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Analysis

BICOM Analysis: Egypt’s role in the Middle East strategic picture

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Key Points

  • The long-standing poor relations between Egypt and Iran have recently undergone a further serious deterioration. The immediate precipitating factor in this is Iranian sponsorship of the Hamas enclave in Gaza, and attempts to back internal subversion in Egypt itself.
  • Egypt, traditionally the strongest Arab state, with a wide circle of interests across the region, is inevitably opposed to the Iranian drive for regional hegemony. The Egyptians are particularly concerned by the Iranian nuclear programme, and the prospect that a nuclear Iran could draw Arab states away from the traditional patterns of Egyptian-led Arab diplomacy.
  • Egypt is responding to the Iranian threat vigorously, keeping the Rafah crossing closed, cracking down on smuggling into Gaza, and acting firmly against Hezbollah’s attempts to organise on Egyptian soil.
  • Egypt’s construction of an underground steel wall on the Egypt-Gaza border has led to a notable escalation in the tensions between Egypt and the Iranian-supported Hamas enclave in Gaza.

Introduction

In recent months, Egypt has been attempting to play its traditional mediating role in Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian affairs, seeking to secure reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and to broker a deal for the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit. At every turn, however, the Egyptians have been frustrated by Hamas intransigence, and by the attempt by Hamas and its backers in Iran to portray Egypt as a ‘collaborator’ with the west and Israel. This document will examine the background and key events in this process in recent months.

Egypt’s struggle for regional leadership

Egypt today finds itself at the centre of the strategic process in the Middle East. The key dynamic underlying current events in the region, is the attempt by Iran to dominate the region. This ambition of the Iranians, together with their Islamist ideology, places them on a collision course with Egypt, because of Cairo’s traditionally senior role in Arab diplomacy. The result has been the emergence of something resembling a new ‘cold war’ in the region. This cold war sees Iran and its allies, including Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, pitted against a tacit alliance of pro-western states in the region, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

A key aspect of the Iranian ambition in the region is the desire to achieve ‘ownership’ of the Palestinian issue, which remains the most important cause in the eyes of millions of Arabs. For this reason, Tehran is sponsoring the Hamas-controlled enclave in Gaza. This support is one of the main factors causing friction with Egypt.

Egypt’s concern at the persistence of Hamas rule in Gaza is exacerbated by the fact that the movement is the Palestinian franchise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood constitutes the main domestic opposition to the Mubarak regime, and Hamas’s maintenance of an independent enclave on the border with Egypt is worrying for Cairo.

The Egyptian regime is also approaching a process of succession. President Hosni Mubarak is 81 years old. He is known to favour the succession of his son Gamal to the presidency following his departure. However, it is not certain that such a transition will be smooth. There are many in the Egyptian elite who dislike the idea of Egypt adopting the model of a ‘republican monarchy’ established by Syria. Intelligence Minister Omar Suleiman has been mentioned as a possible alternative for the leadership. The looming succession issue further increases the regime’s sense of uncertainty, and Mubarak’s desire to address threats to its stability.

Egypt, Iran and Hamas

Egypt’s relations with the Islamist regime in Iran have been problematic since the emergence of the clerical regime in Tehran. However, relations have taken a distinct turn for the worse in the last couple of years.

Egypt regards the Iranian nuclear programme as a matter of grave concern. The Egyptians believe that a nuclear capability would increase Iran’s ability to project its power regionally, and would increase pressure on Arab states to follow the Iranian line. Egypt sees the regional role currently being played by Qatar as a harbinger of what could be expected if Iran goes nuclear. Qatar, traditionally a small and not particularly consequential state on the Arab stage, has begun to exercise disproportionate regional influence in the last years, as a result of its close relations with Iran. In attempting to mediate between Hamas and Fatah, brokering a truce in Lebanon in 2008 and hosting an Arab gathering during Operation Cast Lead, Qatar has begun to ‘punch above its weight’.  The prospect, in Egypt’s eyes, would be for other Arab states to detach themselves from the traditional pattern of Egyptian and Saudi-led Arab diplomacy, and to align themselves with the alternative, Iranian-led camp.

Secondly, the rise of the hardline conservatives within the Iranian regime over the last few years has resulted in a more aggressive Iranian regional policy. This has become increasingly obvious because of a series of events over the last two years.


Recent deterioration in relations

Many Egyptian analysts openly blame Iran for provoking Operation Cast Lead, by encouraging Hamas not to renew the six-month ceasefire which preceded the operation. During the operation, Egypt was the subject of furious denunciations by Hezbollah and Iran, because of its decision to keep the Rafah crossing between northern Sinai and Gaza closed. This Egyptian decision undoubtedly contributed to the military setback suffered by Hamas during the operation. It also served to starkly demonstrate the reality of the regional divide.

