BICOM

Key points

• The new coalition in Lebanon marks the ascent of Hezbollah and its allies to clear political dominance in the country. This is a significant achievement for Hezbollah and the Iran-led regional bloc, entrenching Hezbollah’s freedom of action in Lebanon.
• The development is welcome news for Syria, which is keen to maintain a friendly neighbour during its internal conflict, as well as contain the threat of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is expected to accuse Syrian and Hezbollah officials of killing former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.
• Israel has said in the past that if Hezbollah initiates another conflict with Israel, Israel would regard the Lebanese state as responsible. Hezbollah’s new degree of political dominance increases the credibility of this position.
• Were another conflict between Israel and Hezbollah to break out, it would exact a very high cost from both sides. This, along with the gains Hezbollah has achieved politically, may make Hezbollah more wary about initiating hostilities in the future.

Introduction

Hezbollah and its allies held the first sitting of the new pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian governing coalition in Lebanon last week. This is a new high point in the political dominance of Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese, Shia Islamist movement. For the first time since the 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’, which ended the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian elements dominate the government in Beirut. The pro-West ‘March 14’ movement is now in opposition. Hezbollah has long positioned itself as a force for militant opposition to Israel’s existence. During the Second Lebanon War, a bloody six week conflict in 2006, it fired thousands of rockets at towns and cities in northern Israel. What implications does the emergence of the new government, dominated by Hezbollah and its allies, have for the tense situation on the Israeli-Lebanese border?

How did the new government come about?

Coalition negotiations in Lebanon began in January, following the decision of Hezbollah and its pro-Syrian allies to quit the coalition government led by then-prime minister Saad Hariri and the pro-Western March 14 bloc of factions. This decision was designed to prevent the government from supporting the tribunal investigating the 2005 murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. The pressure from Syria to complete the formation of the new government relates to the fact that the pre-trial judge in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Fransen, is expected to soon issue indictments. Hezbollah members and possibly Syrian officials are expected to be named as suspects when the tribunal issues indictments. Syria apparently wanted to have a government in place which could be relied upon to reject the tribunal’s authority, should this happen. The switch by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt of his parliamentary representation to the pro-Hezbollah side granted this bloc a small parliamentary majority. 

There is considerable evidence that long-running disputes over how to divide power in the new cabinet were resolved as a result of Syrian influence and pressure. Though Syria’s military presence in Lebanon ended in 2005, it still holds considerable political influence within the country. Jumblatt told the pro-Hezbollah al-Akhbar newspaper this week that ‘Assad asked his allies to accelerate the cabinet formation, because [the formation of] a cabinet in Lebanon will diminish the pressure on Syria.’ The outcome is a cabinet in which the Hezbollah-led ‘March 8’ bloc of factions, which is pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian, controls a majority of the 30 cabinet seats. The new prime minister, Najib Mikati, a multimillionaire businessman, is Sunni, but closely associated with the Syrians.

The Syrian desire for the conclusion of the negotiations may also be linked to the current revolt against the Assad regime within Syria. The presence of a friendly government in neighbouring Lebanon is an important asset for Assad, whilst his regime attracts increasing international condemnation for its brutal suppression of anti-regime protests. Hezbollah has been vociferous in its defence of the Assad regime. The movement fears the fall of its ally, and there have been reports of Hezbollah moving its missile supplies from Syria into Lebanon out of concern for the Assad regime’s instability.

What does the emergence of the new Lebanese government mean for Israel?

The new government in Lebanon represents a significant achievement for Hezbollah, which has now emerged into plain sight as the dominant political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah, which is a radical Shia movement with close strategic and ideological ties to Iran, draws legitimacy in Lebanon by positioning itself against Israel. It proved itself as a potent military force when war broke out between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. Though Hezbollah incurred significant damage in 2006, it has since increased its military capacity.

During the violent events of May 2008, when the then-Lebanese government tried to move against it, Hezbollah confirmed that no other force in the country could oppose its will. With the new cabinet dominated by its allies, it has now established a political supremacy to go alongside its military power. 

