BICOM

Summary

• Political upheaval in Israel, deep divisions within Palestinian society, and the forthcoming US presidential election campaign together create a climate of acute uncertainty which affects the Annapolis peace process.
• Broadly, there are three plausible outcomes of the Kadima primary scheduled for 17 September: (a) Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s swift replacement by a party colleague by October; (b) a longer process involving national elections being brought forward to early 2009, with a new leader in office by spring; or (c) a period of tense coalition negotiations which are resolved by the turn of the year.  The situation remains fluid, though this last scenario seems most likely.
• The leading Kadima candidate is Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, though her victory is far from secure.  If she wins and is unable to form a strong coalition, she may be tempted to draw on her public appeal and take Israel into early national elections.
• Concern about whether comprehensive peace and security is obtainable notwithstanding, there is a shared sense within Israel’s political mainstream about the need to make the Annapolis concept work.  Nonetheless, both the Kadima primary (in Israel) and Fatah challenges (in the Palestinian Authority) affect both the substance and timing of how ongoing negotiations are likely to proceed.
• As such, international engagement and sensitivity, especially whilst the American presidency is changing hands, could prove crucial in ensuring the survival of the process begun at Annapolis last November.

Introduction

Video footage last week of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert telling Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he desires a peace agreement “by the end of the year” was insightful – due more to its media release than its content.  It publicly reaffirmed Olmert’s commitment to the Annapolis process despite the fact that his departure from office is looming.  Regular bilateral meetings between the two leaders have been taking place since the international meeting in Annapolis, Maryland on 27 November 2007.  Annapolis established the basis for renewed negotiations and proposed a timeframe for concluding an agreement before US President George W. Bush leaves the Oval Office.

The subsequent period has been profoundly testing for Olmert and Abbas as both have been embroiled in worsening domestic strife.  Political uncertainty continues to intensify due to a constellation of unrelated factors.  They include the growing Hamas threat within Palestinian society and impending leadership transitions in Israel and the US, which may be followed by elections in the Palestinian Authority next year.  Whilst negotiations have continued (and even fresh indirect talks with Syria initiated), the forthcoming Kadima party primary scheduled in less than two weeks time will impact upon the future of the Annapolis process.  The key questions are whether and how it can be further advanced in a constructive and legitimate way in light of these ongoing developments.  This brief sets out plausible scenarios going forward and offers a guide as to how expectations can be managed in the months to come.

The Kadima primary and the leadership transition

Prime Minister Olmert declared his intention to resign on 30 July, owing to corruption inquiries which effectively made his position untenable.[i]  Israel’s complex political system makes it impossible to determine precisely when he will step down, though scheduled events, formal timetables and latest polling data indicate three possible modes of transition.

(a)   Smooth handover following Kadima primary

The Kadima primary is scheduled for 17 September.  The threshold for outright victory is 40% of the votes cast.  If a clear victor does not emerge, the two most popular candidates will enter a second round scheduled for 25 September.  Either way, the winning candidate will have 28 days to form a new coalition government within the existing Knesset (parliament), which could be extended by another 14 days, and take office in November.  But if a new coalition can be formed quickly, the victor could replace Olmert as prime minister as early as October and remain in the post at least until general elections are held (potentially not until 2010).

(b)   A forced early general election

If the new Kadima party leader cannot form a coalition within 42 days, the Knesset will be dissolved in November and national parliamentary elections held 90 days thereafter.  Olmert would continue to serve as acting prime minister of a transitional government until such time as a new premier is sworn in.  Depending on how quickly coalition negotiations are resolved, Olmert could remain in his post until April or May 2009.

(c)    Protracted coalition negotiations following Kadima primary

Kadima primary might lead to the election of a new party chairman in September, but concessions and deal brokering could drag out the process of forming a new coalition.  In this scenario, which seems most likely, power may not be formally transferred until late November or December.

