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Key points

• Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing growing opposition to a renewed settlement freeze from within his own party. This opposition includes senior ministers and prominent MKs.
• The current opposition to a renewed freeze in Likud includes security hawks, adherents of the traditional anti-partition ideology of Herut, (the party from which Likud emerged,) and individuals of religious-nationalist persuasion close to West Bank settler groups.
• A similar reaction has taken place within Likud on two previous occasions, when Likud prime ministers proposed major territorial concessions – in 1978 and in 2004. On both occasions, the ferment did not prove sufficient to prevent the concessions, though in the latter case it resulted in a split in the party.

Introduction

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is currently engaged in intensive negotiations with the United States in order to reach a memorandum of understanding that will allow for a 90-day renewed moratorium on West Bank settlements construction. At present, the US is formulating a letter outlining its guarantees to Israel in return for a renewed freeze. As these contacts continue, the Prime Minister is also facing an unprecedented wave of opposition to the plan from his own Likud party.

Four Likud ministers – Vice Premier Silvan Shalom, Minister without portfolio Benny Begin, Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon and Diaspora Affairs Minister Yuli Edelstein have signed a petition opposing a renewed freeze. A larger group of MKs, popularly known as the ‘Likud rebels’, are engaged in attempting to build a campaign to sway security cabinet members away from support for a renewed freeze. Fourteen of 27 Likud MKs signed on to a public add opposing freeze. Efforts are also directed at swaying the Ultra-Orthodox Shas party from abstention on the renewed freeze to opposing it. Fourteen of 27 likud MKs signed on to a public add opposing freeze including Coalition chairman Ze’ev Elkin, MK Danny Danon, Yariv Levin, Tzipi Hotovely, Miri Regev and Haim Katz.

Netanyahu has pledged that when the US letter arrives, the security Cabinet will vote on it and repeatedly states his determination to renew the negotiations with the Palestinians. The Prime Minister is engaged in attempts to quell Likud opposition to the freeze, and has been particularly critical of Cabinet ministers who signed the petition opposing it.

What is the basis and what are the roots of the determined Likud opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? What, if any, are the implications of the emergence of the ‘rebels’ for the diplomatic process, and for the internal Israeli political map?

Who are the ‘rebels’?

There is no single, united camp of Likud rebels. Neither should the emerging ‘anti-freeze’ camp in the Likud be seen as an immediate challenge to Netanyahu’s leadership of the party, as none of Likud’s major figures currently challenges Netanyahu’s leadership. It is also important to differentiate between the cabinet ministers opposed to the freeze – none of whom appear to be on the way to resigning their seats – and the more ideological positions taken by the group of back bench MKs usually referred to as the ‘rebels.’

Nevertheless, the emergence of opposition to the preferred diplomatic path of the prime minister within the Likud is both significant and with historical precedent. The rebels represent the latest incarnation of a coalition of views that traditionally emerges in reaction to moves toward territorial compromise.

In addition to pragmatic political calculations and the pressure of Likud grassroots groups on their representatives, opponents of a renewed freeze may be broadly divided into three groups: security hawks, ideological conservatives and individuals with close links to the religious-national West Bank settlers. These are not absolute categories, there are points of crossover between them, but they are helpful in isolating different strands of the argument used by Likud opponents of a renewed freeze, and of territorial compromise in general.

Security hawks

Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon is a prominent representative of Likud’s ‘security hawks’. A former chief of staff with biographical roots in Israel’s Labour movement, Ya’alon believes that the diplomatic process with the Palestinians is flawed at its core. He contends that the Palestinian national movement has undergone no deep strategic shift from its original goal of replacing Israel with a single Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the sea. As such, he is opposed to the current diplomatic process, while not ruling out in principle the idea of a partition of the area between the river and the sea, under certain circumstances. It is worth noting that the individual who most prominently represented this position within Likud prior to 2003 was former prime minister Ariel Sharon.

Ideological nationalists

Among this group are minister without portfolio Benny Begin, Knesset Chairman Reuven Rivlin, and MKs Yariv Levin and Danny Danon. These are individuals with deep roots in the ideology of the Herut Party, and the Revisionist Zionist tradition which preceded it. While they may also employ security-related arguments, their opposition to the principle of partition is rooted in the core ideology of the Likud, and has a resonance for many members of this party which should not be underestimated.

