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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: How will the next US president tackle Iran?

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Introduction

Last week’s American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in Washington coincided with the 2008 presidential race finally being reduced to two candidates.[i] It became the first real opportunity for Senators John McCain and Barack Obama to outline their thinking on Iran in the context of the campaign; an issue that is liable to occupy the next Oval Office incumbent’s time more than any other in the realm of foreign policy.[ii]

The key message to emerge was that if Iran persists with its nuclear ambitions in defiance of the international community, either a McCain or Barack commander-in-chief would be willing to force it to yield militarily. As risky and undesirable as the military option would be, it is considered preferable to a nuclear Iran. As a major strategic issue for Israel and the Middle East, the importance of this development cannot be underestimated.

The candidates’ positions on the Iran issue have highlighted the different foreign policy approaches that might be pursued, and leadership styles adopted, by the next US president. But the McCain and Obama speeches at AIPAC show that beneath the presidential campaign battle there is a bipartisan policy consensus, which is likely to define much of the next US administration’s Iran policy. That Japan has put Iran’s nuclear programme at the heart of the forthcoming G8 summit meeting set to take place 7-9 July, and that President Bush and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are reinforcing the international community’s stance in Berlin at present, are positive signs.[iii]

Primarily European-led efforts to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear programme with economic incentives and offers of international integration have so far failed. Indeed, economic sanctions have not been sufficiently wide-reaching to pressure Iran to comply with the UN’s demands. The question as to whether President Bush will use military force during the twilight phase of his presidency remains open; as one commentator put it, “It’s doubtful whether Bush himself knows the answer to that question.”[iv] This brief examines the Iran content of the AIPAC speeches in the context of the presidential campaign, which offers a guide to the possible trajectory of US foreign policy in a McCain or Obama White House.[v]

Clarity at both ends: the nuclear threat and the military option

It was clear from both candidates’ AIPAC speeches that there is mutual understanding of the severity of the Iranian threat – not only to Israel but to the wider Middle East.[vi] Both cited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s notorious desire to “wipe Israel off the map.”[vii] Moreover, they each painted the picture of his regime’s unparalleled belligerence (pursuit of nuclear weapons, sponsoring terrorism) and destabilising potential (threatening to spark a nuclear arms race). Recognition of the Iranian threat, however, extends beyond the American political establishment; as former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer notes, “Iran’s nuclear programme… threatens irreversibly the region’s strategic balance.”

This shared appreciation of the Iranian threat translates into a broad agreement that under no circumstances can Iran be allowed to produce a sufficient amount of fissile material to produce a nuclear bomb. (This is the critical point after which it would be all but impossible to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power).[viii] It is on this basis that John McCain stated last week, “Tehran’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons poses an unacceptable risk, a danger we cannot allow” and that Barack Obama commented, “I will do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon… let there be no doubt: I will always keep the threat of military action on the table to defend our security and our ally Israel. Sometimes there are no alternatives to confrontation.” [ix] Both expressed clearly, that military force will be used if that is what it takes to prevent a nuclear Iran from emerging.

The AIPAC speeches also shed light on other possible areas of policy overlap. Both candidates would be eager for the US to play a more prominent role in mobilising the international community. The vigorous pursuit of financial sanctions; cutting off loan guarantees; support for public and private sector divestment; severe restrictions on fuel exports: are all actions which both candidates advocate.[x] In terms of appropriate policy mechanisms, both referred to the UN Security Council, as well as to working outside the UN framework, in order to isolate the Iranian regime.[xi]

Interestingly, Bill Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard and described as the “New York Times’s op-ed page neocon,” noted that in policy terms “Obama and McCain don’t actually differ, at least on paper, even on Iran, where they’re arguing about whether they would talk to Ahmadinejad or not – and I think that’s an important dispute.”[xii] Kristol continued, “Still, at the end of the day, Obama doesn’t say he would rule out the use of force. McCain certainly is committed… to trying to increase economic pressure on Iran, which Obama has also talked about.” As Seth Colter Walls put it, “it was interesting to hear someone of Kristol’s stature on the right make the case that the Illinois Democrat’s differences from McCain are ones of degree and not kind.”[xiii]

Reading between the lines of the ‘diplomacy’ storm

If the nature of the Iranian threat and the last resort for tackling it are the areas of most clear consensus between the two presidential candidates, their difference in approach is most acutely seen in the debate about “whether to talk to Iran.”[xiv]

Barack Obama’s statements about engaging America’s adversaries have been exploited by his opponents both by Democrats (during the primaries) and by Republicans. They argue that it points to his “naivety” and “inexperience” in foreign affairs. At AIPAC, McCain charged that Obama’s desire to “sit down unconditionally with the Iranian President or Supreme Leader in the hope that we can talk sense into them” would not only be futile but a distraction from the need to impose heavier sanctions.[xv] Obama clarified his position, reacting, “[c]ontrary to the claims of some, I have no interest in sitting down with men like Ahmadinejad just for the sake of talking.” He set out a model of “tough and principled diplomacy” as a crucial element of American power that, in his view, cannot be forfeited.[xvi]

The difference in approach is not merely rhetorical. The political storm about the merits of diplomatic engagement possibly touches upon a deeper difference between the candidates, which could set the tone for how the next US President might conduct foreign relations.

