BICOM

For the past few weeks the attention of Israeli leaders and the media have been focused on the growing tensions between Israel and Syria. At the heart of this issue is a paradox: It appears in neither side’s interests to go to war, and both sides have stated that they do not wish to initiate a conflict. But nevertheless, the concerns are there. To understand this paradox one has to look beyond the apparent source of dispute between Israel and Syria – sovereignty of the Golan Heights – and understand the wider circumstances which are aggravating the situation. Israel is concerned with its military preparedness and sense of vulnerability following the war last summer with Hezbollah, and Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip, while Syria provides material support to both groups. Moreover, Israel’s greatest fear is the growing strength of Iran, with whom Syria has a close strategic partnership. For its part, Syria is torn between its regional alliance with Iran and its desire to end its international isolation – particularly maintained by the US. Both sides know what the shape of a peace deal would look like. What stops a substantial process evolving between them are the broader considerations, and the lack of a clear determination on both sides that the price is worth paying. The mutual suspicion of the others’ intentions fuels the fear of conflict.

The recent rise in tension on the ground

In the past two weeks Israel has been sending clear and deliberate messages to Damascus that it does not wish to engage in a conflict with Syria.¹ Syrian ministers for their part have also been sending messages that they do not want a war with Israel.² The mutual attempts to cool the situation come following months of rising tension on the ground. Israeli military sources report that tensions have been rising in the Golan since the end of last summer’s conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The IDF has been conducting intensive training in the Golan in the past year, both to correct shortcomings uncovered in last summer’s conflict, and to ensure that the army is ready for all eventualities. The Syrians are reported to have been responding with military exercises of their own, and have been rearming at an accelerated rate, particularly with rockets, anti-tank weapons and dozens of advanced anti-aircraft weapons. A major arms deal with Russia, reported to be worth $900 million, has been recently underway.³

In fact, both sides would have a huge amount to lose from a direct confrontation. The border between Israel and Syria has barely seen any violent incidents since the 1973 war. Damascus will have noted very well the pounding Lebanese infrastructure, and parts of its capital Beirut, took last summer and the apparent ease with which Israel was able to control Lebanon’s coastline and airspace. Whatever the extent of Syria’s arms purchases, both sides know that IDF maintains a significant military edge. But Israel’s confidence that it would come out on top, does not make it nonchalant about the possibility of war. The Israeli government was deeply wounded domestically by the perception that it rushed into a conflict last summer for which neither the military nor the home front were adequately prepared. It also took heavy international criticism over the scale and nature of its military operations. Hezbollah proved that using the right approach, a guerrilla force can simultaneously inflict heavy damage to Israel’s fighting forces with simple but advanced weaponry, and to Israel’s home front with short and medium range rockets.⁴ Syria is better equipped with rockets than Hezbollah was, and will have learned the lessons from relative success of Hezbollah’s ground forces.

Whilst earlier in the year some Israeli intelligence figures were suggesting Syria might attempt to launch a limited war on the Golan to force Israel into concessions, Israel’s current official intelligence assessment is that Syria’s posture is essentially defensive.⁵ However, there are still fears that the intensive training manoeuvres on both sides might lead to a ‘miscalculation’, whereby either side might misinterpret the moves of the other as a sign of a forthcoming attack, and take some form of pre-emptive action.⁶

Underlying causes – the regional configuration

The underlying source of the tension comes down to more than itchy fingers and the dispute over the sovereignty of the Golan Heights. The shape of a deal in which the Golan would be returned to Syria in return for a peace deal between the countries is broadly understood. What stops the two sides advancing the process is that it is not clear whether the deal in itself will satisfy either side’s broader interests. Syria has a more fundamental interest than the hills of the Golan. The regime’s deeper need is to end its isolation from the West, particularly enforced by the US, and to ease the international pressure relating to Syria’s interference in Lebanese politics, particularly the UN inquiry into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. A deal with Israel, which brings the return of the Golan, is of little interest to Syria unless is also brings these associated benefits.⁷ On Israel’s side, returning the Golan must yield a greater prize than simply diplomatic relations with Syria. Currently Syria is ignoring UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and is helping Hezbollah to rearm in Lebanon. What Israel wants to see is Syria unequivocally ceasing its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and distancing itself from Iran and its aspiration for regional domination. These changes would constitute a significant change in Syrian foreign policy, akin to that made by Libya in recent years, one which might risk internal dissent.