Likud is a centre-right party, with roots in an ideological nationalist movement. It traces its lineage back to the Herut party in the post 1948 period. In the past, the party opposed partition of the country on ideological grounds. Such positions are not shared by the Israeli mainstream, or today by many within Likud.

Religious-national supporters of the setter movement

Diaspora Affairs Minister Yuli Edelstein and MK Tsipi Hotovely personify this trend. Edelstein is a resident of Alon Shvut, a community situated in Gush Etzion, south of Jerusalem and across the Green Line. Hotovely is a graduate of the Bnei Akiva youth movement – a religious Zionist group closely associated with the West Bank settlement movement. For these individuals, retaining Jewish settlements and preventing territorial concessions is paramount.

It is important to note that despite the six-month moratorium on settlement construction and his clear effort to renew negotiations with the Palestinian leadership, PM Netanyahu still enjoys the support of most of Likud’s leadership. Even self-proclaimed security hawks and ideological conservatives like Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, Education Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Environment Minister Gilad Erdan remain loyal to the prime minister and distance themselves from the rebels.

Potential political consequences of the emergence of the rebels

Despite the large amount of noise generated by the ‘rebels’, close observation indicates that conditions are not yet ripe for a split in Likud. First, the group includes young and ambitious politicians, such as Danon, Hotovely and Regev. At a time when Israeli politics is moving to the centre, leaving the Likud in a rightward direction is likely to curtail their chances for reaching the top in Israeli politics. The more senior opponents of a renewed freeze, meanwhile, have given no signs of even resigning their ministerial positions.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the ferment against the freeze is likely to continue to take place within the confines of the Likud. Likud suffered a severe electoral defeat in 2006, following the emergence of Kadima, and was reduced to a rump of 12 seats. The party regained ground following the Second Lebanon War and the perceived failure of the Gaza Disengagement, however. In 2009, it substantially recovered its electoral position. Should major territorial concessions come onto the agenda, a split in the Likud might become a possibility. But for anything less than that, Netanyahu’s opponents within the Likud will merely seek to present themselves as the real, authentic Likud ideologues, leaving the conflict well within the party’s confines.

Potential diplomatic consequences

Likud led governments have on two occasions in the past proposed major territorial concessions. These were the proposal to concede Sinai by the government of Menachem Begin in 1978 and the proposal to leave Gaza unilaterally, raised by Ariel Sharon in 2004. On both occasions, a majority in Likud was opposed, and the concessions were eventually carried through. The disengagement, however, led to a split in Likud and the creation of kadima. If PM Netanyahu wants to move toward negotiating final status issues with the PA, it may be taken as a certainty that a similar reaction will take place, and he will face fierce opposition from within his own party.

Netanyahu’s immediate test is the passing of a renewed settlement freeze. If he succeeds, the ferment will re-erupt if and when it appears that major concessions are put on the table. Opposing Likud members are also pledging to disrupt work in key parliamentary committees if the freeze is renewed, by curtailing budgets for inspections and enforcement, for example.

Conclusion

Likud retains broad appeal in the Israeli electorate, deriving from its scepticism toward the peace process and the sense that its positions represent an uncompromising assertion of Jewish rights. When diplomatic processes falter and violence returns, as in 2000 and again in 2006, the party tends to reap an electoral dividend. However, there are still those within Likud who hold to positions much further to the right than the party leadership – rejecting all territorial compromise. When Likud prime ministers try to govern from the centre, these elements organise to oppose them, and political crisis may ensue. This has happened twice before, during the Israel-Egypt peace accords in 1978 and the Gaza Disengagement in 2005.

Such a process is currently beginning in Likud. The extent to which it continues and spreads will depend largely on the extent to which productive negotiations toward territorial compromise in fact take place. If PM Netanyahu were to reach agreement on borders with the Palestinian Authority, for example, he would require an altered coalition to carry this through, and could face an internal Likud attempt to unseat him.