BICOM

On Tuesday 19 November Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog and Dr. Emily Landau briefed journalists on a BICOM conference call ahead of P5+1 talks with Iran on its nuclear programme. They assessed both the content of the deal and its regional consequences. 

Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog, BICOM’s Senior Visiting Fellow, is the former head of the Strategic Planning Division of the IDF, and was chief of staff and senior aide to four former Israeli ministers of defence.

Dr. Emily Landau is director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, and has lectured and published extensively on nuclear proliferation.

The following is an edited summary of their briefing.

Emily Landau

The P5+1’s leverage against Iran

The most important thing going into next round of talks is that the P5+1 remain determined. They have leverage over Iran, which has not been the case for years. Previous international negotiators entered talks with Iran at a disadvantage because Iran had no need for negotiations. The Iranians could proceed unilaterally with their strategic goals and could use talks tactically to advance those goals. This has changed because Iran needs a negotiated deal as well, and it cannot get sanctions relief without international cooperation. This is a transformation in the negotiations dynamic and it is important the P5+1 realises this and remains determined to get the best deal possible.

Arak plutonium reactor

We don’t have specific details about the P5+1 proposal, but the details about Arak need to be followed closely. Before the French intervention during the last round of talks, the Arak clause was problematic, proposing that Iran could not commission the facility but could continue construction in the next six months. This was no concession at all for Iran; they never planned to commission the facility within six months, but need to continue construction in order to activate it in 2014.

Enrichment to 20 per cent

It seems 20 per cent enrichment will be suspended for six months, but the question remains will existing stocks be transformed into oxide forms which are reversible, or into less reversible forms? The oxide form, according to experts such as Mark Hibbs and Olli Heinonen, can be reversed back into the problematic form of 20 per cent uranium within weeks.

International negotiators say their goal is to freeze the situation for six months, in order to negotiate the final deal. However, the interim six month deal is likely to create a platform for continued arguing with the Iranians over every article and clause within the interim agreement. There is a likely danger that as a result of arguing over clauses in the interim agreement, negotiators will be distracted from fixing the parameters for a permanent agreement.

Enrichment to 3.5 per cent

One of issues under discussion is whether the preamble of a deal will state that Iran has a ‘right’ to enrich uranium. If it does, any restrictions on enrichment to 3.5 per cent would be ‘goodwill’ on Iran’s part, not something they need to comply with the international community on. The US is very unlikely to accept this, and Iranian Foreign minister Mohammad Zarif has given some indication that Iran will back down on this demand in the interim deal.

However, one of the P5+1’s stated goals was to freeze the situation for six months. It is therefore strange they are not insisting on a freeze on enrichment of uranium up to 3.5 per cent, as they are  insisting on a freeze up to 20 per cent. It is inconsistent that the 3.5 per cent uranium enrichment will not be frozen, but the International community simultaneously expect Iran not to increase their uranium stockpiles.

Increasing the stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.5 per cent is a problem, due to newly installed advanced centrifuges. The August IAEA report said 1,000 advanced centrifuges were installed at Natanz. With these new centrifuges, the 3.5 per cent uranium can be enriched faster up towards weapons grade uranium, making the distinction between 3.5 per cent enriched uranium and 20 per cent enriched uranium less significant.

The ‘right’ to enrich

The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not say anything about the right to enrich uranium. Peaceful nuclear programmes are achievable without it. Article 4 of the treaty says the rights to a peaceful nuclear programme are dependent on the signatory complying with Articles 1 and 2, which state that a nation cannot work towards a military programme. As long as Iran fails to address deep suspicions about a military nuclear programme, they have no right under the NPT to continue their civilian programme.

Because the process of confronting Iran has been so long, and because the international community has not been dealing with the issue effectively, everyone buys into the Iranian narrative, that they have the ‘right’ to enrichment, and this has become an issue of their national pride. As a result, any deal will probably allow a degree of enrichment, but round the clock inspections by the IAEA will be essential to manage this. Iran has lost all credibility, and needs to be checked at all times.

Michael Herzog

Lack of clear endgame for P5+1

Whilst it is clear the Iranians know what they want, the P5+1 powers have failed to agree among themselves on a clearly defined endgame to the talks. Certainly there is no agreement with regional actors such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and others. The P5+1 should have started with a defined end game and the interim deal should work towards it, but this has not happened.

For instance, with regard to the Plutonium reactor at Arak, if the endgame is that Iran should have no Plutonium reactor, then why negotiate over its construction? If the idea is that it will be converted into a light water reactor from a heavy water plant, this is something else. With regards to enrichment, what is the goal in terms of an acceptable breakout time to one bomb’s worth of weapons grade uranium, and how then is this goal translated into reducing enrichment capacity and thereby setting the clock back towards that acceptable timeframe? Without this clearly defined endgame it would be preferable to freeze the programme and give time for diplomacy, but what we are likely to see is not stopping the clock but merely slowing it.

Another problem is how to synchronise the P5+1 talks with Iran with the IAEA talks. Iran has agreed with the IAEA on inspection of their natural uranium mine and the Arak heavy water production facility, but not Parchin, which is suspected of military nuclear work.

The key question to ask in analysing the deal is what happens after six months if there is no final deal? What capabilities do the Iranians maintain, and will they be confronted with more sanctions, or a credible military option? What do the Iranians think today will likely face them at the end of the six months without a deal?

Regional implications of US stance

Tensions between the US and Israel over the deal are known, but it is not just Israel. The buzz in the region is about lack of US resolve, that the US is not sufficiently reliable here, and that the international community is eager to go for a deal, even if it is a problematic deal. This leads to two main developments.

First, Gulf States are reaching out to Israel for dialogue. This is not as far as some reports suggest – reports of military cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia are unlikely. However, they are reaching out because they fear not only Iran’s nuclear programme, but Iran being allowed to continue with its hegemonic ambitions, even being emboldened by the deal, and that they will be left alone to deal with it.

Second, you see regional states now reaching out to other international actors aside from the United States. You see Egypt talking with Russia about a major arms deal; you see Turkey considering China for a major air defence system; you Saudi Arabia developing ties with France, as is Israel this week with the visit of President Hollande. It is not that these actors have real alternatives to the US or are going to strategically reorientate themselves, but it is a strong expression of deep disappointment with the US and its regional approach.

Next steps for Israel

If there is an interim six month deal, Israel can do very little about it for now. It will likely fix its sight on the end of the six month period. If there is an endgame deal after six months, Israel will evaluate it and make its decisions. If there is no deal after six months, Israel will be in a position to say it gave the process a chance but it failed, and that it can rely on diplomacy no longer.