BICOM

On Thursday, 15 November, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas issued his strongest condemnation of his Hamas rivals since the Palestinian Islamists carried out their coup in the Gaza Strip in June of this year.  For the first time, Abbas called openly for the overthrow of the rival authority established by Hamas in Gaza since June.¹ While Abbas stopped short of calling for an armed uprising against Hamas, his language clearly reflected the severe deterioration which has taken place in relations between Hamas and Fatah since the June events, and which has been exacerbated in recent weeks by the killing of eight pro-Fatah demonstrators and the wounding of 80 more after Hamas security officers fired into a 200,000 strong Fatah demonstration in Gaza on 11 November.² This paper will observe the latest developments in the internal Palestinian situation in the build up to the Annapolis meeting, and assess the interplay between larger regional developments and internal Palestinian politics as a key aspect of the attempt to revive the diplomatic process.

Fatah v. Hamas: latest developments

The events of last week indicate that two related processes are currently taking place in the Gaza Strip: firstly, there is a general sense that the Hamas rulers of Gaza are vulnerable because of their inability to maintain basic living standards in Gaza.  Secondly, elements within Fatah are trying to mobilise to regain political advantage from this situation.

Since the closure of Gaza’s borders following the June coup, tens of thousands of residents of Gaza have lost their jobs, factories have closed, and exports and most imports are now frozen.  Roughly 75% of Gazans now live in poverty, according to Palestinian officials in the West Bank.³ Smuggling through the extensive tunnel system between Gaza and Sinai is endemic, with weapons and foodstuffs passing through, taxed by Hamas security officials.⁴ Alongside this dismal situation, Hamas is expending its energies on preparing for what it regards as a near certain future Israeli military operation to bring down its rule in Gaza. The movement is investing in the development of longer range Qassam rockets, hoping to develop a rocket with a range of 20-25 kms.  This would bring Israeli towns such as Ashkelon and Ofakim within range.⁵ Through smuggling cash and revenues gained from taxes on smuggled goods, Hamas is able to pay the salaries of its own employees and loyalists – ensuring their obedience but heightening grievances among Gazans not connected to the movement.

There is a wider sense in which Hamas’s project in Gaza is seen as foundering.  Having taken power with proclamations that support from Arab backers and from Iran would underwrite the building of a flourishing, uncompromising version of Palestinian self-rule, Hamas is now presiding over a reality of poverty, blockade, the frenzied gathering of weapons and a sense of approaching crisis.

The result of all this is that the popularity of the movement has significantly declined within Gaza. While polling data within the Palestinian territories is notoriously unreliable, it is at least worth noting that one West Bank agency places current support for the movement in Gaza and the West Bank at around 20%.⁶ In addition to this situation, the Israeli security establishment considers that Hamas is currently undergoing serious internal rifts – with former PA foreign minister Mahmoud al-Zahar identified with an element in the movement seeking further confrontation, and Ismail Haniyeh associated with a more ‘pragmatic’ approach.

This situation is leading to claims by some Fatah officials that Hamas control of Gaza is vulnerable.⁷ Last week’s demonstration and the subsequent comments by Chairman Abbas form part of a larger attempt by Fatah to tap into popular anger.

At least for the moment, however, Hamas rule in Gaza, and the movement’s larger fortunes are probably not particularly vulnerable.  In the first place, the movement has by no means exhausted its coercive capabilities.  The Hamas authorities in Gaza are currently looking into placing general restrictions on public gatherings in Gaza, and are introducing further restrictions on media activity in Gaza.  The Interior Ministry has issued a statement permitting only those with accreditation from the ministry to work as journalists in Gaza (and gaining this accreditation requires submitting to rules preventing stories which could cause ‘harm to national unity’, or which are not in line with ‘national responsibilities’ as defined by the Ministry.)⁸ The events of last week, and of the June coup, indicate that Hamas would not hesitate to kill other Palestinians if it deems this necessary.  And Israeli forces who have recently operated in the Gaza Strip have noted that the control of Gaza, along with the possibility of sending selected cadres to train in Iran, has led to a significant improvement in Hamas’s military capabilities.