First, it raises the matter of “whether or not lowering the bar for diplomatic engagement might prove a tactical benefit for U.S. foreign policy”.[xvii]  Obama pointed out that America has “tried limited, piecemeal talks while we outsource the sustained work to our European allies. It is time for the United States to lead.”[xviii]  However, it remains unclear whether Obama’s criticism was directed primarily at the Bush administration or at European-led efforts to rein in Iran. Instead, Obama advocated discussions “with the appropriate Iranian leader at a time and place of my choosing – if, and only if – it can advance the interests of the US.” Nonetheless, this poses a number of crucial practical questions about what, substantively, this would entail.  How long would diplomatic talks last? What format would they take? Are his overtures intended to convey a subtle message to Ahmadinejad’s rivals in Tehran, such as Ali Larijani, the former chief nuclear negotiator?  (Larijani is viewed by the West as a moderating influence, and he was recently elected speaker of the Parliament).[xix] Furthermore, who would Obama appoint to manage these diplomatic ties? Will he, as is widely expected, seek to appoint a senior military figure to a key post in his administration?[xx]

Second, the distinction has implications for how Obama and McCain might differ in terms of seeking international support. As Obama stated, “[m]y presidency will strengthen our hand as we restore our standing. Our willingness to pursue diplomacy will make it easier to mobilize others to join our cause. If Iran fails to change course… it will be clear – to the people of Iran and to the world – that the Iranian regime is the author of its own isolation.” Elsewhere, he stated, “[i]f we must use military force, we are more likely to succeed, and will have far greater support at home and abroad, if we have exhausted our diplomatic efforts.”

A third manifestation is observable in the recent Kyl-Lieberman Amendment, which called, among other things, for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to be proscribed as a terror organization.  McCain highlighted his opponent’s opposition to the bill. Though Obama made a point at AIPAC of clarifying that the IRGC had “rightly been labelled a terrorist organization,” his reluctance to add his name to the legislation reinforces the notion that he prefers “a less deliberately bellicose approach to international relations.”[xxi] Amid the ultra-partisanship of the campaign, both sides will do their utmost to fully exploit any perceived weaknesses until the 4 November presidential elections have passed.

The race for the White House

Whilst foreign policy tends not to be a major determinant of electoral outcomes, for the next five months all political antennae are focused on any domestic capital that can be gained from the nuanced variations in each side’s positions. Nevertheless, several factors conceivably raise the prominence of foreign policy during the electoral fight, including the ongoing US military presence in Iraq (over which there is deep-seated disagreement) and Obama’s liberal credentials versus McCain’s ‘war hero’ image.

A recent poll showed that over 80% of Americans think their nation is ‘headed on the wrong track.’ It is therefore of little surprise that Obama’s campaign is built on the slogan, “Change We Can Believe In.”[xxii] This sentiment was reflected in his AIPAC speech, which he ended by talking about the need to change the direction of US foreign policy in a way that will “restore American power and influence.” Obama is keen to offer a fresh, young, energetic alternative to a continuation of the Bush administration, which is how his campaign is portraying John McCain to the American public. An Obama spokesperson, Hari Sevugan, commented, “John McCain stubbornly insists on continuing a dangerous and failed foreign policy that has clearly made the United States and Israel less secure.”[xxiii] Democrats point to how, on Bush’s watch, Iran has expanded its nuclear capacity “from zero centrifuges to more than 3000 centrifuges,” how Iran’s regional influence has grown and intensified sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah. Most important, they argue, is McCain’s support for the Iraq war, which “has done more to dramatically strengthen and embolden Iran than anything in a generation.”[xxiv]

A key tactic of the McCain camp will likely be to try and reduce Barack Obama’s appeal with many swing voters by defining him as an elitist Chicago liberal who is out of touch with ordinary Americans. Republicans are keen to emphasise an independent assessment of legislators which shows that Obama has “accumulated the most liberal voting record in the Senate.”[xxv] Newt Gingrich, the well-known Republican and former Speaker of the House, has described Obama as the “most leftwing candidate to run since George McGovern.”[xxvi] (McGovern opposed the Vietnam war and lost 49 states out of 50 to Richard Nixon in 1972). In foreign policy terms, Obama presented his political rivals with a golden opportunity to exploit his left-leaning credentials when he declared that he would consider talks with America’s enemies. Even President Bush took a partisan political swipe whilst on a foreign trip – in Israel – last month, where he said, “[w]e have an obligation to call this what it is – the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.”[xxvii] Obama is aware that he needs to counterbalance this potentially harmful caricature, and his unambiguous, tough statements at AIPAC last week were a part of his plan for doing so.

