fbpx

Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Syria’s increased isolation and its implications

[ssba]

Key points

  • Despite ongoing Syrian violence against anti-government protestors, the diplomatic position of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has significantly deteriorated in the past week.
  • Saudi Arabia has led the Sunni Arab world in considerably raising the pitch of condemnation of the Assad regime’s violence against Syria’s Sunni majority.
  • Turkish criticism of the Assad regime has also sharpened considerably. It is Turkey, which has enjoyed a close relationship with Syria, and which has a strong interest in Syrian stability, that may prove to be the most significant external player in the situation.
  • The fate of the regime in Damascus is of acute interest for Israel. Syria is Iran’s key Arab ally and a vital source of support for both Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran is working hard to help the Assad regime to survive.

Introduction

International diplomatic pressure has yet to impact on the brutal actions of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Activists say the regime has killed 1,700 civilians in five months. What is the significance of the latest diplomatic moves? What are the motivations guiding regional actors in their opposition to the Syrian crackdown? Will the potential coalescing of regional and international forces pose a real threat to the survival of the Assad regime?

Increasing Assad’s isolation: reaching a tipping point?

The Assad regime’s diplomatic position has significantly deteriorated in the past week. At the weekend, Turkish President Abdullah Gul met with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to discuss regional developments. Several days earlier, Riyadh took the lead among Arab nations by pulling its ambassador to Syria and demanding an ‘end to the killing machine’ of President Assad. Western powers are also working to tighten Syria’s isolation in the region. A White House statement noted that American, British and Saudi leaders were united in seeking an immediate halt to the Syrian crackdown.

The tone of US condemnation has gradually intensified in recent weeks. Yet the administration has not explicitly called on Assad to step down and has not withdrawn its own ambassador. This reflects the US understanding of the limited ability to force such a move, its desire not to taint the protest movement with a US stamp and its preference for regional powers to take the diplomatic lead. Instead, the US focus remains on diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. Last week, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Syria’s allies – particularly Russia and China – to cut oil and arms trade with the Assad regime. The US also announced new sanctions on firms and banks.

The European Union, which has already put sanctions on some regime figures, has also discussed sanctions against Syria’s oil and gas industry. Should such a move take place, it would have a serious effect on the Syrian economy, striking at one of the regime’s few remaining sources of income.

Western powers until now have been unable to bring about any operative UN Security Council resolution against Syria. Russia has not been keen to see a significant move at the UN. It has a historical relationship with Syria, it is a major arms supplier and has a naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. However, an increasing regional chorus of condemnation against Syria may change the international diplomatic picture.

Increasing Arab criticism

Alongside increasing Western condemnation of Syria, there has been a significant Arab diplomatic move away from the Syrian regime in the last week.

Like the Saudis, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have recalled their ambassadors to Syria for ‘consultations’. The Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League issued statements condemning the violence in Syria. Several influential Sunni leaders backed denunciation of Syria’s ‘atrocities’ against protestors.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria had improved in recent years, as Riyadh sought to lure Assad away from his long-time alliance with Iran. King Abdullah visited Damascus in 2009 hoping to counterbalance Teheran’s influence in the region, a trend the Saudis have observed with growing concern. Despite these efforts, Assad’s refusal to compromise his ties with Iran and the recent violence against Sunni protestors have brought Saudi-Syrian relations to a historical nadir.

Gulf monarchies have been deeply wary of popular uprisings of any kind, and were not inclined to support the uprising in Syria. Initially, protests were not seen to pose an immediate threat to Assad’s Alawite regime, but their continuation and mounting reports of casualties have resulted in stronger Arab opposition to the regime’s crackdown. The assault by the Syrian army on Sunni populations immediately prior to the beginning of Ramadan appears to have been the factor that led the Gulf states and the Arab League to shift. Events in Syria, followed intensively on Al Jazeera and other Arab media, are increasingly seen in the Arab world as a Sunni majority uprising against a non-Sunni government backed by Shia Iran. The sectarian dimension will provide Arab leaders with greater popular demand for taking a stronger position against the Assad regime.

