BICOM

While analysis of the Annapolis Conference has largely centred on the issue of whether or not the conference was a significant development in the search for Israeli-Palestinian peace, a no less significant aspect of the diplomacy surrounding the conference has been largely ignored by the media. This is the issue of Syrian participation at Annapolis and what implications this may have for Syria’s future regional stance. With the regional strategic situation now dominated by the face-off between the ambitions of Iran and its allies and clients, and those of the United States, Israel and moderate Arab states, the Syrian role is pivotal. 

Syria is currently a key regional ally of Iran, and a sponsor and host of pro-Iranian terror groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The issue of the precise motivations for Syria’s alliance with Iran, and whether and how Damascus might be induced to abandon this orientation and align itself with pro-western Arab states formed the backdrop to Syrian attendance at Annapolis. The unexpected announcement last week by the Lebanese government that it would accept the appointment of Chief of Staff Michel Suleiman as president is a key development. The ruling March 14 movement had previously rejected Suleiman’s candidacy, seeing him as too closely linked to Syria. Some analysts are seeing the acceptance of Suleiman as an early reward for Syria’s attendance at Annapolis, and a pointer to the direction of future events.[i] This paper will explore the debate over Syria, and its implications.

The rival positions regarding Syria

Over the last four years, Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria has cemented its alliance with Iran, and has become subjected to diplomatic isolation from the west and anger from leading Arab states. (The precise extent to which Syria and Iran coordinate activity is not clear. Senior Israeli sources, for example, note that Iran appears to have been unaware of the Syrian project struck by Israeli aircraft in September 2007.)

Syria has been blamed by the United States for the flow of fighters across its borders to the insurgency in Iraq, and following the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, the US withdrew its ambassador from Damascus, Margaret Scobey. Syrian backing for Hezbollah in the war of 2006, the mysterious deaths of a number of anti-Syrian public figures in Lebanon in the ensuing year and a half, and Bashar Assad’s description of other Arab leaders as ‘half men’ for failing to support Hezbollah in 2006 all confirmed a sense that the Syrian regime is a firm opponent of regional stability. In order to induce a change in the regime’s attitudes, the US thus followed a policy of seeking to isolate Syria.[ii]

However, in policy circles behind the scenes in both the US and Britain, an ongoing debate is taking place as to whether the Syrian alliance with Teheran represents an unbreakable strategic choice for Damascus, or whether Syria might be induced to abandon this alliance by a process of positive engagement from western countries and Israel. In the US, the former view is associated with Vice-President Dick Cheney, while the latter position is associated with the State Department and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Earlier this year, House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Damascus, in the first clear break with the policy of isolating Syria. A month later, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem in a half hour meeting described as ‘cordial.'[iii]

The decision to invite Syria to Annapolis represents a further significant achievement for the ‘pro-engagement’ camp.

The British Government also supports engagement with Syria. According to senior sources, Britain considers that the power circles of the Syrian regime itself are themselves divided over the question of the alliance with Iran. As such, Britain supports engagement with Syria, in the hope that this may strengthen those elements who wish to break with Iran.

Where does Israel fit into all this? Once again, the debate within Israel is deeply divided on the question of engagement with Syria. For Israel, engagement with Syria means negotiating on the future of the Golan Heights captured in 1967. While the Golan is an undisputed strategic asset for Israel, the possibility of peace with Syria – which it is assumed would also mean the cessation of Syrian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the ending of the Syrian alliance with Iran – is also a tempting proposition. The circles understood to be most interested in promoting the Syrian track at the present time are those associated with Defence Minister Ehud Barak.[iv]

Recently, MK Danny Yatom, a close associate of Defence Minister Barak, told journalists that Israel should drop its preconditions and immediately resume negotiations with the Syrians.  Yatom, who said he had been briefed by Barak following the Defence Minister’s return from Annapolis, told reporters that “Between us and Syria, there’s only the issue of a border, and we were very close in March 2000…The negotiations with Syria, if resumed, will also accelerate the negotiations with the Palestinians”.[v]

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, at least publicly, does not currently share his Defence Minister’s enthusiasm for reopening negotiations with Syria. Indeed in the public arena, Olmert is focused on the Palestinian track. However, given the Olmert government’s clear need for creative initiatives on foreign policy, it is not at all unimaginable that in the future he might turn his attention to the Syrian issue. Certainly there is no bedrock issue of principle or of the Prime Minister’s ideology which would prevent this.   

