Although Islamic State’s homepage declared that the organization, along with other opposition groups, had taken over the Quneitra crossing between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights, and even though its flag was hoisted nearby, IS isn’t there yet. Rather, it is the Nusra Front, along with the Syria Revolutionaries Front – an alliance of a dozen Islamist organizations working together with the Free Syrian Army – that control the border crossing.

This mishmash of organizations, some of which are deemed moderate by the U.S. State Department while others, such as the Nusra Front, are affiliates of Al-Qaida, makes it difficult for the United States and Europe to formulate a strategy to deal with them.

In contrast to Iraq, in which IS controls a continuous territory – making it easy to conduct an aerial bombardment campaign – the complexity of organizations in Syria and their territorial dispersion prevents any concentrated effort against them. The American dilemma is clear: should one view President Bashar Assad and his army as allies, part of the solution in the dismantling of IS? Should the Free Syrian Army receive sophisticated weapons so it can effectively fight IS, in light of its failures on other fronts, and amid justifiable concern that these weapons would pass into the hands of more radical organizations, as they did before?

How should one relate to the fact that the Free Syrian Army is collaborating with the Islamic Front, not noted for its pro-Western stance, and with the Revolutionaries Front, some of whose members used to belong to the Nusra Front? Adding to the mix of deliberations is the unknown reaction of Iran if the United States starts bombing targets within Syria, as well as the unclear reaction of Russia, whose relations with the Americans have recently deteriorated to an unprecedented low in modern times.

Read the article in full at Haaretz.