In January 2009, Israeli aircraft attacked a 23-truck convoy in the Sudanese desert. The convoy was en route to Gaza via Sinai, and was carrying Iranian weaponry for the Hamas regime in Gaza. The convoy included 120 tons of arms and explosives that would have substantially increased Hamas’s capabilities, including antitank rockets and Iranian Fajir rockets with a 40 km range and a 45 kg warhead.

In April last, year, the Egyptian authorities uncovered a large terror network operating in Sinai, led by Hezbollah operatives. The cell was involved in smuggling arms and equipment across Sinai to Hamas in Gaza. It was also
planning to carry out attacks on Israeli targets in Egypt.

Following the uncovering of the cell, Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said that “Iran, and Iran’s followers, want Egypt to become a maid of honor for the crowned Iranian queen when she enters the Middle East.” President Mubarak was yet more blunt, advising Iran in a
public statement that “We are aware of your plans. We will uncover all of your plots and we will respond to your ploys. Stop using the Palestinian issue, and beware the wrath of Egypt.”

Egypt has been centrally involved in attempts to bring about Palestinian reconciliation, and to secure a deal for the release of Gilad Shalit. Success has proved elusive, and Egypt blames Hamas’s intransigence for the failure. Hamas refused at the last minute to sign an Egyptian-brokered deal with Fatah last October.

Hamas also decided last year to bring in German mediators to replace the Egyptian mediation on the Shalit talks, reportedly angering Cairo. Egypt sees Palestinian reconciliation as the best way to contain Iranian encroachment on this issue, and end the embarrassing situation in which Egypt is acting as a de facto ally of Israel in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas-controlled Gaza. Hamas, however, has prevented a successful outcome to the Egyptian attempts.

The result is that recent weeks have seen a distinct hardening of the Egyptian position towards Hamas. The Egyptian decision to build a steel wall to prevent smuggling between northern Sinai and Gaza is the latest point of friction between Hamas and Cairo. Hamas has pledged to act to stop the construction of the underground wall, which is a major project being built with US assistance. The recent flare-up on the border, in which one Egyptian Border Policeman was killed, may well presage further clashes in the coming weeks. The Egyptian decision to stop all but a few members of an international convoy entering the Gaza Strip offers further evidence of Cairo’s determination to stand firm against Hamas.

Egypt’s stance vis a vis Hamas goes hand in hand with Cairo’s ongoing attempts to promote and facilitate the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent visit to Egypt, the Egyptian Foreign minister confirmed Cairo’s view of Israel and Egypt’s shared seriousness in advancing the process.

Attempts to reconcile the situation

Saudi Arabia is also currently trying to shore up the Arab diplomatic system from Iranian encroachment. The Saudis are attempting to woo Iran’s Arab clients away, thus re-establishing the previous Egyptian and Saudi-led system in the Arab world. To this end, Riyadh has been seeking to draw closer to Syria in the last months. The Saudis have also hosted Hamas leader Khaled Ma’ashal in their capital. There are reports of a Saudi effort to hold a three-way summit which would bring President Mubarak together with Syrian President Basar al-Assad.

So far, Saudi efforts have met with only limited success. The main diplomatic achievement to date is the foundation of a new government in Lebanon as a result of Saudi outreach to Syria. Far from stemming Iranian regional influence, however, the new government was founded because Saudi Arabia’s Lebanese clients conceded all the main demands of the Hezbollah-led opposition. If the intention is to close the various routes available to Iran toward influence in the Arab world, the Saudi diplomatic approach has so far achieved little. 

The Egyptian response to Iranian ambitions, however, is shaping up to be more direct. Egypt is therefore emerging as the ‘main Arab bulwark’,
as one Egyptian official put it, against Iranian encroachment across the region.

Conclusion

The long-standing poor relations between Egypt and Iran have recently undergone a further serious deterioration. The immediate precipitating factor is Iranian sponsorship of the Hamas enclave in Gaza and attempts to back subversion within Egypt itself. Egypt, traditionally the strongest Arab state, with a wide circle of interests across the region, inevitably stands in the way of the Iranian drive for regional hegemony.

A recent series of actions by Egypt to contain threats from Hamas and Hezbollah have led to a notable escalation in the tensions between Egypt and the Iranian-supported Hamas enclave in Gaza. The construction of the steel wall on the Gaza-Egypt border in particular, and Hamas attempts to prevent it and to mobilise wider Arab opposition to the wall, are likely to constitute a focus for tensions going forward.