BICOM

I will call together an international meeting this fall of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognise Israel’s right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties. The key participants in this meeting will be the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their neighbours in the region. Secretary Rice will chair the meeting. She and her counterparts will review the progress that has been made toward building Palestinian institutions. They will look for innovative and effective ways to support further reform. And they will provide diplomatic support for the parties in their bilateral discussions and negotiations, so that we can move forward on a successful path to a Palestinian state. (President Bush, White House, 16 July 2007)

President Bush’s statement, made shortly after the Hamas coup in Gaza and the split of the Fatah-Hamas unity government, announcing a conference vague in purpose, arrived on the scene looking to many like a platitude rather than a policy. But lying behind it is a very real need to halt the spread of Iranian backed extremism in the region. Today the Palestinian territories are one of the key active battlegrounds, alongside Lebanon and Iraq, for determining the future of the Middle East. Whilst frequently depicted as a battle between extreme fundamentalism and secular moderation, in reality this dichotomy is hopelessly simplistic. It would perhaps be more honest to describe the struggle as one between those the West feels comfortable doing business with, and those they would rather not. In either case, US, EU and Israeli policy is more or less united behind the principle that Mahmoud Abbas and his ailing Fatah movement are currently the relative good guys that need to be supported, and Hamas, with their Iranian backers, is the enemy that must be isolated.

The Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq may be the states in play right now, but many more states in the region are potentially at stake. The US’s two most important Arab allies in the region, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both have regimes constantly looking over their shoulder at popular Islamist oppositions within their borders. And the differences between Shi’ite and Sunni notwithstanding, the anti-western movement in the region has a sponsor growing in confidence. The ambition of Iran: rich in oil, territory, population and – if things do not change – soon to be rich in nuclear technology, is a threat to every regime in the neighbourhood.[i] It is this threat which has overcome the Bush administration’s Clintonophobia – the fear of following Clinton’s example of apparently fruitless proactive Middle East peace making. Countless words have been written about the content, or lack thereof, of the conference itself, but its success is more likely to be judged by what follows it. Much will depend on the steps the two key protagonists take on the ground, and the way the rest of the Arab world chooses to play its cards.

Annapolis and After

Bush’s statement of belief that this is a crucial moment for determining the future of the Middle East gave the green light to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. What Rice subsequently encountered are the challenging realities on the ground in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. Whilst the Palestinians tried unsuccessfully to turn the conference into a short cut to a final status agreement, it has become clear that neither side is in a position to negotiate or deliver the necessary concessions at this stage. And though it has become fashionable in the last few weeks to treat Annapolis with scepticism and even derision, there are still a number of indications that the worst fears of the most enthusiastic doubters should be taken with a pinch of salt.

The latest came on Friday, when the Arab League decided in favour of attending the conference at ministerial level. Even Syria will send a minister on the proviso that it gets to bring the Syrian track to the agenda at some point during the proceedings.[ii] This latest development follows a series of choreographed steps that have taken place during the past week in the Israeli-Palestinian arena designed to lighten the mood. These include Israel’s announcement that it will release a further 441 Palestinian prisoners, and Tony Blair’s announcement, alongside PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak, of a wave of ‘quick impact’ job creation projects in the Palestinian territories.[iii]

The conference itself, if successful, will mark a milestone in three ways. First, it will make public the degree of consensus that currently exists between the two sides. We know from the positive noises that have come from the bilateral meetings between Abbas and Olmert that consensus exists to some degree. Now will be the time to publish a document which represents the lower common denominators. Even if the level of agreement is only on vague outlines, and not on details, this should not be regarded as a failure, but as a benchmark from which to move forward. This is not the Camp David 2000, or Stormont 1998 approach; a make or break conference where the two sides are supposed to stay there until the job is finished. The only game that has any chance of success for both sides in this context is the long game. The process will be a marathon, not a sprint, and in the new lexicon of the latest incarnation of the peace process, Annapolis is the launch for the negotiating process.[iv]

