BICOM

Reading into Readiness: Israel’s missile test and Iranian nuclear ambitions

Early last Thursday morning, 17 January 2008, Israel successfully conducted a missile test from a principal launch site at Palmahim air force base, south of Tel Aviv. The defence establishment remained relatively tight-lipped, though it was suspected that the rocket propulsion system of Israel’s long range Jericho III missile was checked, which has the capacity to carry both conventional and non-conventional warheads of over 1000 kg.[1] Officials conveyed that it was “part of a future multi-layered defence system designed to counter threats Israel faces from neighbouring countries,”[2] which befits Defence Minister Ehud Barak’s pledge to further develop such a project upon taking office last summer.[3] That this missile could be deployed as part of a military action to curb the potentially existential threat posed by a nuclear armed Iran is certainly plausible, but what is the deeper message about Israel’s intentions?

Subsequent reporting rapidly inferred an association between the test and the prospects of an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.[4] Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s comment, earlier last week, that “all options” must remain on the table for countering Tehran’s atomic ambitions, can be construed as another indication that Israel is headed in that direction.[5] However, it would be misguided to view the test as representing a bellicose shift in Israel’s foreign policy.

New technology, same defence doctrine: Israel’s missile deterrent

The timing of the test was less significant than the strategic context in which it transpired. The Jericho III missile system, which most analysts estimate to have a range of over 4,800 km, has been under development for as long as 14 years and the missile had been expected for some time to become operational in 2008. It follows the short range French designed Jericho I dual-stage ballistic missile which Israel acquired in late 1971 and the updated, medium range, Jericho II model in the mid 1980s. With a range of up to 1,500 km, the Jericho II was already powerful enough to cover potential targets both in the Arab world and Iran. Recent technological breakthroughs at Israel Aerospace Industries[6] instigated the need for trials of third generation components, which culminated in last Thursday’s event.[7]

The Jericho family forms the core of Israel’s ballistic missile arsenal and enables Israel to strike at or retaliate against any regional target.[8] Notably, when confronted with Iraq’s firing of some 90 modified ballistic missiles between January and February 1991, Israel found itself doubly hamstrung: unwilling to enter the Gulf conflict (because it would have threatened the unlikely constellation of forces which allied against Saddam Hussein) and without a defensive shield to neutralize the raining Scuds. The US Patriot as it then existed was found to be deficient. Israeli missile defence has been a national priority ever since. Its Arrow II system, which is interoperable with the Patriot PAC III, has enabled Israel to introduce revolutionary new physical concepts to destroy airborne attacking missiles, including intelligent rapid-fire defence guns and a successfully tested High-Energy Laser (THEL) technology co-produced with the Americans.[9] In broader terms, last week’s test was consistent with Israel’s long-standing defence doctrine, which has remained virtually unchanged since being established by inaugural Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, in 1953: to attempt to avoid conflict by maintaining a qualitative edge in the face of an overwhelming quantitative inferiority vis-à-vis the Arab world.[10] But today it is Iran, more than any of the Arab states, which Israel is being forced to outsmart in terms of consolidating its capacity for strategic deterrence.[11]

Iranian defiance of the international community continues

Since 2003, there has been a relatively united American-European front aimed at halting the Iranian nuclear programme by means of diplomatic dialogue and sanctions. This remains Israel’s preferred solution as well. Sensitivity to its status on the world stage notwithstanding, attempts to cajole Tehran into ceasing all activities in the realm of uranium enrichment, manifesting in a ‘carrot and stick’ package that was presented in May-June 2006, have not induced the substantive negotiations which the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) and the US had hoped for.[12] Success is contingent upon a unified international consensus, which has not emerged, and for which prospects at present seem bleak. Indeed, recent interrelated developments involving the US, Russia and China – three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who are charged with leading these efforts – seem to fly in the face of their purported determination to show Iran that it will pay a heavy price for continuing to defy its international obligations.

