BICOM

Executive Summary

The holding of the 20^th Arab Summit in Damascus offered the Assad regime a prestigious chance to move back toward the Arab mainstream. This, however, would have come at a price for Syria – which it apparently preferred not to pay. The key issue of concern among moderate Arab states is Syrian interference in Lebanon. Syrian actions in Lebanon cannot be isolated from Damascus’s broader stance of alliance with Iran and opposition to the US and its allies in the region. The Iranian-Syrian alliance, and its opposition to Israel, the US and regional stability is the central dynamic in current Middle Eastern politics and diplomacy. The hardening response of pro-western Arab states toward this alliance was reflected in their decision not to attend the summit. 

There is a growing sense that Syria has painted itself into a corner over the issues of the Hariri tribunal, influence in Lebanon, support for Palestinian Islamist terror groups and alliance with Iran. The indications, however, are that Syria is aware of the implications of its decisions, and is not currently seeking a way back.

Introduction

The 20^th Arab Summit, which took place over the weekend, was noteworthy mainly for the extent to which it showcased Syria’s current isolation in the Arab world. Events preceding and surrounding the summit also reflected the deep anger and frustration felt by many Arab governments regarding the current regional policy being pursued by Damascus. The key issue of concern was Syrian interference in Lebanon. But Syrian actions in Lebanon cannot be isolated from Damascus’s broader stance of alliance with Iran and opposition to the US and its allies in the region. This article will observe the background and key events surrounding the Damascus summit, and will go on to ask what implications these have for the Israeli debate on talks with Syria.

The Arab Summit: What happened?

The holding of the summit in Damascus clearly offered the Assad regime a prestigious chance to show Syria’s continued importance in the region. A successful summit, attended by senior Arab leaders, might have signaled the ‘coming of age’ of the Bashar Assad regime (Bashar al-Assad inherited the leadership of Syria from his father Hafez, on the latter’s death in 2000.) This, however, would have come at a price for Syria – which it apparently preferred not to pay. 

First and foremost, to move itself back into the mainstream, Syria would have been required to change course in Lebanon. Since the expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, Damascus has been actively engaged in seeking to destabilise its neighbour state. Saudi Arabia, the major regional backer of the Siniora government in Lebanon, holds Damascus directly responsible for the ongoing political impasse in Lebanon. Hezbollah, clients of Syria and Iran, launched a rolling campaign to bring down the Siniora government in January 2007. Since November 2007, Lebanon has been without a president because of (Syrian backed) Hezbollah and opposition demands for veto power in a future Cabinet. According to EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, Syria is deliberately disrupting attempts to secure the election of Michel Suleiman as president. Solana has also expressed concern that the ongoing assassination of lawmakers in Lebanon is gradually reducing the government’s parliamentary majority.[i] Solana called for greater international pressure on Syria. 

Looming over Syria’s Lebanon policy is the issue of the tribunal into the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri. An initial report on the UN investigation into the killing found “probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials, and could not have been … organised without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services”.[ii] The Syrians have consistently denied all connection with the killing, and with the string of mysterious murders of anti-Syrian figures in Lebanon that have taken place in the subsequent period. But the regime is understood to be close to panic regarding the possibility that the investigation could eventually ask for the extradition of senior officials. The tribunal is approaching the point of readiness to begin its investigation. Eleven Lebanese and foreign judges have been selected to conduct the investigation, and premises have been prepared for its deliberations.[iii]

The Syrian regime thus faced a stark choice:

Either:

1. Cease its disruptive actions in Lebanon – which would mean accepting the potential risk that the tribunal poses to the stability of the regime, and abandoning Syria’s long-held stance of non-acceptance of Lebanese sovereignty, in order to repair relations with the Arab states.

Or:

2. Maintain the alliance with Iran, and the support for Hezbollah and Palestinian terror organizations, as the best way to stand, if necessary, in defiance of international law over the tribunal, and to rebuild influence in Lebanon.

The Syrian regime has clearly chosen option 2. Leaders of major Arab states therefore chose not to attend the summit, in order to express their anger at the Syrian stance. Saudi Arabia sent a junior official.  Egypt, meanwhile, was represented by a junior Cabinet member. Omar Rifai, Jordan’s representative to the Arab League represented Amman at the summit. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh made a last-minute decision to send his deputy Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Lebanon did not send any representative to the summit. Around half of all Arab leaders chose not to attend the summit. Other Arab League member states whose leaders did not attend were Morocco, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Somalia and Djibouti.