In what marks an Israeli concession to Palestinian demands, talks will advance on “all substantive issues” before stage one of the Roadmap is complete.[v] Still in a weak electoral position, and yet to face down the Winograd report and a number of personal corruption scandals, Olmert does not have too much to lose. With a diplomatic success his best hope of a political lifeline, he is likely to continue with the process and see if he can use it to bolter his poor public standing. This may create a problem with timing. The Palestinians have always feared that open-ended negotiations allow Israel to stall whilst continuing to change the reality on the ground in their favour. Bush and Rice would apparently like to see the sides arrive at an agreement by the end of the Bush term, in January 2009, raising the prospect of a hair-raising dash to the finish a year from now, worryingly reminiscent of the failed peace efforts at the end of the Clinton term.[vi] This may be a year too soon for Olmert, whose term is not due to end until March 2010.  Though an early election currently seems unlikely given the current poor showing of Kadima, the Israeli Prime Minister will no doubt watch the polls very carefully for any sign of a surge on the back of successful negotiations, which might present his best chance to fight off Netanyahu at the polls.

The second way in which the conference will mark a milestone is that it will create a renewed expectation, and possibly a new monitoring process, regarding each side’s implementation of their commitments under stage one of the Roadmap. For the Palestinians this means effective action to disrupt and dismantle terror groups. For Israel this means freezing settlement construction, dismantling of outposts, and returning to positions held before the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000. Both sides are supposed to stop incitement.[vii] This is where it starts to get real for both sides. Forcibly dragging people from hilltop caravans is divisive in Israel, and will strain Olmert’s coalition. Two of the partners, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu, fear that Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu will steal votes from them on the right if they go along with it. And Labour Party leader and Defence Minister Ehud Barak, in theory the ‘left-wing’ partner, will be wary of taking steps which interfere with his project to win credibility on the right. On the Palestinian side, it means Fatah clamping down on Hamas and other rejectionist groups in the West Bank, something it has thus far shown little capability of doing.

If both sides are being realistic, they will judge one another more by the spirit than the letter of the Roadmap. When the Roadmap was first agreed, without a recognised mechanism for monitoring, each side was able to use the other’s failure to deliver on its commitments as an excuse not to engage with the agreement. This time, Palestinians will want to see real cooperation from Israel in steps to ease life in the West Bank and help make the investment and development projects recently announced by Tony Blair a success, including the relaxation of the movement and access regime. Israel will want to see the Palestinians genuinely taking steps to establish functioning governing institutions, and inhibiting not only violence, but its glorification and popularisation in the territories under their control. Practical solutions which ease Palestinian life without compromising security ought to be possible if the goodwill is there.[viii]

The third way in which the Annapolis conference will mark a milestone is that it will secure the endorsement of the Arab world in the process. This is important politically, in that it represents the ‘pro-West’ and ‘anti-Iranian’ consensus in the region becoming stakeholders in the Quartet backed Roadmap vision of a negotiated path to a two-state solution. In essence it staples the Saudi backed ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ to the Roadmap. But what exactly is the Arab role in the future of the process?

What the Arab states can do

Arab states have a pivotal role to play, as well. They should show strong support for President Abbas’s government and reject the violent extremism of Hamas. They should use their resources to provide much-needed assistance to the Palestinian people. Nations like Jordan and Egypt, which are natural gateways for Palestinian exports, should open up trade to create opportunities on both sides of the border. Arab nations should also take an active part in promoting peace negotiations…by ending the fiction that Israel does not exist, stopping the incitement of hatred in their official media, and sending cabinet-level visitors to Israel. With all these steps, today’s Arab leaders can show themselves to be the equals of peacemakers like Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan. (President Bush, White House, 16 July 2007)

The last-minute decision of the Arab League to endorse the attendance of Arab foreign ministers at Annapolis is an important success for the US. It turns the conference from a narrow attempt to win progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track to a party with one conspicuous absentee. Iranian leaders will watch the proceedings on TV whilst almost every other state in the region, including even the internationally condemned Pakistan, and “state sponsor of terror” Syria, walks the red carpet. Not only that, but in so doing they will potentially move forward from the position of the Saudi Peace Initiative, and empower the Palestinian people to resolve the question of the Palestinian territories captured in 1967. So if the Palestinians choose to give up on the right of return, or compromise on settlement blocs, other Arab states will not be in a position maintain those demands.

