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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Israel’s policy following the escalation in the south

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Key points

  • The escalation of violence that started with the terror attacks on the Israel-Egypt border last Thursday (18/8) provides a stark reminder of the new security reality in the region and the dilemmas Israeli policymakers face in response.
  • At present, most of the actors involved are not interested in further escalation, and efforts are being made to bring the violence to an end. However, the increasing power of splinter terror groups operating from the Gaza Strip continues to pose a constant threat to regional stability.
  • In the post-Mubarak era, Egypt’s leadership is significantly more attentive to popular sentiment. This will likely pose further challenges that will have to be taken into account in future deliberations between Cairo and Jerusalem.

Introduction

The coordinated terror attacks that took place on Thursday, 18 August, were the most severe incidents along the Israel-Egypt border since the two countries signed a historic peace treaty in 1979. Significantly, the incidents exposed deep differences between Cairo and Jerusalem over the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula, and illuminated the impact of Egypt’s new political reality on the country’s foreign policy. At the same time, the attacks carried out by the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) apparently caught Hamas by surprise and provided proof of the growing power of splinter groups within the Gaza Strip. How has this new strategic and diplomatic reality impacted on policymakers in Israel? What are Israel’s military considerations and how do they correspond to Jerusalem’s diplomatic agenda?

What has been Israel’s policy in the aftermath of the attacks?

The terror attacks near Eilat were followed by a barrage of rockets from Gaza into Israel, the most severe case of rocket fire in months. All major Israeli urban centres in the south were hit at the weekend. One man was killed and dozens were injured. In a late night cabinet meeting on Sunday, Israeli ministers were presented with defence assessments of the situation but were not asked to authorise additional measures. Instead, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly explained that Israel was required to show restraint at this point in order to prevent an escalation of the violence, ease tensions with Egypt and avoid diplomatic confrontations at this stage.

The border incidents also exposed the rising power of smaller terror groups in Gaza and the dilemma faced by the Hamas rulers there. The attacks were launched by the PRC whilst Hamas leaders were holding talks with Egyptian intelligence officials in Cairo. Initially, Hamas officials seemed surprised by the incidents and denied the organisation’s involvement. Despite this, Hamas did not try to prevent smaller groups from firing rockets from Gaza at the weekend, fearing it would be accused of betraying its ‘resistance agenda’.

Given the splintering of authority within Gaza, Egypt’s involvement and influence has become increasingly more important. For this reason, a clear Israeli effort has been made to ensure that diplomatic ties with Cairo are stabilised and that Egypt is allowed to play a key role in restoring order. In the long run, however, the rise of small terror groups in Gaza and their ability to rely on terror infrastructure in the Sinai will pose further threats to both Israel and Egypt.

How have the attacks impacted on Israel-Egypt relations?

Despite Egypt’s tumultuous transition period, strategic coordination between Israel and the military leadership in Cairo remains strong. In fact, many of those who conducted the strategic dialogue with Israel during the Mubarak era are still part of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which controls Egypt in the interim period. At its core, both countries remain committed to the peace agreement between them and see it as a crucial strategic asset.

The Egyptian military leadership was nonetheless torn between two priorities. First, it sought to prove its capacity to govern the country and act against those who seek to take advantage of the transitional period. At the same time, this had to be done with particular attention to popular sentiment, which remains highly resentful of Israel. This is partly why the SCAF reacted so strongly to the death of three Egyptian policemen during last week’s gun battle. Reports that Egypt intended to recall its ambassador from Israel, which were later denied, were seen as a clear warning that the relationship could no longer be taken for granted.

During the Mubarak era, Israel could pursue a strong policy against Palestinian terrorism, with only minor Egyptian gestures of dissatisfaction and actual behind the scenes support. Last week’s incident illustrated the new reality in which a clash between terrorists and Israel can quickly escalate into a diplomatic incident involving Egypt as well.

Although the IDF top brass would have liked to react more forcefully to reassert Israel’s deterrence, PM Netanyahu opted to limit the response to aerial and naval strikes. More importantly, the military response was accompanied by intense diplomatic activity that sought to calm the diplomatic tension with Egypt and enable Cairo to try to broker a ceasefire. To facilitate this, Defence Minister Ehud Barak expressed his regret for the loss of Egyptian life during the incident and said Israel will fully cooperate with Egypt to investigate it.

The basic interests that guide the Israel-Egypt relationship remain as strong as ever. Yet Egyptian popular opinion will play an increasing role in determining the dynamic of relations between the two countries.

Has Egypt lost control of the Sinai?

The PRC’s attacks last week caught many on both sides of the border by surprise. In an interview with Haaretz, Israeli Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Giora Eiland outlined the key issues Israel will have to address when investigating the events. First, the construction of a fence along the Israel-Egypt border has yet to be completed, even though its construction was authorised in principle in 2005. Second, Eiland questioned whether Israel has sufficiently assessed the impact of changes within Egypt on the security situation on the border. Finally, Israel will have to investigate the tactical dimensions of the incidents, from the intelligence warnings to the operation of forces on the ground.

Eiland is not the first to raise concern that the ousting of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak could also change relations between Cairo and Jerusalem. The security situation in the Sinai has been of particular concern, due to its proximity to Israel and its function as an important smuggling route into Gaza. Some Israeli commentators have posited that Egypt’s new leaders lack the determination of the Mubarak regime and that terror groups have exploited this to freely operate in the Sinai. The partial opening of the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza has been cited as an example of the loosening grip of Egyptian authorities in the region. The cross-border attacks on 18 August ostensibly confirmed these warnings.

Yet it is important to remember that the Sinai has long been used by terror groups and smugglers, often aided by local Bedouin tribes. The Israel-Egypt peace treaty stipulated that Egypt will have only 750 lightly armoured troops along the 220km border with Israel, which limited policing in the region. For a long time, all those involved sought to avoid any action that could hamper the region’s tourism industry or damage the commercial natural gas supply to Jordan and Israel.

This delicate status quo increasingly came under strain following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2006, long before the ousting of Mubarak. In January 2007, Eilat was hit by a Palestinian suicide bomber who crossed over the border from Sinai; in 2010, missiles were fired towards Eilat and landed in the Jordanian city of Aqaba. In recent months, the gas pipeline in the northern Sinai was attacked five times, severely disrupting the commercial supply to Jordan and Israel.

In fact, the PRC attacks came only days after Egypt launched a large-scale military operation to crack down on terror and criminal activity in the area. The operation was closely coordinated with Israel, which had to agree to the entry of armoured vehicles into the demilitarised region. The Egyptian move was significant in signalling Cairo’s growing awareness of the deteriorating situation along its border and its determination to reassert its sovereignty in the remote region. A lot will rest on Egyptian determination to persevere with such actions, despite potential conflict with Bedouin tribes and Palestinian groups in Gaza.

Conclusion

It seems that despite a trickle of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel, the Egyptian-brokered lull is holding for now and that all major actors are seeking to avoid an escalation. However, the past few days have illustrated yet again that Gaza remains a source of severe instability. In the new political reality created in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, provocations instigated by small groups have the potential to put Israel’s delicate ties with its neighbours under significant strain. Despite the challenges of recent days, Israel’s restraint and Egypt’s ultimate decision to keep relations on track can also be used as a basis to rebuild trust and re-establish the strategic bonds that have been so crucial to Middle East stability in recent decades.