Among those whose leaders did attend were: Algeria, the Comoros, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.[iv] Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, in a press conference in Riyadh timed to coincide with the opening of the summit, held Syria responsible for blocking compromise to resolve the Lebanon presidential crisis.[v] (It is worth noting that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki also intended the conference. His presence did not prevent the summit from voting in favour of the UAE’s claim on three islands currently controlled by Iran in the Gulf – much to Iran’s reported displeasure.)

Arab analysts are seeing the Syrian stance and the response to it as presaging a major strategic rift in the Arab world. Some have likened the emerging situation to the Arab Cold War of the 1960s, which saw the region polarised between nationalist, then pro-Soviet Egypt and conservative, pro-US Saudi Arabia. Wahid Abdel Megid, director of the Cairo-based Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, has commented that “This summit is taking place under the shadow of a deep Arab split which started at previous summits, but has now reached its peak with leaders unable to hold a dialogue at the summit level.” Explaining the background to the split, Megid pointed to the fact that “Syria is supported by certain Arab forces who want to change the face of the area into a more Iranian one against the United States.” The Egyptian state-owned media was scathing regarding Syria in the days leading up to the summit. Al-Goumhouriya asserted that “Everyone expects the summit to fail [because] most Arab countries won’t sign up to Syria’s lost bet on Iran taking up the leadership of the region.”[vi]

Significance of Syria’s choice

The events surrounding the Arab summit confirm the strategic nature of Syria’s alliance with Iran and with Hezbollah. It is clear that, as Syria expert David Lesch put it, “The big complicating factor [regarding US policy toward Syria] is Lebanon… And from my discussions in Syria – and I was there in early February – they’re not going to budge on that issue. So, this could be a long-simmering and long-standing obstacle to any sort of engagement between the United States and Syria.” Robert Malley, head of the International Crisis Group’s Middle East desk, placed the Syrian decision in a broader context: “For the past quarter century, Iran has been Syria’s most loyal, most dependable and, at some points, only ally… Damascus will not abandon this relationship for the sake of renewed dialogue with the US or an entry fare for negotiations with Israel.”[vii]

The current Israeli government has expressed its willingness to re-open negotiations with Syria. Both Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Military Intelligence Head Major-General Amos Yadlin support re-commencing talks with Syria (Mossad Head Meir Dagan is known to oppose this option). However, the latest reports indicate that repeated overtures made by Israel to the Assad regime over the last year have failed to bear fruit. According to an article in Haaretz, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has despatched around 20 messages to President Assad, attempting to gauge his willingness to re-open talks. Syria yesterday confirmed the existence of a secret channel of communication with Israel – via Turkey.[viii] The results have been disappointing, according to the report. While Haaretz did not include the details of the differences over the sides, they are likely to have been over Syrian unwillingness to include its backing of Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups (and, implicitly, its alliance with Iran) in the talks. The broader impression gained, according to the report, was that senior figures in the regime “are opposed to talks with Israel and are not interested in breaking off the alliance with Iran.”[ix]

Thus, the recent events surrounding the Arab summit confirm the solidity of Syria’s alignment with Iran, and with the various Arab paramilitary organisations which the two countries sponsor. This alliance, and its opposition to Israel, the US and regional stability is the central dynamic in current Middle Eastern politics and diplomacy. The hardening response of pro-western Arab states, meanwhile, was also reflected in their decision not to attend the summit. There is a growing sense that Syria has painted itself into a corner over the issues of the Hariri tribunal, influence in Lebanon, support for Palestinian Islamist terror groups and alliance with Iran. The indications, however, are that Syria is aware of the implications of its decisions, and is not currently seeking a way back.

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[i] Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria defiant on Lebanon despite Arab summit,” Reuters, 26 March 2008. http://www.lebanese-forces.org/

[ii] Ian Black, “The ticking timebomb: UN Tribunal gears up to try Lebanon PM’s killers,” the Guardian, 27 March 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] “Syria shrugs off low summit turnout,” Now Lebanon, 28 March 2008. http://www.nowlebanon.com/

[v] Barak Ravid, “Official: PM sent 20 messages of peace to Assad, but Syrian Pres. Disappointed us,” Haaretz, 30 March 2008. http://www.haaretz.com/

[vi] Now Lebanon.

[vii] “Pundit prattle,” Now Lebanon, 29 March 2008. http://nowlebanon.com/

[viii] “Damascus confirms channel of communication with Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 30 March 2008. http://www.lebanese-forces.org/

[ix] Ravid.