But the success of bringing the Arab states to the table will be of little consequence if they do not follow up their endorsement of the process with continued positive contributions. First, the Arabs can help the process by backing, and not condemning, the Palestinian leadership when or if it makes concessions. They can also help by spending some of their oil dividends on Palestinian development. A measure of the commitment of the Saudis in particular will be the size of the cheque they are willing to write in the name of Palestinian development. They were reportedly willing to put one billion Dollars behind the failed Hamas-Fatah unity government they brokered at the beginning of the year. They were publicly burned by that experience and it will be interesting to see if they are willing to stump up similar sums to back President Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the current context. On the Israeli side, Arab states can reward Israel for its positive steps in the process with diplomatic gestures. Some in the US would like to see Arab states recognising Israel before the end of the process.[ix] This seems an unlikely hope. Recognition is the final card the Arab states have to play and they are unlikely to give it up until the very end. But there are steps short of full recognition, such as lower level diplomatic meetings, relaxing the economic boycott and allowing the establishment of representative offices in their countries which could be offered.

Of course, the Palestinian territories are not the final piece of the puzzle when it comes to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria is the other state with a post-’67 territorial claim. Israeli leaders suggested the possibility of reviving the Syrian negotiating track this week, and the Syrians have now been successfully wooed to the conference.[x] The Syrian track involves its own deep complexities, not least of which was highlighted by a poll published in an Israeli newspaper on Friday, showing that whilst 70% of Israelis support negotiations with Syria, exactly the same number oppose giving up the Golan, which is the clear condition for peace between the two states.[xi]

Leaving Iraq and Lebanon aside, in the regional battle of influence between Iran and the US, Syria is being treated as the potential swing state. Many regard Syria’s real interests as being to secure its influence in Lebanon, and to have the international community call off the dogs over the investigation of the murder of Rafik Hariri, rather than to win back the Golan Heights. The US has so far been firmly opposed to any compromise on these issues, but at some point it may have to make a decision with its allies over which is more important, isolating Syria, or drawing it away from Iran. Their attendance may mark the beginning of a shift on this front, but it will not be the central issue. The question of whether Assad’s regime can or will switch camps will be faced again another day.

Conclusions

One’s assessment for the outcome of the Annapolis conference is based on one’s expectations. If anyone expects this to be a shortcut to peace they will be disappointed. But taking a step back, those who want peace should see no other option than to force those who share a more or less common vision for the future to get together and commit themselves to that end goal. If the world waits for perfect circumstances – strong Israeli and Palestinian leaders, favourable public opinion, a US administration respected in the region, an Arab consensus to reform the region – it will wait forever.  Almost exactly thirty years ago, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his fateful journey to Israel, triggering the first peace deal between Israel and an Arab state. If he had waited for favourable polling he would never have got on the plane.

The anniversary of this event is the strongest reminder that we should be willing to expect the unexpected. A peace process can create its own momentum. The sight of the Israeli flag standing alongside the flags of the Arab nations, and the Israeli Prime Minister at a table with leaders of the Arab world is important in itself. One cannot underestimate the importance that constructive Arab engagement sends to the Israeli and Palestinian street. 

It is something unimaginable for many years. So while this might on the surface look like a nice chat and a photo-op, as a British politician of another era once said, it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war. Talk is not cheap. Even if it is of little content at this stage, it is still infinitely more valuable than no talk at all.

Equally important, though, will be action on the ground. Through positive action, as well as words, the ground must be cleared on which a peaceful model of two states
or two people will be built. However difficult it may look now for each side to change the reality on the ground, the longer they wait, the greater the potential of extremists to supplant their own vision in its place.

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i. For a description of Iran’s growing influence and threat from an Arab perspective, see ‘Iran’s expanding influence,’ Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram, 22-28 November 2007

ii. ‘Israel welcomes Syrian participation in Annapolis conference,’ Aluf Benn and Barak Ravid, Haaretz, 25 November 2007

iii. ‘Blair unveils huge jobs plan to bolster Middle East peace talks,’ Julian Borger, The Guardian, 19 November 2007

iv. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni; Join Press Conference with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, 18 November 2007

v. Ehud Olmert in press conference with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, 20 November 2007

vi. ‘Peres: Peace deal impossible to reach before Bush term ends,’ Haaretz, 22 November 2007

vii. A performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict

viii. ‘Confidence Building after Annapolis,’ David Makovsky, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

ix. International Crisis Group Policy Briefing; 20 November 2007

x. ‘Olmert: Annapolis a momentous opportunity,’ Roni Sofer, Ynetnews, 25 November 2007

xi. Yediot Ahronot, 23 November, 2007