BICOM

Introduction

New developments in the Middle East merit reflection specifically in terms of their Iranian context and how they affect Iran’s strategic ambitions to assert influence across the region.  The distinct set of events in question is as follows:

• Resolution in Doha of the 18 month political paralysis which has gripped Lebanon, leading to the election on Sunday of Michel Suleiman as the country’s new president;
• Coordinated announcements by Jerusalem, Damascus and Ankara that Israel and Syria are conducting indirect negotiations, under Turkish auspices, with the aim of renewing comprehensive peace talks; and
• Progress in the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian terror groups operating from the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

These geographically dispersed developments are intertwined in various ways. Perhaps most pertinently, they each have repercussions for Iran’s status vis-à-vis the balance of regional power.

In looking at the nature of that balance, the preliminary point to stress is that Iran’s influence has grown sufficiently to have reshaped traditional rivalries, for instance those which exist along religious lines between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims.  Indeed, radical elements with very different roots have mobilised operationally in order to promote their shared political interests.[i]  Thomas Friedman recently wrote about a new ‘Cold War’ pitting the US, Israel and moderate Sunni Arab states against the radical Iranian-led bloc, which includes Syria (secular Alawite), Hezbollah (Shi’ite) and Hamas (Sunni).[ii]  Similarly, veteran Israeli commentator Ehud Yaari wrote recently about the dawn of ‘Pax Iranica’, which is perhaps a more accurate portrayal than the widely touted concept of a ‘Shi’ite arc’ or ‘Shi’ite crescent’.[iii]  It emphasises growing Iranian influence in a way that transcends sectarian loyalty, Arab ethnicity, the diverse Muslim faith, the role of non-state actors and movements, issues of national sovereignty, the poverty gap, western imperialism, and other factors which are called upon to explain regional tension.  From an Iranian perspective, too, an editorial printed in the Kayhan daily newspaper on 11 May stated, “In the power struggle in the Middle East, there are only two sides: Iran and the United States.”[iv]

Today’s reality is probably more intricate than a bipolar model can confer, not least due to the strategically invaluable roles played by Turkey (with which Israel has excellent relations and, as a NATO member, has a long term vision for regional security), Egypt and Saudi Arabia (key allies of the west).  Nonetheless, Tehran has hegemonic ambitions, being pursued primarily through its nuclear activities.  On Monday 26 May the IAEA, which serves as the world’s nuclear watchdog, released a restricted report for UN Security Council and agency board members indicating that Iran may be withholding information needed to establish the status of its atomic weapons programme.[v]  Due to the regime’s defiance of the international community in respect of resolutions demanding that it cease uranium enrichment, sponsorship of terrorism, and leadership of the radical bloc, Iran is perceived as the single greatest threat to regional stability.

How, then, do current developments, as referred to above, play into Tehran’s hands?  This brief makes an initial assessment of these issues in the context of Iran’s interests.

Out of the Lebanese quagmire?

Representatives of the Arab League forged a deal in Doha, Qatar, last Wednesday between the western-backed Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the pro-Syrian Hezbollah-led opposition.  The agreement foresaw the creation of a government composed of 16 cabinet seats for the ruling majority, 11 for the opposition, and three to be nominated by the new president, following 18 months of political paralysis.[vi]  It also cleared the way for former army commander Michel Suleiman to be elected president, in place of Emile Lahoud, who left office last November.  Even prior to Suleiman’s appointment, a new sense of optimism was generated as Lebanese newspapers carried headlines such as “Beirut comes back to life” and “Lebanon emerges from the stand-off”.[vii]  French President Nicolas Sarkozy called the agreement “a great success for Lebanon”.  In effect, however, Hezbollah has capitalised on its 7 May military victory (which itself quashed government attempts to curb its autonomy), with a political triumph to match it.[viii]  The shift in Lebanese power provides even greater leeway for Iran to pursue its interests in that arena.

