The summit convened last week by US President Barack Obama with representatives of the Gulf states was designed to ease their concerns about the emerging agreement with Iran on the nuclear question, “compensate” them – in part through the supply of weapon systems – for the materialization of threats that will be posed by Iran as a recognized nuclear threshold state, and recruit support for the agreement. These goals were achieved, if only partially and temporarily.

The unwritten alliance linking the American liberal democracy and the absolute monarchies in the Gulf was based on the principle of action by the monarchies to stabilize the global energy market and support US interests in the region in exchange for protection by the US against external threats – generally while ignoring the inadequate political freedom and human rights in those countries. It was the Carter Doctrine that established the defense framework for relations between the US and the Gulf states. Underlying the policy was the US threat to use force, including military force, should any external power seek to attain hegemony in the Gulf. Since that time, the body of water from the Gulf of Oman through the Strait of Hormuz to Shatt al-Arab has been an “American lake.” In recent years, however, a continued American commitment in the Gulf region has been questioned. Meantime, the source of the gravest threat to the strategic balance in the Gulf is not external, but in the Gulf itself.

The US drive toward an agreement with Iran on the nuclear question, combined with its reduced dependence on oil from the Gulf, has put the relations between the US and the Gulf states to a new test. The royal houses fear the possibility of an Iranian-Western deal that will enable Iran to escape the isolation it has suffered since the nuclear crisis, while at the same time preserve its nuclear capabilities – in other words, a rapprochement between Iran and the West that will give Iran the status of a legitimate state among the nations of the world and enable it to enhance its influence in the Middle East, necessarily at the expense of the Gulf states. A gradual detente between the US and Iran that could develop after the signing of a nuclear treaty would deal a critical blow to the special relations between the Gulf states and the US. Furthermore, the monarchies are worried that if and when the US achieves full energy independence, it will no longer need its Arab allies and will greatly reduce its involvement in the Middle East. The Gulf monarchs also fear an American strategic pivot, in accordance with the administration’s declaration that East Asia heads the American list of priorities. However, it appears that the prevalent fear in the Gulf concerns an American pivot toward Iran.

Read the article in full at INSS.