The second reason why the Hamas enclave of Gaza is probably in no immediate danger is because Fatah itself remains in utter disarray.  Some observers consider that on the West Bank, its supposed heartland, the movement no longer exists as a single functioning entity. Instead, it consists of a host of rival fiefdoms, all concerned mainly with their own parochial material interests.  No real process of reform has taken place in light of the election defeat of January 2006, and the coup of June 2007.⁹ It is generally accepted that were it not for Israeli security forces activity in the West Bank, Hamas could paralyse large parts of the area at will.  At the same time, because of the Israeli presence and because of its unsuccessful rule of Gaza, a Hamas showdown with Fatah in the West Bank is not currently feasible.

Thus, Palestinian internal politics in the approach to Annapolis is characterised by an effective stalemate between two dominant political movements – both of which face serious crises.

The significance of the attempt to revive the peace process for internal Palestinian politics

The current US-sponsored attempt to revive the peace process cannot be seen in separation from internal Palestinian politics, or from wider regional developments.  The crisis of Fatah is part of a larger crisis being faced by secular nationalist movements and governments throughout the region.  Some observers have spoken of the ‘Islamisation’ of the politics of the Arab world, as Islamist movements emerge in country after country, capable of galvanising popular support and challenging the economically and socially unsuccessful Arab regimes of both nationalist and monarchical variety.  The uniform advance of Islamist politics should not be exaggerated.  In some parts of the Arabic-speaking world traditionally associated with more moderate politics – such as Morocco – the Islamists have suffered recent setbacks.  But in the Levant and the Gulf, the trend is inescapable.  Hamas among the Palestinians, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, Hezbollah among the Shia in Lebanon, rival Sunni and Shia Islamist groups in Iraq, opposition movements in Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf emirates – all are in their various ways raising the banner of political Islam in challenge to the Arab state system and the dominant political order of the region.

The revived diplomatic process between Israelis and Palestinians, of which the Annapolis meeting is meant to form the start, is part of an attempt to strengthen the position of the deeply troubled secular nationalist camp among the Palestinians.  Many analysts have contrasted the upbeat tones as the meeting approaches, with the great difficulties that will be involved in implementing any real progress toward conflict resolution.  It is important to understand that the revived diplomatic process is intended to aid that secular, nationalist Palestinian political element with which an agreement is considered feasible.  The possibility of this element being eclipsed by Islamist forces which reject in principle the very possibility of rapprochement with Israel is not an imaginary one.¹⁰ It has been noted that beyond Hamas, yet more extreme forces wait in the wings to try and take advantage of any breakdown and renewal of open conflict.  This knowledge – and the larger regional battle between the forces of secularism and moderation and the advocates of radical Islam – form both the backdrop and a key motivating force behind the revived Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process.

Related article:

BICOM Notes: Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Annapolis meeting, 10 October 2007

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¹ Conal Urquhart, Ian Black, “Abbas calls for overthrow of Hamas in Gaza Strip, claiming population is being abused,” The Guardian, 16 November 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,2212033,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront

² Jim Teeple, “Palestinian President calls for Hamas overthrow,” Voice of America News, 15 November 2007. http://voanews.com/english/2007-11-15-voa14.cfm

³ Karin Laub, “Economic woes behind new unrest in Gaza,” Associated Press, 14 November 2007.  http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hL9OhLekeQMSjvU_hcfrfdj8UI_gD8SSVCJG0

⁴ “Tunnel Visions,” The Economist, 15 November 2007.  http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10147681

⁵ Ehud Yaari, “Just the hard facts,” Jerusalem Post, 11 November 2007.  http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1192380783569&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

⁶ Laub.

⁷ Conversation with Fatah official, London, November 2007. 

⁸ Sarah El Deeb, “Hamas to curb press, gatherings in Gaza,” Associated Press, 14 November 2007.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/14/AR2007111401216.html

⁹ Yaari.

¹⁰ Danny Rubinstein, “Deserting a sinking ship,” Haaretz, 15 November 2007. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/924657.html