When Hezbollah used lethal force to assert its will in internal Lebanese politics, leaving 81 people dead and Lebanon teetering on the brink of civil war, the Shi’ite organisation exposed its true nature as an Iranian-sponsored militia.  Whilst it succeeded to get its way in the formation of a new government, this comes at the cost of a backlash in Lebanese public opinion.  It is perhaps in the light of this, and changes in the electoral law (which might place the March 14 movement in a slightly better position for the May 2009 parliamentary elections),[ix] that British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said Hezbollah had shown an “unacceptable” show of force in the streets which created an “illusion” of its power.  US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice maintained that “Hezbollah lost something very important, which is any argument that it is somehow a resistance movement on behalf of the Lebanese people.”[x]  By stopping short of denying a victory for Hezbollah, they were putting as positive a spin as possible on what happened.

Other elements of the deal, however, show how the Iranian-led bloc is more than satisfied.  First, Hezbollah attained the opposition veto powers long resisted by the March 14 coalition, enabling it to block major government initiatives.  Second, it prevented any serious measures against its Syrian- and Iranian-supplied military arsenal.  Third, it avoided further action in the ongoing international investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which Syria is believed to have masterminded.  Fourth, whilst Michel Suleiman is an acceptable presidential candidate to all sides, he was selected as chief of staff by Damascus nine years ago, and is likely to appoint Hezbollah-sympathetic ministers to the cabinet.  Overall, the weakened Lebanese leadership has been forced to accept a deal on terms favourable to the opposition, which needs to be seen as a regional settlement whose full implications are yet to unfold.  Meanwhile, it is a setback for the West and their allies, including Saudi Arabia, which actively backs the ruling coalition and whose deep dispute with Iran and Syria is most manifest in the Lebanese arena.[xi]

So although Lebanon has emerged from the political quagmire, Tehran’s investment in Hezbollah – which began in the early 1980s – is paying dividends.  It has successfully built Hezbollah up into a force – with an estimated 40,000 rockets – that can control Lebanon and attack Israel in the event of a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.[xii]  Israeli commentator Amos Harel stated in Haaretz last week that developments in Beirut are “keeping Israel’s intelligence awake at night.  Hezbollah’s display of power … reflects a great deal of self confidence, there as well as in Tehran.”[xiii]  Hezbollah’s victory bolsters Iran’s strategic deterrence, and as such is likely to continue with its nuclear programme; it has left Lebanon vulnerable to greater Iranian exploitation in the future.

Iran and the Gaza ceasefire

The Gaza Strip is not an established base for Iranian activity akin to Lebanese territory.  Hamas is a Sunni movement with its origins in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  As one analyst put it, “It draws its legitimacy in the local arena and not from the ayatollahs in Iran.”[xiv]  However, since achieving formal political power for the first time in January 2006 and then usurping full control from Fatah rivals in June 2007, Hamas has been shunned by its traditional Sunni supporters in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and has increasingly looked to President Ahmadinejad’s regime for financial and operational backing.[xv]  From Tehran’s perspective, Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip provides an immediate and considerable obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace and gives Iran another front (in addition to Lebanon) from which to attack Israel, as Hamas has been doing through daily rocket fire on Israeli communities in the south.  Further hard evidence of Iran’s direct involvement in building up Hamas’s weapons was reaffirmed just two weeks ago when an Iranian-made Grad rocket struck a shopping centre in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, injuring 90 people.[xvi]  It follows a series of Grad rocket fire from Gaza in February.  Of course, Iran’s support for Hamas is another means of undermining US policy in the region, but Hamas is also a source of inspiration to radical forces in neighbouring Egypt, a key Sunni ally of the west whose stability Iran seeks to undermine.

On the surface, then, unlike the Doha agreement which ended the latest cycle of violence in Lebanon, an Egyptian-brokered Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, were it to be successfully implemented, could be seen as a setback for Tehran, but only a temporary one.  An attempted attack at the Erez crossing by a truck carrying more than four tons of explosives and subsequent IDF operations in the Gaza Strip last Thursday reinforced the scale of the threat of escalation if the ceasefire is not implemented soon.[xvii]  Last weekend, Yuval Diskin, who heads Israel’s equivalent of MI5, warned that Hamas had obtained even longer range rockets than previously known and that it was only a matter of time before they were used (this would put the southern suburbs of Tel Aviv within just 20 miles of Hamas’s strike range).[xviii]