The intentions of the Syrian regime are difficult to assess. Whilst on the one hand senior officials in Damascus have claimed that they are ready to talk without pre-conditions,⁸ on the other they continue to facilitate the rearming of Hezbollah in Lebanon. They are also accused by the Americans of allowing insurgents to cross their border into Iraq – something the Syrians deny.⁹ In Israel, views differ as to whether giving up the Golan in return for peace is in its interests. Sceptics argue that doing so would mean moving the 20,000 Israelis that have settled there, and could be as divisive as the withdrawal from Gaza. Even if Syria ceases their support for Hezbollah and Hamas in return, those groups will be sustained just as well by Iran, therefore the deal would contribute nothing to Israel’s security.¹⁰ Furthermore, the deal is only as stable as the Syrian regime, and the long term viability of the Assad dynasty is far from certain. Others argue that separating the alliance of Syria and Iran is worthwhile, as it would weaken the anti-Israeli forces in the region, including Palestinian rejectionist forces, and would initiate a positive ‘ripple effect’ promoting Israel’s acceptance in the Arab world. There is also a vocal peace camp, given expression in the left-leaning press, that simply considers it unconscionable that an Israeli leader should turn down an opportunity to make peace when it is offered.

Given Syria’s desire to reconcile itself with the US, and the US’s heavy influence over the Israeli government, the Americans clearly play an important role. Until very recently, President George W. Bush’s doctrine has been to spurn authoritarian, terror supporting regimes such as Syria, rather than finding ways to accommodate them. Only very recently has the US softened its stance through limited engagement with Iran and Syria over the future of Iraq. But so far the US has rejected substantial talks with Syria before it takes steps to reverse its policies. Currently the Syrian regime, looking for an escape from the consequences of the Hariri murder, is in a tight spot. For the US to back a Syrian-Israel peace track now would be to offer the regime a lifeline, a way out of its diplomatic isolation, and a possibility to retain its influence in Lebanon.

Other Arab states are also reported to have little enthusiasm for a Syrian-Israeli peace deal. They are also not enamoured with Syria’s alliance with Iran and its radical Shia forces and want to see its isolation continue.¹¹ The Jordanian government, for example, has put all emphasis on the Israeli-Palestinian track, which it believes must come before all else.¹²

Is there a way forward?

Given that Syria is weaker militarily than Israel, and is facing a diplomatic crisis due to the consequences of the Hariri investigation, many Israelis will conclude that the Syrians need a peace process more than Israel does. As a result, they may feel there is no great incentive for the Israeli government to make any progress and risk political capital in the promotion of an Israeli-Syrian peace track. For Israel the cost of peace would be high, and the benefits uncertain. Furthermore, even if the Israeli government decides it does want to engage in a peace process with Syria, it will need a government of considerable strength to convince the Israeli public and facedown the opposition. The current Israeli government is not popular, and the coalition is not expected to survive the publication of the Winograd final investigation report into the Second Lebanon War.

But if Israel shows no interest at all in making peace with Syria, it risks pushing Syria further into a position where it considers its only option is to contribute further to the undermining of Israel’s security, therefore raising the cost to Israel of not engaging in talks.

Since neither side really wants the war, each side must take responsibility for making peace a worthwhile option. Ultimately Israel and the US might have to consider whether the broader strategic and diplomatic benefits of the peace process in the region, warrant allowing the Assad regime a chance at redemption. Israel should communicate to Syria not only that it does not want war, but that peace is an alternative it will consider. Olmert has begun to make such suggestions.¹³ However, given the limitations of the current Israeli government, and the highly sceptical stance of the American administration, the best message Israel might be able to provide at the moment is, “not ‘no’, but rather ‘not yet'”. If Syria is in a hurry, and wants to give a greater incentive to the Israeli government to come to the table and make sacrificing the Golan appear more worthwhile to the Israeli public, it may have to give more clear-cut signs that it is willing to reverse its support for the regional coalition of anti-Israel forces.

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¹ Barak Ravid and Mazal Mualem, “Israel sends conciliatory messages to Damascus,” Haaretz, 09/08/2007

² “Israel, Syria not interested in war: Barak,” AFP News brief, 15/08/07

³ Amos Harel, Barak Ravid and Yoav Stern, “Arab officials: Syria not planning to attack Israel,” Haaretz, 19/88/2007

⁴ Avi Kober, “The Second Lebanon War,” Perspectives Paper No. 22, 28 September 2006, The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies

⁵ Herb Keinon, “IDF: Syria Not Interested in War, Fatah-Hamas Clashes Likely in West Bank,” Jerusalem Post

⁶ Rumours of war, and peace, The Economist, 16/08/2007

⁷ John Davis, “A Breakable Link?” Ynetnews, 16/08/2007

⁸ “Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, International Crisis Group,” Middle East Report N°63, 10 April 2007

⁹ “Iranian and Syrian officials deny fuelling violence in Iraq,” The Associated Press, 08/08/2007

¹⁰ Giora Eiland, “Renewed Negotiations with Syria, Currently Not in Israel’s Interest,” Strategic Assessment, Volume 9, No. 4, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, March 2007.

¹¹ See for example: Saudi hits back at Syria in growing diplomatic spat, Reuters, 17/08/2007

¹² “Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations,” International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°63, 10 April 2007

¹³ “Olmert: ‘I wouldn’t miss chance for Syria talks’,” Jerusalem Post, 16/08/2007