BICOM

Executive Summary

– Iranian conservatives have won the 2008 Iranian parliamentary elections, increasing their representation as an overall bloc from 156 to 163 seats. However the key aspect of the election is the emergence of two distinct factions within the larger conservative group. These blocs consist of a more radical group, led by President Ahmadinejad, and a more pragmatic group, associated with Ali Larijani.

– Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is the ultimate decision-maker in Iran. Both conservative groups identify with his position – associated with the desire for Iran to achieve status as a regional power, determination to pursue Iran’s nuclear policy, and a repressive, Islamist outlook with regard to domestic policy. However, they differ with regard to the pace and the style with which these goals should be pursued.

– The Majlis (parliament) superficially resembles a western parliament, but it possesses little real power, and its decisions may be over-ruled by the Council of Guardians, which is appointed by the Supreme Leader. 

– The differences within the conservative bloc are not about ultimate goals – both groups are committed to the Iranian nuclear program, to spreading the Islamic revolution, to building Iran as a regional power and to maintaining the current system of government in Iran. As such, the elections represent an overall victory for the path represented by Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Introduction

On Friday (14/3), Iranians went to the polls to elect the eighth Majlis (parliament) since the Islamic revolution of 1979. 43 million Iranians were eligible to take part in the elections, in which candidates competed for control of 290 seats, representing areas in 30 provinces across Iran.[i] According to the currently available results, the conservative bloc has won 163 of the seats, up from 156 in the previous Majlis.[ii] This gives the conservative bloc around four times as many seats as their reformist rivals. 

The Iranian political system is both complex and opaque. The Majlis is far from being a sovereign parliament on the western model. But neither is it entirely a puppet institution rubber-stamping the decrees of a dictator – in the style familiar from Syria or Saddam-era Iraq.[iii] Rather, the Majlis is an institution within a system which includes both elected and non-elected bodies able to wield some influence. But ultimate power is in the hands of an unelected leader. The system also awards considerable influence to unelected bodies, such as the Council of Guardians, and severely restricts participation in the election process. This paper will seek to explain the key elements of the Iranian political system, and will detail the main factions competing in the current Majlis elections, before attempting some concluding remarks concerning what the elections indicate regarding the current direction of Iranian politics and policy. 

The Iranian political system

The Majlis does not have supreme legislative power. While much of its work looks like that performed by any other parliament – it drafts laws, votes on the annual budget, ratifies treaties and so on – its decisions must be approved by the 12-member Council of Guardians. The members of the Council of Guardians, in turn, are appointed by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Council has the constitutional power to overturn all decisions of the Majlis. The Council is also tasked with approving or disapproving all potential parliamentary candidates, presidential candidates and candidates for the Assembly of Experts.[iv]

In addition to the Majlis, the other institutions to be elected directly in Iran are the Presidency and the Assembly of Experts. The Presidency, currently held by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is responsible for the exercise of day-to-day executive authority, and he selects his Cabinet from among the members of the Majlis. The Assembly of Experts, meanwhile, is a body of clerics, elected for eight-year terms, who meet rarely and intervene little in everyday affairs, but who are tasked with the important function of selecting the Supreme Leader when this becomes necessary because of the death, resignation or dismissal of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly is currently headed by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. The Assembly was responsible for the appointment of Ali Khamenei in 1989, and has never attempted to dismiss the Supreme Leader.[v]

Candidates for the Majlis, as noted, must be approved by the Council of Guardians. The Council makes its decisions based on the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on Islamic law. In this way, non-religious candidates or candidates representing outlooks disapproved of by the ruling clerical elite can be prevented from running. 

The Iranian system functions under the principle of ‘Vilayet e-Faqih’ (guardianship of the jurisprudent), and provides for the emergence of a clerical oligarchy, ultimately directed by a Supreme Leader to emerge from within their ranks. This doctrine was developed by ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and has underpinnings in Shia Islam, in that it considers that authority should be exercised by the ‘person who is nearer to the station of infallibility’ until such time as the ‘infallible one,’ that is the Mahdi, or Messiah, arrives.  

As may be seen, however, influence and power are diffused within a variety of bodies, and the principle of consensus is important within the system. Hence, the triumph or rise of a particular faction or outlook within the system will be the product of a slow build-up of power by members of that faction within all the ruling bodies – elected or unelected.

The rise of the conservatives in Iran

The Majlis has been controlled by conservative factions since 2004, and they captured the presidency in 2005. The current Majlis elections reflect this reality of growing conservative dominance within the Iranian elite. Thus, around 1,700 prospective candidates, reflecting 40% of the total number of prospective candidates, had their application to become candidates refused by the Council of Guardians during the preparations for the current Majlis elections.[vi] The candidates whose applications were rejected were overwhelmingly from the more moderate and reformist element (they included also a son of Ayatollah Khomeini).