Were the ceasefire a reflection of any degree to which Hamas is moderating its rejectionist position vis-à-vis Israel (in a way that, as the next section shows, is at least conceivable with regards to Syria), it could indeed constrain Iran’s influence.  But Hamas remains as committed to its radical Islamist goals and Israel’s destruction as it was twenty years ago, and these political objectives are where it finds common ground with Iran and Hezbollah.  (Incidentally, in light of the Israeli-Syrian peace overtures, it is worth bearing in mind intelligence assessments that, over the last two years, the power of the Gaza-based leadership of Hamas has increased relative to that of the exiled leadership in Syria.[xix]  The road from Tehran to Palestine does not always pass through Damascus).  In reality, the ceasefire, if it emerges, is the result of a confluence of interests: Israel will achieve a period of quiet for its southern communities and move in the right direction towards obtaining the release of Gilad Shalit;[xx] Hamas will score a political victory by having the economic blockade on Gaza eased; and Egypt will prevent further destabilising violence or another breach of the Philadelphi border.[xxi]  Hamas can claim that its ability to negotiate a ceasefire shows the degree of threat it poses growing to match that of Hezbollah.  Israel is under no illusions that the ceasefire is temporary; other things being equal, a future confrontation with Hamas remains very likely, in large part due to Iran’s role in strengthening the organisation.

Iran is at the centre of concerns in Israel’s military echelons about the chances of Hamas abiding by the terms of the tahdiya (temporary lull).  Hamas openly acknowledges that it would use the period as a breathing space, for regrouping and rearming, in preparation for further conflict.[xxii]  Iranian assistance will ensure that Hamas provides no less deterrence just because rockets are not actually being launched; the key issue for Tehran is Hamas’s growing capacity to fire deeper into Israeli territory, and is therefore likely to be a major factor in the ceasefire’s undoing.  Iran will no doubt see it as an opportunity to strengthen its allies.

Israeli-Syrian peace overtures: a blow to Tehran

The joint announcement that indirect peace talks are underway between Israel and Syria, under Turkish auspices, concludes the triad of events presently impacting on Iranian strategic interests.  This development has the greatest potential to do real, lasting damage to Iran’s ambitions, hence the Israeli defence establishment’s firm backing of the indirect talks.[xxiii]  The key question now being asked is whether Syria will be willing to break the bear hug with Iran, its long term ally, and sever ties with Hezbollah, Hamas and the other terror organisations they support.  Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni explicitly reiterated this demand upon news of the talks.[xxiv]  Syria’s contradictory responses, amid reports of anger and surprise in Tehran, have been insightful.

Iran’s conspicuous lack of official reaction to the coordinated statement, released almost simultaneously in Ankara, Damascus and Jerusalem, implies that it was not in the loop throughout months of quiet contact.[xxv]  President Ahmadinejad was reportedly unable to conceal his discontent, calling the development “a Damascus violation of the mutual commitments between Syria and Iran”.[xxvi]  The Iranian Supreme National Security Council is now believed to be formulating a policy response.

On the one hand, Syria tried to calm the waters with an editorial in the official daily Tishrin, stating that “Syria’s international ties are not negotiable” and “there should be no preconditions in the negotiations”.  The information minister, Muhsin Bilal, repeated that ties would not be broken as a precondition and confirmed Syria’s “good relations with the resistance groups”.[xxvii]  Yet in stark contrast, his prede
essor, Mahdi Dakhlallah, explained that ‘resistance’ (terror attacks) would become redundant in conditions of peace.

The contradiction is indicative of a deeper split in Damascus which was highlighted over the weekend by Abdel Bari-Atwan, editor-in-chief of the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.  He wrote that the Assad regime is polarised into two camps: the moderates, headed by Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem, who believe Damascus should engage in dialogue with the US and Israel, abandon its nuclear project, assist with global counter-terror, and open itself to the west; and the hawks, headed by Vice President Farouk Shara, who attribute supreme importance to ties with Iran.[xxviii]  Clearly, the internal division reflects the broader divisions in the region.  According to Bari-Atwan, it is difficult to determine whether Damascus is undergoing a meaningful strategic shift or playing a tactical game for self-preservation.  If Syria proves it to be the former and the peace track with Israel matures, it would significantly hamper Iranian manoeuvrability.

