BICOM

The announcement made this morning by Yisrael Beiteinu Chairman Avigdor Lieberman that his party is quitting the coalition came as little surprise to those who have closely followed Lieberman’s recent rhetoric. Indeed, it seemed as if most of Lieberman’s efforts were directed at preparing the ground for this morning’s announcement, which primarily pointed to the recent progress in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as the reason for the party’s decision. However, despite the relative predictability of the announcement, many were asking this morning whether Yisrael Beiteinu’s resignation marks a first crack in Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s coalition. The following analysis assesses the possible implications that the latest developments may have on the stability of the government and the potential risks these changes pose to the progress of the peace process.

Yisrael Beiteinu joined the coalition in October 2006 in an attempt by PM Olmert to broaden the coalition and solidify parliamentarian support for his government following the Second Lebanon War. In order to provide Lieberman with a role that would not compromise his affiliation with strong security and defence policies, a new Ministry for Strategic Threats was established, focusing mainly on the Iranian nuclear threat. The addition of Yisrael Beiteinu to the coalition presented PM Olmert with some challenges from his main coalition partner, the Israeli Labour party. One of the party’s leading figures, Ophir Pines-Paz, resigned from the government and the party faced strong public criticism for sharing the cabinet table with Lieberman’s party, which traditionally holds strong right-wing positions. However, the government’s urgent need to stabilise the coalition in light of diminishing public support for its leaders, forced a compromise that paved Yisrael Beiteinu’s path into the coalition.

PM Olmert’s motivations to push for Yisrael Beiteinu’s addition to the coalition were clear: in addition to extending the support base of the government to 78 Knesset members, PM Olmert was able to fracture the opposition block led by Likud, and supported by right-wing factions and ultra-Orthodox parties. Avigdor Lieberman’s incentives were, however, less clear. To many it seemed that Lieberman was risking more than he could possibly gain by joining an unpopular government affiliated with pragmatic and moderate views on the Palestinian issue. Moreover, Yisrael Beiteinu promotes a strong liberal-secular agenda that appeals to the large Russian-immigrant population in Israel. Joining a government with the orthodox Shas party meant the party’s chances of promoting civil marriage or easing restrictions on immigration imposed by the religious establishment were highly questionable. Immediately after joining the coalition, Lieberman and his party became the target of criticism from Likud spokespeople, who accused Yisrael Beiteinu of providing the government with a political lifeline and losing its ideological backbone.

Yisrael Beiteinu indeed had a lot to lose. The party presented an explicit right-wing agenda, advocating territorial plans according to which Israeli Arab towns adjacent to Palestinian Authority areas would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority, and only those Arabs who felt a connection with the State of Israel and were loyal to it would be allowed to remain. These stances were deemed extreme even by Israeli leaders such as Ariel Sharon who were traditionally affiliated with the centre-right. However, Lieberman was successful in garnering broad public support in the 2006 elections, in which his party won 11 seats. Joining a coalition that, in fact, promoted a centre-left ideological line jeopardised Lieberman’s public image as a direct and uncompromising politician.

Surprisingly, it was the release of the US National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear weapons programme that indirectly broadened the political fissure between Yisrael Beiteinu and Olmert’s coalition. While highly contested by Israeli strategists and only partially adopted by the American administration, the report had nonetheless challenged the domination of the Iranian nuclear threat at the top of Israel’s public agenda. Lieberman, whose ministerial responsibilities focused mostly on the Iranian issue, faced a new reality: while intense work was still taking place to prepare Israel to deal with the immense strategic threat posed by Iran, the revived Israeli-Palestinian talks rapidly took over the national and international headlines. The international summit in Annapolis marking the reopening of official negotiations, and PM Olmert’s repeated statements reiterating Israel’s commitment to a two-state solution based on the land-for-peace formula became key catalysts in this process. The launching earlier this week of talks on the core issues of the conflict, including the status of Jerusalem, the borders of the future Palestinian State and a resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem marked the defining moment that could no longer be dismissed as “futile attempts.” The initial negotiations that took place with the encouragement of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have been stepped up to the point in which Lieberman was compelled to acknowledge the new reality and quit the coalition.