Ongoing developments

In policy terms, the AIPAC conference was most significant for the way that the presidential candidates cleared up ambiguity between them at a crucial time in the ongoing international effort to thwart Iran. IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei has submitted a new report on Iran to IAEA Board Governors and UN Security Council members, which is being discussed in meetings in Vienna this week.

Although the nuclear watchdog documents an unprecedented level of concern about Iran’s unrelenting progress towards uranium enrichment, the international community is still far from being well coordinated or united in confronting Iran.  Russia is probably the biggest stumbling block. Prime Minister Putin responded to the IAEA report by stating, “I don’t think the Iranians are looking to make a nuclear bomb. We have no reason to believe this.” However, now that the IAEA has once again adopted a tougher stance, analysts suspect that Iran will attempt to reengage EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, in the context of the revised incentives package to halt nuclear enrichment. Solana is due to visit Teheran next weekend, and the UN Security Council is purportedly awaiting the outcome of his visit before weighing its next move.[xxviii]

Conclusion

“Fault for the failure to contain Iran lies first with the feckless international community,” wrote New York Times columnist David Brooks last week.[xxix] This view strikes a chord in the American political establis
ment, where there is fundamental agreement about the nature of the threat, about the need for effective economic sanctions, about the need for the US to take a leading role in efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear programme, and about keeping the military option on the table. The political feud about the correct diplomatic approach will likely be a running theme in the campaign, yet it ought not obfuscate the way in which the policy gap was narrowed at the AIPAC forum, in which both McCain and Obama ostensibly made the same points. Ultimately, when one of these two men are in the Oval Office, the campaign debate about ‘whether to talk’ will be history; the real issue will be about how best to exert pressure and obtain leverage in the face of an Iran creeping ever closer to the nuclear status it seeks.[xxx] The bottom line is that neither the incumbent president nor either of the two candidates destined to replace him will tolerate a nuclear armed Iran, and they are committed to doing whatever it takes to prevent Iran’s ambitions from being realised.


[i] The AIPAC policy conference took place from 2-4 June.  Hillary Rodham Clinton officially suspended her candidacy on Saturday 7 June, though Obama clinched the Democratic nomination on Tuesday 3 June, whilst the AIPAC conference was underway.

[ii] ‘The Reality Situation’, David Brooks, The New York Times, 30 May 2008.

[iii] ‘Japan puts denuclearization at center of G8 summit’, Dana Zimmerman, Ynetnews, 6 June 2008; ‘Iran tops Bush-Merkel agenda: ‘all options on the table’ – Summary’, The Earth Times, 11 June 2008.

[iv] Rather than futilely trying to anticipate what President Bush may or may not do between now and next January, the paper proceeds on the basis of Israel’s ‘worst case scenario’: that the Iranian nuclear threat will remain on the next US president’s agenda in 2009.  The point is worth reinforcing, however, that a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has not been ruled out before the end of the Bush presidency.  Some senior Washington officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney and Defence Secretary Robert Gates, as well as outside advisers such as former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, and prominent journalists like Thomas L. Friedman, share the view that today’s Iran, substantially more confident than it was five years ago, needs to be dealt a military blow before diplomatic progress of any kind can be made.  For further reading, see ‘It’s all about leverage’, Thomas L. Friedman, International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2008; ‘Middle East, the next seven months’, Shmuel Rosner, Rosner’s Blog, Haaretz, 31 May 2008; ‘Will he or won’t he attack? It’s doubtful Bush knows’, Shmuel Rosner, Rosner’s Blog, Haaretz, 22 May 2008.

[v] Complete transcripts of both AIPAC speeches under review can be read here: www.freerepublic.com.  Alternatively, visit www.aipac.org

[vi] McCain noted, “[F]oremost in all our minds is the threat posed by the regime in Tehran…It [Iran] acts in ways directly detrimental to the security of Israel and the United States … [and] threatens to destabilize the entire Middle East from Basra to Beirut.”  With greater brevity, Obama stated, “There is no greater threat to Israel – or to the peace and stability of the region – than Iran.”