In Egypt, the ‘6th of April’ movement has vowed to demonstrate in front of the Syrian embassy until the Syrian ambassador leaves the country. Similar protests have taken place in Jordan, Turkey, Tunisia and Kuwait. More recently, the Syrian attack on the city of Latakia forced thousands of Palestinians in a nearby refugee camp to flee their homes. In a strong response to the attack, Yasser Abed Rabbo, the PLO secretary-general, denounced what he described as ‘a crime against humanity’.

The hardening Arab position is unlikely to have a direct impact on the Assad regime. Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby told reporters that the League would support ‘step by step persuasion’ rather than ‘drastic measures’ to resolve the situation. Nonetheless, Arab states and regional forces like Turkey will play an essential role in legitimising any future international steps against the Syrian leadership.

The crucial role of Turkey

Exiled Syrian oppositionists have long stressed Turkey’s key position in deciding the outcome of events in Syria. Turkey, which has an 800-kilometre border with Syria, enjoyed improved relations with the Assad regime in recent years, but also maintained relations with the Sunni opposition in Syria. This dual orientation, together with Turkey’s growing regional influence, makes Ankara’s position pivotal.

In the first months of the unrest, Turkey unsuccessfully sought to use its ties with the Assad regime to restore stability. The fissure between the two countries became explicit last week when Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Syria to encourage Assad to begin a process of reform. Following Davutoglu’s departure, the Syrian regime launched new military operations close to the Turkish border. Ankara later stated that Assad had two weeks to initiate the reform process, after which Assad could no longer rely on Turkey’s friendship in the event of international military action.

Turkey has a strong interest in Syrian stability and Ankara is increasingly concerned that unrest in Syria could spill over. Thousands of Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey since the outbreak of violence. Turkey, like Syria, has significant Alawite and Kurdish minorities. Should the conflict in Syria become increasingly sectarian, this could foster increasing unrest among ethnic communities within Turkey. It has been reported that a Turkish military commander issued tacit warnings to Syria regarding the possibility of Turkey creating a buffer zone on Syrian territory to house refugees from the violence. Turkey has not reached this point yet, but if the violence continues unabated, some form of Turkish intervention is a possibility.

Assad’s Iranian lifeline

Mounting regional isolation has highlighted Assad’s deep reliance on the support of the Iranian regime. For Teheran, protecting the Assad regime is of strategic importance. Syria is an important ally that  facilitates Iranian infiltration into the Arab Middle East. Syria is particularly important in connecting Iran with Lebanese and Palestinian terror networks which work to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

In the past few years, Syria has operated as the main artery connecting Iran with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives have moved freely around Syria and large amounts of weapons have been transferred into Lebanon through both the Damascus airport and smuggling convoys arriving from Iran (via Iraq and into Syria). Hezbollah, which is keen to protect this strategic supply route, has reportedly assisted the Syrian forces in suppressing demonstrations. Damascus also remains the base for the political bureau of Hamas, which receives considerable support from Iran.

At a time of great regional volatility, Iran has sought to ensure the emergence of a friendly regime in Iraq as Western forces pull out of the country. Pro-Iranian regimes in Bagdad, Damascus and to a large extent Beirut could solidify a contiguous set of Arab countries supporting Iranian interests. Assad’s survival is pivotal in realising this strategy, which explains Teheran’s eagerness to protect the Alawite regime in Damascus. Assad’s fall would be a significant blow for Iran.

Conclusion

The moves by the US, the Arab states and Turkey leave Assad isolated. But with Iranian support solid, and his army largely intact, the Syrian dictator remains committed to a path of continued repression, rather than accommodation and reform. In the absence of increased international pressure, the bloodshed and repression in Syria look set to continue. In this state of affairs, Turkey will play a key role. But what options they or any other external players have to change what is happening on the ground remains to be seen.