BICOM

The visit of President George Bush to Israel and the Palestinian Authority areas last week contained few real surprises. The US’s long-standing friendship with Israel was reaffirmed.  The Administration’s commitment to the Roadmap and to rekindling the diplomatic process between Israelis and Palestinians was reiterated. The president also repeated his Administration’s explicit commitment both to Israel’s security and to the establishment of a Palestinian state at the conclusion of the negotiations.

One aspect of Bush’s visit which has been noted by Israeli analysts, however, was the slight harshening of tone toward Israel and shift of emphasis in some of the president’s statements regarding the peace process. Bush’s speech on 24 June 2002 and his letter to Prime Minister Sharon in April 2004 have generally been seen as the clearest expositions of the President’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 2004 letter, Bush first expressed his view that a final status accord would be unlikely to include an Israeli retreat to the 1949 ceasefire lines. He also expressed his view that Palestinian refugees and their descendants should be re-settled in the new Palestinian state ‘rather than in Israel’ and, importantly, allowed for continued Israeli control of airspace, territorial waters, and land passages, “pending agreements or other arrangements.”[i]

In his recent visit Bush reiterated his commitment to these previously held positions on the borders and refugee issues.  However, he also spoke in more unequivocal terms of a need for an end to the ‘occupation’ begun in 1967 and made clear his support for the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian state, which should not, he said, look like a ‘Swiss cheese.'[ii] Bush also repeated his determination to reach a final status accord by the end of the year. The general sense emerging was one of reduced emphasis on the obligations of the Palestinians to launch a determined campaign against the infrastructures of terror, and a correspondingly increased focus on the need for an as swift as possible conclusion to the peace process, concluding in a viable Palestinian state.

Analysts have differed on the reasons for this slight but significant US shift in emphasis.  This article will consider a number of explanations for it, and will go on to look at the possible effect that this shift in tone may have on internal Israeli politics and the nature of PM Olmert’s coalition.

Explaining the US change of tone

According to one school of thought, the President’s shift in emphasis is a reflection of growing, genuine differences between the US and Israel – a continuation of the stark difference in perspectives shown by the December NIE report on Iran. According to this view, the US’s problematic position in the Middle East – as a result of its difficulties in Iraq, the failure of the Administration’s hopes for regional democratisation, and the rise of Russian and Chinese regional influence – are causing Washington to attempt a greater alignment with the prevailing political culture of the region and with the outlook of key allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These countries consider that Israel is the key factor preventing an advancement of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and that pressure on Israel is the key factor in advancing that process. The President, according to this view, was seeking to placate mainstream Arab opinion with a new tone on the relative rights and responsibilities of Israel and the Palestinians.[iii]

A second school of thought sees the President’s visit in the context of the need to shore up the alliance of moderate Arab states against the Iranian threat. According to this view, the NIE report has not fundamentally altered the President’s view of Iran, and his visit to the region is largely concerned with solidifying the moderate coalition against Tehran’s nuclear programme. For this reason, the President’s Mid-East trip was originally intended to take him only to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states. The visit to Israel was added later.  According to this view, the President’s change of emphasis vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian process was a gesture intended to facilitate the strengthening of the coalition of moderate Arab states.[iv] Events since the President’s departure from Israel lend a great deal of credence to this view. In a speech in Abu Dhabi on Sunday, Bush criticised Iran in the harshest terms, calling it the ‘world’s leading state sponsor of terror.’ Also, a report in Newsweek has revealed that in private talks with Israeli officials, the President made clear that the NIE report does not represent his views.[v]

A further explanation focuses on internal Israeli politics. As is well known, PM Olmert’s coalition is fragile, and contains two right of centre parties which may leave if discussions on concessions to the Palestinians reach a certain point on final status issues. The final report of the Winograd Committee, due to be issued on January 30, is also fuelling speculation of possibly imminent coalition instability. According to this view, the President’s remarks were intended to give PM Olmert room to manoeuvre – in that he may claim that certain courses of action have become necessary because of US pressure, rather than because he himself desires them. In this regard, it is worth noting that Olmert is committed to the creation of a territorially contiguous Palestinian state and opposes illegal outposts. Hence Bush’s criticisms were all in areas in which he and the Israeli Prime Minister are in any case largely in agreement.[vi]

The impact on Israeli politics

President Bush made clear during his visit the importance he attaches to the survival of PM Olmert’s coalition, in order to make possible progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians.  Will his emphasis on this point, and his bluntly expressed commitment to the swift conclusion of the process aid the preservation of the coalition?