[vii] Ahmadinejad made the remarks at the UN food crisis summit in Rome.  Israeli President Shimon Peres and others strongly criticised his having been invited.  In the AIPAC speeches, Obama said, “President [Ahmadinejad] denies the Holocaust and threatens to wipe Israel off the map.”  McCain said, “The Iranian President has called for Israel to be wiped off the map and suggested that Israel’s Jewish population should return to Europe.  He calls Israel a stinking corpse…”

[viii] ‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done?’, Ephraim Kam, INSS, Memorandum 88, February 2007, www.inss.org.il.

[ix] ‘Republican candidates: US may strike Iran’, Yitzhak Benhorin, YNet News, 5 April 2008.

[x] McCain spoke of the need to “create the weary world pressure that will peacefully but decisively change the path that they [Iran] are on.” Obama stated, “[w]e will pursue diplomacy with no illusions about the Iranian regime. Instead we will present a clear choice. If you abandon your dangerous nuclear program, support for terror, and threats to Israel, there will be meaningful incentives – including the lifting of sanctions, and political and economic integration with the international community. If you refuse, we will ratchet up the pressure.”

[xi] McCain referred to imposing “multi-lateral sanctions…outside the UN framework” and Obama spoke of “work[ing] with Europe, Japan and the Gulf states to find every avenue outside the UN to isolate the Iranian regime.”

[xii] ‘Bill Kristol At AIPAC: Obama And McCain “Don’t Actually Differ” On Iran’, Seth Colter Walls, The Huffington Post, 7 June 2008.

[xiii] ‘Bill Kristol At AIPAC: Obama And McCain “Don’t Actually Differ” On Iran’, Seth Colter Walls, The Huffington Post, 7 June 2008.

[xiv] ‘The Reality Situation’, David Brooks, The New York Times, 30 May 2008.

[xv] McCain pointed to failed attempts to cajole Iran, first by the Clinton administration, second by European governments over the last few years, as indicative of “a serious misreading of history” on Obama’s part.  In McCain’s view, US presidential talks would proffer legitimacy to Ahmadinejad and undermine moderates within the Iranian regime.

[xvi] In presenting his case, Obama stated, “[w]e cannot unconditionally rule out an approach that could prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon…diplomacy backed by real leverage… [is] a fundamental tool of statecraft.”  He pointed to former presidents Truman, Kennedy and Reagan as examples, adding that “it is time to once again make American diplomacy a tool to succeed, not just a means of containing failure.”

[xvii] ‘Bill Kristol At AIPAC: Obama And McCain “Don’t Actually Differ” On Iran’, Seth Colter Walls, The Huffington Post, 7 June 2008.

[xviii] Elsewhere, Obama stated clearly his view that “we must be clear about the failure of today’s policy.  We knew, in 2002, that Iran supported terrorism.  We knew Iran had an illicit nuclear program. We knew Iran posed a grave threat to Israel. But instead of pursuing a strategy to address this threat, we ignored it and instead invaded and occupied Iraq.”

[xix] ‘Rival to president wins Iran parliamentary post’, Nazila Fathi and Graham Bowley, International Herald Tribune, 29 May 2008.

[xx] ‘A crash course for Obama’, Amir Oren, Haaretz, 9 June 2008.

[xxi] Ibid.  For a deeper analysis, see also: ‘Soft on Iran: McCain misrepresents Obama’s stand on naming Revolutionary Guard as terrorists’, FactCheck, 5 June 2008.

[xxii] ‘81% in Poll Say Nation Is Headed on Wrong Track’, David Leonhardt and Marjorie Connelly, The New York Times, 4 April 2008.

[xxiii] ‘In AIPAC Speech, McCain Hits Obama on Iran, Iraq’, Michael Cooper, The Caucus: The New York Times Politics Blog, 2 June 2008.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Right slams Obama as ‘shady Chicago socialist’, Sarah Baxter, The Times, 17 February 2008.

[xxvii] “It’s also called diplomacy”, Charles A. Kupchan and Ray Takeyh, International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2008.

[xxviii] For new analysis of the IAEA report, see ‘The Belated Message from the IAEA on Iran’, Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau, INSS, Insight No. 59, 8 June 2008, www.inss.org.il; Editorial, ‘Iran, the U.S., and the inspectors’, International Herald Tribune, 29 May 2008; ‘Security Council to await outcome of Solana’s visit to Iran’, AFP, EUBusiness, 3 June 2008.

[xxix] ‘The Reality Situation’, David Brooks, The New York Times, 30 May 2008.

[xxx] Ibid. See also ‘Friedman: It’s all about leverage’, Thomas L. Friedman, International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2008.