The situation remains very fluid, but a Dialog poll of Kadima party members for Haaretz/Channel 10 News in Israel last week put Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni far ahead of her closest rival, Transport Minister and former IDF chief of staff Shaul Mofaz, with enough votes to secure a first round victory.[ii]  If the primary goes to a second ballot, Livni currently stands to win with 51% of the vote against Mofaz.  Speculation about a Livni victory ought not to overstated, however, because Mofaz is considered to be better organised at a root and branch level within the party. He is an experienced campaigner, and there is still a considerable proportion (28%) of swing voters.  The other two candidates, Public Security Minister Avi Dichter and Interior Minister Meir Sheetrit, are considerably less popular, with last week’s poll showing support of 6% and 5% respectively.[iii]  Whether any of the candidates would be able to form a stable coalition – either along the same lines as the current one, or on the basis of a national unity government in which Likud and Labour participates, or in a more liberal composition – remains to be seen.

Livni, as the leading candidate, might seek to bolster support for the peace process in which she has been a key player over the last year by bringing the left-wing Meretz-Yahad faction into the coalition, or invite Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party to return.  Alternatively, her ‘Mrs. Clean’ image and relatively popular appeal in Israeli society may persuade her to opt not to broker deals with the smaller parties.  She may choose to set the wheels in motion for early elections in order to try and shore up her own power base in the next Knesset.

Implications for the Annapolis process

The implications of such a high degree of uncertainty are most easily demonstrated by what stands to be lost if the Annapolis process breaks down.  First, it would legitimise the critique that has circulated since its inception that the peace talks were composed of weak leaders paying lip-service to unachievable goals in unrealistic timeframes.  Second, the in-built risk of launching Annapolis was that failure to yield results would compound the sense of despair about achieving the two-state compromise, which remains the only realistic model for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.  Previous failures have been followed by dramatic escalations in violence, such as in September 2000 after talks broke down at Camp David.  Indeed, the Annapolis process itself is taking place against the backdrop of an ongoing low-intensity conflict and a perpetual threat of bloodshed.  Annapolis has marked a de facto break of real significance from the intifada period in which the Israel-PA ‘partnership’ was bereft of meaning.  Substantive developments on the ground are contingent upon this mechanism for building confidence.

Shared ideological interests, conflicting political agendas

Olmert’s successor will ‘inherit’ Annapolis however it exists at such time that he or she becomes prime minister.  Yet so much is at stake right now for the individual candidates in terms of their short term political objectives.  As such, they are effectively unable to extrapolate their own interests from the ongoing negotiations.

Tzipi Livni shares with Olmert an ideological interest in the goals of Annapolis.  They have both shown commitment to advancing the process and continue to play key roles in keeping it alive.  But with Olmert’s days numbered, he is naturally conscious of his political legacy, hence his keenness to secure a tangible achievement before he leaves office.  Constitutionally, the administration would be more robust with Olmert serving as acting prime minister; in an interim government, the Knesset is unable to take a vote of no confidence and ministers are forbidden from resigning.[iv]  The Prime Minister’s Office maintains that as long as Olmert is prime minister, he has the legitimacy to carry out diplomatic moves.  However, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz, whose decision it is whether or not to indict Olmert, could urge him to take a more cautious approach.  Furthermore, politically, considerable gaps remain between the two negotiating teams, and Olmert’s chief negotiator, Livni, is in less of a rush to resolve them.

Until last week, Olmert had been mooting the idea of an interim agreement, perhaps along the lines of a ‘declaration of understandings’ which US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been pushing for.  The Bush administration would of course wish to have something to show for its efforts before it leaves Washington.  However, the concept has not garnered support among the Palestinians, Egypt or Jordan; they do not see how such a deal would help resolve the core issues (borders, refugees, Jerusalem).  Notably, Livni has also been explicitly circumspect.  Following Olmert’s most recent meeting with Abbas last week and the videoed commitment to aim for a comprehensive agreement by the end of the year, Livni responded: “we can’t allow time constraints to rush us into making grave mistakes in trying to bridge gaps that are too big in a way that will bring about a clash, nor can we compromise on critical issues only for the sake of results.  This is not how I operate in negotiations.”[v]

Livni is keen to see the fruits of Annapolis ripen on her watch as prime minister.  This is in part because the premature publication of a deal could make it much more difficult for her to form a stable coalition.  She would also like to be able to present a package to the Israeli public as the basis for her re-election as prime minister.  Such a vote of confidence would provide the required legitimacy for any deal’s implementation at the appropriate time.

