeably stepped up efforts to curb weapons smuggling.[xiv]  For Israel, if the relative lull does not hold and the deployment of ground troops becomes the only solution to rocket attacks, the implications for Egypt would be integral to any exit strategy. The issue will continue to challenge both Egypt and Israel in the coming months.

The internal Egyptian context and regional considerations

Whilst the veteran Mubarak remains in control of affairs, Israeli policymakers are conscious of a probable leadership transition.  The president has been in office since succeeding Anwar al-Sadat 27 years ago; he celebrates his 80^th birthday in six weeks.  It is unclear whether power will pass to his son Gamal (who controls the ruling National Democratic Party bloc)[xv]; a leading figure from the military-political establishment (of which General Omar Suleiman is thought to be among several serious contenders); or another candidate.  Secular socialist and Coptic Christian oppositionists are overshadowed by the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and largest Islamist movement in the world, and a growing force in Egypt.[xvi]

Although constitutional amendments curtail their formal political participation, the Brotherhood won 88 out of 454 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections as ‘independent’ candidates.[xvii]  Their performance in forthcoming local council elections on 8 April will be closely scrutinised, though arrests of hundreds of members since February is likely to inhibit their success.[xviii]  Hamas, an offshoot of the original Egyptian movement, represents the first instance anywhere of their obtaining power – and they did so in Egypt’s backyard.  As such, Cairo has domestic concerns to contend with, including extremists emboldened by the defiance of their Palestinian affiliates and a precarious security situation in Sinai.  The threat intensified following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005 and was further aggravated by the border breach.^[xix] 

The repercussions of an unstable Egypt – one bereft of Mubarak or certainly of his political outlook – would be felt far beyond Israel.  In the West Bank, for instance, Abbas would be unlikely to survive the weakness bestowed upon him by an alternative Egyptian leadership which signalled rapprochement with, rather than containment of, Hamas.  More broadly, Iran would exploit any trace of instability.  Both King Abdullah II of Jordan and President Mubarak have expressed concern about Iran’s ‘Shi’ite arc’[xx], which spreads a doctrine of transnational jihad to Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq and the Gulf states.  It also extends to Sunni militias with shared ideologies, including Hamas and other Palestinian terror groups.[xxi]  Syria would likely bandwagon with Iran and abandon any posturing towards peace with Israel.  Ultimately, there would be a transformational impact on the balance of regional interests, enabling Iran to challenge the less powerful conservative Arab regimes for regional hegemony.

Conclusion

The frostiness which has characterised Israel-Egypt relations throughout 30 years of formal peace has been largely due to Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territories since 1967.  Therefore, it is ironic that the outcome of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza should be the test for the strength of Israel-Egypt relations today.  Whilst Egypt is equally as keen as Israel not to be dragged into the Gaza quagmire, pressure has mounted on President Mubarak to recalibrate Cairo’s policy towards the Strip.^[xxii]  His handling of the border breach demonstrates how in touch he is with the Arab street.

Mubarak plays the role of interlocutor not just because he is ideologically disposed to peace but also because his active engagement underpins Egyptian national interests.  Yet the ageing Egyptian premier is juggling cooperation with Israel against growing domestic threats.  In turn, Mubarak comprises a key component in Israel’s strategic thinking.  The Israeli-Egyptian relationship could be further reinforced by the overriding strategic interest both countries share in containing Hamas.  Ultimately, it hinges on the stability of the world’s largest Arab republic, whose political future, unfortunately for Israel, cannot be guaranteed.

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[i] ‘Egypt mediating intensive talks on long-term deal for Gaza ceasefire’, Amos Harel, Barak Ravid and Yoav Stern, Haaretz, 19 March 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=965782

[ii] ‘Egyptians Reseal Border, Cutting Access From Gaza’, Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post, 4 February 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/03/AR2008020300450.html

[iii] ‘Mubarak to Israel: ‘Occupation’ can’t last forever’, Roee Nahmias, YNet News, 18 March 2008. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3520871,00.html

[iv] Egypt’s population in 2000 was 67.9 million, which comprised 24 percent of the Arab world’s population.  As the most populous Arab country, the figure is closer to one third today.  For further reading, see ‘Egypt’s Demographic Challenges and Economic Responses’, Paul Rivlin, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2003. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue4/jv7n4a2.html; Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, Fred Halliday, 2003 (I.B. Tauris: London); Arab Political Demography, Onn Winckler, 2005 (Sussex Academic Press: Brighton).

[v] ‘Egypt Working to Contain Gaza’, Ehud Yaari, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch # 1337, 1 February 2008.

[vi] ‘The Road Out of Gaza’, Nathan J. Brown, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Outlook No. 39, February 2008.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] ‘With Gaza-Egypt border re-sealed, Egyptians to miss out on Palestinian falafel’, Associated Press, International Herald Tribune, 4 February 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/04/africa/ME-GEN-Palestinians-Egypt-Falafel-Woes.php

[x] ‘No Entry’, Joshua Mitnick, The Jerusalem Report, 17 March 2008.

[xi] ‘Egypt to take over supplying Gaza power in draft deal’, Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz, 20 March 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=966226

[xii] ‘International: The bloody conundrum of Gaza; Israel and the Palestinians’, The Economist, 8 March 2008.

[xiii] ‘Israel says Egypt doing “terrible” job on Gaza border’, Ari Rabinovitch and Matthew Jones, Reuters, 24 December 2007. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L247895423.htm; ‘Mideast: Israel threatens to make Egypt responsible for Gaza’, Peter Hirschberg, Global Information Network, 31 January 2008.

[xiv] ‘Israel ‘impressed’ by Egypt’s Gaza efforts’, Yaakov Katz, The Jerusalem Post, 12 March 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1205261308544; ‘Report: Explosives, mines found near Egypt-Gaza border’, AFP, YNet News, 18 March 2008. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3520665,00.html

[xxii] ‘Israel/Egypt/Gaza Strip politics: The shifting balance of power’, Economist Intelligence Unit, 1 February 2008 ; ‘No Entry’, Joshua Mitnick, The Jerusalem Report, 17 March 2008.