Conservatives are committed to the Iranian nuclear program, to spreading the Islamic revolution, to building Iran as a regional power and to maintaining the current system of government in Iran.  Reformists also support the Iranian nuclear program, but favour rapprochement with the west and want greater domestic liberalization.

The Council of Guardians, under the influence of Supreme Leader Khamenei, clearly preferred to marginalise reformists, forcing voters to choose in effect between hard-line Islamists supportive of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and more pragmatic conservatives around former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and former Revolutionary Guard commander Mohsen Rezai. The extent to which the politics of the ruling elite have shifted in a conservative direction is reflected by the fact that all these men would have themselves been regarded as hard-liners in Iran a decade ago. The rise of radicals such as Ahmadinejad has meant that they are now seen as comparative moderates.[vii]

The result of the massive banning of reformist candidates is that voters were presented with a choice between two conservative factions, one more radical than the other. An additional, particularly notable aspect of the list of candidates was the large proportion of former Revolutionary Guards standing for the Majlis. The rise of the IRGC within Iranian politics is a further indication of the trend towards greater conservatism. (This document is concerned mainly with those parts of the Iranian system subject to election. However, it should be borne in mind that unelected bodies, such as the armed forces, Expediency Council, IRGC and judiciary are also players vying for power and influence.). The IRGC – with a network of former officers and veterans active in every sphere of Iranian life, and itself controlling more than 500 companies – has emerged as a key pillar of support for the current system in Iran.[viii]

The available results indicate that the more pragmatic conservatives have made some gains. In this regard, the poor management of the economy by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government is likely to have been a factor. Despite the current skyrocketing oil prices, the Iranian economy remains in poor shape.[ix]

However, the really important story behind the contest between Ahmadinejad’s faction and that of his rivals is the extent to which Iran’s conservatives have achieved a near hegemonic position within the already severely curtailed world of Iranian politics.

Implications

What implications, if any, will the current Majlis elections have for the direction of Iranian regional and nuclear policy?  If taken in isolation from other elements of the system, the clear answer is that there are no real implications at all, since the Majlis does not decide on the form of these policies. However, for reasons explained above, it would be mistaken to see the Majlis elections in isolation. Analysts are rather seeing the latest elections as a significant moment in the rise of conservatives loyal to Supreme Leader Khamenei to power in all Iranian institutions of governance. As mentioned, the Council of Guardians consists of loyalists nominated by the Supreme Leader. The presidency has been held by a hardliner who sees himself as bound by the Supreme Leader’s diktats. The parliament has been controlled by the conservatives since 2004. By encouraging younger ‘pragmatic’ conservatives such as Larijani and Ghalibaf, the Supreme Leader is putting forward men who – unlike older relative pragmatists such as Rafsanjani – lack an independent power base separate from their links to the Supreme Leader. The result of this is that the Supreme Leader may now balance his own stances between two rival conservative factions which each regard themselves as loyal to him – reining in the more extreme Ahmadinejad-type figures when suitable, and allowing them greater liberty when this serves his purpose.[x] It is likely that next year’s presidential elections will be a race between Ahmadinejad and one or more members of the pragmatic conservative group.

The large number of former IRGC men in the new Majlis is being seen as a further gain for the Supreme Leader and his conservative outlook: the younger former Revolutionary Guards are known to be loyal to Khamenei, whereas in the past his religious credentials had been challenged by some of his contemporaries among the clerics. 

The bottom line from a western and Israeli point of view is that the current direction of Iranian policy – including the drive for a nuclear capability, and the support for Islamist insurgencies across the region as part of a wider ambition to emerge as the pivotal regional power – is being further entrenched by the latest trends in Iranian politics. The Eighth Majlis, with what limited influence it has, will be dominated by younger conservative politicians loyal to this path and to the Supreme Leader.

 

 

 

 

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[i] ‘Hard liners dominate Iran polls,’ BBC Online, 16 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk

[ii] ‘Conservatives win Iran election,’ BBC Online, 16 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk

[iii] Karim Sadjadpour, ‘Iran’s elections: a glass half full or a glass half empty?’ Daily Star, 11 March 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org

[iv] Ibid. 

[v] Vahid Sepehri, “Iran: Secretive Assembly of Experts Begins Fourth Term,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 February 2007, http://www.rferl.org

[vi] Scott Peterson, ‘In Iran vote, conservatives set to retain power,’  Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com

[vii] Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s orchestrated elections,” International Herald Tribune, 13 March 2008, http://www.iht.com

[viii] Amir Taheri, ‘Iran’s Choice: a man in a military cap, or a man in a military cap,’ Times, March 14, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk

[ix] Sadjadpour.

[x] Takeyh.