Given that Hezbollah has already long posed a major military threat to Israel, from an Israeli point of view, the more explicit role of Hezbollah and its allies in the Lebanese government may have a positive aspect. A significant problem for Israel during the conflict in 2006 was that the Lebanese government was dominated by the pro-Western March 14 movement, which did not support Hezbollah’s actions. This left Israel in the difficult situation of trying to fight a war against Hezbollah whilst leaving the state in which it resided unharmed, as far as was possible. 

Israel has said since that if Hezbollah initiates another conflict, Israel would regard the Lebanese state as responsible and conduct its military response accordingly. Hezbollah’s new degree of political dominance in Lebanon increases the credibility of this position.  

Hezbollah could still try to maintain the fiction whereby the actions of its own armed elements in no way ‘obligate’ the government of which it is a major element. But such a case would be far harder to make in the current context, where Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian elements are the majority force in the coalition.   

The emergence of the new government in Lebanon is likely to have the added consequence of causing a review of Western aid to the Lebanese security forces. Israel has long argued that the rationale for such aid no longer applies, since anti-Western forces have become dominant in Lebanon. This is a far harder case to dispute now. The US Congress is already reviewing the large package of support offered to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese security services. This support began after Syria withdrew its armed forces from Lebanon in 2005, and was an attempt to build up the Lebanese government as a pro-Western ally. With the government now under the open control of Hezbollah and its allies, this foundation is no longer relevant. 

Does the new government in Beirut make conflict with Israel more likely?

Hezbollah’s new dominance of the coalition government in Beirut is unlikely to alter its strategic calculations regarding renewed conflict with Israel. Hezbollah has largely recovered the losses and damage that it suffered in 2006. At the same time, all reports suggest that there is little or no appetite for renewed conflict among Hezbollah’s core constituency, which is the Shia population of south Lebanon. Many residents of the south have taken to leaving the area for Beirut when the security situation grows tense, in order to avoid being caught up in a renewed conflict.  Hezbollah is aware that any new war could see a wider IDF operation than in 2006.

A Reuters analysis last week expressed concern that Hezbollah might choose to provoke a border incident with Israel in order to deflect attention from the uprising against Assad’s rule in Syria. Whilst such a possibility cannot be ruled out, Hezbollah is ultimately a client of Iran, not Syria, and it is not clear that the movement itself or its Iranian patron would wish it to risk a frontal challenge to Israel in order to protect the Assad regime. Hezbollah is likely to be busy consolidating its rule against determined domestic opposition in the period ahead.

Conclusion

The emergence of a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon represents a significant achievement for the Iran-led regional bloc, of which the movement forms a part.  It came about as a result of Syrian pressure on its Lebanese clients. Damascus generally desires a friendly government in Beirut, but particularly so now due to the threat of indictments from the Hariri tribunal, and the volatile situation within Syria. 

From Israel’s point of view, Hezbollah’s military forces have long presented a major threat. Hezbollah’s more explicit political dominance now reduces the ambiguity about whom rules in Lebanon. Hezbollah has long had freedom of manoeuvre in Lebanon. Now it can no longer hide behind the illusion of a pro-Western elected government. 

Yet Hezbollah’s increasing political dominance does not necessarily make a confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah more likely in the immediate future. The border skirmish of August 2010 demonstrated that the potential for conflict to spark unexpectedly always exists, and the possibility of a provocation against Israel on behalf of Syria’s Assad should not be ruled out. However, the high cost to Hezbollah of renewed conflict with Israel, and the fact that Hezbollah is ultimately an Iranian rather than Syrian client, reduces the likelihood of Hezbollah risking confrontation with Israel on Assad’s behalf. Both Hezbollah and Iran have an interest in consolidating their rising power in Lebanon. Whether Iran might push Hezbollah to heat up the border to serve Iranian interests at some point in the future, remains to be seen.