Conclusion

The most substantive of recent events, and the one which at present seems most likely to impact most heavily on the regional power struggle over coming months and years, was resolution of the Lebanese political crisis in Doha.  It constituted a victory for Hezbollah, Syrian and Iran against the pro-western, Saudi-backed coalition.  Although Lebanon is plagued by perennial sectarian divisions, Hezbollah’s consolidation over the past few weeks has strengthened Iran’s strategic deterrence, from which it derives the confidence to act in defiance of the west, for instance in respect of its nuclear activities.

It contrasts against a tahdiya between Hamas and Israel which is not yet finalised and anyway expected to be short-lived, and a tough road ahead to peace between Israel and Syria.  Sceptics justifiably question whether Syria, so closely identified with the Iranian bloc, will be capable of distancing itself and relinquishing ties with terror groups.

A ceasefire between Hamas and Israel would be bad news for Iran if it indicated that Hamas were moderating but there are no signs that this is the case.  In fact, the Damascus-based leader of Hamas, Khaled Meshal, paid a visit to Tehran earlier this week, where he is rumoured to be considering relocating “in protest” at Syria’s resumption of peace talks with Israel.[xxix]  Yet several commentators have observed that the value of Palestinian terror groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Syria is not that great.[xxx]  It is unlikely to happen immediately, but pressure will mount on Syria to expel them.  Syria is not theologically committed to Israel’s destruction in the same way as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.  Whilst the regime may have ideological objections to Israel’s existence, their alliance with Iran is ultimately a strategic choice.  If Syria is serious about the negotiations announced last week, it could indicate a potential crack in the Iranian alliance.

The nature of Iran’s influence in the region is complex; its anti-western, radical Islamist message gives it grassroots ideological influence which transcends religious divisions and is difficult to identify or combat.  But there is little doubt that Iran’s disputed atomic weapons programme tops the agenda when it comes to regional security issues.  A dossier published last week by the International Institute for Strategic Studies warns of the danger that Iran is sparking a nuclear arms race (at least 13 Middle Eastern countries are interested in exploring or reviving nuclear programmes, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria).[xxxi]  Fresh evidence, for instance about the advanced centrifuges being tested, is likely to come to light in the coming days, following the latest IAEA report and next week’s deadline for Iranian compliance with UN resolutions.

At a conference held in Jerusalem earlier this month, President Shimon Peres stated that “the skies of the Middle East are clouded over with Iranian ambition.”[xxxii]  He added that Iran was destroying hope in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.  That is because Iran-sponsored Hamas and Hezbollah are at the heart of the political challenges facing the Palestinian and Lebanese governments.  Iran’s reach also extends to other Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq and Bahrain (which have Shi’ite majorities), Sudan and Yemen (both Sunni).  However, President Bashar Assad’s regime is Iran’s most intimate state ally; a breakdown in the Syria-Iran relationship would make Tehran appear much more isolated on the world stage.

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[i]  Zvi Bar’el, ‘The mirage of a Shi’ite threat’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[ii] Thomas Friedman, ‘The new Cold War’, New York Times, 14 May 2008.

[iii] King Abdullah II of Jordan spoke of an emerging ‘Shi’ite crescent’ in December 2004; President Mubarak of Egypt expressed similar concerns soon afterwards.  For more details, see ‘Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Global Jihad: A New Conflict Paradigm for the West’, Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 2007.

[iv] Sami Moubayed, ‘Tehran ponders the spoils of victory’, Asia Times, 17 May 2008; Thomas Friedman, ‘The new Cold War’, New York Times, 14 May 2008.

[v] ‘IAEA: Iran still holding back information about nuclear research’, Reuters, 27 May 2008.

[vi] Nada Bakri and Alan Cowell, ‘Deal gives Hezbollah more power in Lebanon’, International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2008.

[vii] IBA TV News, 22 May 2008.

