BICOM

Key points

• A Tzipi Livni victory in the Kadima primary looks like the most likely course of events, though much will depend on her camp’s ability to mobilise her voters to go to the polling booths on Wednesday. A low turnout has the outside possibility of leading to an upset, because of the more organised nature of the Mofaz camp.

• Regarding the likelihood of early general elections, much will depend on the identity of the new Kadima leader. If Livni is elected, she has said she will try to preserve the coalition and then expand it, but she has much less to fear from elections than Shaul Mofaz does. While most Israeli opinion polls still suggest a victory for the Likud against Kadima led by Livni, the margins are narrow and Livni may choose to attempt to continue the public momentum she will gain if she wins the Kadima primary into an early general elections campaign, if her early attempts at preserving the coalition fail. If Mofaz wins, he will have a clear interest in avoiding elections, because his relatively low public standing would lead to a likely Kadima defeat.

• It is difficult to accurately predict the response of other coalition parties following the primary results, though it is clear that re-negotiation of the coalition agreement will be necessary. Prediction is difficult because currently the other coalition parties are hinting at a tough stance in order to establish strong positions for themselves in post-primary negotiations.

Introduction

On 17 September, 74,000 Kadima members are set to elect a new leader.[1] Voting will take place in 114 polling stations in 93 localities across Israel. Following the Kadima primary, the Israeli political system faces the prospect of prolonged wrangling over the formation of a new governing coalition, or the possibility of early general elections.  This document will examine the latest polls in the build-up to the primary, and will look at possible scenarios for what will happen following the election of a new leader of Kadima.

Who will win?

There are four candidates in the leadership race for Kadima: Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz, Public Security Minister Avi Dichter and Interior Minister Meir Sheetrit.  The favourite in all Israeli opinion polls is Livni, while the only other serious contender is Mofaz.[2] Neither Dichter nor Sheetrit score above single percentage figures in any polls. 

The main candidates – Livni and Mofaz – are often seen as representing respectively the more left-wing and right-wing sides of Kadima. This is undoubtedly true regarding the issue of the diplomatic process with the Palestinians.  Livni has expressed her determination to pursue negotiations with the Palestinians, though she also supports ending the current talks with the Syrians for as long as they persist in supporting Hezbollah.[3]  Mofaz, meanwhile, has expressed his deep scepticism regarding the chances of the talks with the Palestinians leading to a final status peace accord.  He is therefore against the idea that the current talks should touch on ‘core issues’ of the conflict.[4]   

There are significant discrepancies in the polls regarding the gap between Livni and Mofaz.  In order to win outright and avoid a second round of voting, front-runner Livni would need to win 40 percent of the votes or more in the first round.  A poll taken last week by the Dialog polling agency for Haaretz newspaper had her doing just that – winning 40 percent of the votes to Mofaz’s 20 percent.  However, a poll by the Panorama agency for Kol Yisrael produced a very different result, giving Livni 39 percent of the votes to Mofaz’s 35 percent.[5]  A possibly significant difference in the methodology of the two polls is that Panorama polled only Kadima voters who are intending to vote, while Dialog made no such stipulation.  Thus, the much larger volume of support for Mofaz in the Panorama poll may indicate that the Mofaz camp’s electoral machine is making a better job of drawing out the vote for the candidate than Livni’s.  Analysts have noted the Mofaz camp’s assiduous targeting of 300 key Kadima activists who are thought to have the ability to command the votes of thousands of members.[6] Livni’s camp until recently had been criticised for making insufficient efforts at canvassing the vote within the party, instead relying on Livni’s undoubted greater popularity among the broader public.  In recent days, however, Livni’s camp has been increasing their activity in this regard, amid accusations of complacency.    

A poll conducted by the Dahaf agency for Yediot Ahronot on 12 September, meanwhile, also gives Livni a comfortable lead.  This poll of Kadima voters puts Livni ahead with the support of 47 percent of those polled, compared with 32 percent for Mofaz, eight percent for Sheetrit and six percent for Dichter.[7] The wide margin between the candidates was maintained when respondents were asked to gauge a direct contest between only Livni and Mofaz. Thus, a Livni victory looks like the most likely option, though much will depend on her camp’s ability to mobilise her voters to go to the polling booths on Wednesday.  A low turnout of less than 50 percent has the outside possibility of leading to an upset, because of the more organised nature of the Mofaz camp.[8]  

What will happen after the primary?

After the primary, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will stand down as Kadima leader, while remaining interim prime minister.  The new Kadima leader will then be asked by President Shimon Peres to form a new coalition within 21 days.  If they are unable to do so, the president will then call for general elections, which will be held after a further 90 days.[9]  

It is difficult to accurately predict the response of other coalition parties, though it is clear that re-negotiation of the coalition agreement will be necessary. Prediction is difficult because currently the other coalition parties are hinting at a tough stance in order to establish strong positions for themselves in post-primary negotiations.  Regarding the likelihood of early general elections, much will depend on the identity of the new Kadima leader.  If Mofaz wins, he will have a clear interest in avoiding elections, because his relatively low public standing would lead to a likely Kadima defeat.  If, as is more likely, Livni is elected, however, the calculations will be different.  Livni has said she will try to preserve the coalition and then expand it, but she has much less to fear from elections.  While most polls still suggest a victory for the Likud against Kadima led by Livni, the margins are narrow and Livni may choose to attempt to continue the public momentum she will gain if she wins the Kadima primary into an early general elections campaign, if her early attempts at preserving the coalition fail.[10]   