The Lebanese angle

The decision to accept General Michel Suleiman as the new Lebanese President undoubtedly represents a serious victory for the ‘engage Syria’ side of the western debate.  The ‘Cedar Revolution’ in Lebanon in 2005, and the subsequent emergence of the pro-western government of Fuad Siniora and Saad Hariri was seen as one of the few unequivocal achievements of the US policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East.  The decision to accept Suleiman has shocked the circles of the March 14 movement, who believe that they are being sacrificed as part of a larger regional strategy to ‘de-couple’ Syria from Iran.  

March 14 politicians accuse the US of naïveté in their approach.[vi] They assert that Syria has no intention of making a decisive break from Iran, but rather that Syria wishes to give the impression of openness to this possibility, in order to induce the west to abandon or defang the proposed international tribunal to charge the killers of Rafik al-Hariri. Syria feared that senior officials from Damascus could be arraigned before the tribunal.  It has been suggested that the acceptance of Suleiman as president was a condition given by Syria for its attendance at Annapolis.

Some US analysts have suggested in the last days that the acceptance of Suleiman as president does not signal an imminent US policy shift, but rather a victory for the pro-engagement lobby within the Administration, in a debate which is not yet over.[vii]

Conclusion

While the official US position remains that current Syrian policy is incompatible with the hopes of peace expressed at Annapolis, there may be signs of change in the Bush Administration’s stance on Syria. If such a shift indeed takes place, then the implications for Israel are important – it will mean the prospect of renewed negotiations over the Golan Heights. 

Last week US National Security Adviser Steve Hadley put it in the following terms: “I think for Syria, there is a fundamental choice…are they going to make a strategic decision, give up their support for terror, let Lebanon alone, support a new Iraqi government, rather than obstruct it and undermine it, and make a decision for peace? If they do, I think there are opportunities for them in the Golan Heights. The door is open to them”.[viii]

A prominent US analyst noted speculation in Lebanon in recent days that current events regarding Syria represent a desire in the west to remove Syria from its alliance with Iran prior to decisive action against the Iranian nuclear programme, expected next year.[ix] While such speculation may be merely alarmist, it undoubtedly represents a more general sense that Syrian attendance at Annapolis and the Suleiman initiative in Lebanon are part of a new and serious initiative to induce Syria to re-align with the pro-US camp in the region. Whether this initiative will bear fruit, or whether the regime in Damascus will merely make use of these overtures to promote its allies in Lebanon and extricate itself from possible isolation over the Hariri murder, will become apparent in the months ahead. 

Ultimately, the clash between those in the US, Israel and the UK who support ‘engagement’ with Syria, and those who support a less conciliatory stance rests on an interesting conceptual difference. The former adhere to a view whereby the Syrian regime is seen as ultimately pragmatic, not opposed in principle to western influence in the region, and therefore susceptible to practical inducements. The latter see the regime as having built its regional strength, and indeed its internal stability on its perceived radicalism. According to this view Syria’s ideological orientation, practical interests and regional ambitions are served by its alliance with Iran, which the Damascus regime will therefore be unlikely to break. The period to come is likely to see these theories being put to practical test.

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[i] Nicholas Blanford, “The Sleiman Scoop,” NowLebanon, 30 November 2007. http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=22067

[ii] Helene Cooper, “A payoff for Syrians: Seats at the table, at least,” New York Times, 30 November 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/world/middleeast/30diplo.html?ex=1354078800&en=0da359b150c6d7b3&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] “MK Yatom: We must talk to Syria unconditionally,” Jerusalem Post, Associated Press, 1 December 2007. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1195546775095&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Blanford.

[vii] Lee Smith, “No Deal,” NowLebanon, 2 December 2007. http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=22175

[viii] Shmuel Rosner, “Washington: there is no place yet for Syria in peace process,” Haaretz, 2 December 2007. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/929744.html

[ix] Joshua Landis, “How the Lebanese delegation was blindsided at Annapolis,” Syria Comment, 1 December 2007. http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=505