Finally, it is worth noting that the contest between top Israeli politicians has tended to revolve around the personalities involved more than their policy positions.[vi]  This in part reflects an easily overlooked consensus at the core of mainstream Israeli politics about the need to pursue concepts intrinsic to the Annapolis framework.  Of course, politicians are outwardly sceptical in varying degrees about the feasibility of concluding a workable agreement with security guarantees.  But even those prospective replacements for Olmert with more hawkish reputations, including both Shaul Mofaz and Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, would find it difficult to discard a ‘live’ Annapolis process.

Steering expectations

The Annapolis process can be preserved through this uncertain period provided that it remains a cornerstone of US policy and that other governments remain engaged.  An early commitment will be required of either President Obama or President McCain to carry it forward regardless of whether any new document is produced.  This would provide both Israelis and Palestinians with assurances about the value of the bilateral talks and US-led international assistance to implement the clauses of any forthcoming agreement.  On the Palestinian front, it remains unclear at present whether President Abbas will continue in his role, when Palestinian Legislative Council (parliamentary) elections will be held, and how long the ’emergency government’ will last.[vii]  These are matters of controversy at present which impact upon the deep fault lines running through Palestinian society.  Within Fatah itself, internal reform is taking place at a snail’s pace, but is direly needed to make the party more accountable, transparent and unified.  Failure to reform and tackle corruption gave Hamas a ticket to power in the January 2006 elections.  It is difficult to overstate these huge challenges to Fatah, especially since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip by force over a year ago.

When the UN General Assembly convenes later this month, instead of focusing on the specific positions and gaps between the two sides, the Israeli-Palestinian peace track would be better served by coordinated support and a message of encouragement for the progress that has so far been made.  If implementation of international commitments to support West Bank economic regeneration can be made to tie in with the UN gathering, that would also send a positive signal of confidence in the peace talks.

A further focal point could be improvements that have been witnessed, including by Israeli security officials, in the PA security forces.  The PA has markedly stepped up its efforts to clamp down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad activity in the West Bank and take militants associated with both terror organisations into custody.  At the same time, Israel’s removal of ten additional roadblocks in the Hebron area at the end of last week is concurrent with its ongoing attempt to ease mobility for Palestinian civilians living in territory under PA jurisdiction.[viii]  Interestingly, this has political ramifications for Labour leader Ehud Barak, who may be forced to become more cooperative when it comes to forming the new coalition.  The meagre political capital he has earned as defence minister over the last several years by taking a tough stance on security matters is being used up in these initiatives.

Conclusion

The political upheaval in Israel, divisions in the Palestinian territories, and the US presidential election campaign together create a climate of acute uncertainty.  Nonetheless, Israel, the PA, and the international community have a clear and common interest in ensuring that the Annapolis process does not unravel due to domestic political constraints.  Previous failures have led to chaos in the Palestinian Authority.  Hamas, which wields much greater power today than in the past, would use any sign of weakness on the peace track to undermine its Fatah rivals.  The commitment of the international community in the coming months and the level of engagement it demonstrates throughout this period could significantly influence the fate of current talks.

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[i] Ehud Olmert, “I will prove my innocence… but the good of the state must prevail”, Jerusalem Post, 31 July 2008.

[ii] Yossi Verter, “Dialog Poll for Haaretz and Channel 10: Livni surging ahead of Mofaz”, Haaretz, 4 September 2008.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Israeli Government- Legal Situation, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 November 2005.

[v] Barak Ravid, “Israel, PA to aim for peace deal by year’s end”, Haaretz, 1 September 2008.

[vi] See, for instance, Colette Avital, “The public wants to know”, Jerusalem Post, 2 September 2008.

[vii] Joe DeVoir, “The Day after Annapolis: Policy Scenario and Options Facing the Palestinian Authority”, Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, 1 September 2008.

[viii] “Ten Additional Road Blocks Removed in the Hebron Area”, Israel Government Press Office, 4 September 2008.