The first major setback was publication in November 2007 of the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which assessed that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003. It is hardly surprising to conceive of Iranian uneasiness leading to a temporary freeze of their covert centrifuge programme in this period, just as US and British troops were forcing regime change in next door Iraq. Yet questions have since arisen about the report’s credibility, certainly in the manner of its presentation, and the White House has sought to distance itself from the findings, as illustrated by President Bush’s recent Middle East tour in which he reaffirmed Washington’s concerns.[13] In addition, less publicised aspects of the NIE indicate that Iran might still be technically capable of producing nuclear weapons by next year, and almost certainly within seven years. Once sufficient fissile material is produced, experts agree that weaponization is virtually inexorable; merely a matter of time, probably no longer than a year.[14] Israeli intelligence suggests that, ceteris paribus, Iran will actually acquire nuclear weapons between 2010 and 2011.[15] Whatever the timeframe, the NIE has effectively severed the American military option at least until a new president is sitting comfortably in the Oval Office. Whilst the diplomatic route is the preferred course for all parties, the threat of American (or Israeli) military action should Iran fail to comply with international commitments has at least tacitly underpinned that strategy.

The world media’s inevitable focus on the NIE’s headline conclusion created the misperception that the US has softened its position.[16] Further such speculation has been generated by Nicholas Burns’ retirement last Friday as US undersecretary for political affairs.[17] He had pressed for tough sanctions at the UN. The NIE is therefore seen as having been used as a sufficiently convenient pretext for policy adjustments. Indeed it is the former US Ambassador to Moscow, William Burns, who is replacing his namesake in the No. 3 State Department job. Naturally William Burns is thought to be more amenable to the Kremlin’s stance.

For their part, following months of procrastination, Russia is now supplying Iran with nuclear fuel for use at its Bushehr domestic nuclear power reactor, which international onlookers have reluctantly swallowed. The third 11 ton shipment within a month arrived last week and five more deliveries are scheduled to take place by March.[18] The rationale for the deal was that it would render Iran’s enrichment programme superfluous were its nuclear fuel ambitions truly peaceful, but Iran maintains that it will continue its project in order to be able to supply home-grown nuclear fuel at other power plants. In bilateral meetings with Israel last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dubiously cited the importance of enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to do its work as an explanation for Moscow’s aversion to taking a harder line in relation to the Iranian threat.[19]

Beijing has also acted in a contradictory manner by signing a $2.3 billion economic agreement with Tehran which had been stalled for more than half a year prior to the NIE. The fear that China will simply replace lucrative markets which the EU stands to lose by imposing greater sanctions is causing inaction across the board.[20] Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili emerged from meetings last week declaring that China was opposed to sanctions and referred to the existence of a “similar stance” between the two countries on the nuclear issue.[21] This is despite a UN sanctions regime that is contingent upon Iran’s cessation of the production both of a weapons capability (which military intelligence assessments suggest is still occurring clandestinely) and highly enriched uranium (which Iran overtly continues to conduct). Yet Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi seemed to bolster the renewed spirit of Sino-Iranian cordiality by regurgitating Iran’s stated wish to resume ‘talks’, conspicuously omitting any reference to the application of more stringent economic pressure on Tehran.

Despite this backdrop of weakened international support, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany met in Berlin on Tuesday and agreed to a proposed third sanctions resolution against Iran. Nevertheless Russian and Chinese objections to the wording of the resolution remain, and no date has yet being given for when the UN Security Council vote on the resolution will take place. Therefore another opportunity to face down Iran will be missed as a third UN Security Council resolution with more comprehensive sanctions on Iran may well be vetoed by Russia or China. As such, substantive progress towards removing what is almost certainly now the gravest threat to global security continues to look uncertain.[22]

Conclusion

Tel Aviv’s missile test sparked speculation about Israel’s intentions towards Iran because of the strategic climate in which Israel finds itself vis-à-vis Iranian belligerency. It was sequential with the continuous modernization of Israel’s defence requirements for maintaining its basic defence doctrine, and does not signify an impending alteration of Israel’s foreign policy posture. Nevertheless, the nature and outlook of the radical Iranian regime does not appear on the cusp of becoming more amiable to the West at any point soon. On the contrary, it is widely perceived as a source of peril, particularly among the Arab nations of the Middle East who fear Iranian regional domination. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s statement within hours of the missile test that “Israel did not have the courage to attack his country” was Tehran’s way of trying to show the world that Iran will not bow to international pressure.[23] He will certainly be proved right if Iran perceives empty and fractured diplomatic overtures that are not given clout – politically, economically and militarily.

Ultimately, as one columnist put it last week, “Teheran has ignored both the “carrot” of economic incentives and the “stick” of international isolation, pursuing its quest for nuclear weapons at all costs”.[24] Mutually reinforcing international pressure and the imposition of robust, heavy-duty economic and political sanctions are paramount in the final stage of diplomatic efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme.[25] The missile test might reinforce how seriously Israel takes the Iranian threat, though its success will still be of little comfort to its leadership in light of an international diplomatic process which for the time being is not achieving its intended aims.