First of all, despite Bush’s statements, the coalition is probably in no immediate danger. A poll published in Friday’s Haaretz newspaper revealed that all save one of the parties currently forming the coalition would lose seats if elections were held now. According to the poll, Kadima would go from its current 29 seats to 13 if elections were held tomorrow.  Labour would go from 19 seats to 17, Shas from 12 seats to nine, and the Pensioners from seven to two. The only coalition partner which would increase its Knesset representation would be the right wing Yisrael Beiteinu.[vii] This electoral picture is the key reason why the coalition is in no imminent danger. Indeed the latest poll finds that the Likud would win 30 seats should elections be held now.[viii] A Dahaf poll found slightly differing results – putting Likud on 28, Labour on 21, Kadima on ten and Yisrael Beiteinu on eight if elections were held tomorrow.[ix] But these differences do not change the substantive picture – namely, that the members of the coalition have a natural interest in postponing elections.

The right wing parties are nevertheless in a dilemma in that they cannot afford to stay too long in a government which may support concessions on Jerusalem and other core issues. Avigdor Lieberman yesterday informed PM Olmert that his party may quit the coalition if talks begin with the Palestinians on core issues such as the future of Jerusalem.[x] The Israeli media is reporting that Lieberman’s departure is looking increasingly likely.[xi] The coalition could, however, survive the departure of Lieberman’s party – which joined the government only in November 2006.

Yisrael Beiteinu aside, it is hard to see how Shas – a non-Zionist party which nevertheless depends on a hawkish, right-leaning electorate – could stay in the coalition if real concessions on Jerusalem and dismantling of settlements came onto the agenda. Regardless of what the opinion polls or the US President says, at that point quitting the coalition would be likely to be seen as a political necessity.

Hence, President Bush’s hardening of tone toward Israel is unlikely to play a key role in the preservation of the coalition, which is not in immediate danger, but which would probably collapse if extensive concessions came onto the agenda.

Conclusion

It now appears likely that President Bush’s changed tone formed an aspect of a wider strategy for keeping solid the coalition of pro-western states vis-à-vis the Iranian threat.  It will be interesting to note the tone of other key western states in the weeks to come, since this may form an aspect of a wider strategy.

The President’s changed tone notwithstanding, on the essential contours of both the desired outcome and the process between Israel and the Palestinians, his position is very close to that of the Government of Israel.  PM Olmert, in remarks to the Cabinet yesterday, made clear that Bush accepts the need for all sides to complete their commitments under the Roadmap before any agreement can be implemented.  He also noted that the President regards Palestinian obligations as applying to Gaza as well as to the West Bank.[xii] Thus, regardless of the notable shift in atmospherics in the recent Bush visit, no substantive pressure from the US on Israel is expected.

---

 

[i] President Bush’s letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 14 April 2004.  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/bushletter.html

[ii] Rory McCarthy, ‘Bush calls for an end to Israeli occupation,’ the Guardian, 11 January 2008.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,2238955,00.html

[iii] See Gerald Steinberg, “The Bush visit and tensions in the US-Israeli relationship,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 7, no. 27, 7 January 2008.  http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=376&PID=0&IID=2007&TTL=The_Bush_Visit_and_Tensions_in_the_U.S.-Israel_Relationship

[iv] Interview with Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Senior Lecturer, Bar-Ilan University.

[v] Michael Hersh, ‘Bothersome Intel on Iran,’ Newsweek, January 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/91673

[vi] Interview with senior Israeli journalist.

[vii] Yossi Verter, ‘Who shall quit and who shall stay?’ Haaretz, 11 January 2008.

[viii] Ibid

[ix] Dahaf Poll, 11 January 2008.  http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=37603

[x] Mazal Muallem, “Lieberman to tell PM he may quit over nature of talks with PA,” Haaretz, 13 January 2008.  http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/944209.html

[xi] Gil Hoffman, ‘Olmert wants UTJ if Lieberman goes,’ Jerusalem Post, 14 January 2008. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1199964915214&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

[xii] PM Olmert: US position in coming year is highly significant, communicated by the PM’s Media Adviser, 13 January 2008.