The current coalition partners are likely to hold out for an improved agreement following the primary.  Shas leader Eli Yishai, for example, has said that increased child allowances for the large families that form the movement’s voting base is an unequivocal condition for Shas to remain in the government – though it is worth noting that Livni has made clear that she intends for Roni Bar-On, who opposes increasing child allowances, to continue as finance minister in her
government.[11] The Shas electorate is also hawkish, and party leaders have suggested in recent days that Shas would not be able to sit in a government that favoured concessions on Jerusalem.[12] The party has openly declared its support for Mofaz in the primary.

Labour Leader Ehud Barak has said that he is opposed to the continuation of the current coalition, and would like to see the forming of a ‘broad emergency government’ or elections.  But there is little realistic prospect of a broad emergency government, which would bring together all the main parties.  This is because of the improbability of the Likud proving willing to join such a coalition.  For the same reason, the rumours of a possible Labour-Likud unity government excluding Kadima are also unlikely to be realised.  With Labour trailing badly in all polls, Barak has a clear interest in avoiding general elections. Thus, despite his statements, Labour is likely to prove amenable following an attempt to improve Labour’s position through negotiations, to the preservation of the current coalition.[13] 

The calculus for the coalition negotiations depends very much on whether Livni or Mofaz is victorious in the primary.  Also important in this regard will be the scale of the victory.  If, for example, Livni wins by a very convincing majority, this will give her a stronger hand in the negotiations, because she will be seen as being less afraid of general elections. 

Livni is seen as having a chance of pulling in the left-wing Meretz list into the coalition, in the event that Shas were to leave.  On paper, Livni could create a coalition of Kadima, Labour, Meretz and the Pensioners Party, which would amount to 60 MKs and would enjoy the support of the Arab parties from outside of the coalition. Mofaz would not enjoy this option and is understood to be interested in drawing in the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party as a coalition partner.  Likud Leader Benjamin Netanyahu has made clear that he has no intention of serving in any government except one led by the Likud. Both Livni and Mofaz, meanwhile, are also understood to be interested in drawing the ultra-orthodox United Torah Judaism party into the coalition.[14]

An additional scenario under discussion in political circles is the possibility that in the event of a Mofaz victory, Livni might lead her followers out of the party.  According to this scenario, she would accuse Mofaz of attempting to turn Kadima into a ‘Likud B’ party, and would try to form a list based on her perception of the original idea of Kadima.  Given the likely electoral cost of such a move, however, the probability of the realisation of this scenario is small.

Thus, after the primary, if Livni wins, she may face the difficult task of building a centre-left coalition.  If Mofaz wins, he will face the even more daunting task of building a centre-right coalition.  Neither project can be guaranteed success, but Mofaz, because of his lower public support, would have a greater interest in avoiding general elections and thus making the negotiations succeed. In this regard, it is interesting that a recent poll indicated that 63 percent of Kadima members would prefer that the new leader continue to govern on the basis of the current Knesset, rather than go to new elections.

Conclusion

The Kadima primary is Livni’s to lose.  Barring an unlikely upset, she will probably be elected party leader on 17 September.  She will then attempt to preserve and expand the coalition.  It is not at all certain that she (or Mofaz in the unlikely event of his victory) will succeed in creating a stable basis for a new government, which raises the real possibility of new general elections in 2009, in which the main contenders will be Kadima and the Likud.[15]

 

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[1] ‘Livni to supporters: not voting is out of the question’, Jerusalem Post, 14 September 2008.  http://www.jpost.com

[2] Donald Macintyre, ‘The Spy who would be PM’, The Independent, 15 September 2008.  http://www.independent.co.uk

[3] Carolynne Wheeler, ‘Tzipi Livni is preparing to end talks with Syria if she becomes Israel’s new prime minister’, Sunday Telegraph, 14 September 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk

[4] Mazal Mualem, ‘Mofaz: If elected Kadima chair, I will handle peace talks’, Haaretz, 31 July 2008.  http://www.haaretz.com

[5] For all polls, see http://www.imra.org.il/

[6] Attila Somfalvi, ‘The Day after the primaries’,  Ynetnews, 12 September 2008. http://www.ynetnews.com

[7] Shelly Paz, ‘Livni rejects aide’s remark that ‘riff raff back Mofaz’, Jerusalem Post, 14 September 2008.  http://www.jpost.com

[8] Attila Somfalvi, ‘Livni fears low turnout in Kadima primaries’, Ynetnews, 14 September 2008.  http://www.ynetnews.com

[9] Somfalvi.

[10] Yossi Verter, ‘Ready, set, elect’, Haaretz, 12 September 2008. 

[11] Matthew Wagner, ‘Yishai: Shas wont join govt that negotiates on Jerusalem’, Jerusalem Post, 14 September 2008. http://www.jpost.com

[12] Wagner.

[13]  Verter. 

[14] Ibid. 

[15] ‘Poll: Livni continues closing Kadima’s gap with Netanyahu’s Likud’, IMRA, 11 September 2008. http://www.imra.org.il