Lieberman’s announcement was thus almost inevitable. As is the case in events of this sort, speculations were made on a possible last moment postponement of the announcement following the events in the Gaza Strip and a possible escalation with Hamas. However, Lieberman carefully listened to PM Olmert’s statements made earlier this week at the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, clarifying that Israel will not initiate a large-scale military operation in Gaza and will only act directly against rocket launching cells and their senders. In this sense, Olmert indirectly singled to Lieberman that the government under his leadership will not change its fundamental policy and will avoid any action that could counter the negotiations with the Palestinian leadership under Mahmoud Abbas.

Lieberman’s resignation provides a rare moment of clarity in the Israeli political landscape. In more than one sense it helps crystallise the agenda on which Olmert’s government will base its actions in the foreseeable future, namely, a continuation of substantial talks with the Palestinians including the highly sensitive core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Olmert, a coalition of 67 MKs who will back this agenda is worth more than a conflicted coalition of 78 MKs.

However, the coalition is far from providing the prime minister with unlimited credit. Shas continues to strongly oppose any compromise on the core issues and will not hesitate to vote against the coalition if these matters are brought to the decision of the Knesset. Shas Chairman Eli Yishai has outspokenly rejected any Israeli compromise in Jerusalem and has repeatedly called for tougher military action in Gaza. Indeed, Shas is likely to find itself at the frontline of opposition criticism. While Lieberman remained in the coalition, Shas could present their joint participation as a restraining force that prevents the government from making substantial compromises. Now that Yisrael Beiteinu has left the coalition, Shas will be placed at the centre of the public attention and its voters will observe its actions carefully. In the past, Shas was able to follow a pragmatic political strategy and even be part of Yitzhak Rabin’s government during the Oslo Accords. While fearing a backlash from their right-leaning constituency, the party is likely to prolong its participation in the coalition until the very last possible moment, i.e., until Olmert publicly presents the negotiation results on the core issues. And this, as even the most optimistic assessments suggest, may take some time.

During the press conference in which he announced his resignation, Lieberman was asked about a possible union with Likud. A political alliance of this sort would bring together Lieberman and Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu ten years after the former resigned his position as Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office during Netanyahu’s premiership. Although Lieberman denied that such an alliance is imminent, both leaders approved reports that they have met in recent months several times and discussed Yisrael Beiteinu’s participation in the government. At this point in time, Lieberman is unlikely to give up the political capital he gained since the launching of his independent political career. Lieberman rightly assesses that a leading ministerial role is secured for him in any future Likud government, and a joining of forces with Netanyahu would not provide him any substantial advantage.

The various scenarios of regrouping in the opposition are also likely to affect Israeli Labour leader Ehud Barak, who faces a substantial political obstacle with the release of the Winograd Committee’s final report on the handling of the Second Lebanon War. While running for Labour chairmanship last spring, Barak told Labour voters that he would “reconsider” the party’s participation in the government once the final investigation report was released. The committee is expected to publish its final findings in two weeks time and Barak will be called to announce the party’s future in the coalition. Lieberman’s resignation enables Barak – who does not favour Labour quitting the coalition at this time, consequently bringing forward early elections – a way to present his party’s participation in the coalition as worthy and responsible. Barak knows he cannot be seen as the direct instigator of general elections, which, according to all recent polls, predict an overwhelming victory for Likud. One of Barak’s close allies, Benjamin Ben Eliezer, already indicated that Lieberman’s resignation obliges Labour to sustain the government and support the advancing peace process.

 

Those expecting Lieberman’s resignation to cause a political earthquake are likely to be disappointed. PM Olmert still holds onto a parliamentary majority and can also rely on some support from Meretz MKs, who will provide the government with a political “safety net” on issues relating to the diplomatic process. The negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are also likely to progress and are now the key pillar on which the government rests. Olmert will use the leading figures in his government to present a balanced and cautious image: Haim Ramon is likely to set the tone regarding compromise with the Palestinians, only to be balanced by Barak’s vigilant security perspective and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s support for a cautious handling of the diplomatic front with the Palestinian negotiators.

In a sense, without Yisrael Beiteinu around the cabinet table, Olmert now envisions a draft of the final-status agreement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as his political legacy: If successful, this agreement can provide him with the agenda with which he can face the Israeli public. To that extent, Lieberman’s resignation may in fact mark the moment in which the peace process moved toward a new, and decisive, stage.