[viii] The Lebanese administration first sacked the airport security chief and then tried to ban Hezbollah’s military communications network.  Militants seized Muslim areas of Beirut and fighting spread to the Shouf and Aley mountains overlooking the capital, before the two government resolutions were reversed.  In the aftermath, the US and Iran each accused one another of being behind the violence.  For more details, see David Schenker, ‘Lebanese Crisis Ends: Hizballah Victory or Temporary Truce?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 May 2008; ‘Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward’, International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing No. 23, 15 May 2008.

[ix] David Schenker, ‘Lebanese Crisis Ends: Hizballah Victory or Temporary Truce?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 May 2008.

[x] For more details, see Sue Pleming, ‘U.S. and UK say Hezbollah weaker after Beirut fighting’, Reuters, 22 May 2008.

[xi] ‘Deal seeks to end Lebanon violence’, Reuters, 16 May 2008; Zvi Bar’el, ‘The mirage of a Shi’ite threat’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[xii] Thomas Friedman, op. cit.

[xiii] Amos Harel, ‘Three-way chess: The morning after the tahadiyeh’, Haaretz, 20 May 2008.

[xiv] Zvi Bar’el, ‘The mirage of a Shi’ite threat’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[xv] Iran’s support for Hamas is widely documented, though many elements remain classified.  An updated report was published in April by an Israeli organisation with close ties to military intelligence.  It can be downloaded here: www.terrorism-info.org.il/

[xvi] Yuval Azoulay, Amos Harel and Ari Shavit, ‘Rocket hits Ashkelon mall, 90 hurt’, Haaretz, 15 May 2008.  In response to the attack, Israel’s former Deputy Defence Minister Ephraim Sneh commented, “This is part of the Iranian war on Israel, which intends to gain control of the Middle East.”

[xvii] Editorial, ‘Avoid all delays’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[xviii] Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, ‘Diskin: Ashdod is likely in rocket range’, The Jerusalem Post, 26 May 2008.

[xix] ‘Hamas’s military build-up in the Gaza Strip’, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Centre (IICC), April 2008.

[xx]  Corporal Shalit was kidnapped by Palestinian militants on 25 June 2006 and has been held hostage by Hamas since.

[xxi]  Hamas destroyed sections of the Gaza border on 22-23 January 2008, enabling up to 750, 000 people to drift to and from Sinai.  See ‘Egypt Working to Contain Gaza’, Ehud Yaari, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 February 2008; Editorial, ‘Avoid all delays’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[xxii] Moshe Arens, ‘A Ceasefire with terror?’, Haaretz, 20 May 2008.

[xxiii] Amos Harel, Barak Ravid and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Olmert labels Syria talks ‘historic breakthrough”, Haaretz, 22 May 2008.

[xxiv] Livni stated, “Israel wants to live in peace with its neighbours, but Syria also needs to understand that it needs full renunciation of supporting terror – Hezbollah, Hamas and of course Iran.”  See Barak Ravid and Amos Harel, ‘P.M.: No promises made to Syrians’, Haaretz, 23 May 2008.

[xxv] The development was referred to briefly and without commentary on a number of Iranian media outlets, but was spun in the context of Israel’s inaccurately reported ‘pledge’ to withdraw from the Golan Heights (Yossi Melman, ‘Iran declines to comment’, Haaretz, 22 May 2008).  In reality, Israeli cessation of the Golan is subject to lengthy negotiations, and will come down to the choice which Syria must make about whether to make an historic break with the Iranian bloc.

[xxvi] Roee Nahmias, ‘Ahmadinejad furious over Israel-Syria talks’, Ynet News, 23 May 2008.

[xxvii] Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Will Syria break the bear hug?’, Haaretz, 25 May 2008.

[xxviii] Roee Nahmias, ‘Damascus divided over peace talks’, YNet News, 24 May 2008; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Will Syria break the bearhug?’, Haaretz, 25 May 2008;

[xxix] Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘Hamas ‘very disturbed’ over peace talks’, The Jerusalem Post, 24 May 2008.

[xxx] Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ‘Will Syria break the bear hug?’, Haaretz, 25 May 2008.

[xxxi] ‘Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran’, International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2008.

[xxxii] Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Peres at int’l meet: Iranian threat clouds Mideast skies’, Haaretz, 14 May 2008.