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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Israel and the uprising in Syria

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Key points

  • The current balance of power between the regime and protestors in Syria suggests that the fall of the Assad regime is not imminent.
  • A number of factors appear likely to allow regime survival: the Syrian security forces do not appear to have split, the uprising lacks a coherent leadership and the international response has been insufficient to place real pressure on the regime.
  • The Syrian uprising has weakened the case of those Israelis who were arguing for negotiations with Syria. The long-term future of the regime is uncertain, and the extensive aid afforded Assad by Iran in crushing the uprising makes his turning away from Teheran unlikely.

 

Introduction

Now entering its third month, the uprising in Syria against the regime of President Bashar Assad shows no sign of abating. Over the weekend, another 23 people were killed as the Syrian regime continued its efforts to crush the protests. Over 1,000 people have been killed in the uprising so far and 10,000 have been detained. Protests reached eastern Syria on Friday as demonstrators in the town of Albu Kamal, near the Iraqi border, burned pictures of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

As the unrest and repression continue, what is the current balance of power in Syria and how are Israeli policy-makers responding to the strategic and policy questions presented by the uprising?

The current Syrian balance of power

Syrian President Bashar Assad has in recent months proved himself equal to his father in his willingness to use brutal force against his own people to maintain his power. Hafez Assad crushed an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in the early 1980s, killing thousands of civilians. Bashar is still holding out verbal promises of reform, whilst in practice using tactics of extreme repression. Is this likely to succeed?

The main instrument of the regime’s oppression, the Syrian army, remains loyal to the Assad regime. Early in the uprising, reports suggested that the largely Sunni 5th Division had refused orders to forcefully suppress demonstrations in Deraa. Since then, no credible reports have emerged of unrest in the security forces. It appears that the regime responded to the initial signs of fissures with extreme brutality. A mass grave containing around 80 bodies of soldiers, according to opposition sources, was discovered in the Deraa area.

The Syrian armed forces and security services are led by members of the Alawi sect and individuals close to the regime. Any serious challenge to the regime is also seen as a direct challenge to the military elite. For as long as this remains the case, the regime possesses a blunt instrument likely to keep it in power.

The uprising still has no clear leadership and the divided Syrian opposition outside the country is apparently playing no significant role in directing it. Some efforts are underway to coalesce a new, internal leadership. Approximately 150 people two weeks ago signed a new “national initiative for democratic change”, including organisers of the current demonstration and veteran oppositionists. But these initiatives do not yet add up to a recognised leadership with a clear strategy for gaining power.

The international response to the repression in Syria remains somewhat tepid. So far, the US and its partners in Europe have been unable to persuade the UN Security Council to condemn the violence. The resolution under consideration was drafted by Britain and other countries, but diplomats are trying to persuade Russia not to block it. In the meantime, the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on Bashar Assad and other regime members, as well as an arms embargo on the regime. Yet no explicit call for Assad to step down by either the EU or the US has been made, and Arab states remain silent or have expressed support for Assad.

The current US and EU sanctions, whilst serious, fall short of anything likely to put the regime at risk. A number of reasons have been cited for this relatively weak international response, including possible Western wariness as to what could follow the Assad regime, concern at Western involvement in yet another Middle Eastern conflict, and fear of retaliation from Syria’s regional allies. Iran in particular is engaged in direct support for the regime, according to statements by US officials.

All of these factors, combined with the still limited size of the protests, mean that in the immediate future, the fall of Assad regime remains relatively unlikely. Nevertheless, the regime has been seriously hit by the protests. As a recent report in Time magazine noted, the economy has been adversely affected, with a negative 3% contraction in GDP now expected over the coming year. Economic reform had been a central aspect of the regime’s claim to legitimacy, and to the tacit support offered to it by the largely Sunni merchant and business classes.

The prospect of a weakened Syrian regime, racked by continued unrest and economic decline, therefore looks most realistic in the period ahead.

Israel’s views on the Syrian uprising

Senior Israeli officials – including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Shimon Peres and Defence Minister Ehud Barak – have expressed general support for the opposition in Syria and the toppling of the Assad regime. These statements are in contrast to earlier suggestions that Israel might prefer that Assad stay in power, on the basis that he is a known quantity. In this regard, an unnamed official recently quoted in the US media said that “This idea of the devil you know is better than the one you don’t know is not relevant anymore… When he was strong, we thought he might switch camps and be able to do something in the peace process, but that’s over now. He has no more legitimacy after this.”

This statement appears to reflect the prevailing opinion, even among those influential Israeli officials who had hitherto supported the idea of a diplomatic process between Israel and Assad’s Syria. In these circles, which included a considerable number of defence officials, it had long been considered that a diplomatic process with the Assad regime could offer a promising breakthrough for Israel, since the price for a deal (the Golan Heights) was known, and Assad was considered to be a pragmatist who would adhere to any agreement concluded.

In recent years, some Israeli officials argued that Syria’s alliance with Iran formed an uncomfortable necessity for Assad, from which he might be tempted to withdraw through the offer of territorial gains and peaceful relations with Israel. Few expected that Assad would wholly abandon his links with Iran, but senior officials believed that he might at least be enticed to balance or lessen these relations through the prospect of territorial gains from Israel.

The latest events in Syria appear to have put paid to this view, at least for the moment. The lack of legitimacy and the uncertainty of the regime’s future reduces the value of any treaty that might be signed with it, since this could be annulled by its successor. The central role being played by Iran in the suppression of the uprising similarly makes it less likely that Assad will be seeking a way out of this alliance in the period ahead.

The decline of support for the ‘Syrian option’ in Israeli policy thinking contrasts sharply with a number of reports emerging from Washington in recent weeks that Israeli officials have been ‘lobbying’ for the survival of the regime. Sources close to the Israeli prime minister have denied these reports, though they note that Israel has long been opposed to any military effort to remove Assad, fearing that such a conflict could deteriorate into a Syrian war with Israel.

Nonetheless, the weakening of the Assad regime constitutes a clear setback for Hezbollah, which is dependent on Syria as a conduit through which Iranian arms can be transported to it. The eastern Beqa’a valley in Lebanon is Hezbollah’s strategic heartland. The absence of a friendly Syrian regime on the other side would seriously erode the movement’s position.

The regime’s current travails are already having a negative, if less tangible impact on Hezbollah. The movement has always presented itself as an opponent to tyrannies and an ally of the Arab peoples. Yet now it is staunchly aligned with what is evidently one of the most repressive regimes in the Middle East. Hassan Nasrallah spoke last week in favour of the Assad regime, claiming that most Syrians supported it. In response, Syrian protestors burned Hezbollah flags.

Conclusion

Whilst the current levels of unrest present a clear challenge, they are probably not sufficient to topple the regime in the immediate future. Barring a split in the security forces, or a very significant increase in international pressure, Bashar Assad looks set to hold on, though his regime’s reach, strength and legitimacy will be significantly diminished by the uprising.

The Israeli view with regard to Syria is in essence one of ‘wait and see’. There are no known links between Israel and elements of the Syrian opposition. The fall of Assad, a key linchpin in the Iran-led regional alliance, would weaken Hezbollah and the Palestinian terror groups based in Damascus, but it could also create a potential void, leading to prolonged instability in Syria of the type which preceded the rule of the Assads. Similarly, the potential emergence of a new and militant Sunni regime in Syria if the Assad regime were toppled could pose new dangers to regional stability and democratisation.