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[1] ‘Long-range ballistic missile test-fired’, Yaakov Katz, The Jerusalem Post, 18 January 2008; ‘Israel test-fires long-range missile for propulsion system test’, Yan Liang, ChinaView, 18 January 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/18/content_7442399.htm

[2] IBA News, 17 January 2008.

[3] ‘Israel successfully tests new rocket system’, Hanan Greenberg, YNet News, 17 January 2008. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3495427,00.html

[4] ‘Israel tests missile after warnings to Iran’, Dan Williams and Ori Lewis, Reuters, 17 January 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSL1723222920080117

[5] ‘Israel test-fires long-range missile for propulsion system test’, Yan Liang, ChinaView, 18 January 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/18/content_7442399.htm

[6] Formerly known as Israel Aircraft Industries, the name was officially changed in November 2006.

[7] ‘Missile test ‘will improve deterrence”, Yuval Azoulay, Haaretz, 18 January 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945859.html

[8] ‘Israel Tests a New Propulsion for 4,000 km Jericho III Missile’, Defense Update, 18 January 2008. http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0108/news/170108_missile#more

[9] ‘Missile proliferation in the Middle East’, Mohamed Kadry Said, Disarmament Forum (2), 2001.

[10] ‘The Growing Threat to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge’, MK Dr. Yuval Steinitz, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 3:10, 11 December 2003. http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=717&TTL=The_Growing_Threat_to_Israel’s_Qualitative_Military_Edge

[11] ‘Missile test ‘will improve deterrence”, Yuval Azoulay, Haaretz, 18 January 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/945859.html

[12] ‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done?’ Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 88, February 2007.

[13] ‘E.U. and Iran: No Chance for Sanctions to Work’, Michael J. Economides and Peter Glover, Energy Tribune, 15 January 2008. http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=751

[14] ‘Speaking about the Unspeakable: U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Chuck Freilich, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 77, December 2007; ‘Questions of intelligence’, Ephraim Sneh, The Boston Globe, 11 December 2007 http://www.sneh.org.il/eng/articles/siteArticle.asp?aid=162&cid=69

[15] ‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done?’, Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 88, February 2007.

[16] ‘Iran Now Free to Achieve Its Military Nuclear Ambitions: An Israeli Perspective on the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate’, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 7,  No. 28, 9 January 2008 http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=2009&TTL=Iran_Now_Free_to_Achieve_Its_Military_Nuclear_Ambitions:_An_Israeli_Perspective_on_the_U.S._National_Intelligence_Estimate

[17] ‘Washington lines up with Moscow’s soft diplomacy on Iran, Nicholas Burns drops out’, DEBKAfile, 19 January 2008. http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=4952

[18] ‘Iran gets third nuclear fuel batch from Russia – IRNA’, Reuters, 18 January 2008. http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-31473020080118

[19] ‘Livni fails to change Lavrov’s stance on Iran’, The Jerusalem Post, 17 January 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1200572478701&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

[20] ‘E.U. and Iran: No Chance for Sanctions to Work’, Michael J. Economides and Peter Glover, Energy Tribune, 15 January 2008. http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=751; ‘Back to business as usual with Iran’, Matthias Kuntzel, The Jerusalem Post, 13 January 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/Page/IndexList&cid=1150885851861; ‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done?’, Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 88, February 2007.

[21] ‘Iran slams US sanctions drive, China backs dialogue’, AFP, 17 January 2008. http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hvt7RiOsTAEcAe-HQuV4se8jwmqg; ‘Iran says has nuclear stance similar to China’s’, Ben Blanchard, Reuters, 18 January 2008. http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-31473520080118

[22] ‘UN Powers agree on new Iran draft,’ BBC Online, 22 January 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7201708.stm

[23] ‘Iran brushes aside Israeli test firing of missile’, Yan Liang, ChinaView, 18 January 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/18/content_7442392.htm; ‘Israel “would not dare attack Iran”: Ahmadinejad’, Firouz Sedarat, Reuters, 17 January 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL1781409020080117

[24] ‘Back to business as usual with Iran’, Matthias Kuntzel, The Jerusalem Post, 13 January 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/Page/IndexList&cid=1150885851861

[25] ‘A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can Be Done?’, Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, Memorandum 88, February 2007 ; ‘Back to business as usual with Iran’, Matthias Kuntzel, The Jerusalem Post, 13 January 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/Page/IndexList&cid=1150885851861